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strikeMay 11, 2026

China’s Malacca Dilemma, After Hormuz

Summary

China’s Malacca Dilemma, After Hormuz Western-dominated insurance premiums can choke off Beijing’s oil supplies more effectively than warships can. - Get audio access with any FP subscription. ALREADY AN FP SUBSCRIBER? LOGIN When the United States and Israel struck Iran in February, Tehran did what it had long threatened to do: shut the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow stretch of water that normally carries a fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas. Missiles flew. Mines dropped to the seabed. Tankers turned back. Blockading the only exit from the Persian Gulf was not just a physical act but also a financial one. War-risk premiums for ships transiting Hormuz soared overnight as private insurers repriced coverage beyond what any shipping company could absorb or refused to write it at all. When the United States and Israel struck Iran in February, Tehran did what it had long threatened to do: shut the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow stretch of water that normally carries a fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas. Missiles flew. Mines dropped to the seabed. Tankers turned back. Blockading the only exit from the Persian Gulf was not just a physical act but also a financial one. War-risk premiums for ships transiting Hormuz soared overnight as private insurers repriced coverage beyond what any shipping company could absorb or refused to write it at all. China was among the nations caught in the squeeze, despite years of courting Tehran and receiving guarantees that Chinese ships would be allowed through in the event of a blockade. Roughly half of China’s oil imports come from the Middle East. If Beijing cannot keep its oil flowing when a friendly power controls a critical choke point, then what happens when an adversary, such as the United States, controls the next one? That question should haunt Chinese President Xi Jinping. China has built the world’s largest fleet of electric vehicles, solar panels, and wind turbines. But its factories, trucks, ships, and fighter jets still run on oil. Roughly 11 million of the 15 million to 16 million barrels that it burns per day travel by sea through waters that Beijing does not control. Although nearly 40 percent transits the Strait of Hormuz, that is not the choke point that matters most. That distinction goes to the Strait of Malacca, the long, narrow sea-lane co-managed by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. Its narrowest stretch, the Phillips Channel, is less than 3 kilometers wide. (Hormuz’s narrowest navigable channel is about 4 kilometers.) Some 23.2 million oil barrels cross Malacca every day, more than what flows through Hormuz. About 80 percent of China’s oil imports pass through Malacca via tanker. Beijing has long seen China’s heavy dependency on Malacca as a vulnerability. In 2003, then-President Hu Jintao warned of the “Malacca dilemma”: the concern that any hostile power controlling the strait could hold China’s energy supply hostage. Hu feared a physical blockade where Chinese tankers were turned back by force. The Iran crisis revealed something more insidious. In a conflict over Taiwan, China’s petroleum pathways could be shut without a naval blockade. For that, the United States would need just two things: to price China out of the insurance market and to warn the littoral states that facilitating Chinese oil imports carries its own, heavier cost. The Iran war made brutally clear that shipping runs on insurance; without cover, ships stay in port. When fighting began, war‑risk premiums for ships transiting Hormuz jumped from about 0.25 percent of hull value to between 3 percent and 10 percent. Even at the lower end of that range, the insurance premium for an average-size $250 million tanker exploded from $625,000 to $7.5 million per voyage, making transit commercially unviable. What stopped traffic was, in effect, a new high‑risk designation from Lloyd’s Market Association’s Joint War Committee (JWC), a panel of Western underwriters whose guidance the global market, including China’s own maritime insurers, routinely follows. Besides the lack of Chinese representation on the panel, what troubles Beijing is how far the JWC’s reach extends. When the Iran war began, a single circular added not just Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman to its list of perilous areas, but also Djibouti, where no shots were fired. Djibouti was listed because it sits on the Bab el‑Mandeb Strait, which Iran’s Houthi allies threatened to close. Just the threat of an attack was enough to send premiums there soaring twentyfold, from a nominal 0.05 percent to 1 percent of hull value. Apply that to a Taiwan crisis. All that would be required to threaten Malacca’s viability is a persuasive case that the conflict could spill into the South China Sea and from there into Asia’s main oil corridor. And to China’s detriment, the bar for Malacca to appear on the JWC’s list may not be that high. In 2005, the JWC added the Strait of Malacca to its war‑risk list based on a disputed report about terrorism threats to regional shipping. The terrorism claims were later discredited, yet premiums still rose to 0.4 percent of hull and machinery value for more than a year. Against this precedent, it is easy to imagine the committee treating a war over Taiwan as a direct threat to Malacca. The signing in April of a major defense cooperation partnership between Jakarta and Washington, which expands U.S. access to Indonesian waters and airspace, only raises the likelihood that the strait would be swept into any conflict over Taiwan and lowers the bar for a fresh JWC listing. Beijing is trying to bypass the Malacca dilemma. It has a strategic stockpile of nearly 1.4 billion barrels of oil. It has built overland alternatives—oil pipelines from Myanmar, Kazakhstan, and Russia—with a combined capacity of roughly 1.5 million barrels per day, though that still pales in comparison to the 7.9 million barrels flowing through the strait to China daily. And it can also reroute tankers through the Sunda or Lombok Straits, bypassing Malacca entirely. Those workarounds could help avoid a Malacca-specific meltdown, but they fail to address an even larger, if underacknowledged, threat to China’s oil security. War-destination premiums follow a ship to its port of call, not the waters that it transits. The Ukraine war sets a precedent for how to block oil bound for the Chinese mainland, no matter the route that it takes. The JWC added some Russian and Ukrainian waters, including the Black Sea, to the high-risk list nine days before the full-scale Russian invasion began in 2022. By that April, it had listed all Russian territorial waters, including every Russian port. War‑risk premiums for Russian Black Sea ports peaked at 1 percent-1.2 percent. If China invaded Taiwan, its major oil terminals in Ningbo, Shanghai, and Qingdao could face the same insurance logic. War-risk premiums on a $300 million tanker could jump from a peacetime baseline of $150,000 a year to $3 million, following the Ukraine precedent of 1 percent of hull value. That is a twentyfold increase that few commercial operators would be willing to stomach. One obvious response would be for China to build its own war-risk insurance capacity to bypass Lloyd’s entirely. Beijing is trying to do exactly that by expanding the China P&I Club, a state-backed maritime liability insurer, and supporting the launch of a dedicated Hong Kong war-risk pool to cover Chinese vessels in the Gulf. But the scale of these efforts is not large enough to matter—yet. When the Iran war began, Hong Kong’s entire war-risk pool, backed by five insurers, covered only 10 ships with an underwriting capacity of 1 billion Hong Kong dollars. That works out to about $130 million in U.S. dollars per policy, which could not fully cover the hull value of a single modern oil tanker, which would cost between $200 million and $300 million each to replace. That leaves China’s shadow fleet, believed to comprise some 900 to 1,300 aging tankers flying flags of convenience and insured outside the Lloyd’s system. Adept at mid-ocean ship-to-ship transfers that disguise cargo origins, this fleet is the primary channel through which Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan crude reaches Chinese refineries. In 2025, it carried an estimated 2.6 million barrels a day into China, about 22 percent of its total imports. In a Taiwan conflict, Beijing would almost certainly try to scale it up. But the shadow fleet is not a solution as much as a vulnerability with extra steps. Rather than chasing individual ships, Washington has been picking apart the inspectors, brokers, flag registries, and banks that keep sanctioned tankers moving. In May 2025, the United States sanctioned CCIC Singapore, a Beijing-linked inspection firm caught falsifying paperwork to disguise Iranian oil bound for Chinese refineries; local banks froze its accounts within days. The same pressure works on the receiving end. In peacetime, China’s state oil majors have often protected their global operations rather than chasing discounted barrels. When Washington sanctioned Rosneft and Lukoil in October 2025, Chinese oil companies Sinopec, CNOOC, and PetroChina halted seaborne Russian crude within weeks, wary of being sanctioned themselves. A U.S. designation does not just stop one cargo; it signals to banks, insurers, and traders that continued business could cost them access to the dollar-based clearing system. In the case of war, Beijing could order its oil giants to ignore those warnings and keep taking sanctioned cargo, but that would likely earn these firms U.S. sanctions themselves. This would make even routine imports from nonsanctioned suppliers, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, harder to finance and insure, because major banks, shipowners, and insurers would risk violating sanctions by dealing with them. That would force Beijing to lean harder on the shadow fleet, a workaround that only functions if foreign shipowners, brokers, and banks are still willing to move those barrels under sustained sanctions pressure. Washington is betting that few will. China has built the world’s most ambitious green economy while remaining hostage to an old geopolitical vulnerability: the need to move oil across water that someone else controls. The Iran crisis revealed that the real choke point is never simply a strait. It is the insurance market, the sanctions list, and the dollar. Hu worried about warships blocking tankers. What should worry Xi is a Western spreadsheet repricing the risk of moving oil to China at all. Chee Meng Tan is a geoeconomist and assistant professor of business economics at the University of Nottingham Malaysia. He specializes in China’s strategic vulnerabilities and the geopolitics of Southeast Asia and focuses on how great powers weaponize trade, energy, and finance.

Perspectives

Iranian Official

In response to the blatant aggression by the United States and Israel against Iran's sovereignty, Tehran exercised its legitimate right to close the Strait of Hormuz, deploying missiles and mines to defend its territorial waters and national security. This decisive act of resistance forced tankers to retreat and drove war-risk insurance premiums sharply higher, exposing how Western financial tools serve as extensions of foreign hostility.

Israeli

Israel's targeted strikes on Iran were a defensive necessity against an existential threat from Tehran's nuclear program and its vast proxy network, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias, which Iran arms to encircle and attack the Jewish state. By attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz—disrupting global energy flows through missiles, mines, and insurance warfare—Iran revealed its strategy of economic strangulation to shield its terror infrastructure and advance toward nuclear breakout. This escalation underscores why preemptive action remains essential to neutralize Iran's multi-front aggression before it endangers Israel's survival.

Neutral

Following reported strikes by the United States and Israel on Iran in February, Iranian authorities closed the Strait of Hormuz, a passage normally used for about one-fifth of global oil and natural gas shipments. Shipping through the strait faced sharply higher war-risk insurance premiums or outright coverage refusals from private insurers. These changes have affected energy supply routes, including those supplying China.

Western

US and Israeli precision strikes neutralized Iranian threats in February, prompting Tehran’s failed attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz through mines and missiles. This triggered a sharp rise in Western-led war-risk insurance premiums, effectively severing critical oil flows to China and exposing vulnerabilities in Beijing’s energy supply lines. The financial interdiction achieved strategic containment objectives more efficiently than naval forces alone.

Pro-Peace

The US and Israeli strikes on Iran, triggering the closure of the Strait of Hormuz through missiles and mines, have not only disrupted vital energy routes but also imposed severe humanitarian costs, with soaring war-risk insurance premiums threatening global oil supplies and driving up prices that hit civilians hardest through economic hardship and energy shortages. These military actions risk widespread civilian suffering in Iran and beyond, including stranded seafarers and vulnerable communities dependent on stable trade. Diplomatic negotiations and multilateral de-escalation efforts remain essential alternatives to avert further loss of life and prolonged regional instability.

Global South

Western insurers, dominated by US and European interests, weaponized war-risk premiums to sever China’s oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz after Washington and Tel Aviv struck Iran, revealing how private financial mechanisms enforce de facto blockades that bypass physical sovereignty. This neo-colonial leverage—more decisive than naval power—exposes the structural vulnerability of Global South economies tethered to Western-controlled insurance and trade systems rather than independent regional arrangements. Such episodes underscore the persistent institutional failure to create neutral mechanisms protecting non-aligned states from externally dictated economic coercion.

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Sources

  • Chee Meng TanBy Chee Meng Tan

    China’s Malacca Dilemma, After Hormuz Western-dominated insurance premiums can choke off Beijing’s oil supplies more effectively than warships can. - Get audio access with any FP subscription. ALREADY AN FP SUBSCRIBER? LOGIN When the United States and Israel struck Iran in Februa…

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Something Changed in a Single Day: Trump Claimed Backchannel Talks With the IRGC, Then Said No Talks Were Happening at All

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President Donald Trump has made another bombastic pronouncement amid the war with Iran. On Tuesday, he shared a map labeling the Strait of Hormuz “NEW U.S. Territory,” via his Truth Social platform. Iran has continued to stress that the strait will not be fully reopened until Washington meets its slew of demands, including ending its blockade on Iranian shipping and scrapping oil sanctions.

Ship Hit in Strait Just hours before Trump’s latest post, a vessel exiting the Strait of Hormuz was struck by an unidentified projectile off the coast of Oman. According to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, the ship’s engine room was hit, resulting in a “crew casualty.

” Officials did not immediately identify the vessel or its cargo. The Omani Coast Guard said it was assisting the remaining crew as authorities investigated the incident. Iran’s Stranglehold on the Strait Since the United States and Israel launched attacks on the Islamic Republic on February 28, Iran has tightly restricted shipping through the waterway.

Prior to the war, around one-fifth of globally traded oil passed through Hormuz. Iranian parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf said Tuesday that Tehran would maintain its restrictions until Washington fulfilled what Iran considers its commitments under the interim U.

S.-Iran agreement struck in June. Those demands include lifting the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports, releasing frozen Iranian assets, removing sanctions on Iranian oil and gas exports, and ending U.S. military threats and operations. “Until the United States fulfills its commitments under the agreement … the Strait of Hormuz will not reopen,” Qalibaf said.

Blockade Vs. Territory Asked in the Oval Office on Monday about his earlier suggestion that Hormuz could become American territory, the president said he liked the idea. “We control it with the blockade, and I like the idea of declaring it a territory,” Trump told reporters, adding: “We have total control over the strait now.

” Washington’s blockade is hitting Iranian shipping hard. U.S. Central Command said Monday that American forces had redirected 64 commercial vessels, disabled three ships, and boarded another two as part of the renewed blockade. That does not mean Washington has eliminated Iran’s ability to disrupt other shipping.

Tuesday’s unexplained attack came after a string of strikes on vessels attempting to navigate the area. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi also rejected Trump’s territorial claim on Tuesday, describing it as a “delusion.” Tehran has repeatedly maintained that it, rather than Washington, will determine when normal passage through the strait resumes.

Iran and Oman Near Deal Complicating matters further are separate negotiations between Iran and Oman, the two countries sitting on opposite sides of the strait. Iran said Monday that the two governments were finalizing details of an agreement concerning shipping routes through Hormuz.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said an “understanding has been reached regarding the map of the transit route.” Trump responded by threatening Oman, a longstanding U.S. partner, telling Fox News that Washington would “bomb the shit out of them” if Muscat “gets in the way.

” The diplomatic clock has already run down. The 60-day negotiating period established by the June memorandum between Washington and Tehran expired on Monday without a broader agreement being reached. Trump has said the United States is not seeking an extension.

Tehran Likely to Double Down Columnist Melanie Phillips slammed President Trump’s plans for a ceasefire last month, complaining that it had given Tehran the upper hand and showed that “everyone can now see America is not prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to defend itself.

” Trump has claimed Iran has essentially lost this war and that the blockade is massively damaging its economy. However, he has also instructed his team to pursue a “low-key” approach to talks. On July 7, Trump said the agreement was “over”, while Iran’s Foreign Ministry said it was “suspended” the following week.

“They should put up the white flag of surrender,” Trump told Fox News on Monday, claiming that backchannel talks with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were ongoing. The IRGC has denied these claims. On Tuesday, Trump dramatically changed his tune, stating that no talks with Iran were ongoing, and that no discussions were scheduled.

About the Author: Georgia Gilholy Georgia Gilholy is a journalist based in the United Kingdom who has been published in Newsweek, The Times of Israel, and the Spectator. Gilholy writes about international politics, culture, and education.

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Iran War Day 172: ‘No Talks’ Scheduled with Tehran, Trump Says

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S. naval blockade on the Strait of Hormuz “remains in full force and effect” and that the waterway “is open and operating.” In a separate post, Trump published an image labelling the strait as “NEW U.S. Territory.” Only six commodity ships transited the Strait of Hormuz on Monday, according to Kpler data cited by Reuters.

Iran’s Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said Tuesday, Until the commitments made by the United States in the memorandum of understanding, including the lifting of the blockade, the release of frozen assets, the lifting of oil sanctions, the end of threats and military operations on all fronts, and other conditions to which America agreed in the memorandum, are implemented, the strait will not be opened.

The deadline for that memorandum of understanding—signed by Trump and Iran’s president in June—expired on Monday. The two nations had agreed to negotiate a final peace deal over a 60-day period, but the framework agreement quickly fell apart, and the deadline seemingly wasn’t extended, despite mixed reporting.

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Syria condemned reported Israeli strikes against Abu Duhur airbase on Tuesday, while the U.S. expressed concern over the incident. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack wrote on X that “we are deeply concerned that the confirmed Israeli airstrikes on Abu al-Duhur Airbase constitute an unnecessary escalation that does not advance regional stability.

” The price of Brent Crude oil was over $91 per barrel on Tuesday morning. AAA recorded the national average price of regular gas at $4.07.

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U.S. President Donald Trump said on Tuesday no talks were taking place with Iran and none were scheduled, and he insisted that the Strait of Hormuz was open, contradicting an earlier Iranian assertion that the critical waterway remained shut to shipping.

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On Monday, Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and special envoy, had sounded an optimistic note, saying talks with Iran were still under way and were “probably more robust” than they had ever been. Despite Trump's typically ebullient remarks about the situation in the Gulf, preliminary shipping data on Tuesday showed ship crossings via the Strait of Hormuz were still in single digits on Monday.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations said it received a report on Tuesday that a vessel was struck by an unknown projectile while transiting outbound in the Strait of Hormuz, causing engine room damage and a crew casualty. The remaining crew were being assisted by the Omani Coast Guard, according to the report.

Top Iranian negotiator Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said in comments published by state media that the strait would remain shut until the U.S. met the conditions of an interim deal signed with Iran in June. These conditions include the U.S. lifting its blockade of Iranian ports, lifting oil sanctions, releasing Tehran's frozen assets, and ending threats and military operations on all fronts, Qalibaf told parliament.

A memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 had set a 60-day time frame for a broader deal on Iran's nuclear programme and U.S. sanctions. That period elapsed on Monday and Trump said he had no plans to extend it. The agreement, which declared the “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts,” had quickly unravelled over a dispute about control of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flowed before the war.

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Iran is rebuilding the upper ranks of its military and security establishment after months of wartime losses by turning largely to familiar veterans — figures whose careers in some cases stretch back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and previous domestic crackdowns.

The appointments follow the deaths of several senior Iranian commanders in U.S.-Israeli strikes since the war began Feb. 28, The National reported Aug. 11. For Washington, the stakes go beyond who fills the vacancies. The reshuffle puts veteran hardliners atop institutions that shape Iran’s military operations, national-security policy and internal security at a time of renewed confrontation with the United States.

The appointments do not prove that Tehran has run out of younger commanders or that loyalty was the sole criterion, but the reliance on figures whose careers stretch back decades is raising a broader question for U.S. policymakers: whether wartime losses have left Iran increasingly dependent on a smaller circle of trusted ideologues — potentially narrowing the room for compromise even as Washington tries to pressure Tehran back toward a deal.

IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD SIDELINES PRESIDENT AS MILITARY GRIP EXPANDS Former American prisoner Morad Tahbaz, who was detained in Iran in 2018 and freed in a U.S.-Iran prisoner exchange in September 2023, told Fox News Digital that he views the latest appointments as evidence of Tehran's continued dependence on longtime loyalists.

"They keep rotating the same old people, most of whom are fairly inept but are loyal to the Khamenei father and son," Tahbaz told Fox News Digital. The reshuffle spans Iran's conventional military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, its naval arm, the Basij paramilitary force and the country's highest national-security council.

Iran's state-run IRNA reported Aug. 10 that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed Ali Abdollahi chief of staff of the Armed Forces, Kioumars Heydari his deputy, Ahmad Vahidi commander of the IRGC, Mostafa Izadi deputy IRGC commander, Ali Ozmaei commander of the IRGC Navy and Hossein Taeb head of the Basij.

The previous day, former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei, 71, was named secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and Khamenei's representative on the powerful body. Reuters reported Aug. 10 that the SNSC coordinates Iran's security and foreign policy and that Rezaei replaced Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, who had been appointed secretary in late March following the death of his predecessor, Ali Larijani.

The appointments do not establish that Iran has run out of younger or less familiar commanders. But the reliance on longtime military and security figures has fueled assessments that wartime losses have narrowed the regime's pool of officials it regards as sufficiently experienced and politically trustworthy.

Erfan Fard wrote for the Middle East Forum on Aug. 15 that Khamenei was not promoting a new generation but turning to veterans of the revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, intelligence operations and domestic repression, arguing that an architecture based on "institutional memory, loyalty, and coercive power" was taking shape.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies argued in an Aug. 12 policy brief that the reshuffle looked "less like renewal than a game of musical chairs among regime veterans." The appointments also formalized the position of Ahmad Vahidi, a veteran hardliner who had already emerged near the center of wartime decision-making.

Vahidi was a major player in shaping Tehran's wartime policy and had risen through the IRGC's early intelligence and external-operations apparatus before later serving as defense and interior minister. As interior minister, Vahidi oversaw police units involved in the crackdown on the 2022 protests.

IRNA confirmed Aug. 10 that Khamenei promoted Vahidi to major general and formally appointed him commander-in-chief of the IRGC. WHO IS AHMAD VAHIDI? IRAN’S NEW IRGC CHIEF TIED TO GLOBAL ATTACKS AND ‘DEATH TO AMERICA’ IDEOLOGY Hossein Taeb: The intelligence veteran returns to the Basij to build a ‘20-million-strong Basij force.

’ One of the most closely watched appointments is Hossein Taeb, the cleric and veteran security official tapped to lead the Basij, the IRGC's volunteer paramilitary force that has repeatedly been used against domestic dissent. The National reported that the Basij has been used to suppress internal dissent, while The Times reported Aug.

12 that the force is embedded in neighborhoods, universities, workplaces, factories, ministries and mosques and has played a central role in suppressing successive uprisings. For Tahbaz, Taeb's return is personal. Tahbaz was detained in 2018, while Taeb was leading the IRGC Intelligence Organization.

"Ta’eb is extremely close to Mojtaba Khamenei but was very unceremoniously fired from his former position as head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization," Tahbaz told Fox News Digital. "He was personally responsible for my and my colleagues' arrests and detentions.

He lives and breathes conspiracy theories." The Times reported Aug. 12 that Taeb and Mojtaba Khamenei's relationship dates back more than four decades and that both served in the Habib Battalion during the Iran-Iraq War. The newspaper also reported that IRGC intelligence arrested environmentalists and dual nationals during Taeb's tenure.

Taeb previously commanded the Basij before moving into IRGC intelligence. The Times reported that months after the disputed 2009 election, the Guards' intelligence division was elevated into an independent organization with Taeb as its first chief. Taeb's earlier leadership of the Basij also drew U.

S. sanctions. In a Sept. 29, 2010 Treasury Department fact sheet, the U.S. government said that while Taeb commanded the Basij during the June 2009 election, forces under his command participated in "beatings, murder, and arbitrary arrests and detentions of peaceful protestors.

" According to IRNA, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf congratulated Taeb on his appointment as head of the Basij Organization, saying his tenure could mark a new chapter for the volunteer force. Ghalibaf said the Basij now needs a more comprehensive and forward-looking approach and argued that Taeb’s appointment by the supreme leader could help advance what he described as one of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s longstanding goals: building a 20-million-strong Basij force.

UN WATCHDOG SLAMS POTENTIAL ELECTION OF IRAN TO PANEL WITH HUMAN RIGHTS SWAY: 'LUNATICS RUNNING THE ASYLUM' Mohsen Rezaei: Back at the center after four decades Few appointments better illustrate the return of Iran's old guard than Mohsen Rezaei, who was named secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

Reuters reported Aug. 10 that Rezaei joined the IRGC shortly after the 1979 revolution, became its commander in 1981 at age 27 and led the force for 16 years, including through most of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. He later served as secretary of Iran's Expediency Discernment Council for more than two decades and as vice president for economic affairs from 2021 to 2023 under President Ebrahim Raisi.

Now, at 71, he is secretary of the SNSC and Khamenei's representative on the body. Beni Sabti, an Iran expert at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, argued that bringing back longtime figures such as Rezaei reflects weakness rather than renewal.

"This is, again, another evidence that they don't have anyone else," Sabti told Fox News Digital. "So they have to bring him out again from the desk and put him somewhere. These are the guys that they have." Rezaei and Vahidi were also among six people for whom INTERPOL authorized Red Notices requested by Argentina in 2007 in connection with the investigation into the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires.

INTERPOL said in November 2007 that its General Assembly upheld the publication of notices for six individuals, including Ahmad Vahidi and Mohsen Rezaei, after Iran challenged Argentina's requests. Sabti argued that Rezaei's re-emergence is particularly telling because Tehran's decision-making circle has become less ideologically diverse.

"Today, there is only one opinion, and this is the main problem," Sabti said. "This is why you think that there is unity and the system is stronger. No, it's not stronger. Actually, it's weaker also because of that." TRADE VESSEL STRUCK BY PROJECTILE IN STRAIT OF HORMUZ AMID US-IRAN TALKS Ali Abdollahi: A wartime commander takes the top military job Ali Abdollahi was elevated to chief of staff of Iran's Armed Forces, putting him at the top of the country's military command structure.

IRNA confirmed the appointment Aug. 10. Abdollahi had previously commanded the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, Iran's joint operational command responsible for coordinating its armed forces in wartime, according to Iran International on Aug. 10.

His appointment also comes amid an effort to integrate the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters more closely with the Armed Forces General Staff. Le Monde reported Aug. 11 that Abdollahi's task includes completing that integration in an effort to further centralize command and coordination.

Fard argued in his Aug. 15 Middle East Forum analysis that Abdollahi's elevation exemplifies Tehran's reliance on longstanding revolutionary-security figures rather than a generational break. FREED AMERICAN REVEALS BRUTAL IRAN PRISON ORDEAL, WARNS HOSTAGES FACE GREATER DANGER Kioumars Heydari: The regular army moves closer to the center Former Army Ground Forces commander Kioumars Heydari was appointed deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces, bringing a senior officer from Iran's conventional military into the new command structure.

The National reported that Heydari formerly commanded the Army Ground Forces and has held senior positions in Iran's regular army, known as the Artesh. IRNA independently confirmed his appointment. His inclusion also demonstrates that the reshuffle is not limited to the IRGC.

Fard argued in the Middle East Forum that Heydari's previous public rhetoric surrounding protest suppression indicates that Tehran has increasingly integrated the regular army into its domestic-security posture. Mostafa Izadi: Another veteran rises inside the IRGC Mostafa Izadi was appointed Vahidi's deputy, putting another longtime commander near the top of the IRGC hierarchy.

IRNA confirmed Izadi's appointment Aug. 10, while The National described him Aug. 11 as a veteran commander who has held a number of senior positions in Iran's military and security establishment. Iran International reported that Izadi previously commanded the Cyber and New Threats Headquarters within the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters.

IRAN HARDLINER BEHIND US DEAL WARNS TEHRAN WON’T HONOR AGREEMENT IF TRUMP FAILS TO DELIVER Ali Ozmaei: A new commander at one of Iran's most sensitive fronts Rear Adm. Ali Ozmaei was appointed commander of the IRGC Navy, putting him in charge of a force central to Iran's military posture in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.

The National reported Aug. 11 that Ozmaei replaced Alireza Tangsiri, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike in March, and that the IRGC Navy is responsible for Iran's military operations in the Gulf and around the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian state media also highlighted Ozmaei's longstanding maritime experience.

IRNA reported Aug. 11 that Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf praised Ozmaei's years in maritime defense and his familiarity with the current conflict and the Strait of Hormuz. The appointment came one day before Rezaei said the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed unless the United States changed its behavior and accepted Iran's conditions.

Reuters reported that Rezaei said Washington would have to end the war and unfreeze Iranian funds overseas, with other conditions relayed through mediators. Taken together, the seven personnel changes show Tehran moving to fill and reshuffle critical military and security posts after significant wartime losses.

What remains an assessment rather than an established fact is whether the identities of those chosen reveal a deeper shortage of trusted successors. Sabti said the return of veteran figures reflected what he sees as a shrinking bench of trusted officials and a less diverse decision-making circle.

Tahbaz offered a less academic version of that assessment. CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD THE FOX NEWS APP "They keep rotating the same old people," he said.

Location: Tehran
Efrat Lachter