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strikeApr 16, 2026

Hezbollah is Iran’s key proxy in US diplomacy | The Jerusalem Post

Summary

From the outset of US-Iran negotiations, a key fault line emerged: whether the ceasefire applied to the Israel-Hezbollah front. As expected, Tehran tested American resolve, seeking concessions beyond the framework, from unfreezing assets to pressing President Donald Trump to restrain Israel in Lebanon. While Washington has treated the Lebanon and Iran fronts as separate, that distinction is inaccurate. Hezbollah is not an independent actor, but a forward arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, deeply intertwined with the regime and responsible, alongside Tehran, for American bloodshed. Over the past two and a half years, I have spent extensive time on the front lines with Israeli troops along the Lebanese border, witnessing Iran’s crown jewel, Hezbollah, repeatedly strike Israeli civilians across the western and northern Galilee, and now even central Israel with drone and missile fire. More than 60,000 Israeli civilians were evacuated beginning on October 8, 2023, amid fears of a cross-border invasion by Hezbollah’s Radwan forces. I am now returning for my 10th visit to the northern border since October 2023. Regardless of developments involving Iran, Israel’s northern front will remain volatile. These conflicts are not isolated; they are interconnected theaters in a regional campaign driven by Iran’s hegemonic ambitions and revolutionary Islamist ideology. This raises a critical question: If the United States reaches a deal with Iran, will Washington pressure Israel to halt operations in the North, leaving tens of thousands of Hezbollah missiles intact and its terror infrastructure free to regenerate? Hezbollah's control over Lebanon Having covered every Israeli war since the Second Intifada, including the 2006 Lebanon War, I have seen Hezbollah evolve into far more than a terrorist organization. It now exercises effective veto power over the Lebanese state. On April 11, Hezbollah reportedly threatened Lebanon’s prime minister, forcing him to acquiesce to its demands and cancel a visit to Washington amid US-facilitated talks with Israel. Funded and directed by Tehran, Hezbollah operates under the Twelver Shi’ite doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, aligning its decisions with Iran’s supreme leader. In practice, it functions as a forward-deployed arm of the IRGC, who control the regime. This is not merely Israel’s problem; it is a direct challenge to US strategic interests. Hezbollah has killed hundreds of Americans, most notably in the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing. It maintains global terror and criminal networks, including narcotics pipelines in Latin America that fuel addiction in the United States, generate revenue for terrorism, and destabilize US partners. Allowing Hezbollah to consolidate power and reconstitute would not only endanger Israel but also expand a transnational threat network that directly impacts American homeland security, law enforcement, and regional stability. The non-Shi’ite part of the Lebanese government, comprising Sunnis, Christians, and Druze, would welcome relief from Hezbollah’s dominance, but its ability to act is constrained by the power of Hezbollah and the risk of civil war. Hezbollah has deeply penetrated Lebanese state institutions, including the armed forces. Many within its ranks sympathize with Hezbollah and Iran, complicating any expectation that the state can confront the group. There have been symbolic gestures of resistance. Lebanon’s decision to declare the Iranian ambassador persona non grata would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. But symbolism does not alter strategic reality. The ambassador, in effect, is no diplomat; he is an IRGC operative and has reportedly refused to leave Lebanon. The Lebanese government claims Hezbollah was disarmed in southern Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701. That claim does not withstand scrutiny. Before Israel’s recent offensive, while embedded with the IDF’s 91st Division, I observed that Hezbollah remains deeply entrenched in the south. Israeli intelligence on weapons depots and rearmament has been shared with the Lebanese Armed Forces, yet enforcement has been minimal, forcing Israel to act unilaterally. Hezbollah’s control over southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and parts of Beirut has been built over decades. Its forces never withdrew, despite binding international resolutions and commitments by the Lebanese government. Following the killing of senior Iranian figures, the Iranian-directed militia escalated its attacks on Israel. In response, Israel expanded operations into southern Lebanon, targeting entrenched positions. IRGC commanders remain embedded within Hezbollah units, underscoring the depth of operational integration. Lebanon’s internal dynamics further complicate matters. Nearly half the population is Shi’ite, and many rely on Hezbollah’s extensive social services network, subsidized by roughly $1 billion from Iran in 2025. The Lebanese state remains weak, lacking both the will and the capability to confront Hezbollah. In Washington, a dangerous assumption appears to be taking hold: that if the United States de-escalates with Iran, Israel should follow suit, not only with Tehran, but with Hezbollah. This assumption ignores reality. Israel has attempted to change the security equation in southern Lebanon, learning from past failures. It has taken steps, including evacuating Lebanese Shi’ites from areas near the Israeli border, to prevent Hezbollah from using them as human shields. Jerusalem will inevitably face American pressure to allow their return. If Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acquiesces prematurely, northern Israeli communities will again be exposed to immediate threat. Even after thousands of Israeli strikes, Hezbollah retains significant military capabilities, including long-range missiles, drones, and domestic production infrastructure. Much of the American media has focused on Iran while largely overlooking the sustained conflict along Israel’s northern border, where civilians remain under constant threat. Across the Middle East, a consistent concern is emerging: if the United States leaves Iran weakened but intact while allowing its proxy network to survive, regional actors will lose confidence in American resolve. They may hedge toward China or Russia, accommodate Tehran, or pursue independent security arrangements. As Alma’s Sarit Zehavi put it to me, “The loss of Lebanon to Hezbollah would directly undermine US interests by entrenching an ideologically anti-American Iranian proxy with long-range missiles capable of threatening US forces, assets, and allies across the region and beyond.” The question is not only whether Israel would agree to halt operations, but whether it should. Israeli defense and intelligence leaders increasingly view this moment as a rare strategic window, one unlikely to recur soon. A premature halt to military pressure on Hezbollah would not stabilize the region; it would all but guarantee the next, more dangerous war. If the United States deprioritizes Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah, it is not a tactical oversight – it is a strategic failure, one that leaves Iran’s most powerful proxy intact, emboldened, and positioned to threaten American interests for decades to come. The writer is director of the Middle East Political Information Network (MEPIN) and senior security editor of The Jerusalem Report. He frequently briefs Congress, think tanks, and the State Department on Middle East affairs and their implications for US national security.

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  • ERIC R MANDELBy ERIC R MANDEL

    From the outset of US-Iran negotiations, a key fault line emerged: whether the ceasefire applied to the Israel-Hezbollah front. As expected, Tehran tested American resolve, seeking concessions beyond the framework, from unfreezing assets to pressing President Donald Trump to rest

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The White House is now apparently using Russian tactics to convince the American public that the war in Iran is not, in fact, a war. When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday whether the most intense sustained air campaign by American forces since the invasion of Iraq would be over by the midterms, Vice President JD Vance replied: “I wouldn’t call it a war.

” Vladimir Putin said much the same thing when he invaded Ukraine. Russia was not fighting a war either, the Kremlin insisted; it was merely conducting a “special military operation.” If that comparison strikes you as shocking, consider the contours of the two conflicts.

A vastly more powerful military launched a punishing offensive against a smaller, less well-equipped adversary, inflicted enormous damage without achieving a decisive resolution, and then found itself drawn into a longer, grinding conflict with no clear way out.

The motivations behind the wars may be different, and they’re playing out in different theaters, but the pattern is eerily similar. Now, so too is the attempt by those in power to control how the public understands, and even what it is allowed to call, the obvious war unfolding in front of them.

If This Isn’t a War, What Is? Let us take a moment to assess what exactly has happened since February 28, when the U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury. The opening U.S.-Israeli attack killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the defense minister and various other senior officials.

According to the U.S. military’s own accounting, the first 38 days of major combat operations involved more than 10,200 sorties and 13,500 strikes. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) says those attacks damaged or destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone and naval defense industrial base, while knocking out 82 percent of its air-defense missile systems.

The U.S. sent carrier strike groups and warships into the region, later imposing a military blockade on Iranian ports. Meanwhile, American and allied air defenses intercepted more than 6,000 Iranian attack drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles fired at U.

S. forces, Israel and American partners across the Middle East. More than 50,000 U.S. service members remain deployed across the region. The fighting has killed 18 U.S. service members and at least 8,000 people across Iran, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states.

More than 750 U.S. service members have been wounded. Last month, during a lull in the fighting, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a sanctions package likened to an “economic D-day” that is designed to make Iran an “economic outcast” and cut the adversary off from all available forms of economic support.

In the announcement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent openly declared that Iran had been “at war against America” for 47 years. This week, the shooting resumed; the U.S. hit targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran blasted missiles at targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq.

All this from an administration that almost exactly a year ago launched a rapid rebrand of the Defense Department into the “Department of War”. No boots on the ground, though, so it’s not a war, right? Tell It Kind of Like It Is Even the very best snake-oil salesman would have a hard time convincing people that the war in Iran isn’t a war.

So why is JD Vance even trying? Well, if there’s one thing politicians understand better than anyone, it’s the importance of language and rhetoric. Words have immense power; a well-written speech can unite millions of people, and a catchy slogan like Make America Great Again can come to represent an entire political philosophy.

But war is a pesky word. For one, it implies there will eventually be a winner and a loser. It also brings with it certain expectations—and some very difficult questions. What is the objective? How many people will die? When will it end? And, perhaps most dangerously of all: was it worth it?

Those are not questions the White House wants Americans to be asking. Trump built a substantial part of his political identity around ending, rather than beginning, America’s “endless wars.” When Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in June, the White House presented it as proof that Trump’s America First approach could deliver peace without another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Then the hostilities started again. Earlier this week, Trump shared a Truth Social graphic declaring that “Hormuz Oil Volumes are BACK!”, saying 18 million barrels a day were once again leaving the Strait, compared with 20 million before the war. No independent commodity tracking company or energy analyst appeared to verify Trump’s claims.

But most Americans won’t be checking tanker-tracking dashboards. What they’ll care about is the cold, hard fact that diesel hit a new record price this morning, soaring to an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever. Gasoline is $4.15 a gallon on average, compared with $3.

20 at this time last year, according to AAA. The numbers on the sign at the gas station and the price on the grocery receipt aren’t affected by Trump’s tall tales, but they’ll surely affect how Americans vote at the midterms. When viewed in this light, Vance’s attempt to discourage reporters from “call[ing] it a war” begins to make sense.

A war is something that we want to end. It tends to result in a winner and a loser. And its worth is up for debate at all times. A different kind of engagement that doesn’t quite meet the threshold of war—say, a special military operation—is not exposed to the same kind of scrutiny.

Vance effectively made that case himself. “When you ask, ‘When will this end?’ You’re asking me a question like, ‘When will the Iranians stop shooting at ships?’” he said. By that logic, there is no American war—only recurring Iranian provocations that require American military responses.

That’s exactly the logic applied by Putin to Ukraine and supposed expansion of NATO. Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly invoked the War Powers Resolution to challenge Trump’s authority to keep fighting Iran without specific congressional authorization.

The law generally gives a president 60 days after U.S. forces enter “hostilities” to secure congressional approval or bring those hostilities to an end. That makes the pauses in fighting hugely important. When the original 60-day deadline arrived in May, Trump told Congress that the temporary ceasefire reached in April meant the hostilities that began on February 28 had ended.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the War Powers clock could “pause, or stop” when the shooting did. That position is disputed by legal experts, but its political utility is obvious. If every new outbreak of fighting can be treated as a separate skirmish, rather than part of one continuous war, the administration can argue that a fresh 60-day clock starts each time.

Vance’s insistence that there is no continuing “war” fits neatly for an administration that has already tried to divide six months of conflict into separate periods of hostilities, interrupted by ceasefires and pauses. This brings us back to Moscow.

The Kremlin’s own linguistic trick was also about making one sprawling war sound smaller, more limited and more manageable than it really was. From the very beginning of the invasion, Putin described the war as a special military operation. Only after two years of grinding warfare did Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly declare Russia to be in a “state of war”—and even then, he said the transformation had occurred because the “collective West” had joined the fight against Russia.

Vance is playing a similar game, but in reverse. Only now—with soaring fuel prices, mounting casualties, concerns over the military’s munitions stockpiles, and midterm elections on the horizon—is the conflict no longer a war. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, though, and the American people aren’t stupid.

Vance and the White House may discover in November that voters are perfectly capable of recognizing a war, even when the vice president doesn’t want to call it one.

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