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strikeJul 16, 2026

The illusion of collapse: Why the US-Iran ceasefire is actually a bargaining tool

Summary

At first glance, the ceasefire understanding between the United States and Iran appears to be steadily unravelling. Public rhetoric has hardened, military signalling continues unabated, and both sides increasingly question each other’s commitment to de-escalation. Yet appearances can be deceptive. Rather than signalling the collapse of diplomacy, these developments point to a carefully managed process in which the ceasefire itself has become an instrument of negotiation. This deliberate use of tactical ambiguity—carefully deploying military, diplomatic, and economic measures-serves to keep negotiations alive and strengthen bargaining leverage, emphasizing that the ceasefire endures not through resolved differences but through strategic ambiguity that benefits all principal actors. For President Donald Trump, sustaining the ceasefire is as much a political challenge as a diplomatic one. His administration must reconcile competing domestic constituencies whose expectations are fundamentally at odds. The pro-Israel lobby and influential evangelical groups expect unwavering American support for Israel and remain deeply sceptical of any accommodation with Tehran. Conversely, a war-weary electorate has little appetite for another prolonged military engagement in West Asia, particularly when inflation, fiscal pressures and economic uncertainty dominate domestic concerns. With the mid-term elections approaching, any perception of weakness towards Iran could invite political criticism, while renewed military escalation risks alienating voters concerned about its economic and strategic costs. These competing pressures have compelled Washington to pursue a dual-track approach—keeping diplomatic channels open even as it projects military resolve to reassure allies and address domestic anxieties about stability and security. Israel confronts a similar political dilemma. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently portrayed the conflict as an existential struggle. A ceasefire that ends hostilities without visibly achieving its declared objectives risks being perceived as an incomplete victory. With elections approaching, PM Netanyahu must demonstrate that the high political, military and economic costs of the war have yielded tangible strategic gains. Failure to do so could not only undermine his electoral prospects but also revive the legal challenges that have long shadowed his political career. Israel’s continued pressure on Iran must therefore be viewed not merely through the lens of national security, but also as an imperative of political survival. Iran, meanwhile, appears both emboldened and compelled to adopt a harder negotiating posture. The assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei transformed the conflict into a deeply emotional national cause. Massive funeral processions and widespread calls for revenge have generated strong public pressure for a forceful response, leaving the leadership with little political space for compromise. Within Shia Islam, resistance to perceived injustice and the ideal of martyrdom constitute central elements of its religio-political ethos. Khamenei’s assassination has therefore been projected not merely as the death of a national leader, but as the martyrdom of a religious and political symbol whose sacrifice against American injustice demands both resistance and retribution. At the same time, the assassination of Khamenei and the deaths of several senior military commanders have strengthened the influence of hard-line elements within Iran’s strategic establishment. After four decades of sanctions, economic isolation and sustained confrontation with the United States and Israel, these factions view the present crisis as an opportunity to negotiate from a position of strength. Tehran’s uncompromising public posture should therefore be seen not merely as ideological defiance, but as a political necessity aimed at preserving domestic cohesion while reinforcing its bargaining leverage. Iran’s strikes against U.S. military facilities in Jordan and Gulf bases aim beyond immediate retaliation, exposing vulnerabilities and advancing its long-term goal of reducing U.S. military presence in the Gulf, while demonstrating its capacity to impose high costs if negotiations falter, emphasizing strategic bargaining objectives. Equally significant is what Iran has chosen not to do. Despite its uncompromising rhetoric, Tehran has avoided direct large-scale attacks on Israel. This tactical restraint is intended to deny Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu the electoral advantages of a wider war, while preserving differences between Washington and Tel Aviv over the pace and endgame of the negotiations. The maritime domain has become central to Iran’s bargaining strategy. As Oman and other Gulf states explore alternative southern shipping routes to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran has signalled that these corridors would remain vulnerable in any future conflict. The message is unmistakable: alternative routes cannot neutralise Iran’s leverage over Gulf energy exports. Maritime geography thus remains one of Tehran’s most effective instruments of deterrence and negotiation. Against this backdrop, President Trump’s decision to reinstate the naval blockade of Iranian ports underscores Washington’s continued reliance on maritime coercion as a bargaining instrument. Although the proposed 20 per cent escort charge appears to have been moderated under pressure from allies, the blockade itself perpetuates tactical uncertainty. However, the resulting increase in security risks, insurance premiums and freight costs imposes economic burdens on global shipping and energy markets, potentially diluting the blockade’s strategic objectives even as it strengthens Washington’s negotiating leverage. Strategic consequences The greatest danger lies in this environment of calibrated ambiguity. Measures intended to deter adversaries, reassure allies or strengthen negotiating leverage can easily be misread by actors driven by different political compulsions, making miscalculation—rather than deliberate escalation—the gravest threat to regional stability. Recent developments across Syria, Turkey and Yemen illustrate how tactical signalling can produce unintended strategic consequences. Washington’s willingness to reconsider F-35 sales to Turkey and deepen engagement with Syria’s new leadership appears aimed at strengthening a Turkey-centred regional security architecture while simultaneously reducing Russian and Iranian influence. However, such a strategy also carries significant risks. It could sharpen competition among Turkey, Iran and Israel in Syria, potentially opening another front in the regional conflict. The attack on the Iranian airlines at Sanaa airport could be intended to increase pressure on Tehran. However, it could provoke a renewed Houthi escalation around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, opening another major maritime front. Such an outcome would threaten one of the world’s most critical trade corridors, compounding further disruptions to global energy supplies and international commerce while unsettling regional partners, particularly Saudi Arabia, whose overriding priority remains stability at this stage. It is time for both Washington and Tehran to recognise that tactical ambiguity may serve the interests of negotiation, but it must not be allowed to produce irreversible strategic consequences. Disclaimer Views expressed above are the author's own.

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  • Dr B Bala BhaskarBy Dr B Bala Bhaskar

    At first glance, the ceasefire understanding between the United States and Iran appears to be steadily unravelling. Public rhetoric has hardened, military signalling continues unabated, and both sides increasingly question each other’s commitment to de-escalation. Yet appearances…

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strikeUnverifiedUSIranProxy
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The government has said the UK is “ready to defend itself” after Iran’s military warned that any bases being used by the US were “legitimate targets”. The UK has allowed the US to launch “defensive” operations from British bases hosting American planes since the start of its war on Iran but has refused to help in offensive operations.

That policy has not been altered by the new prime minister, Andy Burnham, who was notified last week that a decision had been made to extend the agreement with the US. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said on Thursday that “any base used for aggression against Iranian territory constitutes a legitimate target for our forces”.

In a statement published on the IRGC-linked Tasnim news agency, the group said American bombing missions had been launched from RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire two days earlier. The statement came after the US carried out a 12th consecutive night of strikes against targets in Iran.

The Ministry of Defence has not commented on whether Fairford was used by the US for operations against Iran this week. The IRGC also accused the “British monarchy regime” of causing being the “primary cause of hardships in our region with a black record of partitioning Islamic nations, widespread massacres, imposing despotic regimes, and organising the occupation of Palestine”.

It warned the government “not to weigh down its record any further”. A spokesperson for the British government said: “Our armed forces are ready to keep the United Kingdom safe from any kind of attacks, whether it’s on our soil or from abroad. The UK stands ready 24/7 to defend itself.

“This includes through operating a layered approach to air and missile defence, provided by Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force assets equipped with a range of advanced capabilities, working closely with our Nato allies. “We are committed to defending our people, our interests and our allies, acting in accordance with international law and not getting drawn into the wider conflict.

” On 1 March a drone struck the RAF base at Akrotiri in Cyprus, hitting a hangar, and prompting a partial evacuation of the facility. On 19 March, Iran fired two ballistic missiles at the UK’s Diego Garcia base in the Chagos Islands. One reportedly failed mid-flight, while the other was shot down by a US airship.

Iran has launched strikes against countries in the Gulf that house US military bases, including Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, killing American service personnel in some of the attacks. Donald Trump said Iran would “pay a big price” for killing US troops.

On Thursday afternoon, the US president said he was considering ordering a “massive attack” on Iran. “I am close to making a decision,” he told Axios. “We’re all set for it.” He said he believed Iran’s leaders “want to negotiate”, but aren’t yet ready to make a deal.

In another sign of the conflict potentially escalating, Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels said they attacked two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea on Thursday, as oil topped $100 a barrel.

strikeUnverifiedUSIranProxyRussia
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September WTI crude oil (CLU26) on Thursday closed up +5.36 (+6.17%), and September RBOB gasoline (RBU26) closed up +0.0793 (+2.44%). WTI crude oil prices (CLU26) rallied more than +6% on Thursday after the Iran-backed Houthis launched a missile and drone attack on two Saudi Arabian oil tankers in the Red Sea, expanding the oil disruptions beyond the Strait of Hormuz and threatening oil shipments in the Red Sea.

Sep Brent crude oil prices (CBU26) on Thursday rallied above $100 per barrel for the first time since May. President Trump said in an interview with Axios on Thursday that he is considering a “massive attack” that would be “bigger than ever before” and is “close to making a decision on it.

”Don’t Miss a Day: From crude oil to coffee, sign up free for Barchart’s best-in-class commodity analysis. The Houthis have vowed to blockade shipping linked to Saudi Arabia and warned shipowners against calling at the nation's ports. The move threatens Saudi oil exports from Yanbu, a Red Sea hub that the Saudi's are using to ship crude since the war brought shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to a near halt.

Meanwhile, the US and Iran exchanged attacks for the 12th straight day, and the US maintained its blockade of Iranian oil shipments in the Persian Gulf. Global crude oil supplies are tightening due to reduced flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The International Maritime Organization warned last Wednesday that it is too dangerous to cross the Strait of Hormuz at the moment, and visible transit through the strait has fallen sharply as Iran continues targeting tankers attempting to transit it.

Crude prices also have support as Ukraine intensifies drone attacks on Russian oil infrastructure. Russian crude production fell to 8.928 million bpd in June, the lowest in 2.5 years, according to monthly OPEC data. According to EA Analytics, Russian crude-processing rates will average 3.

51 million bpd in July, the lowest in 24 years, amid damage to Russian energy infrastructure caused by drone and missile attacks from Ukraine. According to Bloomberg, Ukrainian forces have attacked Russian fuel-producing facilities more than 50 times this year, hitting at least 24 of Russia’s 34 largest refineries.

As of the end of June, around 90% of Russian regions have imposed some form of fuel rationing or reported supply issues, as refining capacity has plunged following damage to facilities. The strikes have deepened a nationwide gasoline shortage, with several major refineries shut down and the government banning almost all gasoline, jet fuel and diesel exports.

Russia is the world’s number two diesel exporter, after the US, according to Vortexa. Stronger Russian crude exports are also adding to global oil supplies, which is bearish for prices. Data compiled by Bloomberg show the four-week average of Russian crude exports rose to 4.

13 million bpd through June 28, the highest since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Russia may be boosting its crude exports as the country’s refining capacity has plunged due to damage at its refining facilities from Ukraine drone and missile attacks.

The outlook for higher US crude output is negative for oil prices. The Department of Energy (DOE) on July 7 raised its US 2026 crude production estimate to 13.78 million bpd from a June estimate of 13.72 million bpd. As a bearish factor for crude, OPEC delegates said on May 14 that the cartel aims to continue a series of oil quota increases over the next few months, completing the return of halted oil production by the end of September.

The group already formally agreed to restore about two-thirds of the 1.65 million bpd supply cutback it made back in 2023 and said it plans to raise output targets further and to revive the final portion in three more monthly stages. On July 5, OPEC+ said it will boost its crude output by 188,000 bpd in August, though that increase might prove difficult due to revived US-Iran military attacks in the region.

OPEC’s June crude production rose by +2.34 million bpd to 18.75 million bpd. Vortexa reported on Monday that crude oil stored on tankers that have been stationary for at least 7 days rose +31% w/w to 90.03 million bbl in the week ended July 17. Wednesday’s weekly EIA report was mostly negative for crude oil and products.

EIA crude inventories unexpectedly rose +2.01 million bbl versus expectations of a -1.95 million bbl decline. Also, EIA gasoline supplies rose by +765,000 bbl versus expectations of a -1.9 million bbl decline. In addition, EIA distillate stockpiles rose by +1.

4 million bbl, a larger build than expectations of +825,000 bbl. On the positive side, crude supplies at Cushing, the delivery point for WTI futures, fell -624,000 bbl. Wednesday’s EIA report showed that (1) US crude oil inventories as of July 17 were -5.

3% below the seasonal 5-year average, (2) gasoline inventories were -7.1% below the seasonal 5-year average, and (3) distillate inventories were -9.6% below the 5-year seasonal average. US crude oil production in the week ending July 17 fell -0.5% w/w to 13.

798 million bpd, just below the record high of 13.862 million bpd posted in the week of November 7. Baker Hughes reported last Friday that the number of active US oil rigs in the week ended July 17 rose by +7 to a 13-month high of 452 rigs, up from the 4.

25-year low of 406 rigs posted in December 2025. However, the number of US oil rigs remains sharply below the 5.5-year high of 627 reported in December 2022. On the date of publication, Rich Asplund did not have (either directly or indirectly) positions in any of the securities mentioned in this article.

All information and data in this article is solely for informational purposes. For more information please view the Barchart Disclosure Policy here. The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Nasdaq, Inc.

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TEL AVIV, July 23. /TASS/. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will deal "a crushing blow" to Iran, if it attacks the Jewish state, Defense Minister Israel Katz warned, according to the Ynet portal. "We are ready for any development of events. If Iran attacks Israel, we will deal a crushing blow," he said.

Earlier on Thursday, US President Donald Trump said that he was considering carrying out a massive attack on Iran, and the strikes would be harder than before. According to the American leader, Israel will "join the attack in two minutes" if requested by the United States.

However, he added that Washington "does not need anyone" to launch a new military operation. Trump did not specify a deadline for making a decision. The United States and Israel started a war with Iran on February 28. In June, Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding providing for an immediate cessation of hostilities on all fronts, including in Lebanon.

However, on the night of July 8, the United States resumed large-scale strikes against Iran, accusing it of violating the terms of the agreements regarding the Strait of Hormuz.

strikeUnverifiedUSIsraelIran
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The British government stated that it stands ready to defend itself following Iranian comments designating UK bases hosting US forces as legitimate targets in response to US military strikes on Iran. Iranian officials described the UK as an accomplice to US operations, while UK policy has allowed US use of bases such as RAF Fairford and Diego Garcia for what the UK has termed defensive purposes.

Permissions for this arrangement, first granted in March, were extended under the current UK government.

Location: Iran