Summary

Six Months Into the Iran War, the United States Has No Good Options Operation Epic Fury failed to produce the quick victory that President Donald Trump predicted and may be remaking the political order in the Middle East. By experts and staff - Published Six months into the U.S. war with Iran, the conflict’s end is nowhere in sight. President Donald Trump confidently predicted at the war’s start that it would last “four to five weeks.” At the end of March, he said it would take “maybe two weeks, maybe a couple of days longer, to do the job.” Since then, he has repeatedly declared the United States victorious. The reality is different. Iran’s regime has neither collapsed nor capitulated, despite intense U.S. and Israeli air strikes that have killed many of the country’s prewar leaders and devastated its military infrastructure. A rickety ceasefire agreed to in April and extended in June continues to hold, but tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains far below prewar levels. Trump has periodically threatened to launch even more destructive attacks on Iran, only to back down because the U.S. military lacks the defensive interceptors needed to protect U.S. allies and military bases in the region. Stymied on the military front, Trump has recently signaled that he will now wait for economic pressure to force Iran’s leadership to its knees. To that end, he vowed last week to unleash an “Economic D-Day” that will be “the most crushing economic operation ever taken against any country!” Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent unveiled Operation Economic Outcast on Monday. For now, the plan leans heavily on threats to punish countries that refuse to “tighten the noose” around Iran voluntarily rather than steps to compel them to do so. There is good reason for that. The so-called secondary sanctions that Washington is proposing could, in Bessent’s words, “blow up the global financial system.” China buys more than 80 percent Iranian oil exports, and it has already forced the Trump administration to abandon steep tariffs on Chinese goods by threatening to cut U.S. access to critical minerals. Chinese President Xi Jinping is also set to visit the White House next month. The potential to roil the global economy and trigger a diplomatic crisis with China are why so many experts doubt that the administration will ever fully follow through on its threat to force Iran’s “complete global isolation.” But with the current stalemate keeping oil prices high and raising questions about U.S. power and influence, can the Trump administration afford to allow Iran to continue to threaten its neighbors and restrict commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz? To get a better understanding of the Trump administration’s strategy and whether it is ceding the once-dominant U.S. position in the Persian Gulf, I sat down with my Council on Foreign Relations colleague Steven Cook for the latest episode of the CFR podcast, The President’s Inbox. [Video: https://youtu.be/Asykfcte8ZM?si=fZu8CHFM0uKxyoK8] Here are my three takeaways: 1. The United States has no good options to compel Iran to meet its demands. Escalating militarily is risky because Iran can strike its Arab neighbors and U.S. military bases in the region. Escalating economically is problematic because it means antagonizing China and risking significant economic retaliation. The White House is left hoping that the U.S. naval blockade will deepen the effect of existing U.S. sanctions and force the Iranian leadership to sue for peace. This line of thinking assumes that the Iranian people will be able to put meaningful political pressure on their leaders. But Iran’s hardline leaders have already shown a ruthless willingness by using deadly force against any Iranians who take to the streets to protest. 2. U.S. allies in the region are hedging against a possible decline of U.S. influence and interest in the Middle East. Earlier this month, Saudi Arabia signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Pakistan and Turkey. The text of the agreement has not been released, so it is difficult to know what to make of claims that it constitutes a true defensive alliance with significant NATO–like protections. Pakistan and Turkey certainly did not, as Steven put it, “send the cavalry to help” when the Houthis fired on Saudi Arabia just forty-eight hours after the agreement was signed. The United Arab Emirates, meanwhile, is placing its chips on deepening the Abraham Accords, rather than following Riyadh. The rift between the two regional powers is real and could complicate U.S. diplomacy going forward. 3. The U.S. military presence in the Gulf will likely diminish in the years to come, but that could be a mixed blessing. For years, policymakers and experts have argued that the United States should reduce its role in the Middle East. In recent months, Steven and other Middle East experts have argued that this process is already underway as the Iran war ushers in a new regional order. But be careful what you wish for: a United States that is less involved in the Middle East could still see events emerging from the region that harm U.S. interests. As Steven put it, the “Iranians, the Saudis, the Turks, the Israelis, and others are going to try to order the region [in a way] that best serves their interests. And there’s the possibility for continued conflict and chaos as a result.” Oscar Berry and Asher Ross assisted in the preparation of this article. This work represents the views solely of the author(s). 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