Yemen, Bab al-Mandab and Saudi Arabia: Tehran’s strategic calculus in the balance Recent Houthi attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and the Yemeni group’s growing leverage over Red Sea shipping have played to Iran's strategic advantage, increasing pressure on Riyadh and strengthening Tehran’s position in the regional conflict.
The Houthis’ capture in September of the strategic Yemeni port city of Mokha from Saudi-backed government forces has placed a vital alternative route for Saudi oil exports through the Bab al-Mandab Strait at risk. For Tehran, this presents an opportunity to drive up oil prices and pressure US President Donald Trump to end the war, while linking threats to shipping through Bab al-Mandab to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.
But as Saudi Arabia sought Tehran’s help in containing the Houthis, Iran must also contend with the limits of its influence over the Houthis, who have their own domestic objectives. The escalation has also left Iran facing a delicate balancing act of supporting a key regional ally without allowing the conflict to spiral beyond its control.
New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters 'Not an Iranian proxy' Tensions between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, officially called Ansar Allah, have been simmering for months.
In July, Tehran reportedly sent a plane carrying between 10 and 21 the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel, including senior commanders, to Yemen, according to sources speaking to Reuters, to challenge the Saudi-led blockade. A senior conservative source told Middle East Eye that the Saudi ambassador to Iran, who has a security background, subsequently met Iranian officials in an effort to defuse tensions.
The source said that "Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had signalled his readiness to travel to Saudi Arabia at Riyadh’s request, but the trip did not take place". According to the source, Riyadh wanted Tehran to pressure the Houthis to halt their attacks and threats.
Tehran, in turn, called for the Saudi blockade to be lifted and offered to mediate between the warring sides. The source added that Pakistani officials had also repeatedly travelled to Tehran or contacted Araghchi by phone, urging Iran to use its influence to persuade the Houthis to de-escalate.
However, a senior source close to the establishment told MEE that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were mistaken in viewing the Houthis as an Iranian proxy. While Hezbollah in Lebanon could be considered an extension of Iran, the source argued, the Houthis have acted according to their own interests.
If the Houthis were simply an Iranian proxy, he said, they would have blocked all ships from passing through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, including American vessels, rather than targeting only Saudi-linked shipping. "Saudi asked Iran to help secure a ceasefire for several weeks, however, Houthies didn't agree," the source added.
On 11 October, following two Houthi attacks on Riyadh's main airport that killed 13 people, Araghchi said in a phone call with his Saudi counterpart that Tehran was ready to help initiate talks between Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah and work toward a political solution to the crisis in Yemen.
An unresolved conflict A Saudi affairs analyst writing for a reformist media outlet in Iran argued that the 2022 ceasefire between the Houthis and Riyadh, which largely halted fighting in Yemen, had not resolved the crisis but merely pushed it to the margins.
The crisis, he told MEE, had resurfaced at the slightest sign of regional escalation because its underlying causes remained unresolved, while security around the Bab al-Mandab Strait had become increasingly intertwined with developments in the Strait of Hormuz.
As a result, he added, Yemen’s crisis was evolving from an internal conflict, and later one largely confined to the Arabian Peninsula, into a broader regional and international confrontation. The analyst argued that in addition to immediate security concerns, Riyadh’s insistence on a military approach also stemmed from its view of Yemen as a matter of national and regional prestige and historical credibility.
In the analyst’s view, this mindset, coupled with Riyadh’s perception of its eminent role in the Arabian Peninsula, has left Saudi Arabia unwilling to adopt a more flexible approach to Yemen, recognise the Houthis or accept the emergence of a Shia-led government on its border.
Sanaa’s new rules of engagement Following the Houthis’ rapid advances along the Red Sea coast and around the Bab al-Mandab Strait, Riyadh turned to Beijing last month for help, as the group’s gains threatened Saudi oil exports and shipping. Iranian sources told Reuters that China had privately urged Tehran to rein in the Houthis to prevent further escalation along vital energy routes on which China depends.
A conservative analyst close to Iran's power centres told MEE that strikes on vital installations deep inside Saudi territory signalled that Sanaa’s response to Saudi Arabia’s actions and blockade against Yemen was moving beyond conventional military retaliation.
In recent weeks, the Houthis have attacked Saudi airports several times, including King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and Abha International Aiport in Asir province. On 10 October, an attack on King Khalid airport killed at least 12 people and wounded more than 300.
The following day, another attack on the airport killed one person and wounded nearly a dozen others. The Houthis, the analyst said, were seeking to establish a new set of battlefield equations: “Riyadh for Sanaa”, “airport for airport”, “oil for oil” and “blockade for blockade”.
“The phrase ‘Riyadh for Sanaa’ is more than a political slogan,” the analyst added. “It reflects an attempt to redefine the relationship between attack and retaliation, signalling that, according to Sanaa’s leadership, Yemen’s territory will no longer be the only battleground.
” The analyst said the military message was inseparable from the political one: Sanaa wanted to demonstrate that continuing the war would carry consequences for Saudi Arabia itself. Tehran faces a big danger A Iranian reformist academic said Iran risks losing its strategic position as regional and international actors move towards a new security arrangement around the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
He believes Tehran must therefore seek to ease tensions between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. In July, Saudi Arabia and 13 other countries announced the creation of a maritime military coalition to safeguard freedom of navigation through the three waterways.
The significance of the alignment, the academic argued, extends well beyond the immediate confrontation with Ansar Allah. 'The phrase ‘Riyadh for Sanaa’ is more than a political slogan. It reflects an attempt to redefine the relationship between attack and retaliation' - Conservative analyst He noted that what initially appeared to be a campaign focused on countering Houthi attacks on commercial shipping may be evolving into a broader effort to establish a lasting regional maritime security framework, with the Bab el-Mandab Strait at its centre.
Countries with different strategic priorities – and, in some cases, competing interests – are increasingly finding common ground around the security of vital maritime routes. This, he added, could have far-reaching implications for global trade and the regional balance of power.
"For Tehran, the implications are particularly serious. The challenge is no longer confined to its relationship with the Houthis or its ability to influence events in Yemen,” he said. “It concerns the possibility that a new regional arrangement could gradually constrain Iran’s strategic reach and diminish its influence over one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.
" The academic’s central concern is that Tehran may be focusing too heavily on immediate tactical calculations while overlooking a much larger transformation unfolding around it. Linked outcomes Iran’s Tasnim News Agency, an outlet affiliated with the IRGC, has argued that the outcome of the US-Iran war and the future of the Strait of Hormuz will directly affect the conflict in Yemen, particularly the strategic balance around the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Saudi oil exports through the Red Sea.
Houthi restrictions on Red Sea shipping, combined with disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, have increased pressure on Saudi Arabia’s energy exports. 'The challenge for Iran is a new regional arrangement could gradually constrain its strategic reach...
over one of the world’s most important maritime corridors' - Reformist academic “Whatever outcome emerges in the Strait of Hormuz will have a direct impact on the Yemen file, whether positive or negative,” Tasnim wrote, quoting an Iranian expert who warned that weakening the Houthis or ending their control over parts of the Red Sea coastline could have serious consequences for Iran.
“If the Houthis are weakened, lose access to the Red Sea and its coastline, or if the United States, the West and Saudi Arabia secure guarantees that Saudi energy infrastructure is no longer threatened from the south, the consequences for Iran could be highly damaging, giving Washington and its allies greater freedom to act against Tehran,” the outlet quoted the expert as saying.
Tasnim urged Tehran to step up its diplomatic support for the Houthis, arguing that Iran should not expect its allies to defend it if it fails to support them. "When we do not deploy all our capabilities to defend an ally, we should not expect that ally to deploy all of its capabilities to defend us," the expert said.
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