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strikeMar 14, 2026

Inside F1’s decision to cancel Bahrain and Saudi Arabian GPs, and what comes next

Summary

Following confirmation that Formula 1 has cancelled its planned 2026 races in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia due to the unfolding conflict in the Middle East, a number of questions remain. It is the first time since 2023 that F1 has been forced to scrap a grand prix. That was at Imola, Italy, with the race unable to go ahead due to severe flooding in northern Italy. It was called off with four days’ notice. Advertisement But the unfolding situation in the Middle East amid the escalating conflict made this far more pressing for F1. Following airstrikes on Iran by the U.S. and Israel, Iranian forces launched retaliatory strikes on a number of United States military bases and other targets in the region, including some in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Here’s how F1’s decision to call off the races unfolded, what it means for the sport, and what comes next. Why was canceling F1’s only option? Following the first strikes by Iran on U.S. military bases in late February, including one in Bahrain just 20 miles from its track, F1 said in a statement that it would “closely monitor” the situation. It noted its season would start with events in Australia, China and Japan, and that the Bahrain/Saudi Arabia races were “not for a number of weeks” — six and seven weeks, respectively. The closure of airspace in the Middle East and flight cancellations did contribute to some travel issues for F1 personnel getting to Australia for the opening race of the season on March 8. The F1 organization laid on charter flights to help ensure they arrived in time. Since the start of the conflict, F1 remained in close contact with local authorities in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, as well as the promoters of the races and the UK Foreign Office. The F1 organization and eight of the 11 teams have their primary headquarters in the UK. Although there was hope that military action would quickly de-escalate and allow the races to go ahead as planned, once the severity and scale of the conflict became evident, stretching into weeks rather than being resolved in a matter of days, the need to cancel both races grew clearer. When did F1 make its decision? Despite the paddock feeling there was only one likely outcome as early as the Australian GP race weekend, one week into the conflict, F1 still had to work through an array of matters before it could formally make the call. Advertisement Throughout the past two weeks, F1’s leadership, including CEO Stefano Domenicali, has been closely working with the respective race promoters in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia to discuss what may follow any cancellation. This includes the impact on their race contracts and the fees due to F1, plus what cancellation meant for ticket holders and paddock hospitality agreements. But the final cut-off was always going to be when freight had to be sent to Bahrain — in the days following this weekend’s Chinese GP. Ayao Komatsu, the team principal of the Haas team, said on Thursday that teams would have preferred to know “last week,” but they anticipated that a call would be made in China. The decision was communicated to the teams on Friday evening in Shanghai, ahead of everything being finalized by F1. This paved the way for the announcement to be made early on Sunday in Shanghai. Could Saudi Arabia’s race have gone ahead? It never seemed realistic that the Bahrain race would be able to go ahead, given its closer proximity to Iran and the strikes on the U.S. base that prompted the closure of its airspace. But there were suggestions that Saudi Arabia’s race, which is held in Jeddah on the country’s western side and away from the Gulf region, could have been viable. The UK Foreign Office had only advised against travel to certain parts of Saudi Arabia, as opposed to all of Bahrain. The Iranian strikes in Saudi Arabia have only reached as far as Riyadh, the capital in the center of the country. As recently as Monday, the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix’s X account was promoting ticket sales for the race, suggesting internal plans were still progressing as normal and that the organizer could still have delivered the grand prix. But while there is likely to be an understandable degree of disappointment for the organizers in Jeddah, given the grand prix stands as one of Saudi Arabia’s most prestigious annual sporting events, there will surely be respect for F1’s decision. Advertisement Even if F1 had managed to get security guarantees in place for the Saudi Arabian race to go ahead, the image of the sport pushing on with an event in the region would likely have been met with a very negative reaction. The optics would have been awful. One team source, speaking to The Athletic on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to speak publicly on the subject, also highlighted the concern of getting F1 freight to Jeddah and missile strikes then occurring in the region — which was targeted by Houthi rebels in 2022 midway through the second Saudi Arabian GP — that could then compromise subsequent events on the calendar. Will F1 replace the canceled races? When F1 faced a slew of race cancellations in both 2020 and 2021 due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the sport drafted in a series of replacement events to bolster the calendar and ensure it delivered a decent season of racing to fulfill a minimum schedule length requirement. In 2020, F1 managed a 17-race season before running 22 races in 2021 despite travel restrictions around the world, with events at tracks such as Imola, Portimão in Portugal, and Istanbul Park in Turkey boosting the schedule. Keeping the calendar at a certain length helped satisfy important sources of F1 revenue, such as TV contracts and sponsorship deals, which required a certain number of races to be paid in full. Races that did take place behind closed doors paid either no race hosting fees or heavily reduced fees, as many countries did not allow spectator attendance due to lockdown restrictions. There was reason to expect F1 to seek replacement races for Bahrain and Saudi Arabia this time, however, as a five-week gap now sits in the calendar between Japan (March 29) and Miami (May 3). Stand-in events now had the potential to make up for the lost hosting fees from the two cancelled races. But, as The Athletic reported last week, replacement races were never a serious consideration for F1 in this scenario. This is because the short notice meant getting a reasonable hosting fee for a stand-in round was never realistic, as ticket sales and logistics would have been hard to arrange with only a few weeks’ notice. That would have meant the teams losing money after adding in new logistical costs to get to the races, without a share of F1’s hosting fees added into the annual prize money pool to cover their costs, as is usually the case with all planned races. Advertisement And that was before even considering the practical challenges of getting a venue ready to host a full F1 event with fans — something most of the Covid-19 stand-ins did not have to consider — in just a few weeks. Unlike the World Endurance Championship, which has already rescheduled its Qatar round for October, F1 also does not have space in its calendar to squeeze in any extra races later in the year. The calendar will be capped at 22 rounds. How much could this cost F1 and teams? Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are two of F1’s highest-paying races, with Saudi Arabia’s deal reportedly worth in excess of $50 million per year. Zak Brown, the CEO of McLaren Racing, said in Australia that the potential cancellations would likely have a small financial impact on teams in any case. Their prize money pool — which totalled $1.4 billion across the grid last year — is linked to F1’s revenue. This means any possible fall in hosting fee income would also dent team payments. But the nature of the cancellation means the financial impact of not having these races was never a significant issue for teams or F1 itself. “We’re not bothered if it does have a little bit of a financial impact,” said Brown. “So be it, with what’s going on.” One factor that will soften the lost revenue for 10 of the teams is the dilution fee that Cadillac, F1’s new team for 2026, paid to join the grid as compensation to make up for the prize money being cut an 11th way from now on. This payment was upwards of $400 million, giving each team a windfall of at least $40 million that will boost their finances this year only. There is also no real concern within the F1 paddock that this decision could harm the sport’s relationship with several key stakeholders in the Middle East. In an FIA statement released about the cancellations, FIA president Mohammed Ben Sulayem said, “Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are incredibly important to the ecosystem of our racing season, and I look forward to returning to both as soon as circumstances allow.” Advertisement Bahrain was F1’s first race in the region in 2004. Since then, the sport has laid down deeper roots there, adding events in Abu Dhabi (2009), Qatar, and Saudi Arabia (both 2021). Saudi Arabia’s national oil company, Aramco, is also a key F1 partner, as well as being the title sponsor of the Aston Martin team. F1 has long-standing deals to race in both Bahrain (to 2036) and Saudi Arabia (to 2030), pointing to the strength of those relationships. This was also indicated in the collaborative approach the race promoters have taken in talks over the cancellations. In a statement released on Sunday in China, Prince Khalid bin Sultan Al-Abdullah Al-Faisal, chairman of the Saudi Automobile and Motorcycle Federation, said: “SAMF respect the decision taken by Formula 1 regarding the 2026 race calendar. “Fans across the Kingdom were once again looking forward to the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix in Jeddah this April, but we understand the considerations behind this decision and remain in close partnership with Formula 1.” What will teams do with the five-week break? Although the lack of racing between Japan and Miami could have an impact on teams’ finances — and without downplaying the horror of the conflict — in some ways, the break will be welcomed. The start to the 2026 season has been one of the most demanding in recent F1 history. After the final 2025 race on December 8, teams got only a few weeks of rest, enforced by the regulations, before going into car build and launch preparations in early January. Because of the all-new cars for 2026, more preseason running was required, with three winter tests instead of one as in previous years. This brought forward all plans, with cars hitting the track almost a month earlier than normal. A shorter winter, added testing, and then going into an early run of races across Australia, China and Japan far from European bases has stretched team personnel to their limits. A five-week gap will offer some respite. One team staff member, speaking on condition of anonymity, expressed the keen feelings many have to take a break from traveling, even if there will still be plenty of work to complete at the factories during the new calendar gap. Advertisement Unlike the summer and winter shutdowns, which forbid any work being undertaken, teams will be able to use this period to try to develop their car designs, offering some time to catch up. For a team such as Aston, which has endured a miserable start to this season amid issues with its Honda engine, it will be a precious opportunity to regroup and try to resolve any problems. But the cancellation of two races also denies a chance for further car running, which is the most useful source of data and learning for any team. Are further races at risk of cancellation? Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are not the only countries on the F1 calendar that have been targeted by Iran, with strikes being reported in Azerbaijan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. All three countries are slated to host grands prix later this year. The Azerbaijan Grand Prix is scheduled for September 26, while the 2026 season will conclude with consecutive rounds in Qatar and Abu Dhabi (part of the UAE) on November 29 and December 6. Right now, those races are so far out that it is difficult for F1 to give any significant consideration to their viability, especially given the fluidity of the conflict.

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The White House is now apparently using Russian tactics to convince the American public that the war in Iran is not, in fact, a war. When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday whether the most intense sustained air campaign by American forces since the invasion of Iraq would be over by the midterms, Vice President JD Vance replied: “I wouldn’t call it a war.

” Vladimir Putin said much the same thing when he invaded Ukraine. Russia was not fighting a war either, the Kremlin insisted; it was merely conducting a “special military operation.” If that comparison strikes you as shocking, consider the contours of the two conflicts.

A vastly more powerful military launched a punishing offensive against a smaller, less well-equipped adversary, inflicted enormous damage without achieving a decisive resolution, and then found itself drawn into a longer, grinding conflict with no clear way out.

The motivations behind the wars may be different, and they’re playing out in different theaters, but the pattern is eerily similar. Now, so too is the attempt by those in power to control how the public understands, and even what it is allowed to call, the obvious war unfolding in front of them.

If This Isn’t a War, What Is? Let us take a moment to assess what exactly has happened since February 28, when the U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury. The opening U.S.-Israeli attack killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the defense minister and various other senior officials.

According to the U.S. military’s own accounting, the first 38 days of major combat operations involved more than 10,200 sorties and 13,500 strikes. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) says those attacks damaged or destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone and naval defense industrial base, while knocking out 82 percent of its air-defense missile systems.

The U.S. sent carrier strike groups and warships into the region, later imposing a military blockade on Iranian ports. Meanwhile, American and allied air defenses intercepted more than 6,000 Iranian attack drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles fired at U.

S. forces, Israel and American partners across the Middle East. More than 50,000 U.S. service members remain deployed across the region. The fighting has killed 18 U.S. service members and at least 8,000 people across Iran, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states.

More than 750 U.S. service members have been wounded. Last month, during a lull in the fighting, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a sanctions package likened to an “economic D-day” that is designed to make Iran an “economic outcast” and cut the adversary off from all available forms of economic support.

In the announcement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent openly declared that Iran had been “at war against America” for 47 years. This week, the shooting resumed; the U.S. hit targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran blasted missiles at targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq.

All this from an administration that almost exactly a year ago launched a rapid rebrand of the Defense Department into the “Department of War”. No boots on the ground, though, so it’s not a war, right? Tell It Kind of Like It Is Even the very best snake-oil salesman would have a hard time convincing people that the war in Iran isn’t a war.

So why is JD Vance even trying? Well, if there’s one thing politicians understand better than anyone, it’s the importance of language and rhetoric. Words have immense power; a well-written speech can unite millions of people, and a catchy slogan like Make America Great Again can come to represent an entire political philosophy.

But war is a pesky word. For one, it implies there will eventually be a winner and a loser. It also brings with it certain expectations—and some very difficult questions. What is the objective? How many people will die? When will it end? And, perhaps most dangerously of all: was it worth it?

Those are not questions the White House wants Americans to be asking. Trump built a substantial part of his political identity around ending, rather than beginning, America’s “endless wars.” When Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in June, the White House presented it as proof that Trump’s America First approach could deliver peace without another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Then the hostilities started again. Earlier this week, Trump shared a Truth Social graphic declaring that “Hormuz Oil Volumes are BACK!”, saying 18 million barrels a day were once again leaving the Strait, compared with 20 million before the war. No independent commodity tracking company or energy analyst appeared to verify Trump’s claims.

But most Americans won’t be checking tanker-tracking dashboards. What they’ll care about is the cold, hard fact that diesel hit a new record price this morning, soaring to an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever. Gasoline is $4.15 a gallon on average, compared with $3.

20 at this time last year, according to AAA. The numbers on the sign at the gas station and the price on the grocery receipt aren’t affected by Trump’s tall tales, but they’ll surely affect how Americans vote at the midterms. When viewed in this light, Vance’s attempt to discourage reporters from “call[ing] it a war” begins to make sense.

A war is something that we want to end. It tends to result in a winner and a loser. And its worth is up for debate at all times. A different kind of engagement that doesn’t quite meet the threshold of war—say, a special military operation—is not exposed to the same kind of scrutiny.

Vance effectively made that case himself. “When you ask, ‘When will this end?’ You’re asking me a question like, ‘When will the Iranians stop shooting at ships?’” he said. By that logic, there is no American war—only recurring Iranian provocations that require American military responses.

That’s exactly the logic applied by Putin to Ukraine and supposed expansion of NATO. Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly invoked the War Powers Resolution to challenge Trump’s authority to keep fighting Iran without specific congressional authorization.

The law generally gives a president 60 days after U.S. forces enter “hostilities” to secure congressional approval or bring those hostilities to an end. That makes the pauses in fighting hugely important. When the original 60-day deadline arrived in May, Trump told Congress that the temporary ceasefire reached in April meant the hostilities that began on February 28 had ended.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the War Powers clock could “pause, or stop” when the shooting did. That position is disputed by legal experts, but its political utility is obvious. If every new outbreak of fighting can be treated as a separate skirmish, rather than part of one continuous war, the administration can argue that a fresh 60-day clock starts each time.

Vance’s insistence that there is no continuing “war” fits neatly for an administration that has already tried to divide six months of conflict into separate periods of hostilities, interrupted by ceasefires and pauses. This brings us back to Moscow.

The Kremlin’s own linguistic trick was also about making one sprawling war sound smaller, more limited and more manageable than it really was. From the very beginning of the invasion, Putin described the war as a special military operation. Only after two years of grinding warfare did Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly declare Russia to be in a “state of war”—and even then, he said the transformation had occurred because the “collective West” had joined the fight against Russia.

Vance is playing a similar game, but in reverse. Only now—with soaring fuel prices, mounting casualties, concerns over the military’s munitions stockpiles, and midterm elections on the horizon—is the conflict no longer a war. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, though, and the American people aren’t stupid.

Vance and the White House may discover in November that voters are perfectly capable of recognizing a war, even when the vice president doesn’t want to call it one.

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