The 60-day window created by the Islamabad Memorandum expired on Monday with no permanent agreement between the United States and Iran. The 14-point framework, brokered principally by Pakistan with Qatar’s involvement, was signed on 17 June in an attempt to convert a fragile ceasefire into something durable.

It covered the war’s end, Iran’s nuclear programme, sanctions, frozen assets, the US naval blockade and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Both sides had 60 days to reach final terms. Those 60 days are gone. Iran now says it is shifting to a “fully offensive” posture.

Washington has ruled out an extension. Tehran says Hormuz stays shut until the US lifts its blockade, ends oil sanctions, releases frozen assets and halts military pressure. Brent crude is back above $90 a barrel, and another commercial vessel was struck near the strait this week.

It would be easy to file this as one more US-Iran negotiation collapsing under the usual weight. But the timeline raises a sharper question: did something change inside Tehran’s power structure while these talks were underway — and did that change do more to kill the deal than anything Washington did?

A leader who inherited power through assassination Mojtaba Khamenei did not become Supreme Leader through succession planning. His father, Ali Khamenei, was killed on 28 February in a joint US-Israeli strike that also killed other family members. Mojtaba was injured in the same attack and named successor on 8 March, while Iran was still under bombardment.

That origin matters more than most Western coverage of this story acknowledges. Iran’s current negotiating posture cannot be separated from the fact that its head of state took office because a foreign strike killed his father. Reuters reported in April, citing people close to his circle, that Mojtaba suffered severe facial and leg injuries, including significant disfigurement.

For weeks he essentially vanished from public view — no recordings of his voice, only written statements, while President Masoud Pezeshkian gave shifting accounts of how much contact he actually had with him. Power, in that vacuum, moved to Iran’s security establishment.

The Revolutionary Guards and the Supreme National Security Council gained outsized wartime authority. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf — a former senior IRGC commander, not a moderate by any reasonable definition — became the visible faces of diplomacy.

Their importance was significant enough that Pakistan reportedly asked Israel to remove both men from a target list while Islamabad was trying to build a negotiating channel. Pakistan’s stake in this isn’t neutral, either Pakistan’s mediating role deserves scrutiny, not just credit.

Islamabad’s diplomacy produced the June framework through sustained shuttle efforts, and Pakistan retains genuine access on both sides — relations with Washington, a channel into Tehran, and a demonstrated willingness to intervene directly, as the Israeli target-list episode shows.

But Pakistan is not a disinterested broker. A prolonged US-Iran war on its western periphery threatens energy prices, regional stability and Pakistan’s own security along a border it already struggles to manage. Successful mediation also buys Islamabad exactly the kind of diplomatic capital it has been cultivating all year, from the Mecca defence pact to its expanding Gulf relationships.

None of that makes Pakistan’s mediation illegitimate. It does mean Islamabad has its own reasons for wanting this conflict contained, separate from any commitment to a fair outcome for either side. Then Mojtaba came back By July, Pezeshkian was describing more regular contact with Khamenei.

On 10 August he said he’d spent roughly seven hours with the Supreme Leader, calling him in “full health.” State media released undated footage of Mojtaba meeting officials — not conclusive proof of full recovery, but combined with Pezeshkian’s account, real evidence he is functioning again.

At almost the same moment, Iran’s power structure shifted visibly. On 9 August, Khamenei appointed veteran IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei as his representative to the Supreme National Security Council; the next day, Pezeshkian formalised him as the council’s secretary.

Rezaei commanded the Revolutionary Guards through much of the Iran-Iraq war and has spent decades near the centre of the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus. He replaced Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr, who was moved to a political advisory role. Other appointments strengthened veteran hardliners across the military and security establishment.

Days later, Tehran started using the language of “offensive war.” None of this proves Mojtaba personally torpedoed the Islamabad deal — his own positions were hardline from the start; he rejected de-escalation proposals in his first foreign-policy session back in March, months before this recovery.

What it suggests instead is that Iran’s diplomats had more practical room to manoeuvre while their Supreme Leader was incapacitated, and that room is now narrowing as he reasserts himself. Washington isn’t blameless None of this lets the US off the hook.

Trump was calling the Islamabad framework “over” within a month of signing it. Washington is refusing an extension while demanding what amounts to Iranian surrender, and threatening even Oman — a longstanding US partner mediating Hormuz arrangements — if it gets in the way.

Every threat from Washington hands ammunition to Tehran’s hardliners, who argue the US treats compromise as weakness. Every Iranian strike on shipping does the same for Washington’s hawks. Both governments are currently feeding the factions on the other side least interested in a deal.

What comes next Qalibaf hasn’t disappeared from the picture — he’s still the one stating Iran’s terms publicly. But he, Araghchi and Pezeshkian all now operate beneath an authority that looks considerably more assertive, and more militarised, than it did when the Islamabad framework was built.

Any renewed mediation effort — from Pakistan, Qatar, Oman or Turkey, all of whom have signalled continued involvement — will have to negotiate with that reality, not the Iran of March. The 60-day window has closed. Whether the political conditions that produced it still exist is a separate, and harder, question.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

The UAE announced the suspension of all trade with Iran on Wednesday, citing reports of renewed ballistic missile fire that triggered nationwide shelter alerts Tuesday night. While experts note that Iran relies on the UAE as a re-export hub to mitigate the impact of international sanctions, the full economic consequences of this new blockade remain to be determined.

Business Global oil price rises sharply after vessel attack at Strait of Hormuz Global oil prices surged sharply as attacks on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz slowed shipping in the Middle East region. An oil price survey showed that Brent and West Texas Intermediate, WTI, crude blends jumped to $92 and $85.

90 per barrel, respectively, at the time of reporting on Wednesday. This means that, on a day-to-day basis, Brent and WTI rose by at least one per cent, extending their four-day rally. Reuters, citing shipping-tracking data from Kpler, reported that just six commodity vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz on Tuesday amid heightened tensions in the Gulf region.

Reports also emerged that some ships had turned back in the Strait of Hormuz amid controversy surrounding its blockade. United States President Donald Trump has declared the Strait of Hormuz open, but Iran says it is still closed, impacting global and domestic oil prices negatively.

Dangote Refinery’s recent reduction of its gantry premium motor spirit, PMS price to N1,165 per litre has pushed retail pump prices downward over the last two weeks, to between N1,210 and N1,275 per litre in Abuja and its environs.

Iran’s armed forces chief warned on Wednesday that Gulf states assisting the US military would be viewed as participants in the conflict, which has been ongoing since February 28 following reported US-Israeli attacks on Iran. While the statement asserts that host nations are aware of the presence of US military assets in the region, these claims remain unverified.

The warning coincides with the reported redeployment of the USS George Washington to the Middle East to relieve the USS Abraham Lincoln.