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strikeApr 8, 2026

Iran-US ceasefire: What each side was fighting for, and what have they won or lost

Summary

The United States’ and Israel’s war on Iran was halted early today on April 8, as US President Donald Trump announced a two-week ceasefire. All US attacks on Iran were “suspended”, hours after Trump threatened to end Iranian “civilisation” if Iran did not accept a deal, after 38 days of war. Both Trump and the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, asserted that the US and Iran would now negotiate on the basis of Iran’s ’10-point’ demands (deemed “workable” by Trump), sent as a response to Washington’s ‘15-point demands’. The latter includes the need for Iran to dismantle nuclear facilities in Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz; commit to not build nuclear weapons; hand over enriched uranium to the IAEA and allow inspectors full access; limit Iran’s missile programme; and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, in return for the removal or US and UN sanctions on Iran and US support for nuclear power production in the Bushehr nuclear plant. Iran’s 10 points require the US to commit to non-aggression, recognise Iran’s control of Hormuz, accept Tehran’s sovereign enrichment rights, lift all primary and secondary sanctions and terminate punitive UN and IAEA resolutions, withdraw US forces and compensate Iran, and end Israel’s war on Lebanon. What is the logic behind either side’s position? Across 38 days, US war aims have shifted inconsistently, including (at varying points in time) regime change, an end to Iran’s ballistic missile programme, destruction of Iran’s Navy and Air Force, ending Iran’s relationship with regional non-state armed actors, among other objectives. However, amid these, a core truth about US strategy has remained — every round of escalation that the US pursued, including bombing Iranian universities, energy sites, and infrastructure, has been focused not on Iranian capitulation at any scale but rather to force Iran back to the table. This is consistent with Trump’s continued reluctance to mount any largescale war like that in Iraq in 2003, which would require large force concentration and ground troops staged in US-allied states in the Gulf. That Iran was at the table as of February 27, 2026, and was willing to offer more favourable terms to Trump than the Obama-era nuclear deal the JCPOA, was overshadowed by the reality of the US President already having walked into a commitment trap (since he was using incrementally escalating military threats to force maximalist diplomatic ends). This war, despite its needless destruction and high cost, ultimately became a manifestation of those threats for the same diplomatic ends. This was categorically evident in the 15-points which Washington offered to Iran on March 24, most of which were largely similar to US demands from Iran in May 2025, before the 12-Day war in June. That the US President remains eager for a deal (stamped with his seal rather than Obama’s, and after a self-proclaimed “victory” through weeks of massive bombardment) was evident in his Truth Social post immediately after announcing the ceasefire, which claimed that – “…this could be a Golden Age of the Middle East”, “…Iran wants it too!”, “…Big money will be made. Iran can start the reconstruction process.” Iran has long understood Trump’s preferences and weaknesses. In the first half of 2025, Iranian officials took care to praise Trump’s “pro-peace” image, invited American businesses to Iran, and chastised the Joe Biden administration’s failings. Most importantly, Tehran took care to blame Trump’s failings on his advisors, rather than the President himself. Even as Iran was attacked twice while negotiations were on, Tehran kept up its focus of blaming Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner as inexperienced, pro-Israel, “real estate” agents who misled Trump (although, alongside a barrage of memes and AI-led videos mocking Trump). However, given that Trump’s military threats had moved from potential to kinetic, and included the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Tehran identified a carte blanche to pursue a multi-pronged strategy to prove: its ability and tolerance to absorb costs (no matter the tonnage of US/Israeli bombs, assassinations, or special forces action), its ability to impose costs through widespread horizontal escalation that was reciprocal and proportionate to US/Israeli choice of targets in Iran (except for educational institutes, which Iran did not reciprocally strike), and Iran’s character as a conventionally powerful civilisational state which needed to be engaged on equitable terms, thus also dispelling any illusion of a Venezuela-like outcome for any US campaign. By April 8, after US/Israeli strikes on Iranian railway infrastructure, bridges, as well as the South Pars gas field, Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Kuwaiti and Saudi petrochemical plants proved all three abilities for the 99th time in the war. This is the official number of retaliatory “waves” of drones and missiles that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps launched, announcing each wave as they struck (each with varying effectiveness). Combined with Iran’s decisive chokehold of the Strait of Hormuz, except to US/Israel linked shipping, the growing international costs of the war eventually breached Washington’s tolerance threshold (compounded by pressures from key allies). To fully drive home the imperative of the US treating Iran as a respectable negotiating partner (and with the assumption that Tehran was always theoretically open to discussing the USA’s 15-points), Iran had to convey its own set of demands; to give steadier legs to a historically wobbly negotiating table. These demands necessarily included both old and new asks, including the possibility of Iran and Oman jointly charging a fee for passage through Hormuz (a maximalist aim but designed to be deemed acceptable in lieu of reparations/war damage compensation). The Outcome Until this table was steadied, there was arguably little room for any mediator to make headway — whether Oman (the traditional mediator between Washington and Tehran), Turkey, Pakistan, China, Russia, or Qatar. Until the Trump Administration reconciled itself with the reality of Tehran’s resilience and the high improbability of state collapse or Iranian surrender to Washington’s terms, these actors remained only as “mediators-in-being”. More importantly, on one hand the US President at several points attempted to force Iran into quick negotiations by claiming that Tehran was already talking (which Iran denied), and on the other, Iran itself was categorical in its efforts to refuse Trump any off-ramp. The latter was important to prevent Washington from relapsing into the old view that the US could attack Iran at will; “Bridges can be built but the opportunity to discipline America will not come again” as Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi wrote on April 3. Across the five days since, as US (and Arab) limits became clear, more space opened up for key states such as Pakistan/China to act as passive messengers between Washington and Tehran, but not as traditional proactive mediators (such as Oman). As Trump issued a threat to end Iranian “civilisation” if Tehran did not make a deal, it became largely evident that the US President was preparing ground to claim victory (since Iran’s acceptance of the ceasefire could be highlighted as a concession). Should this cessation of hostilities hold, it is only now that Iran under Mojtaba Khamenei and Washington under Donald Trump will hold sincere negotiations arguably for the first time. Even as Israel remains an unpredictable variable, Tel Aviv arguably also has little to lose/gain by immediately breaching the Trump-induced ceasefire. Its 38 days of bombing, including assassination of key Iranian leaders, simply followed its historic logic of striking “the head of the Octopus”, most prolifically by former PM Naftali Bennett. Israel might strike again when a window presents itself (its likelihood is uncertain). Already, Tel Aviv has removed itself from the US-Iran ceasefire by rejecting Iran’s demand that Israel halt its ongoing fifth invasion of South Lebanon and its fight against Hezbollah. It is undeniably true, however, that the conduct of US-Iran negotiations will now determine the broader future of the Middle East, which is already a changed landscape after Iran’s categorical military dominance over the Gulf. This lattermost fact is Tehran’s strategic victory.

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Sources

  • Bashir Ali Abbas; YasheeBy Bashir Ali Abbas; Yashee

    The United States’ and Israel’s war on Iran was halted early today on April 8, as US President Donald Trump announced a two-week ceasefire. All US attacks on Iran were “suspended”, hours after Trump threatened to end Iranian “civilisation” if Iran did not accept a deal, after 38

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The White House is now apparently using Russian tactics to convince the American public that the war in Iran is not, in fact, a war. When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday whether the most intense sustained air campaign by American forces since the invasion of Iraq would be over by the midterms, Vice President JD Vance replied: “I wouldn’t call it a war.

” Vladimir Putin said much the same thing when he invaded Ukraine. Russia was not fighting a war either, the Kremlin insisted; it was merely conducting a “special military operation.” If that comparison strikes you as shocking, consider the contours of the two conflicts.

A vastly more powerful military launched a punishing offensive against a smaller, less well-equipped adversary, inflicted enormous damage without achieving a decisive resolution, and then found itself drawn into a longer, grinding conflict with no clear way out.

The motivations behind the wars may be different, and they’re playing out in different theaters, but the pattern is eerily similar. Now, so too is the attempt by those in power to control how the public understands, and even what it is allowed to call, the obvious war unfolding in front of them.

If This Isn’t a War, What Is? Let us take a moment to assess what exactly has happened since February 28, when the U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury. The opening U.S.-Israeli attack killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the defense minister and various other senior officials.

According to the U.S. military’s own accounting, the first 38 days of major combat operations involved more than 10,200 sorties and 13,500 strikes. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) says those attacks damaged or destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone and naval defense industrial base, while knocking out 82 percent of its air-defense missile systems.

The U.S. sent carrier strike groups and warships into the region, later imposing a military blockade on Iranian ports. Meanwhile, American and allied air defenses intercepted more than 6,000 Iranian attack drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles fired at U.

S. forces, Israel and American partners across the Middle East. More than 50,000 U.S. service members remain deployed across the region. The fighting has killed 18 U.S. service members and at least 8,000 people across Iran, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states.

More than 750 U.S. service members have been wounded. Last month, during a lull in the fighting, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a sanctions package likened to an “economic D-day” that is designed to make Iran an “economic outcast” and cut the adversary off from all available forms of economic support.

In the announcement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent openly declared that Iran had been “at war against America” for 47 years. This week, the shooting resumed; the U.S. hit targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran blasted missiles at targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq.

All this from an administration that almost exactly a year ago launched a rapid rebrand of the Defense Department into the “Department of War”. No boots on the ground, though, so it’s not a war, right? Tell It Kind of Like It Is Even the very best snake-oil salesman would have a hard time convincing people that the war in Iran isn’t a war.

So why is JD Vance even trying? Well, if there’s one thing politicians understand better than anyone, it’s the importance of language and rhetoric. Words have immense power; a well-written speech can unite millions of people, and a catchy slogan like Make America Great Again can come to represent an entire political philosophy.

But war is a pesky word. For one, it implies there will eventually be a winner and a loser. It also brings with it certain expectations—and some very difficult questions. What is the objective? How many people will die? When will it end? And, perhaps most dangerously of all: was it worth it?

Those are not questions the White House wants Americans to be asking. Trump built a substantial part of his political identity around ending, rather than beginning, America’s “endless wars.” When Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in June, the White House presented it as proof that Trump’s America First approach could deliver peace without another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Then the hostilities started again. Earlier this week, Trump shared a Truth Social graphic declaring that “Hormuz Oil Volumes are BACK!”, saying 18 million barrels a day were once again leaving the Strait, compared with 20 million before the war. No independent commodity tracking company or energy analyst appeared to verify Trump’s claims.

But most Americans won’t be checking tanker-tracking dashboards. What they’ll care about is the cold, hard fact that diesel hit a new record price this morning, soaring to an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever. Gasoline is $4.15 a gallon on average, compared with $3.

20 at this time last year, according to AAA. The numbers on the sign at the gas station and the price on the grocery receipt aren’t affected by Trump’s tall tales, but they’ll surely affect how Americans vote at the midterms. When viewed in this light, Vance’s attempt to discourage reporters from “call[ing] it a war” begins to make sense.

A war is something that we want to end. It tends to result in a winner and a loser. And its worth is up for debate at all times. A different kind of engagement that doesn’t quite meet the threshold of war—say, a special military operation—is not exposed to the same kind of scrutiny.

Vance effectively made that case himself. “When you ask, ‘When will this end?’ You’re asking me a question like, ‘When will the Iranians stop shooting at ships?’” he said. By that logic, there is no American war—only recurring Iranian provocations that require American military responses.

That’s exactly the logic applied by Putin to Ukraine and supposed expansion of NATO. Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly invoked the War Powers Resolution to challenge Trump’s authority to keep fighting Iran without specific congressional authorization.

The law generally gives a president 60 days after U.S. forces enter “hostilities” to secure congressional approval or bring those hostilities to an end. That makes the pauses in fighting hugely important. When the original 60-day deadline arrived in May, Trump told Congress that the temporary ceasefire reached in April meant the hostilities that began on February 28 had ended.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the War Powers clock could “pause, or stop” when the shooting did. That position is disputed by legal experts, but its political utility is obvious. If every new outbreak of fighting can be treated as a separate skirmish, rather than part of one continuous war, the administration can argue that a fresh 60-day clock starts each time.

Vance’s insistence that there is no continuing “war” fits neatly for an administration that has already tried to divide six months of conflict into separate periods of hostilities, interrupted by ceasefires and pauses. This brings us back to Moscow.

The Kremlin’s own linguistic trick was also about making one sprawling war sound smaller, more limited and more manageable than it really was. From the very beginning of the invasion, Putin described the war as a special military operation. Only after two years of grinding warfare did Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly declare Russia to be in a “state of war”—and even then, he said the transformation had occurred because the “collective West” had joined the fight against Russia.

Vance is playing a similar game, but in reverse. Only now—with soaring fuel prices, mounting casualties, concerns over the military’s munitions stockpiles, and midterm elections on the horizon—is the conflict no longer a war. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, though, and the American people aren’t stupid.

Vance and the White House may discover in November that voters are perfectly capable of recognizing a war, even when the vice president doesn’t want to call it one.

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