Washington: US consumer sentiment fell in August, survey data from the University of Michigan confirmed Friday, reflecting worries over persistent inflation as war in the Middle East weighs on the world's biggest economy. "Consumer sentiment confirmed its early month reading, falling about six percent from last month," said Joanne Hsu, director of the survey.

This is 11 percent down from a year ago, with the gloominess fueled by "continued worries that inflation will remain elevated for the foreseeable future," she added. The university's consumer sentiment index came in at 51.7 this month, a slight revision from the preliminary reading of 51.

0 points. This was a retreat from July's reading of 55.2 points. Global energy prices soared after the United States and Israel launched the war on Iran in late February, plunging the Middle East into conflict. Tehran had retaliated by attacking Washington's Gulf allies and snarling a fifth of the world's oil and gas supplies.

"Sentiment declines in August were seen for all political groups and were particularly acute among Republicans," the University of Michigan survey found. This comes just months ahead of key US midterm elections in November. Survey data added that older consumers, alongside those from lower- and middle-income groups, showed a sharper drop in sentiment.

War in the Middle East has already sent US inflation higher, with prices at the gasoline pump climbing and piling pressure on households. "With ongoing policy uncertainty including the Iran conflict, consumers anticipate further increases in gasoline prices both in the short and long run," Hsu said.

While year-ahead inflation expectations crept down to 4.0 percent, from 4.2 percent in July, current readings still exceed levels seen before the war began. (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel) "Consumer sentiment confirmed its early month reading, falling about six percent from last month," said Joanne Hsu, director of the survey.

This is 11 percent down from a year ago, with the gloominess fueled by "continued worries that inflation will remain elevated for the foreseeable future," she added. The university's consumer sentiment index came in at 51.7 this month, a slight revision from the preliminary reading of 51.

0 points. This was a retreat from July's reading of 55.2 points. Global energy prices soared after the United States and Israel launched the war on Iran in late February, plunging the Middle East into conflict. Tehran had retaliated by attacking Washington's Gulf allies and snarling a fifth of the world's oil and gas supplies.

"Sentiment declines in August were seen for all political groups and were particularly acute among Republicans," the University of Michigan survey found. This comes just months ahead of key US midterm elections in November. Survey data added that older consumers, alongside those from lower- and middle-income groups, showed a sharper drop in sentiment.

War in the Middle East has already sent US inflation higher, with prices at the gasoline pump climbing and piling pressure on households. "With ongoing policy uncertainty including the Iran conflict, consumers anticipate further increases in gasoline prices both in the short and long run," Hsu said.

While year-ahead inflation expectations crept down to 4.0 percent, from 4.2 percent in July, current readings still exceed levels seen before the war began.

Trump Stuns By Outright Dismissing Notion Putin Preparing To Attack A NATO State

President Trump has added fuel to the fire of controversy and speculation over the question of why CIA Director John Ratcliffe made a surprise and highly rare trip to Moscow on Tuesday.

Media accounts which seek to explain the nature of his meeting with top Kremlin intelligence officials, while apparently being snubbed by Putin in terms of a direct interaction, have shifted in days since the visit. The early 'consensus' was that he delivered a stern warning for Russia not to attack any NATO state. But President Trump has poured cold water on this explanation, appearing to dismiss it outright in his latest comments.

"I've had good talks with him. He's not going to be attacking a NATO territory," Trump said of Putin on Thursday while talking to reporters in the Oval Office.

Trump didn't answer specifically when pressed on if the president directed Ratcliffe to deliver a warning to Putin to not attack NATO. "I don't want to comment on that but they're not going to attack," Trump said.

While many times over the course of the Ukraine war, European heads of state have claimed that Russia is expansionist and seeks to attack countries in Europe beyond Ukraine, this has not ever been a public allegation of Trump, who has tended to downplay it as a possibility.

Trump did deny the reports centered on Ratcliffe in an interview with Axios Thursday, saying "Ratcliffe sees his Russian counterpart once every six months or once every year. They have a very good relationship. There was no message and there was nothing unusual."

And when asked over whether he's concerned that Putin might attack NATO or deeper inside Europe, Trump replied, "I am not concerned … at all. There is no problem." According to more:

The president called Ratcliffe's trip "standard business" and expressed puzzlement over the media accounts of it.

But the reality is that no CIA director has made such a trip in well over four years. The prior time was November 2021, when then-CIA Director William Burns traveled to Moscow to meet with senior Russian officials and issued a stark warning against invading Ukraine.

It was also highly unexpected in terms of timing, given the stalemated nature of the Ukraine conflict, and the fact that zero peace negotiations are happening. There has not even so much as been any efforts at achieving a short-term ceasefire, akin to last year's Christmas truce.

Trump in the Oval on Thursday declaring confidently that no, the Russians are not going to attack NATO:

REPORTER: Did Ratcliffe delivered a warning to Russia not to attack NATO territory during his trip? US PRESIDENT TRUMP: Well, I don't wanna comment on that, but they're not going to attack NATO. pic.twitter.com/TbAvq8NUJR — Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) August 27, 2026 One theory on the motive for Ratcliffe's trip, which has gained traction among independent analysts, is that it was focused on the Iran war amid allegations from US officials that Russia has assisted Tehran with targeting information on US troop and base whereabouts in the Mideast region.

At times throughout Operation Epic Fury, Tehran appears to have even targeted CIA stations. The bulk of American military assets and bases in the Gulf countries have suffered severe damage earlier in the conflict, resulting in a Pentagon troop drawback to safer areas. This is indeed a big deal if it is the case that Russia or China (or both) have handed the Iranians intel to help push back American bases and forces.

Tyler Durden Fri, 08/28/2026 - 12:10

A bridge, missiles, and billions in revenue: North Korea's role in Russia's war deepens again North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (R) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) shake hands after a welcoming ceremony at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19, 2024.

(Gavriil Grigorov / POOL / AFP via Getty Images) No longer a minor player, Pyongyang has become an essential cog in Russia's war machine. Now, Kyiv warns that its role may grow further still — but not overnight. Ukrainian intelligence in August issued alarming warnings hinting that Russia could soon ask North Korea to contribute up to 50,000 more of its troops for its war against Ukraine, with missiles, drone operators, and technical brigades to follow.

This influx of additional troops and materiel would come on top of the soldiers, shells, and missiles that Moscow had already received, helping it accelerate its offensives against Ukrainian forces and ramp up strikes against Ukraine's cities. While this mass deployment is unlikely to happen immediately, experts who spoke to the Kyiv Independent agreed that a 50,000-strong reinforcement force would be a significant boost for Russian forces in any case — and that Pyongyang will increasingly be helping Russia's army in the future.

read also Important support — and a cash bonanza for Pyongyang In almost any comparison, Russia and North Korea are hardly equals. The former has eight times the population of the latter, and the Russian economy is almost 100 times larger than North Korea's.

But when it comes to military production, the two countries are surprisingly complementary, with North Korea helping Russia's war on Ukraine in many areas. “I wouldn't even say that North Korea is the minor partner in this relationship anymore," said Leonid Petrov, a researcher specializing in Pyongyang's international relations at the Australian National University.

Assistance is not limited to boots on the ground. Since 2024, Russia has, for instance, launched at least several dozen North Korean ballistic missiles on Ukrainian territory. While these missiles vary in type, they are generally considered more powerful – but less accurate – than their Russian equivalents.

Russia's dependency on North Korea does not stop there. "This (dependency) was especially visible during the phase of the so-called 'artillery hunger' in Russian forces (in late 2022 and early 2023), when North Korea actively supplied Russia with ammunition," said Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military and political expert at the Ukrainian Center for Security Studies.

"Aside from that, (North Korea) produces high quantities of artillery powder, which Russian manufacturers cannot produce enough of," the researcher said. Specialized personnel is also important, with Ukrainian intelligence estimating that North Korea had recently sent 400 drone operators to Russia.

Another case in point was Russia's efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast, a western Russian border region partially occupied by Ukraine between August 2024 and the spring of 2025. Moscow's campaign there would have been "much slower" without support from North Korean soldiers, Kovalenko said, adding that Russian advances in other sections of the front line would have also been more difficult without North Korean military deliveries.

South Korea's Defense Ministry confirmed that Pyongyang is preparing for additional troop deployments in Ukraine. This assistance is set to increase further, with Russia investing considerable funds to improve delivery logistics. Currently, Russia's only land connection to North Korea is a rail bridge built in 1959, but differences in rail gauges between the two countries make it difficult to use.

This should change by the end of 2026, when Russia and North Korea plan to open their first car border crossing across the Tumen River, which separates the two countries. Both sides claim that the bridge is intended to boost tourism and civilian economic exchanges and is not intended for military purposes.

"This is almost certainly not true," said Nazar Myhun from the Ukrainian NGO Truth Hounds, which investigated the bridge project. "Russian-North Korean (non-military) trade is valued at barely $20 million to $30 million per year. Tourism is almost non-existent, and the small number of tourists mostly fly directly through Pyongyang, in any case.

" The bridge project is exclusively financed by Russia, whose military needs have funded a cash bonanza for the regime of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un in recent years. According to estimates, North Korea raked in around $22 billion in foreign revenue between 2022 and 2025, almost four times as much as in the previous four-year period.

"$22 billion is both a large sum and not really a big one at the same time," Petrov commented. "On the one hand, North Korea's annual GDP sits just above that figure, so this is a lot of money for the regime. At the same time, this is not a huge amount on its own, and international sanctions mean it's difficult for the regime to use these funds.

" A firm alliance — but with limits Soon after Russia and North Korea signed their strategic partnership agreement in 2024, North Korean soldiers were deployed to Russia's Kursk Oblast against Ukrainian forces fighting there. However, this precedent does not mean that Russia can simply demand a large number of troops from Kim and immediately receive them, Kovalenko said.

"Things like this do not happen overnight in North Korea," Petrov noted, citing the 2024 treaty, which came much later than Russia's first requests for North Korean military assistance in 2023. "Normally, Kim Jong Un first contemplates the pros and cons, possibly consults advisors, calculates risks, then soldiers need to be trained and indoctrinated — all of this takes time," the researcher said.

South Korea's Defense Ministry confirmed that Pyongyang is preparing for additional troop deployments in Ukraine, but said it sees no signs that this should happen immediately. North Korea has also set firm limits on troop deployments, refusing to send them directly into Ukrainian territory, Kovalenko said in turn.

"So, if thousands of new North Korean troops are sent to Russia, they will most likely be dispatched to Russian border regions, such as (the) Kursk or Voronezh (oblasts)," the expert predicted. In theory, these forces could allow Moscow to free up soldiers stationed on Russian soil for new offensives on Ukrainian territory, especially after speculations that Russia could carry out a new wave of mobilization following parliamentary elections in September.

"In this scenario, North Korean soldiers are unlikely to be used as combat forces — but they could be used as an occupation force, if something changes and Kim Jong Un agrees to send troops directly to Ukraine," Petrov said. Another scenario could involve Pyongyang focusing on deploying additional missile launch units — and other specialized forces — but refraining from sending soldiers to territories internationally recognized as sovereign Ukrainian territory, Kovalenko explained in turn.

"In any case, all of these scenarios are hypothetical, and it's unlikely that anything will change from one day to another, with tens of thousands of North Korean soldiers suddenly flowing into Russia," Petrov concluded.

A bridge, missiles, and billions in revenue: North Korea's role in Russia's war deepens again North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (R) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) shake hands after a welcoming ceremony at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19, 2024.

(Gavriil Grigorov / POOL / AFP via Getty Images) No longer a minor player, Pyongyang has become an essential cog in Russia's war machine. Now, Kyiv warns that its role may grow further still — but not overnight. Ukrainian intelligence in August issued alarming warnings hinting that Russia could soon ask North Korea to contribute up to 50,000 more of its troops for its war against Ukraine, with missiles, drone operators, and technical brigades to follow.

This influx of additional troops and materiel would come on top of the soldiers, shells, and missiles that Moscow had already received, helping it accelerate its offensives against Ukrainian forces and ramp up strikes against Ukraine's cities. While this mass deployment is unlikely to happen immediately, experts who spoke to the Kyiv Independent agreed that a 50,000-strong reinforcement force would be a significant boost for Russian forces in any case — and that Pyongyang will increasingly be helping Russia's army in the future.

read also Important support — and a cash bonanza for Pyongyang In almost any comparison, Russia and North Korea are hardly equals. The former has eight times the population of the latter, and the Russian economy is almost 100 times larger than North Korea's.

But when it comes to military production, the two countries are surprisingly complementary, with North Korea helping Russia's war on Ukraine in many areas. “I wouldn't even say that North Korea is the minor partner in this relationship anymore," said Leonid Petrov, a researcher specializing in Pyongyang's international relations at the Australian National University.

Assistance is not limited to boots on the ground. Since 2024, Russia has, for instance, launched at least several dozen North Korean ballistic missiles on Ukrainian territory. While these missiles vary in type, they are generally considered more powerful – but less accurate – than their Russian equivalents.

Russia's dependency on North Korea does not stop there. "This (dependency) was especially visible during the phase of the so-called 'artillery hunger' in Russian forces (in late 2022 and early 2023), when North Korea actively supplied Russia with ammunition," said Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military and political expert at the Ukrainian Center for Security Studies.

"Aside from that, (North Korea) produces high quantities of artillery powder, which Russian manufacturers cannot produce enough of," the researcher said. Specialized personnel is also important, with Ukrainian intelligence estimating that North Korea had recently sent 400 drone operators to Russia.

Another case in point was Russia's efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast, a western Russian border region partially occupied by Ukraine between August 2024 and the spring of 2025. Moscow's campaign there would have been "much slower" without support from North Korean soldiers, Kovalenko said, adding that Russian advances in other sections of the front line would have also been more difficult without North Korean military deliveries.

South Korea's Defense Ministry confirmed that Pyongyang is preparing for additional troop deployments in Ukraine. This assistance is set to increase further, with Russia investing considerable funds to improve delivery logistics. Currently, Russia's only land connection to North Korea is a rail bridge built in 1959, but differences in rail gauges between the two countries make it difficult to use.

This should change by the end of 2026, when Russia and North Korea plan to open their first car border crossing across the Tumen River, which separates the two countries. Both sides claim that the bridge is intended to boost tourism and civilian economic exchanges and is not intended for military purposes.

"This is almost certainly not true," said Nazar Myhun from the Ukrainian NGO Truth Hounds, which investigated the bridge project. "Russian-North Korean (non-military) trade is valued at barely $20 million to $30 million per year. Tourism is almost non-existent, and the small number of tourists mostly fly directly through Pyongyang, in any case.

" The bridge project is exclusively financed by Russia, whose military needs have funded a cash bonanza for the regime of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un in recent years. According to estimates, North Korea raked in around $22 billion in foreign revenue between 2022 and 2025, almost four times as much as in the previous four-year period.

"$22 billion is both a large sum and not really a big one at the same time," Petrov commented. "On the one hand, North Korea's annual GDP sits just above that figure, so this is a lot of money for the regime. At the same time, this is not a huge amount on its own, and international sanctions mean it's difficult for the regime to use these funds.

" A firm alliance — but with limits Soon after Russia and North Korea signed their strategic partnership agreement in 2024, North Korean soldiers were deployed to Russia's Kursk Oblast against Ukrainian forces fighting there. However, this precedent does not mean that Russia can simply demand a large number of troops from Kim and immediately receive them, Kovalenko said.

"Things like this do not happen overnight in North Korea," Petrov noted, citing the 2024 treaty, which came much later than Russia's first requests for North Korean military assistance in 2023. "Normally, Kim Jong Un first contemplates the pros and cons, possibly consults advisors, calculates risks, then soldiers need to be trained and indoctrinated — all of this takes time," the researcher said.

South Korea's Defense Ministry confirmed that Pyongyang is preparing for additional troop deployments in Ukraine, but said it sees no signs that this should happen immediately. North Korea has also set firm limits on troop deployments, refusing to send them directly into Ukrainian territory, Kovalenko said in turn.

"So, if thousands of new North Korean troops are sent to Russia, they will most likely be dispatched to Russian border regions, such as (the) Kursk or Voronezh (oblasts)," the expert predicted. In theory, these forces could allow Moscow to free up soldiers stationed on Russian soil for new offensives on Ukrainian territory, especially after speculations that Russia could carry out a new wave of mobilization following parliamentary elections in September.

"In this scenario, North Korean soldiers are unlikely to be used as combat forces — but they could be used as an occupation force, if something changes and Kim Jong Un agrees to send troops directly to Ukraine," Petrov said. Another scenario could involve Pyongyang focusing on deploying additional missile launch units — and other specialized forces — but refraining from sending soldiers to territories internationally recognized as sovereign Ukrainian territory, Kovalenko explained in turn.

"In any case, all of these scenarios are hypothetical, and it's unlikely that anything will change from one day to another, with tens of thousands of North Korean soldiers suddenly flowing into Russia," Petrov concluded.