strikeJul 23, 2026

The missing half of mediation

Summary

The missing half of mediation The future of diplomacy between the US and Iran depends on giving trusted mediators the backing needed to make agreements stick. The memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran, signed on June 17, briefly appeared to have achieved what weeks of military confrontation had not. It extended the ceasefire, reopened a path back to negotiations and offered the prospect of restoring stability to one of the world’s most strategically important regions. The early indicators were encouraging. Commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries roughly a fifth of global oil trade, began to recover. Oil flows rose markedly, while Iranian exports more than doubled from their wartime low under a temporary sanctions waiver. About 340 commercial vessels passed through the Strait during the week of 22–28 June, making it the busiest period since hostilities began on February 28. For a brief moment, diplomacy appeared to be succeeding. Within weeks, however, ships were disappearing from the strait again, military exchanges had resumed and mediators were seeking another temporary truce, simply to rescue the original agreement. What had looked like a diplomatic breakthrough rapidly became another fragile ceasefire. Its rapid unravelling exposed the missing half of the mediation process: the parties had agreed on a political text, but not on the mechanisms needed to implement it, while the states that brokered the agreement lacked the leverage to make it stick. Part of the problem was that the signing of the agreement had been treated as the culmination of mediation rather than the beginning of its most demanding phase. The US and the mediators appear to have focused on securing a mutually acceptable political text. Success was measured by signatures and public declarations, with too little attention paid to the challenges that inevitably arise once governments, militaries, regulators, banks, insurers, shipping companies and regional allies begin to put an agreement into practice. Questions of interpretation, sequencing, verification, dispute resolution and confidence-building were largely deferred rather than resolved. Like many ceasefire arrangements, the June MoU relied heavily on constructive ambiguity. This was understandable. Both Washington and Tehran needed sufficient political flexibility to present the agreement as a victory to domestic audiences while leaving difficult issues unresolved. Such ambiguity can allow diplomacy to move forward when complete agreement is impossible. But ambiguity is useful only when clear mechanisms exist to manage what remains unresolved. Otherwise, disagreements simply migrate from the negotiating table into the implementation phase, where trust is lower and the political costs of failure are considerably higher. The MoU referred to maintaining a nuclear “status quo” without defining which activities were permitted or prohibited. It envisaged sanctions relief without specifying which restrictions would be suspended, under what legal authority or on what timetable. It also referred to frozen Iranian assets without establishing how those funds would be released, controlled or monitored. Public discussion suggested that approximately $12bn might eventually become available, yet disagreements quickly emerged over whether the funds would remain in supervised escrow accounts or come under unrestricted Iranian control. The same weakness was evident in the maritime provisions. The agreement required Iran to “make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels” and to engage in dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services of the Strait of Hormuz “in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of the coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz”. Yet it established no agreed framework governing navigation, maritime security, inspection procedures, routing arrangements or dispute resolution. The language also allowed Tehran to interpret the agreement as recognising a future role in administering the strait. Commercial traffic initially recovered because markets responded positively to the ceasefire announcement. Confidence, however, remained fragile because the institutional arrangements needed to sustain normal shipping had never been agreed. Although Washington committed to a temporary 60-day sanctions waiver covering limited oil sales, banking, insurance and shipping activities, many insurers, refiners and shipping companies remained cautious. A two-month legal window was simply too short to justify restoring long-term commercial relationships worth billions of dollars. Iran undoubtedly benefitted from the respite. During the waiver period, it is estimated to have exported around 70 million barrels of oil, worth approximately $5bn–$6bn. Yet oil loaded onto tankers does not necessarily translate into unrestricted funds reaching Tehran. Uncertainty over sanctions, escrow arrangements and banking procedures prevented the commercial recovery from delivering the meaningful economic relief envisaged under the agreement. The ceasefire also gave both sides time to prepare for the possibility that diplomacy might fail. The United States replenished military stocks and repositioned regional assets, while Iran used the pause to manage a delicate political transition and project continuity through the supreme leader’s funeral. Mediators hoped that time would generate political progress. Instead, both sides used it to strengthen their positions should negotiations collapse. The episode is a reminder that implementation is not merely an administrative exercise that follows successful diplomacy; it is diplomacy by other means. Every disagreement over sequencing, sanctions, verification, compliance or interpretation requires continued mediation if an agreement is to endure. The MoU’s implementation failures were not merely the result of weak drafting. They reflected a deeper weakness in the mediation process: the states that secured the agreement had enough trust to bring the parties together, but not enough leverage to compel them to resolve disputes or honour their commitments once implementation began. One encouraging development is that the mediation effort has broadened. What began largely as a Pakistani initiative has evolved into a wider diplomatic coalition, with Qatar, Egypt and other regional partners supporting efforts to restore the ceasefire and revive negotiations. This expansion spreads the considerable political, financial and logistical burden of mediation, broadens diplomatic access to regional stakeholders, including Israel, Hezbollah and others, and makes the process more resilient if any single channel becomes blocked. Expansion alone, however, is unlikely to resolve the problem that has emerged. The additional mediators have much in common: they are trusted interlocutors with strong regional relationships, but they possess limited leverage over the strategic calculations of Washington and Tehran. They can facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings and sustain negotiations. They cannot, by themselves, guarantee implementation. The latest proposals illustrate the point. Mediators are discussing the reopening of an “Iran-approved” northern shipping route, currently affected by the US naval blockade, alongside a US-backed southern route where vessels have faced Iranian attacks. They are also considering possible arrangements for transit fees, either through a jointly managed fund or through a mechanism allowing Iran to collect charges linked to maritime security and environmental services. These arrangements may help revive the MoU, but on their own they are unlikely to secure a durable ceasefire, restore confidence in commercial shipping or sustain meaningful sanctions relief. Sustainable implementation requires a different form of international support. As negotiations move from agreeing principles to enforcing obligations, stronger external guarantors become increasingly important. Major powers with significant economic, political and strategic influence can provide incentives, reassurance and, where necessary, pressure that smaller mediating states cannot readily mobilise. Their involvement need not replace the existing mediators, whose credibility and relationships remain indispensable. It should instead complement their efforts by providing the leverage needed to underpin implementation and reassure the parties that commitments will be reciprocated. The challenge for the next phase of diplomacy is therefore not simply to broaden the circle of mediators, but to diversify its composition. Trusted regional mediators may be able to bring Washington and Tehran to the table. But without guarantors capable of underpinning implementation and imposing costs for non-compliance, any new agreement risks meeting the same fate as the June MoU: signed with optimism, briefly observed and rapidly undone. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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Sultan BarakatBy Sultan Barakat
The missing half of mediation The future of diplomacy between the US and Iran depends on giving trusted mediators the backing needed to make agreements stick. The memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran, signed on June 17, briefly appeared to have ach…

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Iran's foreign ministry said the UK was an "accomplice" in the US war, while the powerful Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) military wing said any country which supports the US militarily "will be responsible for the consequences and repercussions".

It came after the US carried out a 12th consecutive night of strikes against targets in Iran. While US President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticised the British government and former Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer for what he has deemed a lack of support for his war, Iran's comments on 23 July sought to paint the UK as a party to the campaign.

In March, days into the US-Israel led war, permission was given to the US for it to use British bases including RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean to target Iranian military infrastructure used to attack Gulf countries and vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.

That policy has not been altered by new Prime Minister Andy Burnham, who was notified last week that a decision had been taken to extend the agreement with the US. In a statement published on the IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency on 23 July, the group said American bombing missions had been launched from RAF Fairford two days earlier.

The UK Ministry of Defence has not commented on whether the base was used by the US for operations against Iran this week. Responding to the Iranian threats, a UK government spokesperson said: "Our Armed Forces are ready to keep the United Kingdom safe from any kind of attacks, whether it's on our soil or from abroad.

The UK stands ready 24/7 to defend itself. "This includes through operating a layered approach to air and missile defence, provided by Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force assets equipped with a range of advanced capabilities, working closely with our Nato allies.

"The UK's approach to the conflict remains the same - we are committed to defending our people, our interests and our allies, acting in accordance with international law and not getting drawn into the wider conflict." Days after the war began on 28 February, Iran's ambassador to London, Seyed Ali Mousavi, said Iran would have the "right to self-defence" if the UK joined the war, and said it should be "very careful" about taking part.

On 19 March, Iran fired two ballistic missiles at the UK's Diego Garcia base in the Chagos Islands. One reportedly failed mid-flight, with the other shot down by a US airship. There were doubts then over whether Iran had missiles which were capable of reaching the archipelago, which is about 2,360 miles (3,600km) from Iran.

The same month, Israel claimed Iran possessed missiles that could reach up to 4,000km (2,485 miles), which would theoretically mean they could reach the UK and mainland European countries. However, then Housing Secretary Steve Reed told BBC News at the time there was "no specific assessment that the Iranians are targeting the UK - or even could if they wanted to".

Analysts have also raised doubts over the reliability and accuracy of Iran's missile arsenal, which the US says has been severely degraded by its strikes. Iran has launched strikes against several countries in the Gulf which house US military bases in recent months, while attacks against civilian vessels in the Strait of Hormuz have effectively closed the vital shipping route.

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From gas to grocery aisles and back-to-school items: How higher oil prices will hit your wallet Consumers already feeling pinched since the Iran war started may feel more pain after oil prices pushed past $100 a barrel Consumers are bracing for further financial strain as global oil prices surged past $100 a barrel on Thursday, driven by renewed fighting and military strikes in the Middle East that have disrupted international oil supplies.

This latest spike follows a period of brief relief in June when hostilities between the U.S. and Iran had temporarily eased. The benchmark Brent crude, an international standard, had last reached the $100 mark in May. The current escalation means that the economic pressures felt by households since the onset of the Iran war are set to intensify.

Businesses across various sectors, including fresh food producers, school supply vendors, and shipping companies, have already reported increased operational costs from earlier energy price hikes after the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran. These rising expenses are now likely to be passed on to consumers, impacting everyday goods.

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" The sustained high oil prices are expected to continue squeezing household budgets. Here's how higher oil prices could further impact consumers' wallets. Drivers are paying more for gasoline at the pump Volatility along the Strait of Hormuz and broader regional instability pushed up the price of crude oil, the main ingredient in gasoline, and could continue to make driving costlier during the second half of summer, according to motor club AAA.

The average U.S. price for regular gasoline reached $4.09 a gallon Thursday, up 15 cents from a week ago, with drivers in most states now paying $4 or more, according to AAA. “Given the typical lag along the oil industry’s supply chain, prices at the pump are poised to keep rising at least into next week,” said Pavel Molchanov, investment strategy analyst at Raymond James.

But he noted that futures prices for oil delivered later this year and next year are lower, suggesting prices could fall once military action ends. For the most part, higher gasoline prices haven't stopped Americans from driving. Gasoline demand rose 1% to 8.

9 million barrels per day last week, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Pressure on gasoline prices could persist because fewer refineries are available to process crude than before the conflict. Refineries in the Middle East have been damaged, and Ukrainian attacks have damaged refineries in Russia.

Shoppers are paying more for a bag of groceries Grocery prices generally rise with oil because farmers use diesel fuel to power equipment, while many food products are transported by trucks that require fuel. “Oil at $100 doesn’t make food prices jump right away, but it does put upward pressure across the food supply chains, especially for categories that depend heavily on trucking, cold storage and packaging,” Gomez said.

Fresh produce and dairy could feel a larger impact because they require refrigeration during delivery. Imported goods are also vulnerable to higher shipping costs, Gomez said. “Things like olive oil that we produce very little here and are coming from mostly from Europe are going to be up.

” Grocery chain Albertsons on Thursday lowered its 2026 fiscal outlook, citing pressure on its core grocery business and a pullback in consumer spending. Every product that moves will have higher costs baked into the price Higher fuel costs for ships, trucks and air carriers can trickle down to consumers and businesses that depend on shipping.

UPS, FedEx and other shipping services introduced fuel surcharges and other fees as fuel prices increased. According to an AFS Logistics and TD Cowen Freight Index released July 14, truckload pricing is at a four-year high because of rising fuel costs and capacity constraints.

Andy Dyer, CEO of AFS Logistics, said diesel prices in the second quarter were about 51% higher than in January and February, while jet fuel prices rose 90% from a year earlier. “Beyond the direct impact of higher freight bills paid by shippers, these price movements also have second-order effects that squeeze rates higher,” he said.

“Smaller truckload carriers working on tight margins may park trucks and wait for fuel prices to revert to more palatable levels before returning to operation.” Retailers are noticing consumers pulling back Rural lifestyle retailer Tractor Supply Co.

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Lawton said customers are still investing in their pets, animals, farms and properties, but shopping has become “more deliberate.” Customers are consolidating trips, prioritizing needs-based purchases and taking a more measured approach to discretionary spending.

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Matt Priest, CEO and president of the trade group, said some of its members have cited 25% price increases for petroleum-based materials used in footwear manufacturing due to the Middle East conflict. Those costs could eventually translate into roughly a 5% increase in the cost of finished footwear products sold to consumers, Priest said in the report.

Footwear companies have been front-loading inventory and accelerating imports before President Donald Trump imposes new tariffs on foreign products, putting additional pressure on shipping rates, he said. “Container rates are spiking right now,” Priest said.

Higher jet fuel costs lead to costlier flights Since the war began, airlines have responded to the jump in fuel costs by raising fares and add-on fees, and trimming flights or routes that are no longer profitable at higher fuel prices. Those moves can help protect the airlines’ margins, but also leave travelers facing higher prices and fewer options, particularly in smaller or less competitive markets.

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) Subscribe to The Economic Times Prime and read the ET ePaper online. (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel) (Catch all the Business News, Breaking News and Latest News Updates on The Economic Times.) Subscribe to The Economic Times Prime and read the ET ePaper online.

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2 Chinese supertankers apparently escape Houthis' Red Sea blockade

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Claims of a Houthi-imposed blockade and related attacks on shipping remain unverified in available reports.

Location: Red Sea

Reuters