Will Iran war start a nuclear arms race in Middle East?

Summary

Will Iran war start a nuclear arms race in Middle East? There is little doubt that the nuclear threat in the Middle East has risen during the current conflict. During the war, which started in late February when the US and Israel attacked Iran, nuclear sites in both Iran and Israel have been targeted. IAEA informed by Iran of a new strike in the area of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, the third such incident in 10 days. No damage to operating reactor nor any radiation release reported, and condition of plant is normal, Iran says. DG @rafaelmgrossi again expresses deep… pic.twitter.com/cGIUSZJMyV — IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency ⚛️ (@iaeaorg) March 27, 2026 US President Donald Trump has said that thewar on Iran was launched in order to prevent Iran getting a nuclear weapon. But, experts suggest, this may well backfire. READ: Iran was not rebuilding nuclear enrichment, US intelligence finds Possessing nuclear arms is supposed to be a deterrent. The theory is that they prevent your enemies from acting against you. Observers often cite the case of North Korea. It has developed nuclear weapons which, some argue, make the dictatorship untouchable. Ukraine provides an example of the opposite. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to give up what was then the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, the US and the UK. The argument now is that, had Ukraine kept those weapons, Russia would not have been able to invade. ‘Nuclear latency’ not enough Iran was considered to be in a state known as “nuclear weapons latency.” Nuclear weapons latency is when a country has all of the tools to produce a nuclear weapon but has yet to do so. READ: US, Israel hit Iran’s nuclear sites as Rubio trails end to war “For years, Iran maintained strategic ambiguity, staying just below the threshold of a bomb to avoid the very strikes that have now occurred,” Rupal Mehta, a professor of political science based in the US wrote in a commentary for the London School of Economics earlier in March. “Tehran’s new leadership faces a grim calculation: while the pursuit of nuclear weapons was dangerous, having an unfinished bomb was the fatal mistake.” This week, Iranian politicians said the country might withdraw from the landmark treaty that is meant to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT, has 191 member states. The changes in security relationships in the region that the Iran war has brought, could also see other countries wanting a nuclear weapon. “There are a number of factors that will push states in the Gulf closer to nuclear weapons,” confirms Kelsey Davenport, director for non-proliferation policy at the Washington-based Arms Control Association. The Gulf states are caught between the hegemonic desires of Iran and Israel and have at least partially lost faith in their security alliances with the US. “Although,” Davenport continues, “it’s unlikely any of the states are going to immediately dash for a bomb. There are significant technical and political hurdles that any state in the region would need to overcome if they wanted to weaponize.” READ: Netanyahu says Iran war goals achieved ‘beyond halfway point’ Gulf state leaders will also be waiting for the conflict to end to see where Iran’s regime and its nuclear program end up, Davenport noted. “But certainly this the conflict is going to drive thinking about the necessity of nuclear weapons for security.” Who wants nukes? Saudi Arabia took the first steps toward possible nuclear latency last year. In the past Saudi Arabian ruler Mohammed bin Salman has said that if Iran produces a nuclear bomb, then Saudi Arabia would need to have one too. After he visited the US in November, bin Salman reportedly returned with an agreement on nuclear cooperation that would allow his country to enrich uranium. Any such agreemend with Saudi Arabia would have to pass through the US Congress first, explains Nour Eid, an independent researcher based in Paris who has published papers on nuclear ambitions in the Middle East for a number of think tanks. In my latest piece for The Stimson Center, I argue that Saudi Arabia’s nuclear trajectory should not be understood as a simple reaction to whether Iran acquires the bomb. https://t.co/NocSQVyG1l — Nour EID (@_Nour_Eid) March 23, 2026 Almost all of the 26 nuclear cooperation agreements the US has, which cover around 155 countries including in Europe, have included what’s known as an “additional protocol” signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA. This gives the IAEA better oversight over a country’s nuclear activities. While it has yet to be officially confirmed, it seems that the 123 agreement will only require a bilateral safeguards agreement between the US and the Saudis, Eid told DW. “It bucks all precedent,” Robert Kelley, a former director at IAEA, told media outlet Bloomberg this week. “The idea the administration is prepared to give Saudi Arabia the ability to do the very things they are bombing Iran for looks hypocritical.” Still, as Eid points out, it will take the Saudis somewhere between 10 and 20 years to develop nuclear power, let alone weapons. There are also other problems such as the lack of a capable workforce. Right now, she believes the Saudis see nuclear projects mostly as a source of domestic energy. The United Arab Emirates already has a nuclear power plant, Barakah. When they entered their agreement with the US back in 2009, they agreed to the additional protocol and to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing. READ: UN watchdog says projectile struck Iran nuclear power plant For the UAE, it was always more about the prestige of being the first Arab nation to develop nuclear power rather than about military ambitions, Eid says. “But there is a clause in their agreement, an oral clause that isn’t written into the final text, that says something along the lines of ‘if a neighboring country has a more flexible agreement then they [the UAE] reserve the right to renegotiate their terms’,” she explains. Eid notes that part of the reason for the more relaxed Saudi nuclear cooperation deal in 2025 is likely due to American competition with China and Russia, the main nuclear suppliers globally. Trump promised to revitalize the US nuclear sector and up until now nuclear deals with Russia or China have tended to have less stringent conditions, and interesting financial packages, Eid explains. Other countries in the Middle East that might be in line for nuclear latency include Egypt and Turkey, Davenport of the Arms Control Association said. In cooperation with Russia, Egypt is building a nuclear reactor on the Mediterranean coast. But, observers say, Egypt, which has officially advocated for a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East, is in financial difficulties and unlikely to be able to parlay nuclear power into an arms program. Turkey is currently developing a nuclear energy program with Russia and may soon start cooperating with China too, Eid noted. “But I don’t see why they would put the international community at odds with them just to acquire nuclear weapons,” Eid pointed out. “Their defense industry is developing well and getting a lot of recognition.” Turkey is a member of NATO and unless they were planning to leave that alliance, they also have that defense umbrella, Eid told DW. How to stop nuclear proliferation? It’s also important to look at the bigger picture on non-proliferation, Davenport added. “It’s not in Chinese or Russian interests to allow the non-proliferation regime to collapse completely,” she told DW. “If you zoom out from the Middle East, some of the states that are most likely to weaponize are in China’s backyard — such as South Korea, Japan.” While Russia and China might provide materials and technologies to help make nuclear weapons, and under less stringent rules than the US has had in the past, they wouldn’t actively assist, she argues. “What is more likely is that states in the Gulf could try to exploit the divisions between the US and Europe on one side, and Russia and China on the other, to minimize the consequences of moving to the threshold of nuclear weapons,” Davenport continued. To prevent more nuclear weapons, regional dialogue is the answer, she stresses. “I am under no illusion that, post conflict, regional security dialogue will be easy or straightforward,” Davenport concluded. “But it is the best option to prevent states from deciding that nuclear deterrents are necessary.” /dl