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strikeMar 31, 2026

Destroy the regime’s power without occupying Iran: A smarter war plan

Summary

The U.S.-Iran war has been underway for a month now. It is increasingly difficult to distinguish real strategic and military expertise from politicized opinion, speculation and narrative. Too many people jump immediately from where we are today to a full-scale ground invasion. They assume the only option is for U.S. forces to seize Tehran, secure nuclear material by force, destroy a supposed million-man army, and then get pulled into another decades-long nation-building effort or fight a Maoist-style insurgency. That is not analysis. That is shallow thinking rooted in outdated and often biased mental models of war. President Trump has signaled a 10-day pause on strikes against Iran’s energy infrastructure, now extended to April 6. We are days into that timeline. But the real question is not what has been done. The real question is what options remain. It is a given that CENTCOM and Israel will continue systematic attacks on Iran’s military system. Iran entered this war with thousands of ballistic missiles, hundreds of launchers, a dispersed drone enterprise, a layered naval capability in the Gulf, remnants of a nuclear enrichment program, and a military industrial base built for redundancy and survivability. That system is being destroyed. But it is not yet eliminated. AI WAR IN IRAN HAS BROUGHT CONFLICT TO SILICON VALLEY. NO ONE IS READY At the same time, Israel is targeting something far more important than just military capability. It is targeting the regime’s ability to rule once the bombs stop falling. That means hunting and eliminating political and military leadership. It means degrading the Basij, the regime’s internal enforcement arm. It means targeting checkpoints, intelligence nodes and internal security infrastructure. This is not just tactical action. This is strategic pressure applied simultaneously against Iran’s means and its will. Its ability to fight and its ability to govern are being targeted at the same time. That is how you coerce behavior change without occupying a capital. It is important to anchor any discussion in the stated strategic objectives. As articulated by senior U.S. leaders, the objectives of Operation Epic Fury are: destroy Iran’s missile arsenal and its ability to produce more, dismantle its navy and its ability to threaten global shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. While regime change has been mentioned and questions have been raised about whether it would be good or bad, it is not the declared U.S. objective. Behavior change is. The current regime has been given pathways, including diplomatic proposals, to alter its course. That matters because it shapes the options available. This is not about occupying Tehran. It is about paralyzing the regime, destroying its capabilities, and forcing it to accept new terms. TRUMP VOWS TO HIT IRAN 'VERY HARD' AFTER OBLITERATING NEARLY '90 PERCENT' OF REGIME MISSILES If the regime collapses under the combined weight of military pressure and its own economic fragility, the United States can still achieve its objectives in a fundamentally different strategic environment. But regime collapse is not required to succeed. From here, the range of options expands, not contracts. One option is to strike the regime’s economic center of gravity. Kharg Island handles roughly 85 to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports, often between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day. That oil is the regime’s primary source of hard currency. Seize it, disable it, or destroy export capacity, and you do not just hurt the economy. You paralyze the regime’s ability to fund its military, sustain patronage networks, and maintain internal control. US MOVES AIRBORNE TROOPS, MARINES AS IRAN REJECTS CEASEFIRE, RAISING GROUND WAR POTENTIAL This matters because the regime has already shown signs of fragility under economic pressure. The January 2026 protests were driven by inflation, banking instability, and the inability to provide basic services, including severe water shortages affecting millions in Tehran. There were even discussions about relocating the capital due to an inability to provide potable water. The regime responded with mass violence, killing over 32,000 civilians in one of the most brutal crackdowns in its modern history. Therefore, economic pressure is not theoretical. It has already brought the regime close to the edge. Another option is to target the national power grid. Iran’s electricity system is concentrated around major urban hubs. Precision strikes on key substations and transmission nodes can create cascading outages across entire regions. Tehran goes dark. The regime would be in immediate trouble without power. Command and control, surveillance, communications, and internal security coordination all depend on it. Precision strikes on key substations and transmission nodes can create cascading outages without total destruction of infrastructure. The U.S. has demonstrated that capability in past conflicts. Cyber operations expand this further. Iran has repeatedly shut down internet access to control its population. That capability can be reversed. Disrupt regime command networks while enabling connectivity for the population through external systems. Information becomes a weapon. Control of narrative, coordination, and awareness shifts away from the regime. The Strait of Hormuz remains decisive terrain. Roughly 20 percent of global oil supply, about 20 million barrels per day, flows through it. Iran’s strategy has long been to threaten and manipulate that flow. One option is to move from deterrence to control. Seize or neutralize key islands. Experts have long identified Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands as critical terrain controlling access to the Strait. Qeshm Island, sitting along the northern edge, hosts IRGC naval facilities, missile systems, and surveillance infrastructure. These positions enable Iran’s anti-ship missile coverage, fast attack craft operations, and maritime coercion. Controlling or neutralizing these islands would fundamentally alter Iran’s ability to contest the Strait. Iran has also built a "toll booth" system in the Strait. The IRGC has created a de facto system where ships must be approved, routed through Iranian-influenced lanes, and in some cases pay millions for safe passage. Reports indicate fees reaching up to $2 million per tanker, selective approval based on political alignment, and designated transit corridors near Larak Island under regime control. The United States and Israel have the capability to systematically dismantle this system. Target the leadership directing it. Destroy the coastal radar, ISR nodes and command centers enabling it. Eliminate the fast attack craft, drones, and missile batteries enforcing it. Break the system, and you break Iran’s ability to turn a global chokepoint into a regime-controlled revenue and coercion mechanism. A related option is to interdict Iranian oil exports at sea. Iran exports roughly 1.5 to 2 million barrels per day, much of it through sanctions evasion networks. Stop and divert tankers. Enforce inspections and seizures at scale. This is already happening at a limited level. Scaling it drives regime revenue toward zero. No revenue means no missiles, no proxies, no repression, no functioning state. INSIDE IRAN’S MILITARY: MISSILES, MILITIAS AND A FORCE BUILT FOR SURVIVAL Other options shift inward. Iran’s population is over 85 million, young, urban, and repeatedly discontent. Available polling, protest patterns, and observable unrest all suggest that well over 50 percent of the population opposes the regime, and possibly much higher. This is not a solid or stable base of power. The January 2026 protests are a clear signal of that underlying pressure. Until now, civilians have largely been told to shelter. That could change. Messaging, corridors, and psychological operations could begin to separate the population from the regime’s control mechanisms. That can be paired with support to internal resistance. Air resupply of weapons, communications, and intelligence directly to resistance groups that may or may not exist. Iran has multiple internal fault lines, ethnic, political, and regional, that have historically produced opposition and unrest. When external pressure aligns with internal resistance, regimes fracture faster, or at least the pressure on the regime increases significantly. At the same time, strikes can continue expanding beyond traditional military targets. The regime’s control system is a network: leadership, IRGC headquarters, Basij units, police, intelligence services, and repression infrastructure. Target those nodes, and you accelerate the erosion of centralized authority. History shows pressure creates fractures. Military leaders hedge. Intelligence services fracture. Political elites reposition. Defections occur. Working with defectors multiplies effects far beyond what strikes alone can achieve. There is also much we do not know. We do not have full visibility into where the regime is strongest or weakest. But indicators matter. Reports of attempts to expand mobilization, including lowering recruitment thresholds to as young as twelve, suggest stress. That is not the behavior of a confident regime. IRAN’S REMAINING WEAPONS: HOW TEHRAN CAN STILL DISRUPT THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ None of these options exist in isolation. They can be combined. Destroy Iran’s missile arsenal and production capacity. Dismantle its navy. Continue degrading its nuclear program. Deny its ability to project power beyond its borders. At the same time, paralyze decision-making by targeting leadership and command systems. Apply pressure across military, economic, informational, and political domains simultaneously. CLICK HERE FOR MORE FOX NEWS OPINION Attack the regime’s means and its will at the same time. Not sequentially. Simultaneously. The objective is to impose multiple dilemmas, more than the regime can handle. Force it into reactive survival. Stretch its decision cycles. Overwhelm its ability to coordinate and control. TANVI RATNA: WITH ONE WAR, TRUMP IS BREAKING MIDDLE EAST'S OLD POWER STRUCTURE War is not a checklist. It is the alignment of ends, ways, and means under conditions of uncertainty. Options can be sequenced, layered, or applied simultaneously. The United States has not run out of options. It has plenty it has not used, many that no one is talking about or that none of us can fully imagine without access to far more than what exists in the public domain, but could. CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD THE FOX NEWS APP Lastly, be careful of analysts who speak in certainties or rely on surface analogies. Iran is not Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq. It is not 1968, 2002, or 2003. The context of each is fundamentally different. The political objectives, from regime behavior change to regime survival, are different. Past wars involved nation building, attempts to create democracy, prolonged fights against insurgencies, and enemies who enjoyed sanctuary outside the operating environment. Those are not the same conditions or objectives at play here. The geography, technology, intelligence and regional dynamics are different. The options available today are far broader and more precise against the objectives. We know a lot about what has been struck. We do not fully know what remains. More importantly, we do not know what decisions will be made next by either side. That uncertainty is not a flaw in analysis. It is the nature of war.

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  • John SpencerBy John Spencer

    The U.S.-Iran war has been underway for a month now. It is increasingly difficult to distinguish real strategic and military expertise from politicized opinion, speculation and narrative. Too many people jump immediately from where we are today to a full-scale ground invasion. Th

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The White House is now apparently using Russian tactics to convince the American public that the war in Iran is not, in fact, a war. When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday whether the most intense sustained air campaign by American forces since the invasion of Iraq would be over by the midterms, Vice President JD Vance replied: “I wouldn’t call it a war.

” Vladimir Putin said much the same thing when he invaded Ukraine. Russia was not fighting a war either, the Kremlin insisted; it was merely conducting a “special military operation.” If that comparison strikes you as shocking, consider the contours of the two conflicts.

A vastly more powerful military launched a punishing offensive against a smaller, less well-equipped adversary, inflicted enormous damage without achieving a decisive resolution, and then found itself drawn into a longer, grinding conflict with no clear way out.

The motivations behind the wars may be different, and they’re playing out in different theaters, but the pattern is eerily similar. Now, so too is the attempt by those in power to control how the public understands, and even what it is allowed to call, the obvious war unfolding in front of them.

If This Isn’t a War, What Is? Let us take a moment to assess what exactly has happened since February 28, when the U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury. The opening U.S.-Israeli attack killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the defense minister and various other senior officials.

According to the U.S. military’s own accounting, the first 38 days of major combat operations involved more than 10,200 sorties and 13,500 strikes. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) says those attacks damaged or destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone and naval defense industrial base, while knocking out 82 percent of its air-defense missile systems.

The U.S. sent carrier strike groups and warships into the region, later imposing a military blockade on Iranian ports. Meanwhile, American and allied air defenses intercepted more than 6,000 Iranian attack drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles fired at U.

S. forces, Israel and American partners across the Middle East. More than 50,000 U.S. service members remain deployed across the region. The fighting has killed 18 U.S. service members and at least 8,000 people across Iran, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states.

More than 750 U.S. service members have been wounded. Last month, during a lull in the fighting, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a sanctions package likened to an “economic D-day” that is designed to make Iran an “economic outcast” and cut the adversary off from all available forms of economic support.

In the announcement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent openly declared that Iran had been “at war against America” for 47 years. This week, the shooting resumed; the U.S. hit targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran blasted missiles at targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq.

All this from an administration that almost exactly a year ago launched a rapid rebrand of the Defense Department into the “Department of War”. No boots on the ground, though, so it’s not a war, right? Tell It Kind of Like It Is Even the very best snake-oil salesman would have a hard time convincing people that the war in Iran isn’t a war.

So why is JD Vance even trying? Well, if there’s one thing politicians understand better than anyone, it’s the importance of language and rhetoric. Words have immense power; a well-written speech can unite millions of people, and a catchy slogan like Make America Great Again can come to represent an entire political philosophy.

But war is a pesky word. For one, it implies there will eventually be a winner and a loser. It also brings with it certain expectations—and some very difficult questions. What is the objective? How many people will die? When will it end? And, perhaps most dangerously of all: was it worth it?

Those are not questions the White House wants Americans to be asking. Trump built a substantial part of his political identity around ending, rather than beginning, America’s “endless wars.” When Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in June, the White House presented it as proof that Trump’s America First approach could deliver peace without another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Then the hostilities started again. Earlier this week, Trump shared a Truth Social graphic declaring that “Hormuz Oil Volumes are BACK!”, saying 18 million barrels a day were once again leaving the Strait, compared with 20 million before the war. No independent commodity tracking company or energy analyst appeared to verify Trump’s claims.

But most Americans won’t be checking tanker-tracking dashboards. What they’ll care about is the cold, hard fact that diesel hit a new record price this morning, soaring to an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever. Gasoline is $4.15 a gallon on average, compared with $3.

20 at this time last year, according to AAA. The numbers on the sign at the gas station and the price on the grocery receipt aren’t affected by Trump’s tall tales, but they’ll surely affect how Americans vote at the midterms. When viewed in this light, Vance’s attempt to discourage reporters from “call[ing] it a war” begins to make sense.

A war is something that we want to end. It tends to result in a winner and a loser. And its worth is up for debate at all times. A different kind of engagement that doesn’t quite meet the threshold of war—say, a special military operation—is not exposed to the same kind of scrutiny.

Vance effectively made that case himself. “When you ask, ‘When will this end?’ You’re asking me a question like, ‘When will the Iranians stop shooting at ships?’” he said. By that logic, there is no American war—only recurring Iranian provocations that require American military responses.

That’s exactly the logic applied by Putin to Ukraine and supposed expansion of NATO. Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly invoked the War Powers Resolution to challenge Trump’s authority to keep fighting Iran without specific congressional authorization.

The law generally gives a president 60 days after U.S. forces enter “hostilities” to secure congressional approval or bring those hostilities to an end. That makes the pauses in fighting hugely important. When the original 60-day deadline arrived in May, Trump told Congress that the temporary ceasefire reached in April meant the hostilities that began on February 28 had ended.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the War Powers clock could “pause, or stop” when the shooting did. That position is disputed by legal experts, but its political utility is obvious. If every new outbreak of fighting can be treated as a separate skirmish, rather than part of one continuous war, the administration can argue that a fresh 60-day clock starts each time.

Vance’s insistence that there is no continuing “war” fits neatly for an administration that has already tried to divide six months of conflict into separate periods of hostilities, interrupted by ceasefires and pauses. This brings us back to Moscow.

The Kremlin’s own linguistic trick was also about making one sprawling war sound smaller, more limited and more manageable than it really was. From the very beginning of the invasion, Putin described the war as a special military operation. Only after two years of grinding warfare did Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly declare Russia to be in a “state of war”—and even then, he said the transformation had occurred because the “collective West” had joined the fight against Russia.

Vance is playing a similar game, but in reverse. Only now—with soaring fuel prices, mounting casualties, concerns over the military’s munitions stockpiles, and midterm elections on the horizon—is the conflict no longer a war. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, though, and the American people aren’t stupid.

Vance and the White House may discover in November that voters are perfectly capable of recognizing a war, even when the vice president doesn’t want to call it one.

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