Summary

The two Koreas have been close observers of the wars in Ukraine and Iran – not least because aspects of the conflicts mirror how both sides think they will win a potential war on the peninsula. The ongoing exchange of long-range drones and missiles, in particular, resembles the type of war both Koreas envision for themselves: a deep strike contest. To this end, both have recently begun developing low-cost, long-range attack drones, with some systems slated to be operational in the near term. Long-range artillery, ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons have, so far, shaped each side’s view of the military balance and whether deterrence holds on the peninsula. Armed drones will soon enter the picture. These drones will exacerbate the South Korean military’s existing gaps in surveilling the North. Pyongyang’s growing missile and nuclear arsenal and diversified launch platforms have made the problem acute. With cheap attack drones, North Korea’s ability to disperse, conceal, and employ offensive firepower will further outpace South Korea’s capacity to destroy it. This trend is at odds with the Lee administration’s ambitious timeline for gaining wartime operational control from the United States. South Korean forces will need additional capabilities to meet the qualitative conditions previously established by the two allies. Drones on the Korean Peninsula Long-range drones – unarmed aerial vehicles with operational range far beyond the forward edge of battle along the armistice line – have been a feature of the inter-Korean military competition for the past two decades. The first known operational use was in 2010 when a North Korean reconnaissance drone was spotted during the Yonpyeong Island shelling. Since then, periodic drone incursions have been a feature of the inter-Korean low-intensity skirmishes. In 2014, South Korea recovered the wreckage of three North Korean drones less than 50 miles from the border. In December 2022, five North Korean drones overflew Seoul, including the presidential office, and returned North. In response, then-President Yoon Suk-yeol floated the idea of South Korean forces conducting reciprocal drone incursions into North Korea. North Korea claimed South Korean drones overflew Pyongyang in October 2024. While officially denied, public analysis of North Korean-released images visually matched developmental South Korean reconnaissance systems. Rudimentary platforms – small, fixed-wing, turboprop, and unarmed – have featured in these largely symbolic aerial incursions so far, alongside unpowered balloons. There is no evidence that either side has employed armed drones in cross-border operations. Drones that had been operationally used on the peninsula, however, represent only a small subset of a broader inventory that includes systems with greater range and capability. North Korea has been importing Chinese and Soviet drones and has been developing indigenous models for reconnaissance missions since the 1980s. In 2023, North Korea unveiled a high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) reconnaissance drone and a medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) multi-role drone. Both are qualitatively different from its existing unmanned aircraft – the latter, for example, is capable of firing a missile – though limited numbers are in the inventory. For South Korea, abortive development efforts in the late Cold War resumed in the 1990s with a focus on the tactical surveillance drones supporting the Army’s ground operations. Interest in long-range systems came in the late 2000s when the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) started developing a domestic MALE, KUS-FS, and the Republic of Korea Air Force procured Global Hawks from the United States. Four Global Hawks were delivered by 2020, and the KUS-FS is expected to enter service in 2027. The wars in Ukraine and Iran have catalyzed the two Koreas’ interest in massed, cheap, and armed long-range drones while they continue to invest in large, sophisticated unmanned systems. In 2024, Kim Jong Un ordered officials to “establish a mass-production system and begin full-scale operation” of “suicide attack drones.” Thousands of North Korean laborers, and possibly engineers, have also reportedly been sent to the Yelabuga factory in Russia producing copies of Iran’s Shahed one-way attack (OWA) drone. For South Korea, the ADD is developing the KUS-LM – dubbed the “K-LUCAS” with reported range and payload figures comparable to the American OWA drone called LUCAS – with plans to deploy it before 2030. The system has started trials on land and sea. Theories of Victory These investments by both Koreas in long-range unmanned systems, for both strike and surveillance, will alter the terms of the inter-Korean military competition. In the past few decades, the main domain of the inter-Korean military competition has become a deep strike-centric contest. The ability to wage a strategic air campaign – one not directly connected to the ground fight – is now central to how each side assesses the balance. Both sides appear to believe loitering munitions fit into this air power paradigm. North Korea has pursued missile and nuclear weapons technology to hold at risk its neighbor and its ally, the United States, with long-range fires. South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense assessed that, in a contingency, North Korea plans a surprise massive firepower attack to create favorable conditions and force a rapid end to the war. Even absent an offensive intent, the threat of catastrophic damage from nuclear missiles and conventional munitions that bypass defenses creates a powerful deterrent intended to prevent attack and ensure regime survival. Under Kim Jong Un’s rule, North Korea has expanded its missile force to deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads deep into South Korea and, increasingly, beyond the peninsula. The nuclear arsenal, too, has increased both numerically and in centrality to North Korea’s security policy. The KPA Ground Force also operates thousands of artillery pieces – with sufficient range to reach Seoul – out of hardened sites concentrated south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. North Korea appears to see drones as a complementary element of its deep strike strategy, enabled by mass, concealment, and dispersal. Indeed, Kim Jong Un noted three attributes that make OWA drones a needed investment for the Korean People’s Army: low production cost, simple manufacturing process, and ease of integration into existing firepower. Drone salvos launched in conjunction with ballistic and cruise missiles could overwhelm South Korea’s air and missile defenses. Their relatively low cost also reduces the economic burden of procurement on North Korea’s constrained economy. In response to a nuclear-armed adversary and fear of abandonment from its ally, South Korea has pursued a counterforce “Three Axis system” to serve as a non-nuclear deterrent. This idea has seen iterative conceptual updates over the past decade. Today, the approach rests on a three-pronged framework that combines preemptive strikes on North Korean nuclear and missile facilities (“Kill Chain”), multi-layered missile defense (Air Force-operated “Korea Air and Missile Defense” against ballistic missiles and the Army’s in-development “Low-Altitude Missile Defense” against artillery and short-range rockets), and overwhelming retaliatory firepower against military and leadership targets (“Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation”). Efforts in the past five years have sought to integrate drones into the strategy. The Yoon administration established the Drone Operations Command in September 2023 with an explicit mission to develop an offensive concept of operations – before that, South Korea’s military had only used drones for reconnaissance and surveillance. Despite initial criticism of the command as redundant, and its subsequent disestablishment for its implication in Yoon’s 2024 self-coup attempt, the South Korean defense community appears to acknowledge the need for this function. The mission continues in the Defense Drone headquarters, the recently formed successor body that focuses on force development, manning, and equipping – albeit shedding any operational role to the services. South Korea’s Surveillance Problems Deterrence on the peninsula holds today as both sides possess long-range strike assets that impose what, for now, are unacceptable risks and costs if the shooting starts. While ground forces remain important in both Koreas’ force structures, the main arena of the inter-Korean competition today lies in deep strike. The drone incursions in the past decade and a half introduced an additional low-intensity element to this competition. The development and eventual deployment of armed drones will create new requirements for South Korea to operationalize its Three Axis strategy and for the United States to defend its treaty ally. South Korea’s limited intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capacity stands out as a glaring vulnerability in anticipating this future. All three “axes” of its strategy depend on a near-perfect and near-persistent intelligence picture over North Korea, to monitor leadership movements, locate concealed facilities, track mobile missile launchers and submarines, identify incoming missiles – and now, detect drone launch sites and their launches. This is a tall order. South Korea’s ISR capabilities have long been identified as a weakness, as it historically has relied on U.S. capabilities. ISR drones and additional ISR satellites are intended to supplement existing gaps to operationalize the Three Axis strategy, but even with systems expected to come online in the next five years, mobile targets will remain difficult to find, fix, and track. South Korea’s space-based ISR layer, in development since 2023, leaves roughly 2-hour windows between observation opportunities over potential launch sites. The South Korean Army’s Low Altitude Missile Defense, expected to come online in 2029, was designed to counter artillery threats and may be constrained by insufficient interceptors and sensor networks against drone salvos. Thus, in the near to medium term, North Korea’s ability to disperse, conceal, and employ its drones, missiles, and nuclear weapons will outpace South Korea’s capacity to destroy them. In fact, North Korea’s rapid operationalization of OWA drones may require greater dedication of U.S. ISR assets to the peninsula. The added challenge to South Korea’s defense strategy thus poses questions about the Lee administration’s ambitious push for wartime operational control transfer by the end of his term in 2030. The proposed change to the command structure of U.S. and South Korean forces has been tied to improvements in South Korea’s capabilities to lead the Combined Forces Command, including the capacity to operate its own ISR assets to meet operational requirements. The Lee administration has insisted on “no additional conditions” being placed on the transfer requirements. Yet, the deteriorating military balance in this domain will necessitate additional capability to meet the established qualitative conditions for making major changes to the Combined Force. The author appreciates feedback from colleagues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies – Pat Bazylczyk, Mark Cancian, Emma Gargiulo, and Andy Lim – and the 2026 cohort of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy Korea fellowship.