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strikeApr 1, 2026

Will Iran war start a nuclear arms race in Middle East?

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Will Iran war start a nuclear arms race in Middle East? There is little doubt that the nuclear threat in the Middle East has risen during the current conflict. During the war, which started in late February when the US and Israel attacked Iran, nuclear sites in both Iran and Israel have been targeted. IAEA informed by Iran of a new strike in the area of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, the third such incident in 10 days. No damage to operating reactor nor any radiation release reported, and condition of plant is normal, Iran says. DG @rafaelmgrossi again expresses deep… pic.twitter.com/cGIUSZJMyV — IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency ⚛️ (@iaeaorg) March 27, 2026 US President Donald Trump has said that thewar on Iran was launched in order to prevent Iran getting a nuclear weapon. But, experts suggest, this may well backfire. READ: Iran was not rebuilding nuclear enrichment, US intelligence finds Possessing nuclear arms is supposed to be a deterrent. The theory is that they prevent your enemies from acting against you. Observers often cite the case of North Korea. It has developed nuclear weapons which, some argue, make the dictatorship untouchable. Ukraine provides an example of the opposite. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to give up what was then the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, the US and the UK. The argument now is that, had Ukraine kept those weapons, Russia would not have been able to invade. ‘Nuclear latency’ not enough Iran was considered to be in a state known as “nuclear weapons latency.” Nuclear weapons latency is when a country has all of the tools to produce a nuclear weapon but has yet to do so. READ: US, Israel hit Iran’s nuclear sites as Rubio trails end to war “For years, Iran maintained strategic ambiguity, staying just below the threshold of a bomb to avoid the very strikes that have now occurred,” Rupal Mehta, a professor of political science based in the US wrote in a commentary for the London School of Economics earlier in March. “Tehran’s new leadership faces a grim calculation: while the pursuit of nuclear weapons was dangerous, having an unfinished bomb was the fatal mistake.” This week, Iranian politicians said the country might withdraw from the landmark treaty that is meant to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT, has 191 member states. The changes in security relationships in the region that the Iran war has brought, could also see other countries wanting a nuclear weapon. “There are a number of factors that will push states in the Gulf closer to nuclear weapons,” confirms Kelsey Davenport, director for non-proliferation policy at the Washington-based Arms Control Association. The Gulf states are caught between the hegemonic desires of Iran and Israel and have at least partially lost faith in their security alliances with the US. “Although,” Davenport continues, “it’s unlikely any of the states are going to immediately dash for a bomb. There are significant technical and political hurdles that any state in the region would need to overcome if they wanted to weaponize.” READ: Netanyahu says Iran war goals achieved ‘beyond halfway point’ Gulf state leaders will also be waiting for the conflict to end to see where Iran’s regime and its nuclear program end up, Davenport noted. “But certainly this the conflict is going to drive thinking about the necessity of nuclear weapons for security.” Who wants nukes? Saudi Arabia took the first steps toward possible nuclear latency last year. In the past Saudi Arabian ruler Mohammed bin Salman has said that if Iran produces a nuclear bomb, then Saudi Arabia would need to have one too. After he visited the US in November, bin Salman reportedly returned with an agreement on nuclear cooperation that would allow his country to enrich uranium. Any such agreemend with Saudi Arabia would have to pass through the US Congress first, explains Nour Eid, an independent researcher based in Paris who has published papers on nuclear ambitions in the Middle East for a number of think tanks. In my latest piece for The Stimson Center, I argue that Saudi Arabia’s nuclear trajectory should not be understood as a simple reaction to whether Iran acquires the bomb. https://t.co/NocSQVyG1l — Nour EID (@_Nour_Eid) March 23, 2026 Almost all of the 26 nuclear cooperation agreements the US has, which cover around 155 countries including in Europe, have included what’s known as an “additional protocol” signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA. This gives the IAEA better oversight over a country’s nuclear activities. While it has yet to be officially confirmed, it seems that the 123 agreement will only require a bilateral safeguards agreement between the US and the Saudis, Eid told DW. “It bucks all precedent,” Robert Kelley, a former director at IAEA, told media outlet Bloomberg this week. “The idea the administration is prepared to give Saudi Arabia the ability to do the very things they are bombing Iran for looks hypocritical.” Still, as Eid points out, it will take the Saudis somewhere between 10 and 20 years to develop nuclear power, let alone weapons. There are also other problems such as the lack of a capable workforce. Right now, she believes the Saudis see nuclear projects mostly as a source of domestic energy. The United Arab Emirates already has a nuclear power plant, Barakah. When they entered their agreement with the US back in 2009, they agreed to the additional protocol and to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing. READ: UN watchdog says projectile struck Iran nuclear power plant For the UAE, it was always more about the prestige of being the first Arab nation to develop nuclear power rather than about military ambitions, Eid says. “But there is a clause in their agreement, an oral clause that isn’t written into the final text, that says something along the lines of ‘if a neighboring country has a more flexible agreement then they [the UAE] reserve the right to renegotiate their terms’,” she explains. Eid notes that part of the reason for the more relaxed Saudi nuclear cooperation deal in 2025 is likely due to American competition with China and Russia, the main nuclear suppliers globally. Trump promised to revitalize the US nuclear sector and up until now nuclear deals with Russia or China have tended to have less stringent conditions, and interesting financial packages, Eid explains. Other countries in the Middle East that might be in line for nuclear latency include Egypt and Turkey, Davenport of the Arms Control Association said. In cooperation with Russia, Egypt is building a nuclear reactor on the Mediterranean coast. But, observers say, Egypt, which has officially advocated for a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East, is in financial difficulties and unlikely to be able to parlay nuclear power into an arms program. Turkey is currently developing a nuclear energy program with Russia and may soon start cooperating with China too, Eid noted. “But I don’t see why they would put the international community at odds with them just to acquire nuclear weapons,” Eid pointed out. “Their defense industry is developing well and getting a lot of recognition.” Turkey is a member of NATO and unless they were planning to leave that alliance, they also have that defense umbrella, Eid told DW. How to stop nuclear proliferation? It’s also important to look at the bigger picture on non-proliferation, Davenport added. “It’s not in Chinese or Russian interests to allow the non-proliferation regime to collapse completely,” she told DW. “If you zoom out from the Middle East, some of the states that are most likely to weaponize are in China’s backyard — such as South Korea, Japan.” While Russia and China might provide materials and technologies to help make nuclear weapons, and under less stringent rules than the US has had in the past, they wouldn’t actively assist, she argues. “What is more likely is that states in the Gulf could try to exploit the divisions between the US and Europe on one side, and Russia and China on the other, to minimize the consequences of moving to the threshold of nuclear weapons,” Davenport continued. To prevent more nuclear weapons, regional dialogue is the answer, she stresses. “I am under no illusion that, post conflict, regional security dialogue will be easy or straightforward,” Davenport concluded. “But it is the best option to prevent states from deciding that nuclear deterrents are necessary.” /dl

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  • Cathrin SchaerBy Cathrin Schaer

    Will Iran war start a nuclear arms race in Middle East? There is little doubt that the nuclear threat in the Middle East has risen during the current conflict. During the war, which started in late February when the US and Israel attacked Iran, nuclear sites in both Iran and Isra

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The US and its allies Britain, France and Germany are pushing other countries on the UN nuclear watchdog's board to pass a resolution next week reporting Iran to the UN Security Council for the first time in 20 years, diplomats said on Friday. If passed, the resolution would follow up on one adopted on June 12 of last year declaring Iran in breach of its non-proliferation obligations for not fully cooperating with an investigation into uranium traces found at undeclared sites.

The US launched an air war against Tehran on February 28 in which, together with Israel, it destroyed or badly damaged Iran's uranium-enrichment facilities. Iran has not let International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors return to the bombed sites since then or verify what remains of its stocks of enriched uranium, some of which was enriched to up to 60% purity, a short step from weapons grade.

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A draft text for the resolution has yet to be formally submitted to the board and negotiations between countries over the exact wording are ongoing, diplomats said. A draft is usually formally submitted early in the week of a board meeting. As a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has the right to develop nuclear technology, including enrichment, for peaceful purposes.

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The White House is now apparently using Russian tactics to convince the American public that the war in Iran is not, in fact, a war. When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday whether the most intense sustained air campaign by American forces since the invasion of Iraq would be over by the midterms, Vice President JD Vance replied: “I wouldn’t call it a war.

” Vladimir Putin said much the same thing when he invaded Ukraine. Russia was not fighting a war either, the Kremlin insisted; it was merely conducting a “special military operation.” If that comparison strikes you as shocking, consider the contours of the two conflicts.

A vastly more powerful military launched a punishing offensive against a smaller, less well-equipped adversary, inflicted enormous damage without achieving a decisive resolution, and then found itself drawn into a longer, grinding conflict with no clear way out.

The motivations behind the wars may be different, and they’re playing out in different theaters, but the pattern is eerily similar. Now, so too is the attempt by those in power to control how the public understands, and even what it is allowed to call, the obvious war unfolding in front of them.

If This Isn’t a War, What Is? Let us take a moment to assess what exactly has happened since February 28, when the U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury. The opening U.S.-Israeli attack killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the defense minister and various other senior officials.

According to the U.S. military’s own accounting, the first 38 days of major combat operations involved more than 10,200 sorties and 13,500 strikes. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) says those attacks damaged or destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone and naval defense industrial base, while knocking out 82 percent of its air-defense missile systems.

The U.S. sent carrier strike groups and warships into the region, later imposing a military blockade on Iranian ports. Meanwhile, American and allied air defenses intercepted more than 6,000 Iranian attack drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles fired at U.

S. forces, Israel and American partners across the Middle East. More than 50,000 U.S. service members remain deployed across the region. The fighting has killed 18 U.S. service members and at least 8,000 people across Iran, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states.

More than 750 U.S. service members have been wounded. Last month, during a lull in the fighting, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a sanctions package likened to an “economic D-day” that is designed to make Iran an “economic outcast” and cut the adversary off from all available forms of economic support.

In the announcement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent openly declared that Iran had been “at war against America” for 47 years. This week, the shooting resumed; the U.S. hit targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran blasted missiles at targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq.

All this from an administration that almost exactly a year ago launched a rapid rebrand of the Defense Department into the “Department of War”. No boots on the ground, though, so it’s not a war, right? Tell It Kind of Like It Is Even the very best snake-oil salesman would have a hard time convincing people that the war in Iran isn’t a war.

So why is JD Vance even trying? Well, if there’s one thing politicians understand better than anyone, it’s the importance of language and rhetoric. Words have immense power; a well-written speech can unite millions of people, and a catchy slogan like Make America Great Again can come to represent an entire political philosophy.

But war is a pesky word. For one, it implies there will eventually be a winner and a loser. It also brings with it certain expectations—and some very difficult questions. What is the objective? How many people will die? When will it end? And, perhaps most dangerously of all: was it worth it?

Those are not questions the White House wants Americans to be asking. Trump built a substantial part of his political identity around ending, rather than beginning, America’s “endless wars.” When Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in June, the White House presented it as proof that Trump’s America First approach could deliver peace without another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Then the hostilities started again. Earlier this week, Trump shared a Truth Social graphic declaring that “Hormuz Oil Volumes are BACK!”, saying 18 million barrels a day were once again leaving the Strait, compared with 20 million before the war. No independent commodity tracking company or energy analyst appeared to verify Trump’s claims.

But most Americans won’t be checking tanker-tracking dashboards. What they’ll care about is the cold, hard fact that diesel hit a new record price this morning, soaring to an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever. Gasoline is $4.15 a gallon on average, compared with $3.

20 at this time last year, according to AAA. The numbers on the sign at the gas station and the price on the grocery receipt aren’t affected by Trump’s tall tales, but they’ll surely affect how Americans vote at the midterms. When viewed in this light, Vance’s attempt to discourage reporters from “call[ing] it a war” begins to make sense.

A war is something that we want to end. It tends to result in a winner and a loser. And its worth is up for debate at all times. A different kind of engagement that doesn’t quite meet the threshold of war—say, a special military operation—is not exposed to the same kind of scrutiny.

Vance effectively made that case himself. “When you ask, ‘When will this end?’ You’re asking me a question like, ‘When will the Iranians stop shooting at ships?’” he said. By that logic, there is no American war—only recurring Iranian provocations that require American military responses.

That’s exactly the logic applied by Putin to Ukraine and supposed expansion of NATO. Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly invoked the War Powers Resolution to challenge Trump’s authority to keep fighting Iran without specific congressional authorization.

The law generally gives a president 60 days after U.S. forces enter “hostilities” to secure congressional approval or bring those hostilities to an end. That makes the pauses in fighting hugely important. When the original 60-day deadline arrived in May, Trump told Congress that the temporary ceasefire reached in April meant the hostilities that began on February 28 had ended.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the War Powers clock could “pause, or stop” when the shooting did. That position is disputed by legal experts, but its political utility is obvious. If every new outbreak of fighting can be treated as a separate skirmish, rather than part of one continuous war, the administration can argue that a fresh 60-day clock starts each time.

Vance’s insistence that there is no continuing “war” fits neatly for an administration that has already tried to divide six months of conflict into separate periods of hostilities, interrupted by ceasefires and pauses. This brings us back to Moscow.

The Kremlin’s own linguistic trick was also about making one sprawling war sound smaller, more limited and more manageable than it really was. From the very beginning of the invasion, Putin described the war as a special military operation. Only after two years of grinding warfare did Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly declare Russia to be in a “state of war”—and even then, he said the transformation had occurred because the “collective West” had joined the fight against Russia.

Vance is playing a similar game, but in reverse. Only now—with soaring fuel prices, mounting casualties, concerns over the military’s munitions stockpiles, and midterm elections on the horizon—is the conflict no longer a war. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, though, and the American people aren’t stupid.

Vance and the White House may discover in November that voters are perfectly capable of recognizing a war, even when the vice president doesn’t want to call it one.

Location: Iran