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strikeMay 13, 2026

Hormuz oil shock tilts shipping towards alternative fuels

Summary

Hormuz oil shock tilts shipping towards alternative fuels The current oil price shock is making alternative fuels more cost competitive in the shipping sector. LNG benefits the most, becoming even more attractive compared to conventional bunker fuels. Methanol is also becoming more viable, strengthening the case for methanol-ready vessels. Still, the emissions benefits remain limited Alternative fuels more attractive now as oil shoots higher The Middle East conflict and blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have disrupted oil supply and pushed shipping fuel prices, like marine gas oil (MGO), sharply higher. In this environment, fuel strategy is no longer just about cost, but also about securing supply and managing price risks. At the same time, higher prices and greater uncertainty are shifting the relative economics of alternative fuels, even as regulatory progress has slowed with the delayed introduction of a global carbon price under the IMO’s Net Zero Framework. Prices for Marine Gas Oil spiked due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz MGO bunker prices in Rotterdam in $ per tonne; we’ll analyse two scenarios Our modelling shows how the costs and economics of renewable fuels of non-biological origin (RFNBOs) – also called synthetic or e-fuels – change in a high oil price scenario, from a Northwest European perspective. The Middle East war has squeezed the supply of oil and oil products. LNG is similarly affected, but less so, as more capacity is coming online, and natural gas continues to be supplied through regional production and pipelines. Our analysis translates the current geopolitical risk into a simple message for shipowners and cargo owners: when oil products spike and gas rises less, the relative economics of LNG and (to a lesser degree) methanol and even ammonia improve quickly, even if the absolute cost of all energy carriers rises. Decarbonisation requires shift to lower carbon fuels While geopolitical tensions do not alter the fundamental science behind decarbonisation, and hence emissions, they do influence the economics of the business case for different fuels. Traditional marine fuels such as marine gas oil (MGO) and very low sulphur fuel oil (VLSFO) currently generate approximately 1,900 kg of CO2 per deadweight tonne for every 1,000 kilometres sailed. This carbon footprint can be lowered by transitioning to alternatives like LNG or synthetic fuels, like methanol and ammonia. However, meaningful climate benefits are achieved only when vessels use the green or blue variants of these synthetic fuels. Just switching to grey methanol or ammonia would only worsen the footprint to 2,500 or even 4,000 kg of CO2. LNG and blue and green versions of synthetic fuels can reduce carbon emissions from shipping Indicative well to wake emissions for different shipping fuels in kilograms CO2 per deadweight tonnage per 1,000 kilometres (kgCO2/DWT/1,000km) Structural changes in fuel prices can significantly influence how and when alternative solutions are adopted within the shipping industry. To assess this impact, we examine the impact of current high prices on the business case for oil and gas-based shipping fuels and synthetic fuels like methanol and ammonia. The duration of elevated fuel prices remains a subject of intense discussion and is closely tied to ongoing geopolitical developments surrounding the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as the potential damage to oil and gas infrastructure in the Middle East from further conflict. You can find our most recent scenario analysis here. In this article, we set aside geopolitical factors and focus solely on how sustained higher prices affect the cost dynamics of various fuels. When oil products remain high, LNG becomes more attractive In the high-price scenario – the one most relevant under a continued Hormuz disruption – oil products become the big movers: - MGO rises from 0.38 to 0.75 $/DWT/1,000km (+97%) - VLSFO rises from 0.30 to 0.61 (+103%) - LNG rises from 0.25 to 0.41 (+64%) The key mechanism is that the high case hits oil products harder than gas and power inputs. LNG becomes the most attractive “available now” hedge. In other words, the Hormuz-driven oil shock makes LNG not only a transitional decarbonisation option, but also commercially the most attractive option. LNG gets more competitive as the Strait of Hormuz remains closed and price gap with green and blue methanol narrows Indicative unsubsidised costs of shipping fuels in $/DWT/1,000km Methanol gains traction faster than ammonia Over the last three years, methanol has outpaced ammonia in commercial momentum in deep-sea shipping. There are four practical reasons: - Engine and vessel adaptation is simpler and faster. Methanol can be used in internal combustion engines with fewer “system-wide” changes than ammonia, which require more extensive redesign and new safety systems. - Bunkering and handling are more straightforward. Methanol is a liquid at ambient conditions, which reduces complexity compared to ammonia configurations. - A “ready now / ready later” option exists. Orders for methanol-capable and methanol-ready dual-fuel vessels have become a pragmatic bet: shipowners can run on conventional fuels today and switch as low-carbon methanol supply grows. It is also a hedge against the possibility that policy pushes faster toward low-carbon fuels than infrastructure. - From a cost perspective, methanol is currently more attractive than ammonia. Methanol’s CO2 footprint signals a downside; only blue and green deliver progress Methanol still contains carbon, which is emitted as CO2 when burned. This limits its CO2 reduction potential compared to ammonia, which is carbon‑free at the tailpipe. Only blue and green methanol deliver emission reductions relative to MGO and VLSFO and even then, the emissions reduction seems to be modest compared with LNG, at least in our framework, where methanol is currently predominantly produced from natural gas in Europe, compared to biomass (as a future green alternative), or coal (common practice in China). This matches our earlier warning: synthetic fuels can increase emissions if they are produced in a non-sustainable way, because the production chain is energy-intensive and the carbon intensity of inputs dominates outcomes. The economics and climate credentials of gas-based methanol remain challenging compared to LNG, even when produced as blue or green variants. Methanol’s biggest strategic value may be its optionality. When oil-product prices become more volatile, the value of being able to switch fuels - or at least switch procurement strategy – rises. That is precisely where dual-fuel capability becomes more than a decarbonisation story; it becomes a resilience story. The oil shock narrows the methanol–oil price gap Our model outputs show that higher prices for bunker fuels narrow the gap between methanol and marine gas oil (MGO). MGO roughly doubles in price, while methanol rises by about 50–60%. So relative competitiveness improves for methanol: while it is still more expensive, the distance between oil and methanol shrinks. But two important caveats remain. Oil products like MGO and VLSFO remain cheaper than blue and green methanol. Price premium of synthetic fuels has narrowed now that oil prices are higher Indicative unsubsidised costs of shipping fuels in $/DWT/1,000km Why blue methanol is probably the attractive variant Given that the green hydrogen market is still stuck in a pilot phase, blue methanol is a plausible near-term stepping stone: it scales earlier because it depends on gas plus CCS rather than small scale electrolysers. This “blue-first, green-later” pathway is also consistent with how many heavy-industry transitions unfold: deploy the imperfect-but-better option first, then upgrade as clean technologies become cheaper and renewable power becomes more abundant. Ammonia remains on the radar: expensive now – promising in the long run Ammonia is expensive in its blue and green variants, but this would offer strong climate benefits and real progress in CO2-reduction. Despite its challenging economics and inherent toxicity, market participants have not dismissed it as a viable option. The perception seems to be shifting from probably not to probably yes. But efficient usage is also a longer-term bet. Participants in the shipping sector now mostly refer to grey ammonia, which is already abundantly available for other purposes. But then again, this comes with more emissions, so it should not be viewed as a sustainable solution. However, overtime, blue and green variants could become more attractive if costs come down and carbon pricing is introduced. LNG holds the best cards LNG still looks like the stronger near-term route for ship owners, based on our numbers, because it combines lower emissions with lower costs compared to oil products. So, the Middle East oil supply crunch could accelerate a shift away from conventional fuels without necessarily accelerating a shift to synthetic fuels, like ammonia and methanol. It rewards the “closest substitute” that is available at scale, which is LNG. That creates a strategic tension for the sector and for policymakers: energy security and cost pressures may drive faster adoption of LNG, while net-zero targets still require a ramp-up of truly low-carbon fuels like biofuels and synthetic fuels from blue and green production routes. LNG vessels offer future flexibility for conversion to ammonia While ammonia presents certain safety challenges, it holds significant long-term promise as a shipping fuel. The possibility of converting LNG-capable vessels to run on ammonia in the future enhances their strategic value, providing shipowners with greater flexibility. Investing in LNG-powered vessels is not only a cost-effective and lower-emission option in the near term, but also future-proof fleets, by allowing for a smoother transition to ammonia as technology and regulations evolve. As gas-propelled vessels, these ships can be adapted to operate on ammonia, supporting both decarbonisation goals and resilience in a changing energy landscape. General momentum slowed amid policy headwinds The total orderbook in global shipping also confirms that LNG leads as an alternative fuel. In May this year, 28% of the over 7,000 vessels on order are capable of running on alternative fuels, over half this share can run on LNG (15%). Methanol comes second, with particularly recent investments by several container liners. After a post-pandemic acceleration, we saw orders for ships capable of running on alternative fuels slowed in 2025. During the second Trump administration, the United States shifted its policy and effectively lobbied International Maritime Organization (IMO) members to oppose the adoption of global measures aimed at advancing the industry’s climate ambitions and implementing a carbon pricing mechanism. Against this backdrop, companies – including frontrunners like Maersk - are still pursuing a diversified strategy and keeping their options open. All eyes on IMO as shipping needs a global carbon price to decarbonise The IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee is still discussing a framework to deliver on the previously agreed net-zero target (NZF) for 2050. The proposal agreed in 2025, which has since been postponed by member states, includes a carbon price of $100 per tonne of CO2 for emissions within the baseline, and $380 for non-compliance (we discussed the details here). Such a system could further narrow the cost gap with synthetic fuels and help pass additional costs along the value chain. After a year of delays, adjustments to the 2025 proposal now appear likely as stakeholders seek a compromise. However, it remains uncertain whether a final agreement will be reached. It's important to keep in mind that shipping costs typically represent less than 5% of overall product costs that are being shipped. The high efficiency of shipping means that even if these costs increase substantially, the impact on end consumers is minimal and the price premium is barely noticeable for most products. However, this dynamic is quite different for shipping companies and charterers, which are directly affected by rising operational expenses. As such, effective policies are essential to address these challenges within the industry. Cost, security and climate goals In the current environment, shipping owners face significant uncertainty, as geopolitical tensions around the Strait of Hormuz continue to drive volatility in bunker fuel prices, like marine gasoil (MGO). Elevated MGO prices are narrowing the cost gap with synthetic fuels such as methanol and ammonia, at least in Europe. However, LNG stands out as the most cost-effective option, solidifying its position as the preferred fuel choice. Amid the ongoing conflict and unpredictable fuel availability, we expect shipping companies to look beyond cost considerations. Dual-fuel capabilities, diversified bunkering access, and flexible contracts that permit fuel switching are increasingly valuable strategies, especially if high prices persist. This dynamic is expected to accelerate orders for LNG, and methanol-ready vessels, supporting operational resilience while helping to future-proof fleets against further market disruptions. It may also help shipowners meet their climate targets by significantly reducing vessel emissions. Appendix: scenario assumptions and model explainer Two commodity price scenarios for the shipping sector from a Northwestern European perspective Model explainer Indicative emissions are modelled for an 82,000 deadweight tonnage (DWT) vessel, assuming 230 sailing days per year at an average speed of 12.5 knots. The analysis adopts a full life-cycle perspective, covering both well-to-tank (fuel production) and tank-to-wake (onboard combustion) emissions. Natural gas is assumed as the primary feedstock for grey and blue methanol and ammonia, reflecting current production in Northwest Europe. As a result, no emission reductions from biomass or Direct Air Capture (DAC) are included. While these lower-carbon sources could be deployed in future pathways, particularly for methanol, they would come at higher cost and result in lower overall emissions compared to our figures. In this analysis, the “colour” reflects the pathway used to produce hydrogen: grey hydrogen is derived from unabated natural gas; blue hydrogen combines natural gas with carbon capture and storage (CCS); and green hydrogen comes from electrolysis powered by low‑carbon electricity. For blue production routes, a CO2 capture rate of 80% is assumed. The relatively limited electricity demand in grey and blue pathways is assumed to be met by grid power with a carbon intensity of 200 kg CO2/MWh, broadly representative of the Netherlands and Belgium. For green methanol and green ammonia, it is assumed that electrolysers are fully powered by low-carbon electricity (renewables, hydro or nuclear), sourced via Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). Emissions are expressed per tonne-kilometre, ensuring comparability across fuels. In addition to the assumptions underpinning the emissions' analysis, we’ve used different economic assumptions for a world where the Strait of Hormuz opens or remains closed. Synthetic fuel costs are modelled using different values for gas, power, carbon and marine fuel prices (see table), while an exchange rate of €1 = $1.18 is used in both scenarios. Hydrogen production is assumed to take place within a 50km radius of methanol and ammonia plants, with transport via pipeline. This results in hydrogen costs of €1.80/kg (grey), €2.00/kg (blue), and €4.50/kg (green) in the low price environment and €2.70/kg (grey), €3.10/kg (blue), and €6.65/kg (green) in the high price environment. Finally, the results reflect fuel costs only and exclude vessel capex and opex, so they do not represent total cost of ownership. This publication has been prepared by ING solely for information purposes irrespective of a particular user's means, financial situation or investment objectives. The information does not constitute investment recommendation, and nor is it investment, legal or tax advice or an offer or solicitation to purchase or sell any financial instrument. 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Perspectives

Iranian Official

The foreign aggression and threats against Iran's sovereignty have forced defensive control over the Strait of Hormuz, triggering an oil price shock that boosts the appeal of alternative fuels such as LNG and methanol in global shipping. This resistance to external interference highlights Iran's determination to safeguard its rights and regional security amid Western-backed conflicts. While supply risks accelerate the shift away from conventional bunker fuels, emissions gains stay limited.

Israeli

Iran’s proxy network, from the Houthis to Hezbollah, is weaponizing the Strait of Hormuz to choke global oil flows, creating an existential energy threat that endangers Israel’s security and the West’s economic resilience. This blockade-driven price shock for marine fuels is accelerating the shift to LNG and methanol, underscoring the defensive necessity of reducing reliance on Iranian-controlled supply routes. Israel’s ongoing operations against these networks remain essential to restoring maritime stability and energy security.

Neutral

Recent disruptions linked to Middle East conflict and a reported blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have increased marine fuel prices, including marine gas oil. This has shifted the relative economics of alternative fuels such as LNG and methanol, according to sector analysis, while also affecting supply security considerations. Modeling of renewable fuels of non-biological origin shows altered costs in a high-oil-price scenario from a Northwest European perspective, with limited associated emissions benefits noted.

Western

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz amid the Middle East conflict has spiked marine gas oil prices, directly threatening Western shipping supply lines and energy security. NATO-aligned operators are responding by accelerating shifts to LNG and methanol-ready vessels, which deliver greater supply resilience and neutralize adversarial leverage over conventional fuels. This precision pivot also advances emissions goals, though near-term gains stay limited.

Pro-Peace

The Middle East conflict and resulting blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have driven sharp spikes in marine fuel prices while exacting heavy humanitarian costs, including civilian casualties, supply disruptions, and economic hardship for vulnerable populations across the region. Though this turmoil has made alternative fuels like LNG and methanol appear more competitive for shipping, such market shifts cannot offset the broader devastation of war. Diplomatic negotiations to reopen safe passage and de-escalate tensions remain the only path to lasting relief for civilians and global stability.

Global South

The Hormuz blockade amid Middle East conflict has exposed how Northern-backed geopolitical maneuvers continue to weaponize energy chokepoints, inflating marine fuel costs and undermining the sovereignty of Global South nations reliant on affordable shipping for trade. While LNG and methanol gain fleeting competitiveness, the IMO’s stalled Net Zero Framework reveals institutional capture by wealthy states, delaying carbon pricing that might otherwise curb neo-colonial resource extraction and price volatility. Developing economies now face heightened supply risks without the capital or infrastructure to pivot, reinforcing calls for independent regional fuel strategies over externally dictated transitions.

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  • Gerben Hieminga; Rico LumanBy Gerben Hieminga; Rico Luman

    Hormuz oil shock tilts shipping towards alternative fuels The current oil price shock is making alternative fuels more cost competitive in the shipping sector. LNG benefits the most, becoming even more attractive compared to conventional bunker fuels. Methanol is also becoming mo…

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Something Changed in a Single Day: Trump Claimed Backchannel Talks With the IRGC, Then Said No Talks Were Happening at All

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President Donald Trump has made another bombastic pronouncement amid the war with Iran. On Tuesday, he shared a map labeling the Strait of Hormuz “NEW U.S. Territory,” via his Truth Social platform. Iran has continued to stress that the strait will not be fully reopened until Washington meets its slew of demands, including ending its blockade on Iranian shipping and scrapping oil sanctions.

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” Officials did not immediately identify the vessel or its cargo. The Omani Coast Guard said it was assisting the remaining crew as authorities investigated the incident. Iran’s Stranglehold on the Strait Since the United States and Israel launched attacks on the Islamic Republic on February 28, Iran has tightly restricted shipping through the waterway.

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” Washington’s blockade is hitting Iranian shipping hard. U.S. Central Command said Monday that American forces had redirected 64 commercial vessels, disabled three ships, and boarded another two as part of the renewed blockade. That does not mean Washington has eliminated Iran’s ability to disrupt other shipping.

Tuesday’s unexplained attack came after a string of strikes on vessels attempting to navigate the area. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi also rejected Trump’s territorial claim on Tuesday, describing it as a “delusion.” Tehran has repeatedly maintained that it, rather than Washington, will determine when normal passage through the strait resumes.

Iran and Oman Near Deal Complicating matters further are separate negotiations between Iran and Oman, the two countries sitting on opposite sides of the strait. Iran said Monday that the two governments were finalizing details of an agreement concerning shipping routes through Hormuz.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said an “understanding has been reached regarding the map of the transit route.” Trump responded by threatening Oman, a longstanding U.S. partner, telling Fox News that Washington would “bomb the shit out of them” if Muscat “gets in the way.

” The diplomatic clock has already run down. The 60-day negotiating period established by the June memorandum between Washington and Tehran expired on Monday without a broader agreement being reached. Trump has said the United States is not seeking an extension.

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“They should put up the white flag of surrender,” Trump told Fox News on Monday, claiming that backchannel talks with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were ongoing. The IRGC has denied these claims. On Tuesday, Trump dramatically changed his tune, stating that no talks with Iran were ongoing, and that no discussions were scheduled.

About the Author: Georgia Gilholy Georgia Gilholy is a journalist based in the United Kingdom who has been published in Newsweek, The Times of Israel, and the Spectator. Gilholy writes about international politics, culture, and education.

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Iran War Day 172: ‘No Talks’ Scheduled with Tehran, Trump Says In a post on Truth Social Tuesday President Donald Trump said that “there are no talks or conversations going on, or scheduled, with the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Trump added that the U.

S. naval blockade on the Strait of Hormuz “remains in full force and effect” and that the waterway “is open and operating.” In a separate post, Trump published an image labelling the strait as “NEW U.S. Territory.” Only six commodity ships transited the Strait of Hormuz on Monday, according to Kpler data cited by Reuters.

Iran’s Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said Tuesday, Until the commitments made by the United States in the memorandum of understanding, including the lifting of the blockade, the release of frozen assets, the lifting of oil sanctions, the end of threats and military operations on all fronts, and other conditions to which America agreed in the memorandum, are implemented, the strait will not be opened.

The deadline for that memorandum of understanding—signed by Trump and Iran’s president in June—expired on Monday. The two nations had agreed to negotiate a final peace deal over a 60-day period, but the framework agreement quickly fell apart, and the deadline seemingly wasn’t extended, despite mixed reporting.

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U.S. President Donald Trump said on Tuesday no talks were taking place with Iran and none were scheduled, and he insisted that the Strait of Hormuz was open, contradicting an earlier Iranian assertion that the critical waterway remained shut to shipping.

The receding prospects of a deal to end the nearly six-month conflict drove up oil prices again on Tuesday, while stock markets sagged and borrowing costs for major economies including the U.S. hit multi-decade highs, amid concerns about the long-term inflationary and fiscal impact of the crisis.

A temporary ceasefire agreement expired on Monday and a senior Iranian official told Reuters that his country was moving to a “fully offensive” military posture due to the diplomatic stalemate, though there were no reports of fresh strikes by either side on Tuesday.

“There are no talks or conversations going on, or scheduled, with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Trump said in a post on Truth Social on Tuesday. “The Naval Blockade remains in full force and effect. The Hormuz Strait is open and operating. All water mines have been removed or detonated,” he added.

On Monday, Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and special envoy, had sounded an optimistic note, saying talks with Iran were still under way and were “probably more robust” than they had ever been. Despite Trump's typically ebullient remarks about the situation in the Gulf, preliminary shipping data on Tuesday showed ship crossings via the Strait of Hormuz were still in single digits on Monday.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations said it received a report on Tuesday that a vessel was struck by an unknown projectile while transiting outbound in the Strait of Hormuz, causing engine room damage and a crew casualty. The remaining crew were being assisted by the Omani Coast Guard, according to the report.

Top Iranian negotiator Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said in comments published by state media that the strait would remain shut until the U.S. met the conditions of an interim deal signed with Iran in June. These conditions include the U.S. lifting its blockade of Iranian ports, lifting oil sanctions, releasing Tehran's frozen assets, and ending threats and military operations on all fronts, Qalibaf told parliament.

A memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 had set a 60-day time frame for a broader deal on Iran's nuclear programme and U.S. sanctions. That period elapsed on Monday and Trump said he had no plans to extend it. The agreement, which declared the “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts,” had quickly unravelled over a dispute about control of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flowed before the war.

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Iran is rebuilding the upper ranks of its military and security establishment after months of wartime losses by turning largely to familiar veterans — figures whose careers in some cases stretch back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and previous domestic crackdowns.

The appointments follow the deaths of several senior Iranian commanders in U.S.-Israeli strikes since the war began Feb. 28, The National reported Aug. 11. For Washington, the stakes go beyond who fills the vacancies. The reshuffle puts veteran hardliners atop institutions that shape Iran’s military operations, national-security policy and internal security at a time of renewed confrontation with the United States.

The appointments do not prove that Tehran has run out of younger commanders or that loyalty was the sole criterion, but the reliance on figures whose careers stretch back decades is raising a broader question for U.S. policymakers: whether wartime losses have left Iran increasingly dependent on a smaller circle of trusted ideologues — potentially narrowing the room for compromise even as Washington tries to pressure Tehran back toward a deal.

IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD SIDELINES PRESIDENT AS MILITARY GRIP EXPANDS Former American prisoner Morad Tahbaz, who was detained in Iran in 2018 and freed in a U.S.-Iran prisoner exchange in September 2023, told Fox News Digital that he views the latest appointments as evidence of Tehran's continued dependence on longtime loyalists.

"They keep rotating the same old people, most of whom are fairly inept but are loyal to the Khamenei father and son," Tahbaz told Fox News Digital. The reshuffle spans Iran's conventional military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, its naval arm, the Basij paramilitary force and the country's highest national-security council.

Iran's state-run IRNA reported Aug. 10 that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed Ali Abdollahi chief of staff of the Armed Forces, Kioumars Heydari his deputy, Ahmad Vahidi commander of the IRGC, Mostafa Izadi deputy IRGC commander, Ali Ozmaei commander of the IRGC Navy and Hossein Taeb head of the Basij.

The previous day, former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei, 71, was named secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and Khamenei's representative on the powerful body. Reuters reported Aug. 10 that the SNSC coordinates Iran's security and foreign policy and that Rezaei replaced Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, who had been appointed secretary in late March following the death of his predecessor, Ali Larijani.

The appointments do not establish that Iran has run out of younger or less familiar commanders. But the reliance on longtime military and security figures has fueled assessments that wartime losses have narrowed the regime's pool of officials it regards as sufficiently experienced and politically trustworthy.

Erfan Fard wrote for the Middle East Forum on Aug. 15 that Khamenei was not promoting a new generation but turning to veterans of the revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, intelligence operations and domestic repression, arguing that an architecture based on "institutional memory, loyalty, and coercive power" was taking shape.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies argued in an Aug. 12 policy brief that the reshuffle looked "less like renewal than a game of musical chairs among regime veterans." The appointments also formalized the position of Ahmad Vahidi, a veteran hardliner who had already emerged near the center of wartime decision-making.

Vahidi was a major player in shaping Tehran's wartime policy and had risen through the IRGC's early intelligence and external-operations apparatus before later serving as defense and interior minister. As interior minister, Vahidi oversaw police units involved in the crackdown on the 2022 protests.

IRNA confirmed Aug. 10 that Khamenei promoted Vahidi to major general and formally appointed him commander-in-chief of the IRGC. WHO IS AHMAD VAHIDI? IRAN’S NEW IRGC CHIEF TIED TO GLOBAL ATTACKS AND ‘DEATH TO AMERICA’ IDEOLOGY Hossein Taeb: The intelligence veteran returns to the Basij to build a ‘20-million-strong Basij force.

’ One of the most closely watched appointments is Hossein Taeb, the cleric and veteran security official tapped to lead the Basij, the IRGC's volunteer paramilitary force that has repeatedly been used against domestic dissent. The National reported that the Basij has been used to suppress internal dissent, while The Times reported Aug.

12 that the force is embedded in neighborhoods, universities, workplaces, factories, ministries and mosques and has played a central role in suppressing successive uprisings. For Tahbaz, Taeb's return is personal. Tahbaz was detained in 2018, while Taeb was leading the IRGC Intelligence Organization.

"Ta’eb is extremely close to Mojtaba Khamenei but was very unceremoniously fired from his former position as head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization," Tahbaz told Fox News Digital. "He was personally responsible for my and my colleagues' arrests and detentions.

He lives and breathes conspiracy theories." The Times reported Aug. 12 that Taeb and Mojtaba Khamenei's relationship dates back more than four decades and that both served in the Habib Battalion during the Iran-Iraq War. The newspaper also reported that IRGC intelligence arrested environmentalists and dual nationals during Taeb's tenure.

Taeb previously commanded the Basij before moving into IRGC intelligence. The Times reported that months after the disputed 2009 election, the Guards' intelligence division was elevated into an independent organization with Taeb as its first chief. Taeb's earlier leadership of the Basij also drew U.

S. sanctions. In a Sept. 29, 2010 Treasury Department fact sheet, the U.S. government said that while Taeb commanded the Basij during the June 2009 election, forces under his command participated in "beatings, murder, and arbitrary arrests and detentions of peaceful protestors.

" According to IRNA, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf congratulated Taeb on his appointment as head of the Basij Organization, saying his tenure could mark a new chapter for the volunteer force. Ghalibaf said the Basij now needs a more comprehensive and forward-looking approach and argued that Taeb’s appointment by the supreme leader could help advance what he described as one of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s longstanding goals: building a 20-million-strong Basij force.

UN WATCHDOG SLAMS POTENTIAL ELECTION OF IRAN TO PANEL WITH HUMAN RIGHTS SWAY: 'LUNATICS RUNNING THE ASYLUM' Mohsen Rezaei: Back at the center after four decades Few appointments better illustrate the return of Iran's old guard than Mohsen Rezaei, who was named secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

Reuters reported Aug. 10 that Rezaei joined the IRGC shortly after the 1979 revolution, became its commander in 1981 at age 27 and led the force for 16 years, including through most of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. He later served as secretary of Iran's Expediency Discernment Council for more than two decades and as vice president for economic affairs from 2021 to 2023 under President Ebrahim Raisi.

Now, at 71, he is secretary of the SNSC and Khamenei's representative on the body. Beni Sabti, an Iran expert at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, argued that bringing back longtime figures such as Rezaei reflects weakness rather than renewal.

"This is, again, another evidence that they don't have anyone else," Sabti told Fox News Digital. "So they have to bring him out again from the desk and put him somewhere. These are the guys that they have." Rezaei and Vahidi were also among six people for whom INTERPOL authorized Red Notices requested by Argentina in 2007 in connection with the investigation into the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires.

INTERPOL said in November 2007 that its General Assembly upheld the publication of notices for six individuals, including Ahmad Vahidi and Mohsen Rezaei, after Iran challenged Argentina's requests. Sabti argued that Rezaei's re-emergence is particularly telling because Tehran's decision-making circle has become less ideologically diverse.

"Today, there is only one opinion, and this is the main problem," Sabti said. "This is why you think that there is unity and the system is stronger. No, it's not stronger. Actually, it's weaker also because of that." TRADE VESSEL STRUCK BY PROJECTILE IN STRAIT OF HORMUZ AMID US-IRAN TALKS Ali Abdollahi: A wartime commander takes the top military job Ali Abdollahi was elevated to chief of staff of Iran's Armed Forces, putting him at the top of the country's military command structure.

IRNA confirmed the appointment Aug. 10. Abdollahi had previously commanded the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, Iran's joint operational command responsible for coordinating its armed forces in wartime, according to Iran International on Aug. 10.

His appointment also comes amid an effort to integrate the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters more closely with the Armed Forces General Staff. Le Monde reported Aug. 11 that Abdollahi's task includes completing that integration in an effort to further centralize command and coordination.

Fard argued in his Aug. 15 Middle East Forum analysis that Abdollahi's elevation exemplifies Tehran's reliance on longstanding revolutionary-security figures rather than a generational break. FREED AMERICAN REVEALS BRUTAL IRAN PRISON ORDEAL, WARNS HOSTAGES FACE GREATER DANGER Kioumars Heydari: The regular army moves closer to the center Former Army Ground Forces commander Kioumars Heydari was appointed deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces, bringing a senior officer from Iran's conventional military into the new command structure.

The National reported that Heydari formerly commanded the Army Ground Forces and has held senior positions in Iran's regular army, known as the Artesh. IRNA independently confirmed his appointment. His inclusion also demonstrates that the reshuffle is not limited to the IRGC.

Fard argued in the Middle East Forum that Heydari's previous public rhetoric surrounding protest suppression indicates that Tehran has increasingly integrated the regular army into its domestic-security posture. Mostafa Izadi: Another veteran rises inside the IRGC Mostafa Izadi was appointed Vahidi's deputy, putting another longtime commander near the top of the IRGC hierarchy.

IRNA confirmed Izadi's appointment Aug. 10, while The National described him Aug. 11 as a veteran commander who has held a number of senior positions in Iran's military and security establishment. Iran International reported that Izadi previously commanded the Cyber and New Threats Headquarters within the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters.

IRAN HARDLINER BEHIND US DEAL WARNS TEHRAN WON’T HONOR AGREEMENT IF TRUMP FAILS TO DELIVER Ali Ozmaei: A new commander at one of Iran's most sensitive fronts Rear Adm. Ali Ozmaei was appointed commander of the IRGC Navy, putting him in charge of a force central to Iran's military posture in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.

The National reported Aug. 11 that Ozmaei replaced Alireza Tangsiri, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike in March, and that the IRGC Navy is responsible for Iran's military operations in the Gulf and around the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian state media also highlighted Ozmaei's longstanding maritime experience.

IRNA reported Aug. 11 that Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf praised Ozmaei's years in maritime defense and his familiarity with the current conflict and the Strait of Hormuz. The appointment came one day before Rezaei said the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed unless the United States changed its behavior and accepted Iran's conditions.

Reuters reported that Rezaei said Washington would have to end the war and unfreeze Iranian funds overseas, with other conditions relayed through mediators. Taken together, the seven personnel changes show Tehran moving to fill and reshuffle critical military and security posts after significant wartime losses.

What remains an assessment rather than an established fact is whether the identities of those chosen reveal a deeper shortage of trusted successors. Sabti said the return of veteran figures reflected what he sees as a shrinking bench of trusted officials and a less diverse decision-making circle.

Tahbaz offered a less academic version of that assessment. CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD THE FOX NEWS APP "They keep rotating the same old people," he said.

Location: Tehran
Efrat Lachter