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strikeMay 3, 2026

Three narratives of winning in one world * WorldNetDaily * by Abdulwajid Soroush, Real Clear Wire

Summary

On February 28, the United States and Israel launched large-scale strikes against Iran’s military and nuclear facilities in an operation introduced under the names Epic Wrath and Lion’s Roar. On the first day of the war, Donald Trump described it as a “short-term excursion” that would end quickly. His defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, declared at his first press conference that “This is not Iraq. This is not endless.” Trump’s secretary of state, Marco Rubio, also reassured America’s G7 partners that the operation would be over “in weeks, not months.” Yet after forty days of fighting, the war culminated in a two-week ceasefire on April 9, 2026, with Islamabad hosting talks between Iran and the United States. Once the ceasefire was announced, all three principal actors claimed victory. The White House described the two-week ceasefire with Iran as a win for the United States. In a televised address, Benjamin Netanyahu endorsed the ceasefire and, by declaring that “Iran is weaker than ever, and Israel has never been stronger” implicitly framed the outcome as an Israeli victory. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, for its part, announced that the enemy had suffered a historic and crushing defeat and that Iran had achieved a “massive and historic victory.” This raises an obvious question: how can all three sides in the same war claim to have won at the same time? At first glance, victory in war may seem like a simple concept: the side that defeats its enemy is the victor. But in modern warfare, victory is less and less defined by the total destruction of the adversary and more by the extent to which each state achieves its strategic objectives. That is why governments interpret outcomes through the lens of the goals they pursued from the outset. The current war is no exception. Each of the three sides has interpreted the two-week ceasefire as its own victory by relying on a different standard of success. This essay examines the strategic logic at work in Tehran, Tel Aviv, and Washington in order to show how each side, shaped by its own security imperatives and political objectives, has arrived at a distinct definition of victory. These definitions are in direct tension with one another. Yet within the internal logic of each state’s wartime calculus, they appear entirely coherent and defensible. Get the hottest, most important news stories on the Internet – delivered FREE to your inbox as soon as they break! Take just 30 seconds and sign up for WND's Email News Alerts! Iran In the Islamic Republic’s official discourse, victory is not confined to battlefield outcomes. It is rooted in a theological framework that allows even apparent defeat to be reinterpreted as success. As Afshon Ostovar argues in Vanguard of the Imams, during the Iran and Iraq War Iranian leaders did not simply pursue military victory; they actively reshaped its meaning. Messages directed at fighters emphasized sacrifice, endurance, and martyrdom as forms of achievement in their own right. As Ruhollah Khomeini argued, “victory itself is an act of devotion,” and the early Imams, while politically defeated, were spiritually triumphant. In this narrative, steadfastness itself becomes victory. Yet in the current war, Tehran’s narrative goes beyond theology. It is closely tied to a strategic reading of asymmetric conflict. Recognizing that it cannot defeat the United States or Israel in conventional terms, Iran has defined success in terms of survival and resistance. Here, the goal is not to destroy the enemy, but to prevent the enemy from achieving its objectives. As Andrew Mack in “Why Big Nations Lose Small War” famously argued, in asymmetric wars the weaker side wins simply by avoiding defeat an insight often echoed in Henry Kissinger’s dictum that “the guerrilla wins if he does not lose.” From this perspective, Iran casts itself as the weaker actor that has denied Washington and Tel Aviv a decisive outcome. After forty days of heavy strikes reportedly including damage to missile and nuclear infrastructure and the loss of senior commanders Tehran frames the preservation of its command structure, political system, and minimum capacity for retaliation as evidence of success. In this logic, the costs of war are secondary to the central objective of regime survival. Not losing becomes indistinguishable from winning. A second pillar of Iran’s claim to victory lies in its ability to impose costs on the attacker and erode the adversary’s political will. From Tehran’s viewpoint, the shift from expectations of a rapid campaign to a ceasefire and negotiations suggests that the costs of continuing the war began to outweigh its benefits for Washington. While this interpretation is contested U.S. officials can just as plausibly argue that the ceasefire reflects the achievement of limited objectives within Iran’s strategic calculus, compelling the adversary to halt military operations constitutes a meaningful success. In this sense, the talks in Islamabad are presented not as a compromise, but as the outcome of sustained resistance. At the same time, Iranian officials have emphasized the preservation of deterrence even in a limited form as a key indicator of victory. In the Islamic Republic’s security logic, defeat would mean the complete erosion of retaliatory capability and the perception that Iran is no longer able to respond. Short of that threshold, even limited military responses or the maintenance of residual capabilities can be framed as success. Moreover, the implicit threat of disrupting the Strait of Hormuz has functioned as a geopolitical lever, reshaping the cost-benefit calculus of the conflict in Iran’s favor. Taken together, these material considerations combined with the enduring theological narrative allow Tehran to portray the two-week ceasefire not as a setback, but as a “great and historic victory.” Israel In Tel Aviv’s narrative, the concept of victory is defined first and foremost within a security doctrine that dates back to David Ben-Gurion. This doctrine rests on several core principles: deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory in the event of war. These principles are rooted in a fundamental geopolitical reality: Israel is a small state with limited strategic depth and therefore cannot sustain prolonged wars of attrition. For this reason, its strategy emphasizes delivering a rapid and effective blow that deprives the enemy of the ability to continue fighting. Within this framework, victory does not necessarily require the total destruction of the adversary. Rather, it consists in creating a situation in which the enemy is either unable or unwilling to continue the conflict. In Israeli strategic thinking, this condition is what constitutes “decisive victory.” Building on this framework, Tel Aviv evaluates the outcome of war through a simple criterion: whether the enemy is weaker at the end of the conflict than it was at the beginning. In this context, another important principle within Israel’s security doctrine is the so-called Begin Doctrine. According to this principle, Israel will not allow any regional adversary that threatens its existence to acquire weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear capabilities. For this reason, in Israeli security thinking, preventing the emergence of such a threat through preemptive action is itself considered a strategic success in war. Benjamin Netanyahu has invoked this same standard, describing the Islamic Republic as “weaker than ever” and treating this relative weakening compared to its initial position as evidence of success. Accordingly, in Israeli strategic discourse, “success” refers to a condition in which the adversary no longer possesses either the operational capacity or the psychological willingness to continue the conflict. At the same time, Israel defines its primary victory in terms of direct and targeted strikes against Iran’s military, industrial, and command infrastructure. The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), emphasizing the principle of shortening wars, argues that prolonged and costly wars of attrition run counter to Israel’s operational, economic, and societal interests. On this basis, actions such as disabling command-and-control centers, eliminating senior commanders and nuclear specialists, and degrading missile production and launch capabilities are treated as indicators of victory. The reasoning is that such measures significantly increase the cost of any future confrontation for Iran while simultaneously reducing its operational capacity and freedom of strategic maneuver. The sustained targeting of Iran’s critical infrastructure and key strategic assets over the course of the forty-day campaign demonstrated that even the most concealed defensive layers and underground facilities were vulnerable to Israel’s military capabilities and intelligence penetration. From this perspective, Israel’s most important achievement in the current war lies not merely in the scale of damage inflicted, but in the shift of the strategic balance in its favor. In Tel Aviv’s official narrative, the war demonstrated that Israel continues to possess superiority in intelligence, technology, and operational capability, and that it is able, when necessary, to penetrate deep into the adversary’s military network. This perception contributes to the restoration of Israeli deterrence and signals to regional actors that the cost of direct confrontation with Israel remains extremely high. For this reason, within Israel’s security logic, victory is ultimately achieved when the adversary emerges from the war with less strategic initiative and reduced capacity compared to its initial position. United States The Donald Trump administration defines victory in the war with Iran as the physical destruction of its military and nuclear capabilities without becoming trapped in a prolonged conflict. From the outset, Trump officials made clear that regime change in Iran was not the objective. Instead, the degradation of Iran’s strategic capabilities was understood as the central goal of the operation. Within this framework, U.S. officials argue that the strikes shifted the balance of power to such an extent that Iran’s deterrent capacity was effectively neutralized and the cost of any meaningful retaliation became prohibitively high. When Trump speaks of a “major victory,” he is referring to the downgrading of the adversary’s warfighting capacity to a level where it no longer poses an immediate threat to U.S. interests. In this sense, the military phase of the conflict is presented as having achieved its objective. At the same time, in the Trump administration’s narrative, the ceasefire itself is interpreted as the imposition of U.S. will on Iran. From Washington’s perspective, Iran’s presence at the Islamabad talks following a period of intense conflict is itself evidence of success. This participation is framed not as a voluntary diplomatic move, but as the direct result of military pressure and the disabling of critical infrastructure. In this view, the war was successfully shifted from the battlefield to the negotiating table, and any agreement reached under the shadow of military coercion is understood as a diplomatic victory for the United States. For Trump, declaring victory was also a political necessity. He had entered the war promising a “short-term excursion” and a rapid conclusion, and any acknowledgment of stalemate or even limited Iranian success would have undermined his political standing and legacy. In the context of domestic politics, framing the outcome as a victory allowed him to deflect attention from the costs of the conflict, including economic disruption and potential casualties, and to avoid comparisons with past U.S. entanglements in the Middle East. In this sense, the declaration of victory reflects not only battlefield dynamics but also the imperatives of political survival and the maintenance of domestic support. Ultimately, this war shows that victory in modern conflicts is no longer a single, measurable outcome, but a fluid concept shaped by each actor’s objectives. Iran defines victory as survival and resistance, Israel as weakening the adversary, and the United States as achieving results without a prolonged war. These definitions, while in tension, remain coherent within each actor’s strategic logic. In this sense, victory is less an objective reality than a narrative parallel claims of success that each side can rationally sustain. Abdulwajid Soroush holds a master’s degree in political science from University of Tehran and is a columnist on Middle Eastern and geopolitical issues, with a focus on conflict and regional security.

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  • RealClearWireBy RealClearWire

    On February 28, the United States and Israel launched large-scale strikes against Iran’s military and nuclear facilities in an operation introduced under the names Epic Wrath and Lion’s Roar. On the first day of the war, Donald Trump described it as a “short-term excursion” that …

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Something Changed in a Single Day: Trump Claimed Backchannel Talks With the IRGC, Then Said No Talks Were Happening at All

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President Donald Trump has made another bombastic pronouncement amid the war with Iran. On Tuesday, he shared a map labeling the Strait of Hormuz “NEW U.S. Territory,” via his Truth Social platform. Iran has continued to stress that the strait will not be fully reopened until Washington meets its slew of demands, including ending its blockade on Iranian shipping and scrapping oil sanctions.

Ship Hit in Strait Just hours before Trump’s latest post, a vessel exiting the Strait of Hormuz was struck by an unidentified projectile off the coast of Oman. According to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, the ship’s engine room was hit, resulting in a “crew casualty.

” Officials did not immediately identify the vessel or its cargo. The Omani Coast Guard said it was assisting the remaining crew as authorities investigated the incident. Iran’s Stranglehold on the Strait Since the United States and Israel launched attacks on the Islamic Republic on February 28, Iran has tightly restricted shipping through the waterway.

Prior to the war, around one-fifth of globally traded oil passed through Hormuz. Iranian parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf said Tuesday that Tehran would maintain its restrictions until Washington fulfilled what Iran considers its commitments under the interim U.

S.-Iran agreement struck in June. Those demands include lifting the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports, releasing frozen Iranian assets, removing sanctions on Iranian oil and gas exports, and ending U.S. military threats and operations. “Until the United States fulfills its commitments under the agreement … the Strait of Hormuz will not reopen,” Qalibaf said.

Blockade Vs. Territory Asked in the Oval Office on Monday about his earlier suggestion that Hormuz could become American territory, the president said he liked the idea. “We control it with the blockade, and I like the idea of declaring it a territory,” Trump told reporters, adding: “We have total control over the strait now.

” Washington’s blockade is hitting Iranian shipping hard. U.S. Central Command said Monday that American forces had redirected 64 commercial vessels, disabled three ships, and boarded another two as part of the renewed blockade. That does not mean Washington has eliminated Iran’s ability to disrupt other shipping.

Tuesday’s unexplained attack came after a string of strikes on vessels attempting to navigate the area. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi also rejected Trump’s territorial claim on Tuesday, describing it as a “delusion.” Tehran has repeatedly maintained that it, rather than Washington, will determine when normal passage through the strait resumes.

Iran and Oman Near Deal Complicating matters further are separate negotiations between Iran and Oman, the two countries sitting on opposite sides of the strait. Iran said Monday that the two governments were finalizing details of an agreement concerning shipping routes through Hormuz.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said an “understanding has been reached regarding the map of the transit route.” Trump responded by threatening Oman, a longstanding U.S. partner, telling Fox News that Washington would “bomb the shit out of them” if Muscat “gets in the way.

” The diplomatic clock has already run down. The 60-day negotiating period established by the June memorandum between Washington and Tehran expired on Monday without a broader agreement being reached. Trump has said the United States is not seeking an extension.

Tehran Likely to Double Down Columnist Melanie Phillips slammed President Trump’s plans for a ceasefire last month, complaining that it had given Tehran the upper hand and showed that “everyone can now see America is not prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to defend itself.

” Trump has claimed Iran has essentially lost this war and that the blockade is massively damaging its economy. However, he has also instructed his team to pursue a “low-key” approach to talks. On July 7, Trump said the agreement was “over”, while Iran’s Foreign Ministry said it was “suspended” the following week.

“They should put up the white flag of surrender,” Trump told Fox News on Monday, claiming that backchannel talks with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were ongoing. The IRGC has denied these claims. On Tuesday, Trump dramatically changed his tune, stating that no talks with Iran were ongoing, and that no discussions were scheduled.

About the Author: Georgia Gilholy Georgia Gilholy is a journalist based in the United Kingdom who has been published in Newsweek, The Times of Israel, and the Spectator. Gilholy writes about international politics, culture, and education.

Location: Tehran
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Iran War Day 172: ‘No Talks’ Scheduled with Tehran, Trump Says

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Iran War Day 172: ‘No Talks’ Scheduled with Tehran, Trump Says In a post on Truth Social Tuesday President Donald Trump said that “there are no talks or conversations going on, or scheduled, with the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Trump added that the U.

S. naval blockade on the Strait of Hormuz “remains in full force and effect” and that the waterway “is open and operating.” In a separate post, Trump published an image labelling the strait as “NEW U.S. Territory.” Only six commodity ships transited the Strait of Hormuz on Monday, according to Kpler data cited by Reuters.

Iran’s Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said Tuesday, Until the commitments made by the United States in the memorandum of understanding, including the lifting of the blockade, the release of frozen assets, the lifting of oil sanctions, the end of threats and military operations on all fronts, and other conditions to which America agreed in the memorandum, are implemented, the strait will not be opened.

The deadline for that memorandum of understanding—signed by Trump and Iran’s president in June—expired on Monday. The two nations had agreed to negotiate a final peace deal over a 60-day period, but the framework agreement quickly fell apart, and the deadline seemingly wasn’t extended, despite mixed reporting.

Subscribe Today Get daily emails in your inbox Ghalibaf will lead a “high-level parliamentary delegation” to Iraq on Wednesday, Iran’s Fars news agency reported. The visit comes as pro-Iran militia groups face a September 30 deadline set by the Iraqi government to disarm.

Syria condemned reported Israeli strikes against Abu Duhur airbase on Tuesday, while the U.S. expressed concern over the incident. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack wrote on X that “we are deeply concerned that the confirmed Israeli airstrikes on Abu al-Duhur Airbase constitute an unnecessary escalation that does not advance regional stability.

” The price of Brent Crude oil was over $91 per barrel on Tuesday morning. AAA recorded the national average price of regular gas at $4.07.

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Trump says no talks planned with Iran, Tehran says Strait of Hormuz still shut

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U.S. President Donald Trump said on Tuesday no talks were taking place with Iran and none were scheduled, and he insisted that the Strait of Hormuz was open, contradicting an earlier Iranian assertion that the critical waterway remained shut to shipping.

The receding prospects of a deal to end the nearly six-month conflict drove up oil prices again on Tuesday, while stock markets sagged and borrowing costs for major economies including the U.S. hit multi-decade highs, amid concerns about the long-term inflationary and fiscal impact of the crisis.

A temporary ceasefire agreement expired on Monday and a senior Iranian official told Reuters that his country was moving to a “fully offensive” military posture due to the diplomatic stalemate, though there were no reports of fresh strikes by either side on Tuesday.

“There are no talks or conversations going on, or scheduled, with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Trump said in a post on Truth Social on Tuesday. “The Naval Blockade remains in full force and effect. The Hormuz Strait is open and operating. All water mines have been removed or detonated,” he added.

On Monday, Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and special envoy, had sounded an optimistic note, saying talks with Iran were still under way and were “probably more robust” than they had ever been. Despite Trump's typically ebullient remarks about the situation in the Gulf, preliminary shipping data on Tuesday showed ship crossings via the Strait of Hormuz were still in single digits on Monday.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations said it received a report on Tuesday that a vessel was struck by an unknown projectile while transiting outbound in the Strait of Hormuz, causing engine room damage and a crew casualty. The remaining crew were being assisted by the Omani Coast Guard, according to the report.

Top Iranian negotiator Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said in comments published by state media that the strait would remain shut until the U.S. met the conditions of an interim deal signed with Iran in June. These conditions include the U.S. lifting its blockade of Iranian ports, lifting oil sanctions, releasing Tehran's frozen assets, and ending threats and military operations on all fronts, Qalibaf told parliament.

A memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 had set a 60-day time frame for a broader deal on Iran's nuclear programme and U.S. sanctions. That period elapsed on Monday and Trump said he had no plans to extend it. The agreement, which declared the “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts,” had quickly unravelled over a dispute about control of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flowed before the war.

Both Trump and Tehran have frequently switched between threats and more emollient rhetoric as they seek a way out of the crisis, which erupted when the U.S. and Israel launched strikes against Iran on February 28. Iran remains open to dialogue with the U.

S. but does not confuse negotiations with surrender, Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Iran's supreme leader, said on Tuesday, according to the semi-official Fars news agency. Mokhber said military pressure and sanctions would not break Iran's resolve and that the country would defend its security, dignity and allies while not seeking war.

Even as Iran projects resilience in the war, its leaders are worried that a threat of more economic punishment could increase hardships, reignite unrest and further erode the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy, according to three Iranian officials. Thousands of people have been killed in the conflict, mainly in Iran and Lebanon.

Iran has bombed U.S. military bases and infrastructure in countries including Oman, Jordan, Kuwait, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Benchmark Brent crude oil futures have surged during the conflict, hitting a peak of $126 a barrel, roughly 75% above pre-war levels.

Brent crude futures settled up 20 cents on Tuesday at just over $91 a barrel. For Americans who will vote in November congressional elections, gasoline prices have risen above $4 per gallon, up from less than $3 before the war, according to the automotive group AAA.

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Iran’s gutted ranks leave loyalists filling critical posts — with one glaring problem

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Iran is rebuilding the upper ranks of its military and security establishment after months of wartime losses by turning largely to familiar veterans — figures whose careers in some cases stretch back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and previous domestic crackdowns.

The appointments follow the deaths of several senior Iranian commanders in U.S.-Israeli strikes since the war began Feb. 28, The National reported Aug. 11. For Washington, the stakes go beyond who fills the vacancies. The reshuffle puts veteran hardliners atop institutions that shape Iran’s military operations, national-security policy and internal security at a time of renewed confrontation with the United States.

The appointments do not prove that Tehran has run out of younger commanders or that loyalty was the sole criterion, but the reliance on figures whose careers stretch back decades is raising a broader question for U.S. policymakers: whether wartime losses have left Iran increasingly dependent on a smaller circle of trusted ideologues — potentially narrowing the room for compromise even as Washington tries to pressure Tehran back toward a deal.

IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD SIDELINES PRESIDENT AS MILITARY GRIP EXPANDS Former American prisoner Morad Tahbaz, who was detained in Iran in 2018 and freed in a U.S.-Iran prisoner exchange in September 2023, told Fox News Digital that he views the latest appointments as evidence of Tehran's continued dependence on longtime loyalists.

"They keep rotating the same old people, most of whom are fairly inept but are loyal to the Khamenei father and son," Tahbaz told Fox News Digital. The reshuffle spans Iran's conventional military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, its naval arm, the Basij paramilitary force and the country's highest national-security council.

Iran's state-run IRNA reported Aug. 10 that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed Ali Abdollahi chief of staff of the Armed Forces, Kioumars Heydari his deputy, Ahmad Vahidi commander of the IRGC, Mostafa Izadi deputy IRGC commander, Ali Ozmaei commander of the IRGC Navy and Hossein Taeb head of the Basij.

The previous day, former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei, 71, was named secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and Khamenei's representative on the powerful body. Reuters reported Aug. 10 that the SNSC coordinates Iran's security and foreign policy and that Rezaei replaced Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, who had been appointed secretary in late March following the death of his predecessor, Ali Larijani.

The appointments do not establish that Iran has run out of younger or less familiar commanders. But the reliance on longtime military and security figures has fueled assessments that wartime losses have narrowed the regime's pool of officials it regards as sufficiently experienced and politically trustworthy.

Erfan Fard wrote for the Middle East Forum on Aug. 15 that Khamenei was not promoting a new generation but turning to veterans of the revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, intelligence operations and domestic repression, arguing that an architecture based on "institutional memory, loyalty, and coercive power" was taking shape.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies argued in an Aug. 12 policy brief that the reshuffle looked "less like renewal than a game of musical chairs among regime veterans." The appointments also formalized the position of Ahmad Vahidi, a veteran hardliner who had already emerged near the center of wartime decision-making.

Vahidi was a major player in shaping Tehran's wartime policy and had risen through the IRGC's early intelligence and external-operations apparatus before later serving as defense and interior minister. As interior minister, Vahidi oversaw police units involved in the crackdown on the 2022 protests.

IRNA confirmed Aug. 10 that Khamenei promoted Vahidi to major general and formally appointed him commander-in-chief of the IRGC. WHO IS AHMAD VAHIDI? IRAN’S NEW IRGC CHIEF TIED TO GLOBAL ATTACKS AND ‘DEATH TO AMERICA’ IDEOLOGY Hossein Taeb: The intelligence veteran returns to the Basij to build a ‘20-million-strong Basij force.

’ One of the most closely watched appointments is Hossein Taeb, the cleric and veteran security official tapped to lead the Basij, the IRGC's volunteer paramilitary force that has repeatedly been used against domestic dissent. The National reported that the Basij has been used to suppress internal dissent, while The Times reported Aug.

12 that the force is embedded in neighborhoods, universities, workplaces, factories, ministries and mosques and has played a central role in suppressing successive uprisings. For Tahbaz, Taeb's return is personal. Tahbaz was detained in 2018, while Taeb was leading the IRGC Intelligence Organization.

"Ta’eb is extremely close to Mojtaba Khamenei but was very unceremoniously fired from his former position as head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization," Tahbaz told Fox News Digital. "He was personally responsible for my and my colleagues' arrests and detentions.

He lives and breathes conspiracy theories." The Times reported Aug. 12 that Taeb and Mojtaba Khamenei's relationship dates back more than four decades and that both served in the Habib Battalion during the Iran-Iraq War. The newspaper also reported that IRGC intelligence arrested environmentalists and dual nationals during Taeb's tenure.

Taeb previously commanded the Basij before moving into IRGC intelligence. The Times reported that months after the disputed 2009 election, the Guards' intelligence division was elevated into an independent organization with Taeb as its first chief. Taeb's earlier leadership of the Basij also drew U.

S. sanctions. In a Sept. 29, 2010 Treasury Department fact sheet, the U.S. government said that while Taeb commanded the Basij during the June 2009 election, forces under his command participated in "beatings, murder, and arbitrary arrests and detentions of peaceful protestors.

" According to IRNA, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf congratulated Taeb on his appointment as head of the Basij Organization, saying his tenure could mark a new chapter for the volunteer force. Ghalibaf said the Basij now needs a more comprehensive and forward-looking approach and argued that Taeb’s appointment by the supreme leader could help advance what he described as one of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s longstanding goals: building a 20-million-strong Basij force.

UN WATCHDOG SLAMS POTENTIAL ELECTION OF IRAN TO PANEL WITH HUMAN RIGHTS SWAY: 'LUNATICS RUNNING THE ASYLUM' Mohsen Rezaei: Back at the center after four decades Few appointments better illustrate the return of Iran's old guard than Mohsen Rezaei, who was named secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

Reuters reported Aug. 10 that Rezaei joined the IRGC shortly after the 1979 revolution, became its commander in 1981 at age 27 and led the force for 16 years, including through most of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. He later served as secretary of Iran's Expediency Discernment Council for more than two decades and as vice president for economic affairs from 2021 to 2023 under President Ebrahim Raisi.

Now, at 71, he is secretary of the SNSC and Khamenei's representative on the body. Beni Sabti, an Iran expert at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, argued that bringing back longtime figures such as Rezaei reflects weakness rather than renewal.

"This is, again, another evidence that they don't have anyone else," Sabti told Fox News Digital. "So they have to bring him out again from the desk and put him somewhere. These are the guys that they have." Rezaei and Vahidi were also among six people for whom INTERPOL authorized Red Notices requested by Argentina in 2007 in connection with the investigation into the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires.

INTERPOL said in November 2007 that its General Assembly upheld the publication of notices for six individuals, including Ahmad Vahidi and Mohsen Rezaei, after Iran challenged Argentina's requests. Sabti argued that Rezaei's re-emergence is particularly telling because Tehran's decision-making circle has become less ideologically diverse.

"Today, there is only one opinion, and this is the main problem," Sabti said. "This is why you think that there is unity and the system is stronger. No, it's not stronger. Actually, it's weaker also because of that." TRADE VESSEL STRUCK BY PROJECTILE IN STRAIT OF HORMUZ AMID US-IRAN TALKS Ali Abdollahi: A wartime commander takes the top military job Ali Abdollahi was elevated to chief of staff of Iran's Armed Forces, putting him at the top of the country's military command structure.

IRNA confirmed the appointment Aug. 10. Abdollahi had previously commanded the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, Iran's joint operational command responsible for coordinating its armed forces in wartime, according to Iran International on Aug. 10.

His appointment also comes amid an effort to integrate the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters more closely with the Armed Forces General Staff. Le Monde reported Aug. 11 that Abdollahi's task includes completing that integration in an effort to further centralize command and coordination.

Fard argued in his Aug. 15 Middle East Forum analysis that Abdollahi's elevation exemplifies Tehran's reliance on longstanding revolutionary-security figures rather than a generational break. FREED AMERICAN REVEALS BRUTAL IRAN PRISON ORDEAL, WARNS HOSTAGES FACE GREATER DANGER Kioumars Heydari: The regular army moves closer to the center Former Army Ground Forces commander Kioumars Heydari was appointed deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces, bringing a senior officer from Iran's conventional military into the new command structure.

The National reported that Heydari formerly commanded the Army Ground Forces and has held senior positions in Iran's regular army, known as the Artesh. IRNA independently confirmed his appointment. His inclusion also demonstrates that the reshuffle is not limited to the IRGC.

Fard argued in the Middle East Forum that Heydari's previous public rhetoric surrounding protest suppression indicates that Tehran has increasingly integrated the regular army into its domestic-security posture. Mostafa Izadi: Another veteran rises inside the IRGC Mostafa Izadi was appointed Vahidi's deputy, putting another longtime commander near the top of the IRGC hierarchy.

IRNA confirmed Izadi's appointment Aug. 10, while The National described him Aug. 11 as a veteran commander who has held a number of senior positions in Iran's military and security establishment. Iran International reported that Izadi previously commanded the Cyber and New Threats Headquarters within the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters.

IRAN HARDLINER BEHIND US DEAL WARNS TEHRAN WON’T HONOR AGREEMENT IF TRUMP FAILS TO DELIVER Ali Ozmaei: A new commander at one of Iran's most sensitive fronts Rear Adm. Ali Ozmaei was appointed commander of the IRGC Navy, putting him in charge of a force central to Iran's military posture in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.

The National reported Aug. 11 that Ozmaei replaced Alireza Tangsiri, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike in March, and that the IRGC Navy is responsible for Iran's military operations in the Gulf and around the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian state media also highlighted Ozmaei's longstanding maritime experience.

IRNA reported Aug. 11 that Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf praised Ozmaei's years in maritime defense and his familiarity with the current conflict and the Strait of Hormuz. The appointment came one day before Rezaei said the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed unless the United States changed its behavior and accepted Iran's conditions.

Reuters reported that Rezaei said Washington would have to end the war and unfreeze Iranian funds overseas, with other conditions relayed through mediators. Taken together, the seven personnel changes show Tehran moving to fill and reshuffle critical military and security posts after significant wartime losses.

What remains an assessment rather than an established fact is whether the identities of those chosen reveal a deeper shortage of trusted successors. Sabti said the return of veteran figures reflected what he sees as a shrinking bench of trusted officials and a less diverse decision-making circle.

Tahbaz offered a less academic version of that assessment. CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD THE FOX NEWS APP "They keep rotating the same old people," he said.

Location: Tehran
Efrat Lachter