Conflict Events Archive
221,284 documented events · latest Aug 27, 2026 — chronological archive with full summaries and multi-source verification.
PDF Strait of Hormuz Disruptions: Beyond reopening - lasting ... - UNCTAD
After 100+ days of disruption, trade through the Strait is set to resume. Daily ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 The prospect of the Strait opening is calming energy markets down. Daily price of crude oil in US$ per barrel But in some sectors, such as transport, prices take longer to adjust.
US-Iran Ceasefire to Last Into October? Crypto Punters Raise Odds as Qatar PM Heads to Tehran
Cryptocurrency traders are pricing in higher odds that the U.S.-Iran ceasefire will hold through October, even as lead mediator Qatar works to restart diplomacy between the two sides. ‘Return to the Path of Negotiations’ Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani is set to visit Tehran on Thursday to discuss the ongoing mediation efforts and other regional issues, Reuters reported. Qatar’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson said on X that the Middle Eastern country is undertaking efforts “to encourage a return to the path of negotiations” between the U.S. and Iran. The spokesperson said Qatar’s priority is “to restore normal navigation” in the Strait of Hormuz, ensure global energy and food security and maintain the safety of supply chains. No Diplomatic Breakthrough in Sight The U.S. has accused Tehran of violating the memorandum of understanding by attacking commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Washington also reimposed the naval blockade against Iranian ports. Although the fighting has ceased for nearly a month, the U.S. has turned to economic sanctions to pressure Iran. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced a new campaign earlier this week targeting the financial networks, companies and countries that help Iran generate revenue and bypass sanctions. Iran has termed the sanctions as “systemic bullying” accusing the U.S. of “annihilating” international law. Polymarket Bets on Ceasefire Meanwhile, the betting crowd on Polygon (CRYPTO: POL)-based Polymarket currently assigns a 90% chance of the ceasefire continuing through Sept. 15, up from 48% a month ago. Similarly, the odds that the ceasefire holds through Sept. 30 rose to 83%, while the chance it lasts through Oct. 30 climbed to 75% Image via Shutterstock/ Below the Sky © 2026 Benzinga.com. Benzinga does not provide investment advice. All rights reserved. To add Benzinga News as your preferred source on Google, click here.
After six months of Iran war, US goals have shifted. The Strait of Hormuz is now a top concern
WASHINGTON (AP) — When President Donald Trump launched the war with Iran in late February, he initially forecast it would last four to five weeks. Six months later, there's still no off-ramp in sight despite Trump's repeated assertions that the war has been won or a deal to resolve it was nearly complete. A June memorandum of understanding designed to pave the way to end the war has fallen by the wayside. U.S. stockpiles of key weapons have diminished and the Trump administration has pivoted to pressuring Iran economically rather than launching more strikes. As the shape of the war has morphed over the last half year, so have the goals for the conflict. One of the prime goals now — reopening the Strait of Hormuz — was not one of Trump's original objectives. The waterway had been a vital shipping lane through which about 20% of the world's oil passed. But Iran seized on it as a chokepoint for the global economy and it has been largely closed since the war started, driving up prices for fuel and fertilizer needed for farms and creating economic and political pressure in the U.S. The U.S. has had tactical success on its goals to degrade Iran's military capabilities. But some of the other key objectives Trump laid out at the start of the conflict remain unfulfilled — and others have shifted. Here’s a look at the objectives and what we know about where they stand: Stop Iran from having a nuclear weapon Last June, Trump declared that the U.S. had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program. But when the war started, his aides justified the strikes by warning that Iran had been just weeks away from developing a bomb. One of the most pressing questions has been what will be done with a stockpile of about 970 pounds (440 kilograms) of enriched uranium that Tehran could potentially use for a weapon. The material is believed to be buried under three sites bombed by the U.S. and Israel last year. Trump said in a May 29 social media post that it would be retrieved by the U.S. “in close coordination and conjunction with the Islamic Republic of Iran, plus the International Atomic Energy Agency, and DESTROYED.” Iran has not said whether it would consent. Without permission from Iran, experts have said seizing it would be a dangerous mission requiring a sizable deployment of U.S. troops into the country. Officials said that Tehran reaffirmed in the June memorandum of understanding that it would not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The deal called for Iran to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. But many other details about Iran's program were left for future negotiations, and it's unclear how much progress, if any, was made before talks quickly fell off. Reopen the Strait of Hormuz Trump has said that a proposed deal with Iran would include the reopening of the strait and the U.S. ending its blockade of Tehran’s ports, but at other times he has suggested the international waterway would somehow become American territory and indicated the U.S. could impose a toll on passing ships. Trump also has repeatedly said that the strait is open, including during an interview on Wednesday on conservative commentator Glenn Beck’s radio show. “It’s a functioning strait. Yes, every once in a while, there’ll be a drone or a rocket or something shot, but it is a very functioning strait,” Trump said. Destroy Iran's ability to fire missiles One of the prime objectives laid out by the administration was to “destroy their missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground." Trump said in late March that Iran's missiles “are mostly decimated" and that 90% of their missiles and launchers were knocked out. By mid-May, that shifted to a more conservative estimate, with the president saying that 82% of Iran's missiles were gone. Iran has shown its ability to still launch attacks in the region, including drone strikes on ships sailing through the strait. As recently as July, the U.S. military still had Iranian military targets to strike, with its Central Command announcing it was striking “Iranian military command centers, air defense and coastal surveillance sites, maritime capabilities, missile and drone launch sites and communications networks.” Destroy Iran's defense industrial base Early in the war, the president and his administration sometimes listed this as a standalone objective. Other times, it has fallen off their list. U.S. Central Command has said its targets for strikes in Iran have included weapons production and missile and drone manufacturing facilities. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told lawmakers in early June that Iran has had “massive destruction” of its defense industrial base and “80 to 90% of attrition. It will take years for them to rebuild it.” Eliminate Iran's navy and air force The U.S. and Israel quickly established air superiority in the skies above Iran, where they flew largely unchallenged. Rubio told lawmakers that Iran still has drone capabilities, but it lacks the ability to use swarms of drones to attack targets, as it did at the start of the war. He also said Iran does not have a navy anymore, and relies on small craft outfitted with machine guns that harass ships and sometimes drop mines in the water. Trump on Wednesday said that Iran's navy and air force are “totally gone." Protect America's Middle Eastern allies Trump, in a March social media post, added another objective for the U.S.: “Protecting, at the highest level, our Middle Eastern Allies, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and others." The U.S. maintains thousands of troops on bases and other installations in the region, but Trump has been unclear on how far he'd be willing to go to protect Middle East allies from threats in the long term. In June, when the U.S. said Iran fired missiles at Kuwait and Bahrain, the U.S. launched strikes on Iran in response. But one ally — Oman — has notably not been feeling the warmth of Trump's offer of protection, and instead has grappled with Trump's wrath over the deal it was negotiating with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz. In mid-August, he threatened in an interview that the U.S. would bomb Oman if it “gets in the way," using an expletive for emphasis. Cut off support for Iranian proxy groups In March, Trump and his administration repeatedly said degrading Iran's proxy terror networks was a key goal. As time has gone on, administration officials have offered fewer updates about this objective, which the president described as ensuring that “the region’s terrorist proxies can no longer destabilize the region or the world and attack our forces” and “ensuring that the Iranian regime cannot continue to arm, fund, and direct terrorist armies outside of their borders.” Early on, the U.S. struck Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq. But the biggest focus has been Israel's war in Lebanon against Hezbollah, which Iran backs. Iran has insisted that the fighting in Lebanon must be stopped as part of any deal with the U.S. Israel and the Lebanese government announced a deal, which was mediated by the U.S., for Israeli forces to leave southern Lebanon in exchange for Hezbollah's disarmament — something an administration official described as a “huge step,” speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to address the issue on the record. But the militant group has refused direct talks and its leader has said it will not disarm. ___ Associated Press writer Konstantin Toropin contributed to this report.
Qatar PM to visit Tehran to pursue mediation efforts
Qatar, a Gulf neighbour of Iran and a U.S. ally, has served as a back-channel negotiator for the warring parties and played a direct role in securing the June ceasefire that briefly led to a cessation of hostilities. The visit comes as the war nears its sixth month with fighting largely paused but no diplomatic breakthrough in sight. The two sides remain at odds over control of the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint for global oil supplies that Tehran has used as leverage. The memorandum of understanding broke down in part because of differences over the narrow waterway between Iran and Oman where one-fifth of the world's oil supplies passed before the war began on February 28. The guns have gone mostly silent - the U.S. military's Central Command has not reported any attacks on Iran for nearly a month. Washington appears to be leaning more on economic pressure by announcing plans to cut Iran off from its trading partners with increased sanctions. Hormuz oil flows have fallen to a three-month low, with just 5 million barrels per day transiting on Monday, according to the latest ship-tracking data. Before the war, the strait carried roughly 20 million barrels per day of crude oil. Iran's Revolutionary Guards said on Wednesday that Iran and Oman had agreed how to share the waterway and its revenues, but a senior Iranian source later said the two countries were still working on the details of an agreement. Despite an aerial bombardment earlier in the war that severely diminished Iran's conventional forces, Tehran has maintained enough missile and drone capability to attack Gulf neighbours that house U.S. military bases and disrupt oil tankers in the strait. The U.N.'s International Maritime Organization has reported 70 incidents in the Strait of Hormuz since February 28 that have killed 19 seafarers. Thousands of others have died, mostly in Iran and Lebanon, since the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran with the stated goals of denying Iran a nuclear weapon, helping Iranians topple their government, and destroying Iran's missile programme. MEDIATORQatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani will discuss the continuation of Qatar's mediation efforts and other developments in the region during his visit to Tehran on Thursday, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said. Qatar's Foreign Ministry spokesperson said on X that Sheikh Mohammed would also address freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the need to return to the status quo before February 28, while also discussing with Iranian officials ways to "de-escalate tensions and create the conditions conducive to dialogue." The international waterway was open to free navigation before the war, but Iran has since clung to its control of the strait as leverage and a revenue source, seeking to charge ships a commission, which the U.S. has opposed. "An agreement with Oman over the Strait of Hormuz has not been finalised," the senior Iranian source told Reuters, adding that the talks were continuing on the details of an accord. That seemed to contradict a statement by Brigadier General Hossein Mohebbi, a spokesperson for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who said Iran and Oman had "reached results that are acceptable to both sides" on controlling the strait and its revenues. Mohebbi said the strait would remain shut unless the U.S. met Tehran's conditions under the interim ceasefire, or memorandum of understanding, that the two sides signed in June before it unravelled. Those conditions include an end to the U.S. blockade on Iranian ports, compensation and removal of sanctions. Iran and Oman have held on-and-off talks for weeks about controlling traffic through the strait. Tehran and Washington have each tried to assert control over the channel, imposing separate blockades. (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel) (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel)
Hormuz And The Law Of Diminishing Returns: When Leverage Burns
Hormuz And The Law Of Diminishing Returns: When Leverage Burns Authored by Tamuz Itai via The Epoch Times, For months, the assumption that the Strait of Hormuz was Tehran's ultimate card dominated commentary on the war. Vessels are seen in the Strait of Hormuz, off the port city of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on Aug. 10, 2026. Atta Kenare/AFP via Getty Images As a narrow waterway through which roughly one-fifth of the world's oil and a substantial share of liquefied natural gas had historically passed, it appeared to be a chokepoint Iran could close or severely disrupt at will. It did not need to destroy every tanker. Hitting a small percentage with drones, cruise missiles, speedboats, or mines would spike insurance rates, deter crews and companies, and effectively shut the strait without continuous physical control. This idea was not new for 2026. It had long been a feature of the Iranian strategic posture, treated as both a military instrument and a political myth-proof that even under pressure Tehran retained a decisive lever over the global energy system. Parts of the Western media and independent analysts amplified the same narrative. Relying on incomplete open-source shipping data, especially once vessels began sailing dark, many concluded that the United States had been caught unprepared and lacked a realistic path to reopen the waterway. Hormuz, they argued, was effectively closed or closable at Iran's discretion. That framing was powerful, but also incomplete. How the Threat Has Been Eroded The assumption that Iran's detection and targeting system could not be dismantled without dramatic escalation proved wrong. Under the U.S. Central Command, also known as CENTCOM, and with significant involvement from the Fifth Fleet and Air Force components, the United States ran a sustained effort to degrade the sensors Iran needed to find and hit ships. Iran relied on mobile truck-mounted radars, drones, cruise missiles, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) speedboats, and naval mines. Inside the narrow strait, ships move in relatively predictable lanes. Iran combined active radars with passive electro-optical and infrared cameras on elevated terrain and islands such as Qeshm, Larak, and Abu Musa. Mobile radars would radiate briefly to locate shipping, then shut down and move before anti-radiation missiles could arrive. Once a ship's approximate position was known, strike systems could be sent to search. The vulnerability was that every radar emission could be detected. American aircraft responded systematically with anti-radiation missiles while visual and intelligence efforts located the passive sensors. This was the core of what some involved called "draining the swamp." Iran had redundancy, but the number of sensors was finite. Hundreds of precision strikes gradually reduced Iran's ability to see traffic in the strait. As the detection layer thinned, the effectiveness of the strike systems declined with it. Parallel efforts neutralized mines with unmanned vessels and declared the southern lane near Oman largely clear. Convoys moved under escort, often at night with the automated information system (AIS) off. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with Aegis radars and standard missile (SM)-family interceptors formed the backbone; drones and Apache helicopters armed with laser-guided rockets provided additional cover. American ships also engaged IRGC speedboats that closed on the convoys. On the commercial side, the United States addressed insurance barriers. In early March, President Donald Trump directed the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to provide political risk insurance and guarantees for maritime trade. The DFC, working with the Treasury and CENTCOM, established a revolving reinsurance facility of roughly $20 billion-later expanded with private partners including Chubb-focused on hull, machinery, and cargo cover. Early uptake was limited. As Iranian success rates fell, more vessels joined. Results have been significant. CENTCOM has reported assisting well over a thousand commercial vessels and moving hundreds of millions of barrels since the spring. Independent trackers often showed lower numbers because much of the traffic sailed dark. Pre-war throughput was 20 million to 21 million barrels per day. Flows through Hormuz remain below that, but combined with the Abu Dhabi-Fujairah pipeline and Saudi Arabia's pipeline to Yanbu in the Red Sea, volumes recovered enough to keep oil prices in the $85 to $95 range-elevated, but far from the predicted catastrophe. Not Seeing the True Picture Public data lagged for both technical and psychological reasons. Ships that went dark during transit normally turned their AIS trackers back on afterward, so theoretically they could have been tracked and counted, yet matching was imperfect amid overlapping night movements, incomplete satellite reception, intermittent signals, and ship-to-ship transfers. Commercial trackers attempt corrections using imagery and other data, but confidence thresholds still produce undercounts relative to what escorting forces could see. There was also a narrative reason. The story of Iranian success and American failure fit expectations many already held. Contradictory evidence produced cognitive dissonance. The common response was to protect the original frame-by applying greater skepticism to inconvenient details and treating quieter progress as temporary. In a contested information environment, narratives that confirm prior expectations often outlast those that require revision. The General Principle Hormuz illustrates a broader pattern. Leverage is often strongest while latent. The threat shapes behavior; the target hedges or hopes the card is never played. Once used at scale, incentives change. Real costs appear, and the value of neutralizing the threat rises sharply. Adaptation follows: sensors are hunted, escorts are organized, alternative routes are accelerated, commercial workarounds are found. Over time, the original leverage delivers diminishing returns. The coercer frequently ends up weaker than before. The pattern is not unique. In 1973, Arab oil producers cut exports and raised prices. The short-term shock was severe; the longer-term response included efficiency gains, strategic reserves, non-OPEC production, and the shale revolution. Russia's gas cut-offs against Europe from 2021 to 2022 produced a similar arc: LNG expansion, storage, demand reduction, and alternative suppliers collapsed Moscow's share of the European market, forcing it to sell more of its supply with heavy discounts to China and others. China's 2010 rare-earth restrictions against Japan spurred alternative mining, recycling, and substitution. In recent years, the United States has also accelerated the shift with CHIPS Act funding, Department of Defense equity stakes and loans, price-floor and offtake arrangements, and Project Vault, which includes equity stakes in key producers and a strategic minerals reserve, while expanding cooperation with partners such as Australia. Remaining Levers and Their Limits If the Hormuz card is already delivering diminishing returns, what options remain for Iran? The most consequential underused lever is a more systematic campaign against Gulf energy production itself-fields, processing plants, refineries, and downstream industries. Iran has already struck these targets at a meaningful scale. What has not been fully attempted is a sustained multi-country effort at lasting destruction of capacity. Other potential levers include intensified proxies, cyber operations, pressure on Bab el-Mandeb, residual nuclear signaling, and heavier strikes on U.S. bases or critical infrastructure. Each retains some potential. Yet the same logic applies. Further large-scale use would accelerate the responses that reduce effectiveness. At the same time, the regime faces continuous economic pressure from the U.S. naval blockade, oil-export enforcement, and broader "Operation Economic Outcast" sanctions. Escalation under that siege significantly raises costs and shortens the runway. Another option might be a distraction elsewhere, perhaps initiated by another country in the emerging axis of Chinese Communist Party-dependent countries, such as Russia, North Korea, or China itself. The battle for the strait is not the entire war. It has, however, illustrated a recurring feature of strategy: geographic and resource levers look most formidable while they remain latent. Once put into continuous action, they often set in motion the forces that ultimately reduce their power. Tyler Durden Wed, 08/26/2026 - 21:45
Tanker struck by unknown projectile in Hormuz Strait, UKMTO says
This is an entry from: Live: Hegseth says military action still possible in US-Israel war on Iran Tanker struck by unknown projectile in Hormuz Strait, UKMTO says 27 August 2026 02:15 BST A vessel was hit by an unknown projectile in the Strait of Hormuz, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) agency said early on Thursday. The strike caused a fire that was later extinguished. No environmental impact was reported and all crew members were safe and accounted for.
US strikes Iran's Revolutionary Guard over attack that killed troops in ...
The U.S. military said Sunday it had ended its latest round of airstrikes on Iran, which included targeting Iran's paramilitary Revolutionary Guard over an attack that killed American troops in Jordan.
Do Iran’s latest threats to Europe have teeth?
Bulgaria, among Iran’s biggest trading partners in Eastern Europe, is among the European countries Iran considered striking if President Trump escalated the war, The Financial Times reported last week. That’s due to both its south-eastern location on the continent and two U.S. Air Force KC-135 refueling planes using one of its bases to support Operation Epic Fury. After Bulgarian officials announced the departure of those planes over the weekend, Iran on Monday issued its latest warning to NATO members that allow their territory to be a jumping off point for American or Israeli military action against the regime, saying it “has the right to target the point of origin and source of any act of aggression against” it. Iran has made similar threats to the United Kingdom, with a drone striking a British airbase in Cyprus in March. That same month, Iran fired two ballistic missiles at the remote U.K.-U.S. base in the Indian Ocean known as Diego Garcia. And Turkey in March said NATO’s air defenses had intercepted several ballistic missiles launched from Iran. While Iran clearly wants to maintain the perception that it’s willing and capable of striking Europe, analysts aren’t convinced it really wants to invite NATO more fully into the fight. “I don’t think the juice is worth the squeeze in terms of antagonizing NATO. . . . I don’t think that attacking European targets gets them anything extra than attacking [Gulf] targets doesn’t get them,” said Alan Eyre, a former head of the Iran office at the U.S. Consulate in Dubai, now with the Middle East Institute. David Cattler, a senior fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis, likewise said that an Iranian strike on a NATO ally would be a major escalation but a bad strategic trade for Tehran, as “that would probably transform Europeans who largely have sought distance from the Iran war into active participants against” the regime. He said the more immediate issue is Iranian coercion. “The reality is Tehran doesn’t need to fire a missile at Bulgaria to achieve an effect. Threatening the countries that provide the bases, logistic support, access to the United States is itself an attempt to raise the price of supporting Washington in an attempt to weaken allied cohesion,” Cattle told The Hill. Insiders can read the full report at thehill.com.
Qatari PM to visit Tehran in effort to relaunch mediation
Qatar's prime minister will visit Tehran in an effort to relaunch diplomacy after the US and Iran traded recriminations over Washington's promise to increase economic pressure on Tehran by targeting its trade partners for sanctions. Qatar, a Gulf neighbour of Iran and a US ally, has served as a back-channel negotiator for the warring parties and played a direct role in securing the June ceasefire that briefly led to a cessation of hostilities. The visit comes as the war nears its sixth month with fighting largely paused but no diplomatic breakthrough in sight. The two sides remain at odds over control of the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint for global oil supplies that Tehran has used as leverage. The memorandum of understanding broke down in part because of differences over the narrow waterway between Iran and Oman where one-fifth of the world's oil supplies passed before the war began on 28 February. The guns have gone mostly silent, as the US military's Central Command has not reported any attacks on Iran for nearly a month. Washington appears to be leaning more on economic pressure by announcing plans to cut Iran off from its trading partners with increased sanctions. Hormuz oil flows have fallen to a three-month low, with just five million barrels per day transiting on Monday, according to the latest ship-tracking data. Before the war, the strait carried roughly 20 million barrels per day of crude oil. Iran's Revolutionary Guards said yesterday that Iran and Oman had agreed how to share the waterway and its revenues, but a senior Iranian source later said the two countries were still working on the details of an agreement. Despite an aerial bombardment earlier in the war that severely diminished Iran's conventional forces, Tehran has maintained enough missile and drone capability to attack Gulf neighbours that house US military bases and disrupt oil tankers in the strait. The United Nations' International Maritime Organization has reported 70 incidents in the Strait of Hormuz since 28 February that have killed 19 seafarers. Thousands of others have died, mostly in Iran and Lebanon, since the US and Israel attacked Iran with the stated goals of denying Iran a nuclear weapon, helping Iranians topple their government, and destroying Iran's missile programme. Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani will discuss the continuation of Qatar's mediation efforts and other developments in the region during his visit to Tehran, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said. Qatar's Foreign Ministry spokesperson said on X that Sheikh Mohammed would also address freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the need to return to the status quo before 28 February, while also discussing with Iranian officials ways to "de-escalate tensions and create the conditions conducive to dialogue." The international waterway was open to free navigation before the war, but Iran has since clung to its control of the strait as leverage and a revenue source, seeking to charge ships a commission, which the US has opposed. "An agreement with Oman over the Strait of Hormuz has not been finalised," the senior Iranian source told Reuters, adding that the talks were continuing on the details of an accord. That seemed to contradict a statement by Brigadier General Hossein Mohebbi, a spokesperson for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who said Iran and Oman had "reached results that are acceptable to both sides" on controlling the strait and its revenues. Mr Mohebbi said the strait would remain shut unless the US met Tehran's conditions under the interim ceasefire, or memorandum of understanding, that the two sides signed in June before it unravelled. Those conditions include an end to the US blockade on Iranian ports, compensation and removal of sanctions. Iran and Oman have held on-and-off talks for weeks about controlling traffic through the strait. Tehran and Washington have each tried to assert control over the channel, imposing separate blockades.
Six Months Into the Iran War, the United States Has No Good Options | Council on Foreign Relations
Six Months Into the Iran War, the United States Has No Good Options Operation Epic Fury failed to produce the quick victory that President Donald Trump predicted and may be remaking the political order in the Middle East. By experts and staff - Published Six months into the U.S. war with Iran, the conflict’s end is nowhere in sight. President Donald Trump confidently predicted at the war’s start that it would last “four to five weeks.” At the end of March, he said it would take “maybe two weeks, maybe a couple of days longer, to do the job.” Since then, he has repeatedly declared the United States victorious. The reality is different. Iran’s regime has neither collapsed nor capitulated, despite intense U.S. and Israeli air strikes that have killed many of the country’s prewar leaders and devastated its military infrastructure. A rickety ceasefire agreed to in April and extended in June continues to hold, but tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains far below prewar levels. Trump has periodically threatened to launch even more destructive attacks on Iran, only to back down because the U.S. military lacks the defensive interceptors needed to protect U.S. allies and military bases in the region. Stymied on the military front, Trump has recently signaled that he will now wait for economic pressure to force Iran’s leadership to its knees. To that end, he vowed last week to unleash an “Economic D-Day” that will be “the most crushing economic operation ever taken against any country!” Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent unveiled Operation Economic Outcast on Monday. For now, the plan leans heavily on threats to punish countries that refuse to “tighten the noose” around Iran voluntarily rather than steps to compel them to do so. There is good reason for that. The so-called secondary sanctions that Washington is proposing could, in Bessent’s words, “blow up the global financial system.” China buys more than 80 percent Iranian oil exports, and it has already forced the Trump administration to abandon steep tariffs on Chinese goods by threatening to cut U.S. access to critical minerals. Chinese President Xi Jinping is also set to visit the White House next month. The potential to roil the global economy and trigger a diplomatic crisis with China are why so many experts doubt that the administration will ever fully follow through on its threat to force Iran’s “complete global isolation.” But with the current stalemate keeping oil prices high and raising questions about U.S. power and influence, can the Trump administration afford to allow Iran to continue to threaten its neighbors and restrict commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz? To get a better understanding of the Trump administration’s strategy and whether it is ceding the once-dominant U.S. position in the Persian Gulf, I sat down with my Council on Foreign Relations colleague Steven Cook for the latest episode of the CFR podcast, The President’s Inbox. [Video: https://youtu.be/Asykfcte8ZM?si=fZu8CHFM0uKxyoK8] Here are my three takeaways: 1. The United States has no good options to compel Iran to meet its demands. Escalating militarily is risky because Iran can strike its Arab neighbors and U.S. military bases in the region. Escalating economically is problematic because it means antagonizing China and risking significant economic retaliation. The White House is left hoping that the U.S. naval blockade will deepen the effect of existing U.S. sanctions and force the Iranian leadership to sue for peace. This line of thinking assumes that the Iranian people will be able to put meaningful political pressure on their leaders. But Iran’s hardline leaders have already shown a ruthless willingness by using deadly force against any Iranians who take to the streets to protest. 2. U.S. allies in the region are hedging against a possible decline of U.S. influence and interest in the Middle East. Earlier this month, Saudi Arabia signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Pakistan and Turkey. The text of the agreement has not been released, so it is difficult to know what to make of claims that it constitutes a true defensive alliance with significant NATO–like protections. Pakistan and Turkey certainly did not, as Steven put it, “send the cavalry to help” when the Houthis fired on Saudi Arabia just forty-eight hours after the agreement was signed. The United Arab Emirates, meanwhile, is placing its chips on deepening the Abraham Accords, rather than following Riyadh. The rift between the two regional powers is real and could complicate U.S. diplomacy going forward. 3. The U.S. military presence in the Gulf will likely diminish in the years to come, but that could be a mixed blessing. For years, policymakers and experts have argued that the United States should reduce its role in the Middle East. In recent months, Steven and other Middle East experts have argued that this process is already underway as the Iran war ushers in a new regional order. But be careful what you wish for: a United States that is less involved in the Middle East could still see events emerging from the region that harm U.S. interests. As Steven put it, the “Iranians, the Saudis, the Turks, the Israelis, and others are going to try to order the region [in a way] that best serves their interests. And there’s the possibility for continued conflict and chaos as a result.” Oscar Berry and Asher Ross assisted in the preparation of this article. This work represents the views solely of the author(s). The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.
Iran Says Russia, China Remain Strategic Partners for Military Cooperation
Russia has previously cautioned the US against launching military action against Iran, while China has expressed political support for Tehran, saying it backs Iran in defending its sovereignty following US and Israeli strikes. Security cooperation between Tehran and Moscow has also intensified in recent years.
How Russia and China Are Helping Iran 2026 Middle East Conflict
Conclusion: The End of Unipolarity The ongoing conflict in 2026 proves one stark reality: the era of uncontested American hegemony in the Middle East is over. The fact that Iran can absorb direct U.S. military strikes and crushing sanctions without its government collapsing is entirely due to the support of Russia and China. As long as this trilateral alliance holds, the geopolitical balance ...
Isolated and under fire: Iran strikes out as Russia and China stand ...
With its supreme leader killed and its war machine under relentless U.S. pressure, Iran now stands largely alone - its longtime partners Russia and China offering nothing more than diplomatic ...
Russia, China, Iran Launch "Maritime Security Belt 2026" Naval Drills ...
Russia, China and Iran deploy destroyers, frigates and support vessels for Maritime Security Belt 2026 in the Strait of Hormuz, signaling deepening military coordination as the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike groups reinforce US naval presence in the Gulf amid escalating global tensions.
2026 Iran-China-Russia trilateral strategic pact — Grokipedia
The 2026 Iran-China-Russia trilateral strategic pact is a comprehensive diplomatic agreement signed on January 29, 2026, by representatives of Iran, China, and Russia, emphasizing economic cooperation, military coordination, nuclear sovereignty, and unified opposition to Western sanctions—particularly those tied to Iran's nuclear program under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ...
Israel-Iran Conflict 2026: Escalation, Strikes & Nuclear Tensions
In 2026 the Israel-Iran conflict remains volatile, with Israeli strikes in Lebanon and continuing tensions over Iran's nuclear program and possible U.S. military involvement. Learn the latest developments and how global citizens can support peace-centered solutions.
Iran and its proxies threaten retaliation against US and Israel amid US ...
Tehran and its regional proxy groups have threatened retaliation against the United States and Israel as Washington moves additional military assets into the Middle East after the regime's lethal crackdown on protesters. Regime-affiliated outlets and proxy leaders have outlined various retaliation scenarios, including drone swarms, maritime disruption efforts, and suicide attacks.
World reacts to US, Israel attack on Iran, Tehran retaliation
World reacts to US, Israel attack on Iran, Tehran retaliation EU urges 'maximum restraint'; mediator Oman warns US 'not to get sucked in' further into conflict.
IDF destroys notorious IRGC Quds Force ... - The Jerusalem Post
Updated: MARCH 7, 2026 20:52 In one of the most significant strikes of the current war, the IDF on Saturday night announced it had destroyed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force ...
Quds Force | Iran, IRGC, Meaning, History, & Israel-Hamas War - Britannica
Quds Force, elite clandestine wing of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), responsible primarily for its foreign operations. Its activities have centered on organizing, supporting, and at times leading local forces abroad in ways favorable to the interests of the IRGC and Iran's clerical establishment.