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strikeApr 16, 2026

The End of Managed Escalation in the Gulf

Summary

Join War on the Rocks and gain access to content trusted by policymakers, military leaders, and strategic thinkers worldwide. The U.S.-Israeli war against Iran has exposed a reality many policymakers long preferred to avoid: The deterrence model that governed the Gulf for decades is no longer working as intended. For years, the region operated in the gray zone — covert strikes, proxy warfare, and carefully managed escalation. Iran built a strategy around missiles, regional partners, and nuclear latency. The United States underwrote Gulf security without direct war. Saudi Arabia and its neighbors relied on that umbrella while hedging against its limits, investing in missile defense and selective partnerships. There were rules, even if unwritten. That world is breaking down. The two-week ceasefire announced last week between the United States and Iran, brokered by Pakistan after 40 days of sustained bombardment, illustrates the point. What has emerged is not a durable settlement but a fragile pause, already strained by continued Israeli strikes on Lebanon, disputed terms over the Strait of Hormuz (and now a U.S. naval blockade), and Iranian accusations of violations. The ceasefire is less a return to order than a snapshot of its absence: ad hoc, conditional, and dependent on a mediator whose security relationship with both Washington and Tehran is itself constrained. What is emerging is not simply more escalation, but a different kind of conflict: direct, sustained confrontation without clear evidence that overwhelming force can deliver decisive political outcomes. The scale of the current campaign makes this plain. U.S. and Israeli operations have targeted Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, missile networks, and command systems at a tempo comparable to the opening phase of the 2003 Iraq War. By mid-March, U.S. and Israeli forces had conducted over 15,000 strikes across 26 of Iran’s 31 provinces with the U.S. military buildup described as the largest in the Middle East since 2003. Early reporting and official summaries confirm a broad campaign targeting Iranian leadership, nuclear sites, and missile forces across the country. Yet weeks into the conflict, Iran retains a meaningful portion of its missile arsenal and continues to strike across the region. U.S. intelligence assessments indicate that roughly a third of Iran’s missile arsenal has been confirmed destroyed, with another third likely damaged or buried in hardened underground sites. Separate analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that Iran’s missile launches fell sharply after the opening days of the war, while the Israeli military claimed that around 70 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers had been disabled by day 16. However, U.S. intelligence assessments disclosed by the Wall Street Journal suggest a different picture: Although more than half of Iran’s estimated 470 launchers had been destroyed, damaged, or trapped underground, many were likely repairable or recoverable. Iran’s missile stockpile had been roughly halved, but Tehran still retained thousands of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. This reveals the central problem: Destruction is not coercion. Military power can degrade capabilities without compelling political surrender — a dynamic long recognized in Thomas Schelling’s work on coercion as signaling and bargaining power, but now playing out in real time. The danger lies not just in escalation, but in escalation without a theory of victory. If military superiority inflicts damage without producing submission, and retaliation continues without restoring deterrence, then repeated strikes become a substitute for strategy rather than an instrument of it. That is not stability. It is managed failure. The Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly a fifth of global oil transits — now sits inside an active conflict zone. Any sustained disruption, whether through mining, retaliatory strikes on tanker traffic, or the withdrawal of commercial insurance, will ripple far beyond energy markets. Gulf economies depend on exposed coastal infrastructure: Desalination, ports, and food supply chains all lie within range of Iranian systems that have yet to be fully eliminated. Yemen’s war demonstrated how quickly supply disruption translates into civilian harm at scale, even in the absence of a direct blockade. A partial or full closure of Hormuz, accompanied by possible Houthi strikes on Bab el Mandeb, would strain humanitarian agencies and systems already operating at near capacity and limit surge capacity to deal with another shock that could affect many states in the Global South. For Iran, the lesson is unlikely to be restraint. Its threshold nuclear posture — remaining just short of a weapon — did not deter attack. If anything, it combined provocation with vulnerability. Under these conditions, the logic of pursuing a more survivable deterrent will strengthen. That conclusion will not stop in Tehran. Saudi Arabia now faces a sharper dilemma. Despite close defense cooperation with the United States — including combined efforts to counter missile and drone threats through the Red Sands Integrated Experimentation Center — the war demonstrates both Washington’s willingness and ability to use force at scale and the limits of that power. Iran retains the capacity to retaliate, escalation cannot be tightly controlled, and Gulf territory remains exposed. This is what a non-absolute security guarantee looks like in practice. Recent diplomacy points to how regional actors are adapting. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s April 2026 visit to the Gulf — focused in part on defense-industrial cooperation and wartime innovation — led to agreements with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar on countering threats from missiles and drones. Zelensky described these as “historic” 10-year strategic partnerships worth billions, encompassing joint defense-industrial projects, coproduction facilities, and the deployment of over 200 Ukrainian counter-drone experts across the region. Qatar’s agreement is particularly telling: It includes coproduction arrangements and technological partnerships that go well beyond procurement, signaling that at least some Gulf capitals now view sovereign manufacturing capacity as a security priority in its own right. The logic is straightforward: Gulf states have been expending costly Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense interceptors against cheap Iranian drones, and Ukraine offers a proven, lower-cost alternative. Ukraine’s war has become a live demonstration of how states can generate deterrent effects through scalable, relatively low-cost technologies. For Gulf states, the takeaway is not alignment with Kyiv, but emulation. There is still no obvious external substitute for American power. Saudi security ties with Pakistan, while politically useful, do not translate into credible wartime guarantees — particularly under conditions of U.S.-Iranian confrontation and nuclear risk. Its role as a mediator underscores this gap between partnership and commitment. Saudi Arabia, in other words, cannot outsource deterrence indefinitely. If the old model is eroding, the alternatives are narrowing. Doubling down on the United States — tighter integration, expanded missile defense — offers diminishing returns when sustained U.S. operations cannot eliminate Iran’s capacity to strike back. Building stronger conventional capabilities — long-range strike, hardened infrastructure, and cost-imposition strategies — improves resilience but does not restore the old equilibrium. A third pathway could emerge via minilateral cooperation built around specific capabilities rather than formal alliances. The Arab Gulf states are already working closely with U.S., UK, Australian, and French counterparts. They are likely to continue to work with European and Asian partners — particularly those with advanced defense-industrial bases such as South Korea, Turkey, and select European states — on codevelopment, procurement, and operational integration. These arrangements are narrower, more flexible, and better suited to an environment defined by rapid technological change and persistent competition. In this context, geographically targeted coercion regains relevance. An imminent or demonstrated capability to threaten Kharg Island — the critical node of Iran’s oil export infrastructure — could reintroduce deterrence at the margins by directly holding at risk the regime’s primary revenue stream. This logic can be found in Iran’s seizure of Abu Musa, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs in 1971: Control over strategically located nodes can shift deterrence perceptions without resolving the broader conflict. Now, there is the possibility of the United States retaking Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands based on the same rationale. Diplomacy remains necessary, but the prevailing model is flawed. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action addressed enrichment timelines but left Iran’s regional posture, missile program, and support for armed non-state actors largely intact. Returning to that model in the middle of an active military campaign would signal that escalation brings diplomatic reward — precisely the wrong incentive. A new deal should be holistic, incremental, and must aim to re-establish a degree of trust or at least predictability. No alternative security provider can replace the United States, and diversification reduces vulnerability only at the margins. This leaves the most sensitive outcome: the gradual erosion of the taboo around nuclear hedging. Israel remains the region’s only nuclear-armed state, an undeclared but widely understood reality that reinforces an already asymmetric deterrence landscape. For Gulf states, this sharpens a structural imbalance: While Israel benefits from both an implicit nuclear deterrent and close alignment with the United States, Arab Gulf partners operate without a comparable nuclear umbrella. Under conditions of persistent conflict and uncertain external guarantees, this asymmetry matters. If adversaries can threaten escalation at higher thresholds, while regional states remain exposed below that level, the incentive to develop an independent deterrent — whether through latency, hedging, or more explicit pathways — becomes harder to resist. What is taking shape is not a new balance, but a more fragile and more combustible order. Direct conflict is replacing proxy competition without producing decisive outcomes. Military superiority remains real but politically constrained. Adversaries can be punished, but not compelled. Under these conditions, deterrence becomes less about prevention and more about managing ongoing conflict. As analysis of Ukraine’s drone war shows, the spread of low cost, long-range strike capabilities is already reshaping Gulf defense planning, reinforcing a shift toward persistent attrition rather than decisive victory. Deterrence is no longer delivered by a single external guarantor. It is increasingly coproduced across networks of states, technologies, and industries. This is a structural shift, not a temporary adjustment. As these dynamics take hold, the incentives facing regional actors will change. If conventional force cannot guarantee security, and external guarantees cannot eliminate risk, nuclear weapons will become more attractive. The lesson of this war is not that deterrence has held. It is that deterrence, as traditionally understood in the Gulf, is beginning to fail. And as it fails, the risks will not remain confined to strategy. A region moving toward nuclear hedging is also one in which civilian populations face escalating danger with diminishing capacity to absorb shocks. The greatest risk now is that policymakers continue to act as if the old rules still apply — as if escalation can be controlled, and competition contained. That assumption is becoming one of the most dangerous variables in the system. Robert Mason, Ph.D., is an associate professor at the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in the United Arab Emirates. His research concerns the international relations of the Middle East with an emphasis on the foreign and security policies of the Gulf states. His latest work is Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates: Foreign Policy and Strategic Alliances in an Uncertain World (Manchester University Press, 2023). Rikard Jalkebro, Ph.D., is an associate professor at the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in the United Arab Emirates. His research sits at the intersection of peace and conflict studies, humanitarian action, and international relations, with a particular focus on peacebuilding, humanitarian diplomacy, and the politics of contemporary crises. Image: U.S. Army Security Assistance Command via DVIDS

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  • Daisy Johnston; Robert Mason; Rikard JalkebroBy Daisy Johnston; Robert Mason; Rikard Jalkebro

    Join War on the Rocks and gain access to content trusted by policymakers, military leaders, and strategic thinkers worldwide. The U.S.-Israeli war against Iran has exposed a reality many policymakers long preferred to avoid: The deterrence model that governed the Gulf for decades…

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Something Changed in a Single Day: Trump Claimed Backchannel Talks With the IRGC, Then Said No Talks Were Happening at All

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President Donald Trump has made another bombastic pronouncement amid the war with Iran. On Tuesday, he shared a map labeling the Strait of Hormuz “NEW U.S. Territory,” via his Truth Social platform. Iran has continued to stress that the strait will not be fully reopened until Washington meets its slew of demands, including ending its blockade on Iranian shipping and scrapping oil sanctions.

Ship Hit in Strait Just hours before Trump’s latest post, a vessel exiting the Strait of Hormuz was struck by an unidentified projectile off the coast of Oman. According to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, the ship’s engine room was hit, resulting in a “crew casualty.

” Officials did not immediately identify the vessel or its cargo. The Omani Coast Guard said it was assisting the remaining crew as authorities investigated the incident. Iran’s Stranglehold on the Strait Since the United States and Israel launched attacks on the Islamic Republic on February 28, Iran has tightly restricted shipping through the waterway.

Prior to the war, around one-fifth of globally traded oil passed through Hormuz. Iranian parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf said Tuesday that Tehran would maintain its restrictions until Washington fulfilled what Iran considers its commitments under the interim U.

S.-Iran agreement struck in June. Those demands include lifting the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports, releasing frozen Iranian assets, removing sanctions on Iranian oil and gas exports, and ending U.S. military threats and operations. “Until the United States fulfills its commitments under the agreement … the Strait of Hormuz will not reopen,” Qalibaf said.

Blockade Vs. Territory Asked in the Oval Office on Monday about his earlier suggestion that Hormuz could become American territory, the president said he liked the idea. “We control it with the blockade, and I like the idea of declaring it a territory,” Trump told reporters, adding: “We have total control over the strait now.

” Washington’s blockade is hitting Iranian shipping hard. U.S. Central Command said Monday that American forces had redirected 64 commercial vessels, disabled three ships, and boarded another two as part of the renewed blockade. That does not mean Washington has eliminated Iran’s ability to disrupt other shipping.

Tuesday’s unexplained attack came after a string of strikes on vessels attempting to navigate the area. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi also rejected Trump’s territorial claim on Tuesday, describing it as a “delusion.” Tehran has repeatedly maintained that it, rather than Washington, will determine when normal passage through the strait resumes.

Iran and Oman Near Deal Complicating matters further are separate negotiations between Iran and Oman, the two countries sitting on opposite sides of the strait. Iran said Monday that the two governments were finalizing details of an agreement concerning shipping routes through Hormuz.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said an “understanding has been reached regarding the map of the transit route.” Trump responded by threatening Oman, a longstanding U.S. partner, telling Fox News that Washington would “bomb the shit out of them” if Muscat “gets in the way.

” The diplomatic clock has already run down. The 60-day negotiating period established by the June memorandum between Washington and Tehran expired on Monday without a broader agreement being reached. Trump has said the United States is not seeking an extension.

Tehran Likely to Double Down Columnist Melanie Phillips slammed President Trump’s plans for a ceasefire last month, complaining that it had given Tehran the upper hand and showed that “everyone can now see America is not prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to defend itself.

” Trump has claimed Iran has essentially lost this war and that the blockade is massively damaging its economy. However, he has also instructed his team to pursue a “low-key” approach to talks. On July 7, Trump said the agreement was “over”, while Iran’s Foreign Ministry said it was “suspended” the following week.

“They should put up the white flag of surrender,” Trump told Fox News on Monday, claiming that backchannel talks with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were ongoing. The IRGC has denied these claims. On Tuesday, Trump dramatically changed his tune, stating that no talks with Iran were ongoing, and that no discussions were scheduled.

About the Author: Georgia Gilholy Georgia Gilholy is a journalist based in the United Kingdom who has been published in Newsweek, The Times of Israel, and the Spectator. Gilholy writes about international politics, culture, and education.

Location: Tehran
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Iran War Day 172: ‘No Talks’ Scheduled with Tehran, Trump Says

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Iran War Day 172: ‘No Talks’ Scheduled with Tehran, Trump Says In a post on Truth Social Tuesday President Donald Trump said that “there are no talks or conversations going on, or scheduled, with the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Trump added that the U.

S. naval blockade on the Strait of Hormuz “remains in full force and effect” and that the waterway “is open and operating.” In a separate post, Trump published an image labelling the strait as “NEW U.S. Territory.” Only six commodity ships transited the Strait of Hormuz on Monday, according to Kpler data cited by Reuters.

Iran’s Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said Tuesday, Until the commitments made by the United States in the memorandum of understanding, including the lifting of the blockade, the release of frozen assets, the lifting of oil sanctions, the end of threats and military operations on all fronts, and other conditions to which America agreed in the memorandum, are implemented, the strait will not be opened.

The deadline for that memorandum of understanding—signed by Trump and Iran’s president in June—expired on Monday. The two nations had agreed to negotiate a final peace deal over a 60-day period, but the framework agreement quickly fell apart, and the deadline seemingly wasn’t extended, despite mixed reporting.

Subscribe Today Get daily emails in your inbox Ghalibaf will lead a “high-level parliamentary delegation” to Iraq on Wednesday, Iran’s Fars news agency reported. The visit comes as pro-Iran militia groups face a September 30 deadline set by the Iraqi government to disarm.

Syria condemned reported Israeli strikes against Abu Duhur airbase on Tuesday, while the U.S. expressed concern over the incident. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack wrote on X that “we are deeply concerned that the confirmed Israeli airstrikes on Abu al-Duhur Airbase constitute an unnecessary escalation that does not advance regional stability.

” The price of Brent Crude oil was over $91 per barrel on Tuesday morning. AAA recorded the national average price of regular gas at $4.07.

Location: Tehran
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Trump says no talks planned with Iran, Tehran says Strait of Hormuz still shut

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U.S. President Donald Trump said on Tuesday no talks were taking place with Iran and none were scheduled, and he insisted that the Strait of Hormuz was open, contradicting an earlier Iranian assertion that the critical waterway remained shut to shipping.

The receding prospects of a deal to end the nearly six-month conflict drove up oil prices again on Tuesday, while stock markets sagged and borrowing costs for major economies including the U.S. hit multi-decade highs, amid concerns about the long-term inflationary and fiscal impact of the crisis.

A temporary ceasefire agreement expired on Monday and a senior Iranian official told Reuters that his country was moving to a “fully offensive” military posture due to the diplomatic stalemate, though there were no reports of fresh strikes by either side on Tuesday.

“There are no talks or conversations going on, or scheduled, with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Trump said in a post on Truth Social on Tuesday. “The Naval Blockade remains in full force and effect. The Hormuz Strait is open and operating. All water mines have been removed or detonated,” he added.

On Monday, Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and special envoy, had sounded an optimistic note, saying talks with Iran were still under way and were “probably more robust” than they had ever been. Despite Trump's typically ebullient remarks about the situation in the Gulf, preliminary shipping data on Tuesday showed ship crossings via the Strait of Hormuz were still in single digits on Monday.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations said it received a report on Tuesday that a vessel was struck by an unknown projectile while transiting outbound in the Strait of Hormuz, causing engine room damage and a crew casualty. The remaining crew were being assisted by the Omani Coast Guard, according to the report.

Top Iranian negotiator Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said in comments published by state media that the strait would remain shut until the U.S. met the conditions of an interim deal signed with Iran in June. These conditions include the U.S. lifting its blockade of Iranian ports, lifting oil sanctions, releasing Tehran's frozen assets, and ending threats and military operations on all fronts, Qalibaf told parliament.

A memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 had set a 60-day time frame for a broader deal on Iran's nuclear programme and U.S. sanctions. That period elapsed on Monday and Trump said he had no plans to extend it. The agreement, which declared the “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts,” had quickly unravelled over a dispute about control of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flowed before the war.

Both Trump and Tehran have frequently switched between threats and more emollient rhetoric as they seek a way out of the crisis, which erupted when the U.S. and Israel launched strikes against Iran on February 28. Iran remains open to dialogue with the U.

S. but does not confuse negotiations with surrender, Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Iran's supreme leader, said on Tuesday, according to the semi-official Fars news agency. Mokhber said military pressure and sanctions would not break Iran's resolve and that the country would defend its security, dignity and allies while not seeking war.

Even as Iran projects resilience in the war, its leaders are worried that a threat of more economic punishment could increase hardships, reignite unrest and further erode the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy, according to three Iranian officials. Thousands of people have been killed in the conflict, mainly in Iran and Lebanon.

Iran has bombed U.S. military bases and infrastructure in countries including Oman, Jordan, Kuwait, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Benchmark Brent crude oil futures have surged during the conflict, hitting a peak of $126 a barrel, roughly 75% above pre-war levels.

Brent crude futures settled up 20 cents on Tuesday at just over $91 a barrel. For Americans who will vote in November congressional elections, gasoline prices have risen above $4 per gallon, up from less than $3 before the war, according to the automotive group AAA.

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Iran’s gutted ranks leave loyalists filling critical posts — with one glaring problem

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Iran is rebuilding the upper ranks of its military and security establishment after months of wartime losses by turning largely to familiar veterans — figures whose careers in some cases stretch back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and previous domestic crackdowns.

The appointments follow the deaths of several senior Iranian commanders in U.S.-Israeli strikes since the war began Feb. 28, The National reported Aug. 11. For Washington, the stakes go beyond who fills the vacancies. The reshuffle puts veteran hardliners atop institutions that shape Iran’s military operations, national-security policy and internal security at a time of renewed confrontation with the United States.

The appointments do not prove that Tehran has run out of younger commanders or that loyalty was the sole criterion, but the reliance on figures whose careers stretch back decades is raising a broader question for U.S. policymakers: whether wartime losses have left Iran increasingly dependent on a smaller circle of trusted ideologues — potentially narrowing the room for compromise even as Washington tries to pressure Tehran back toward a deal.

IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD SIDELINES PRESIDENT AS MILITARY GRIP EXPANDS Former American prisoner Morad Tahbaz, who was detained in Iran in 2018 and freed in a U.S.-Iran prisoner exchange in September 2023, told Fox News Digital that he views the latest appointments as evidence of Tehran's continued dependence on longtime loyalists.

"They keep rotating the same old people, most of whom are fairly inept but are loyal to the Khamenei father and son," Tahbaz told Fox News Digital. The reshuffle spans Iran's conventional military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, its naval arm, the Basij paramilitary force and the country's highest national-security council.

Iran's state-run IRNA reported Aug. 10 that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed Ali Abdollahi chief of staff of the Armed Forces, Kioumars Heydari his deputy, Ahmad Vahidi commander of the IRGC, Mostafa Izadi deputy IRGC commander, Ali Ozmaei commander of the IRGC Navy and Hossein Taeb head of the Basij.

The previous day, former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei, 71, was named secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and Khamenei's representative on the powerful body. Reuters reported Aug. 10 that the SNSC coordinates Iran's security and foreign policy and that Rezaei replaced Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, who had been appointed secretary in late March following the death of his predecessor, Ali Larijani.

The appointments do not establish that Iran has run out of younger or less familiar commanders. But the reliance on longtime military and security figures has fueled assessments that wartime losses have narrowed the regime's pool of officials it regards as sufficiently experienced and politically trustworthy.

Erfan Fard wrote for the Middle East Forum on Aug. 15 that Khamenei was not promoting a new generation but turning to veterans of the revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, intelligence operations and domestic repression, arguing that an architecture based on "institutional memory, loyalty, and coercive power" was taking shape.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies argued in an Aug. 12 policy brief that the reshuffle looked "less like renewal than a game of musical chairs among regime veterans." The appointments also formalized the position of Ahmad Vahidi, a veteran hardliner who had already emerged near the center of wartime decision-making.

Vahidi was a major player in shaping Tehran's wartime policy and had risen through the IRGC's early intelligence and external-operations apparatus before later serving as defense and interior minister. As interior minister, Vahidi oversaw police units involved in the crackdown on the 2022 protests.

IRNA confirmed Aug. 10 that Khamenei promoted Vahidi to major general and formally appointed him commander-in-chief of the IRGC. WHO IS AHMAD VAHIDI? IRAN’S NEW IRGC CHIEF TIED TO GLOBAL ATTACKS AND ‘DEATH TO AMERICA’ IDEOLOGY Hossein Taeb: The intelligence veteran returns to the Basij to build a ‘20-million-strong Basij force.

’ One of the most closely watched appointments is Hossein Taeb, the cleric and veteran security official tapped to lead the Basij, the IRGC's volunteer paramilitary force that has repeatedly been used against domestic dissent. The National reported that the Basij has been used to suppress internal dissent, while The Times reported Aug.

12 that the force is embedded in neighborhoods, universities, workplaces, factories, ministries and mosques and has played a central role in suppressing successive uprisings. For Tahbaz, Taeb's return is personal. Tahbaz was detained in 2018, while Taeb was leading the IRGC Intelligence Organization.

"Ta’eb is extremely close to Mojtaba Khamenei but was very unceremoniously fired from his former position as head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization," Tahbaz told Fox News Digital. "He was personally responsible for my and my colleagues' arrests and detentions.

He lives and breathes conspiracy theories." The Times reported Aug. 12 that Taeb and Mojtaba Khamenei's relationship dates back more than four decades and that both served in the Habib Battalion during the Iran-Iraq War. The newspaper also reported that IRGC intelligence arrested environmentalists and dual nationals during Taeb's tenure.

Taeb previously commanded the Basij before moving into IRGC intelligence. The Times reported that months after the disputed 2009 election, the Guards' intelligence division was elevated into an independent organization with Taeb as its first chief. Taeb's earlier leadership of the Basij also drew U.

S. sanctions. In a Sept. 29, 2010 Treasury Department fact sheet, the U.S. government said that while Taeb commanded the Basij during the June 2009 election, forces under his command participated in "beatings, murder, and arbitrary arrests and detentions of peaceful protestors.

" According to IRNA, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf congratulated Taeb on his appointment as head of the Basij Organization, saying his tenure could mark a new chapter for the volunteer force. Ghalibaf said the Basij now needs a more comprehensive and forward-looking approach and argued that Taeb’s appointment by the supreme leader could help advance what he described as one of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s longstanding goals: building a 20-million-strong Basij force.

UN WATCHDOG SLAMS POTENTIAL ELECTION OF IRAN TO PANEL WITH HUMAN RIGHTS SWAY: 'LUNATICS RUNNING THE ASYLUM' Mohsen Rezaei: Back at the center after four decades Few appointments better illustrate the return of Iran's old guard than Mohsen Rezaei, who was named secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

Reuters reported Aug. 10 that Rezaei joined the IRGC shortly after the 1979 revolution, became its commander in 1981 at age 27 and led the force for 16 years, including through most of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. He later served as secretary of Iran's Expediency Discernment Council for more than two decades and as vice president for economic affairs from 2021 to 2023 under President Ebrahim Raisi.

Now, at 71, he is secretary of the SNSC and Khamenei's representative on the body. Beni Sabti, an Iran expert at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, argued that bringing back longtime figures such as Rezaei reflects weakness rather than renewal.

"This is, again, another evidence that they don't have anyone else," Sabti told Fox News Digital. "So they have to bring him out again from the desk and put him somewhere. These are the guys that they have." Rezaei and Vahidi were also among six people for whom INTERPOL authorized Red Notices requested by Argentina in 2007 in connection with the investigation into the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires.

INTERPOL said in November 2007 that its General Assembly upheld the publication of notices for six individuals, including Ahmad Vahidi and Mohsen Rezaei, after Iran challenged Argentina's requests. Sabti argued that Rezaei's re-emergence is particularly telling because Tehran's decision-making circle has become less ideologically diverse.

"Today, there is only one opinion, and this is the main problem," Sabti said. "This is why you think that there is unity and the system is stronger. No, it's not stronger. Actually, it's weaker also because of that." TRADE VESSEL STRUCK BY PROJECTILE IN STRAIT OF HORMUZ AMID US-IRAN TALKS Ali Abdollahi: A wartime commander takes the top military job Ali Abdollahi was elevated to chief of staff of Iran's Armed Forces, putting him at the top of the country's military command structure.

IRNA confirmed the appointment Aug. 10. Abdollahi had previously commanded the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, Iran's joint operational command responsible for coordinating its armed forces in wartime, according to Iran International on Aug. 10.

His appointment also comes amid an effort to integrate the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters more closely with the Armed Forces General Staff. Le Monde reported Aug. 11 that Abdollahi's task includes completing that integration in an effort to further centralize command and coordination.

Fard argued in his Aug. 15 Middle East Forum analysis that Abdollahi's elevation exemplifies Tehran's reliance on longstanding revolutionary-security figures rather than a generational break. FREED AMERICAN REVEALS BRUTAL IRAN PRISON ORDEAL, WARNS HOSTAGES FACE GREATER DANGER Kioumars Heydari: The regular army moves closer to the center Former Army Ground Forces commander Kioumars Heydari was appointed deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces, bringing a senior officer from Iran's conventional military into the new command structure.

The National reported that Heydari formerly commanded the Army Ground Forces and has held senior positions in Iran's regular army, known as the Artesh. IRNA independently confirmed his appointment. His inclusion also demonstrates that the reshuffle is not limited to the IRGC.

Fard argued in the Middle East Forum that Heydari's previous public rhetoric surrounding protest suppression indicates that Tehran has increasingly integrated the regular army into its domestic-security posture. Mostafa Izadi: Another veteran rises inside the IRGC Mostafa Izadi was appointed Vahidi's deputy, putting another longtime commander near the top of the IRGC hierarchy.

IRNA confirmed Izadi's appointment Aug. 10, while The National described him Aug. 11 as a veteran commander who has held a number of senior positions in Iran's military and security establishment. Iran International reported that Izadi previously commanded the Cyber and New Threats Headquarters within the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters.

IRAN HARDLINER BEHIND US DEAL WARNS TEHRAN WON’T HONOR AGREEMENT IF TRUMP FAILS TO DELIVER Ali Ozmaei: A new commander at one of Iran's most sensitive fronts Rear Adm. Ali Ozmaei was appointed commander of the IRGC Navy, putting him in charge of a force central to Iran's military posture in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.

The National reported Aug. 11 that Ozmaei replaced Alireza Tangsiri, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike in March, and that the IRGC Navy is responsible for Iran's military operations in the Gulf and around the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian state media also highlighted Ozmaei's longstanding maritime experience.

IRNA reported Aug. 11 that Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf praised Ozmaei's years in maritime defense and his familiarity with the current conflict and the Strait of Hormuz. The appointment came one day before Rezaei said the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed unless the United States changed its behavior and accepted Iran's conditions.

Reuters reported that Rezaei said Washington would have to end the war and unfreeze Iranian funds overseas, with other conditions relayed through mediators. Taken together, the seven personnel changes show Tehran moving to fill and reshuffle critical military and security posts after significant wartime losses.

What remains an assessment rather than an established fact is whether the identities of those chosen reveal a deeper shortage of trusted successors. Sabti said the return of veteran figures reflected what he sees as a shrinking bench of trusted officials and a less diverse decision-making circle.

Tahbaz offered a less academic version of that assessment. CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD THE FOX NEWS APP "They keep rotating the same old people," he said.

Location: Tehran
Efrat Lachter