strikeJul 9, 2026

Christopher Walker: The West Must Stop Treating Russia, China, And Iran As Isolated Challenges

Summary

WASHINGTON -- Germany's recent decision to summon the Chinese ambassador following reports that Russian soldiers may have been trained in China has renewed scrutiny of Beijing's support for Moscow's war against Ukraine. For Christopher Walker, vice president of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), the reported training should not be viewed as an isolated development. Rather, he argues, it reflects a broader pattern of cooperation among authoritarian governments that increasingly work together across diplomatic, economic, military and information domains, even without a formal alliance. In an interview with RFE/RL, Walker discusses China's support for Russia's war effort, the evolving relationships among Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran, and why democracies need a sustained, long-term strategy to compete with authoritarian powers. RFE/RL: Germany has summoned the Chinese ambassador over intelligence reports that Beijing may have trained Russian soldiers. Does this represent a significant new development? Christopher Walker: I think it's fair to say that China has afforded the Russian war effort in Ukraine systematic backing, and so it probably shouldn't come as such a huge surprise that the Chinese authorities apparently have elected to provide support of this kind to the Russian war effort. As other observers have noted, China's support really has been pivotal to Russia's war effort. RFE/RL: Does Beijing's role now extend well beyond diplomatic support to becoming an essential economic and logistical partner for Moscow? Walker: I think China has tried to have it both ways by signaling through its information and propaganda channels that it seeks to operate as an honest broker or as some sort of bystander, but its actions and support betray that idea, both in terms of this latest news relating to the apparent support for Russian soldiers who were trained and then went on to fight in Ukraine, but also in economic terms, in the provision of spare parts, diplomatic backing, and information and propaganda support. I think these regimes, in part because they don't have the democratic consent of their own populations, fear their own populations." This is, in a sense, part of a package of support that China has been providing to Russia effectively since the full-scale attack on Ukraine began [in February 2022]. Moreover, the relationship that has evolved between Russia and China dates back even further. One could argue to Xi Jinping's arrival as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and other top leadership positions in 2012 and Vladimir Putin's return to the Russian presidency around the same time. Over time, they forged a very close relationship… They have met quite possibly up to about 70 times, either in person or virtually, since Putin returned to office and Xi Jinping assumed the top leadership position in China. They really have reached what we've described as a shared consciousness in the way they approach the wider world. RFE/RL: A recent CEPA report examines the evolving relationship between Russia, China, and Iran. To what extent have these governments developed a coordinated strategic partnership, and how does that affect the US-led alliance system? Walker: Well, it may not be the case that they're synchronized in an extensive way. I think what they've arrived at is a working relationship where they provide support on an as-needed basis among these different powers. As we note in the report, it isn't always seamless cooperation, and it isn't limitless. But on important tracks of activity relating to economic support, energy support, or in certain instances military support -- we can't forget that Iran was providing drones to Russia at scale to attack Ukraine over an extensive period of time. All of these regimes, I think, see the benefit of working with each other in a meaningful way. In many respects, certainly from the vantage point of 15 or 20 years ago, I think this relationship has evolved in an unanticipated way to the extent that the regimes in Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing work quite effectively together, even if it isn't technically synchronized. RFE/RL: Your report notes that these governments often cooperate without the kind of formal institutional structures found in NATO. Should policymakers view that flexibility as a weakness, or would it be a mistake to assume that the absence of a formal alliance limits their ability to cooperate effectively? Walker: Well, it may in its own ways be a bit of both. Vladimir Putin is mortgaging his country's future in part by making it a far weaker, dependent partner in the relationship with China." I think these regimes, in part because they don't have the democratic consent of their own populations, fear their own populations. Let's not forget the Iranian regime has, in recent months, killed thousands and thousands of the country's people. Russia brutalizes its own citizens in a variety of ways and sees tens of thousands of them choose to leave the country. China likewise runs arguably the most efficient techno-authoritarian machinery of any country on the planet. So, these are countries whose leadership clearly fears their own publics. In that sense, they are fragile. But at the same time, it would be irresponsible for the US and other free societies to take lightly the arrangement that has developed among these countries. In a sense, they are providing each other with surge capacity [the ability to quickly provide support when needed] and the kinds of benefits that come through collaboration -- benefits that democratic countries themselves should seek to achieve. RFE/RL: Some policymakers argue that Russia's growing economic dependence on China could eventually create tensions within their relationship, effectively making Moscow the junior partner. Do you see that imbalance as a vulnerability the West can exploit, or is their shared opposition to the US likely to outweigh those differences? Christopher Walker: Well, there too, I think the picture right now, in terms of the relationship between the leaderships in Beijing and Moscow, is that the antipathy toward the West and the desire to see the US weakened is there, and I suspect quite durable. At the same time, Vladimir Putin is mortgaging his country's future in part by making it a far weaker, dependent partner in the relationship with China. So, to the extent that creates fissures within the ruling elites in Russia, I think that's desirable in this context. Whether we can count on things developing quickly in the near term, I think that would be imprudent and irresponsible, because these regimes are there for life. They have no intention of leaving, and they behave accordingly. This requires, in my view, the sort of long-term, sustained commitment from the West and the US to contest these rivals that we face. These competitors are investing on multiple levels with an eye toward weakening the US. I think we and our natural allies need to be prepared for that competition over the longer haul. RFE/RL: Beyond military and economic cooperation, both Beijing and Moscow continue to invest heavily in global media and information activities. Analysts have often described Russian and Chinese information strategies as distinct, with Russia focused on disruption while China promotes a longer-term narrative about governance and international order. Increasingly, however, are their information efforts reinforcing one another? Walker: I think the relationship that has evolved over a protracted period of time between the information apparatuses in Russia and China now has overlap, whether that's by design or simply by coincidence, and we have to take it seriously in either case. For example, in Latin America today there is significant overlap in narratives promoted by both Chinese state media and Russian state media. Those narratives have, over recent years, also reinforced messaging coming from the regimes in Caracas and Havana. In that sense, you have a cluster of media activity operating from authoritarian sources across Spanish-speaking countries throughout the region. We see versions of this playing out in parts of sub-Saharan Africa as well as the Middle East. We have to take this seriously because if you're not competing, it almost stands to reason that the team that's on the field, investing resources and playing harder, is going to have an advantage. These narratives, which include consistent questioning of US prestige, come in different forms from both Russian and Chinese state media sources. I think that works to the strategic disadvantage of the US and deserves greater attention and sustained commitment. RFE/RL: How successful have Russia and China been in shaping public opinion in regions such as Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, particularly regarding Russia's war against Ukraine? Walker: If we use Russia's war against Ukraine as one indicator, it's striking to see the extent to which audiences in different parts of the world -- including but not limited to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America -- view that conflict. Russia is unambiguously the aggressor. It launched an unprovoked attack against Ukraine. Yet that is not the perception in large parts of the world. That is due, at least in part, to the systematic dissemination of information and arguments from sources directed and managed by Beijing and Moscow that almost invariably frame events in that way. I think we have to take that seriously because if it can happen in that instance, of course it can happen on other issues, including the way the US is portrayed. This is not new. The Chinese and Russian states have been undertaking these global efforts for years -- going back well over a decade in the modern context -- and I think this is something we need to take very seriously.

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Alex RaufogluBy Alex Raufoglu
WASHINGTON -- Germany's recent decision to summon the Chinese ambassador following reports that Russian soldiers may have been trained in China has renewed scrutiny of Beijing's support for Moscow's war against Ukraine. For Christopher Walker, vice president of the Center for Eur…

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Jul 23, 2026strikeUnverifiedUSIranProxy

UK ‘ready to defend itself’ after Iranian threat over US bases

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That policy has not been altered by the new prime minister, Andy Burnham, who was notified last week that a decision had been made to extend the agreement with the US. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said on Thursday that “any base used for aggression against Iranian territory constitutes a legitimate target for our forces”.

In a statement published on the IRGC-linked Tasnim news agency, the group said American bombing missions had been launched from RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire two days earlier. The statement came after the US carried out a 12th consecutive night of strikes against targets in Iran.

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“This includes through operating a layered approach to air and missile defence, provided by Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force assets equipped with a range of advanced capabilities, working closely with our Nato allies. “We are committed to defending our people, our interests and our allies, acting in accordance with international law and not getting drawn into the wider conflict.

” On 1 March a drone struck the RAF base at Akrotiri in Cyprus, hitting a hangar, and prompting a partial evacuation of the facility. On 19 March, Iran fired two ballistic missiles at the UK’s Diego Garcia base in the Chagos Islands. One reportedly failed mid-flight, while the other was shot down by a US airship.

Iran has launched strikes against countries in the Gulf that house US military bases, including Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, killing American service personnel in some of the attacks. Donald Trump said Iran would “pay a big price” for killing US troops.

On Thursday afternoon, the US president said he was considering ordering a “massive attack” on Iran. “I am close to making a decision,” he told Axios. “We’re all set for it.” He said he believed Iran’s leaders “want to negotiate”, but aren’t yet ready to make a deal.

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Jul 23, 2026strikeUnverifiedUSIranProxyRussia

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Sep Brent crude oil prices (CBU26) on Thursday rallied above $100 per barrel for the first time since May. President Trump said in an interview with Axios on Thursday that he is considering a “massive attack” that would be “bigger than ever before” and is “close to making a decision on it.

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Meanwhile, the US and Iran exchanged attacks for the 12th straight day, and the US maintained its blockade of Iranian oil shipments in the Persian Gulf. Global crude oil supplies are tightening due to reduced flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The International Maritime Organization warned last Wednesday that it is too dangerous to cross the Strait of Hormuz at the moment, and visible transit through the strait has fallen sharply as Iran continues targeting tankers attempting to transit it.

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25-year low of 406 rigs posted in December 2025. However, the number of US oil rigs remains sharply below the 5.5-year high of 627 reported in December 2022. On the date of publication, Rich Asplund did not have (either directly or indirectly) positions in any of the securities mentioned in this article.

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Earlier on Thursday, US President Donald Trump said that he was considering carrying out a massive attack on Iran, and the strikes would be harder than before. According to the American leader, Israel will "join the attack in two minutes" if requested by the United States.

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