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ردیاب بحران ایران-خلیج فارس ۲۰۲۶
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strikeApr 13, 2026

Hezbollah and the limits of ceasefire diplomacy

Summary

Even as the United States and Iran clasp hands over a fragile ceasefire, Lebanon remains in strategic limbo, with continued Israeli strikes on Hezbollah underscoring that such truces manage symptoms, not causes. Often reduced to labels like “terrorist group” or “Iranian proxy,” such shorthand obscures the deeper historical, ideological, and geopolitical layers that define Hezbollah’s evolution. Hezbollah’s resilience lies in deeper historical, ideological, and socio-political roots. It emerged in 1982 during Israel’s invasion. While the Israeli invasion was aimed at expelling the Palestine Liberation Organisation(PLO), the prolonged occupation transformed Lebanon’s marginalised Shia community—long shaped by exclusion, economic neglect, a legacy of persecution and historical injustice within Twelver Shiism—into a receptive base for militant mobilisation. Structural inequalities persisted through the creation of Greater Lebanon (1920) and independence (1943), which institutionalised a Maronite–Sunni order that sidelined Shias despite their demographic weight, which comprises around 30% population. The creation of Israel in 1948 severed long-standing socio-economic ties between southern Lebanon and northern Palestine, deepening further marginalisation. Subsequent upheavals—the influx of Palestinian fighters, the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), and Israeli invasions in 1978 and 1982 further entrenched deprivation and alienation. Early mobilisation through the Amal Movement under Musa al-Sadr in 1974 proved inadequate, paving the way for more radical currents. The Invasion of Israel in 1982 proved opportune for figures like Ayatollah Husayn Fadlallah to channelise these radical currents into the formation of Hezbollah (the Party of God). The Iranian Revolution of 1979 proved decisive for Hezbollah, offering both ideological inspiration and organisational direction. Under the influence of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Hezbollah adopted the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, aligning itself with Iran’s revolutionary vision. Backed by Iran and facilitated by Syria, it evolved into a disciplined and ideologically driven force. These ties were not merely contemporary but rooted in deeper history: Lebanese Shia clerics from the Jabal Amil region played a key role in Safavid Iran’s transformation into a Shia state. Prior to that, Iran was predominantly Sunni. Since then, these enduring scholarly networks linking Najaf, Qom, and southern Lebanon have continued. Hezbollah’s defining moment came in 2000, when it compelled Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon after nearly two decades of occupation. Through sustained asymmetric warfare, Hezbollah achieved what Arab states had failed to accomplish conventionally, transforming itself from a marginal insurgency group into a powerful politico-military movement with wide legitimacy across the Arab world. Hezbollah’s strength lies not only in its military capability but in its ideological coherence, framing global politics as a civilisational confrontation between Islam and the West. It rejects Western civilisation as a universal model, portraying it as a “cultural invasion,” and critiques capitalism as inherently unequal. Western media and cultural industries are seen as tools of ideological control, turning culture into a political battleground. Within this framework, Israel is viewed as the linchpin of a broader Western project to dominate West Asia—an expansionist project with ambitions of ‘Greater Israel’, making it an existential threat. Moreover, the Israelis see themselves as God’s chosen people and treat all other religions as racially inferior. Thus making Hezbollah’s opposition both ideological and strategic. Central to Hezbollah’s worldview is the distinction between “oppressors” and “oppressed,” inspired by Khomeini’s thought but framed in universal terms. Oppression is not defined solely by poverty but by political, economic, and cultural subjugation resulting from state discrimination and injustice. Thus, the category of the ‘oppressed’ extends beyond sectarian lines to include all those facing domination. Since Israel suppresses the Palestinians through its state policies, it is treated as the ‘oppressor’. Hezbollah adopts a relatively restrained stance toward internal religious dissent: it does not automatically label other Muslims as unbelievers, unless they actively oppose Islamic principles or seek to impose secularism against Islam. Thus, notwithstanding its distinctly Shia identity and Iranian alignment, Hezbollah portrays itself as a champion of the oppressed across religious, sectarian and national lines, framing its resistance in near-universal terms of justice -a rhetorical approach that echoes leftist themes, though rooted firmly in Islamist ideology rather than communism. It has transformed lived experiences of exclusion into a coherent doctrine of resistance. It regards Jerusalem as a sacred trust of the Islamic ummah, beyond negotiation or compromise. This doctrine has enabled Hezbollah to align closely with organisations such as Hamas and to position itself as a leading advocate of the Palestinian cause and a pan-Islamic movement. Beyond its ideological and military roles, Hezbollah has built an extensive welfare network among Lebanon’s marginalised Shia and Sunni populations. This dual identity—as resistance movement and socio-political actor—has entrenched its influence, enabling electoral participation and integration into state democratic institutions. Supporters see a model of “armed legitimacy,” while critics argue its autonomous military undermines sovereignty and the state’s monopoly over force, a tension central to Lebanon’s fragile political order. Hezbollah’s regional role has further complicated its image. Its involvement in the Syrian Civil War, justified as a defence against extremism and protection of allied regimes, has reinforced criticism that it functions as an instrument of Iranian regional strategy. Today, Hezbollah stands as one of the most formidable non-state actors, fusing military capability, political influence, and ideological depth into a resilient yet deeply polarising force. Unlike Hamas, its close ties with Iran lead to a more rigid rejection of Israel’s legitimacy, while Hamas has shown some flexibility by indicating willingness to accept a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders. While Hezbollah’s ultimate objective remains the full liberation of Palestine, its limited openness to incremental gains reflects tactical pragmatism within a fundamentally uncompromising framework. Bridging this ideological-strategic divergence will be a defining challenge for any future negotiations, and a key determinant of whether diplomatic pathways can meaningfully advance. In the direct high-level peace talks, for the first time after the 1979 revolution, the issue of Hezbollah could be one of the challenging tasks. Understanding its evolution is therefore essential to grasp why ceasefires in West Asia remain fragile. Durable peace will require addressing not just immediate violence but the deeper historical grievances, ideological narratives, and structural inequalities that sustain the conflict. Hezbollah is not merely a participant in this conflict—it is one of its most enduring outcomes and a central actor in shaping the durable peace that includes the Palestinian question. West Asia’s crises are no longer regional—they are global in their consequences and human in their cost. What is needed is not further entanglement in cycles of conflict, but a deliberate disentanglement anchored in dialogue, justice, and statemanship. Disclaimer Views expressed above are the author's own.

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The White House is now apparently using Russian tactics to convince the American public that the war in Iran is not, in fact, a war. When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday whether the most intense sustained air campaign by American forces since the invasion of Iraq would be over by the midterms, Vice President JD Vance replied: “I wouldn’t call it a war.

” Vladimir Putin said much the same thing when he invaded Ukraine. Russia was not fighting a war either, the Kremlin insisted; it was merely conducting a “special military operation.” If that comparison strikes you as shocking, consider the contours of the two conflicts.

A vastly more powerful military launched a punishing offensive against a smaller, less well-equipped adversary, inflicted enormous damage without achieving a decisive resolution, and then found itself drawn into a longer, grinding conflict with no clear way out.

The motivations behind the wars may be different, and they’re playing out in different theaters, but the pattern is eerily similar. Now, so too is the attempt by those in power to control how the public understands, and even what it is allowed to call, the obvious war unfolding in front of them.

If This Isn’t a War, What Is? Let us take a moment to assess what exactly has happened since February 28, when the U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury. The opening U.S.-Israeli attack killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the defense minister and various other senior officials.

According to the U.S. military’s own accounting, the first 38 days of major combat operations involved more than 10,200 sorties and 13,500 strikes. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) says those attacks damaged or destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone and naval defense industrial base, while knocking out 82 percent of its air-defense missile systems.

The U.S. sent carrier strike groups and warships into the region, later imposing a military blockade on Iranian ports. Meanwhile, American and allied air defenses intercepted more than 6,000 Iranian attack drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles fired at U.

S. forces, Israel and American partners across the Middle East. More than 50,000 U.S. service members remain deployed across the region. The fighting has killed 18 U.S. service members and at least 8,000 people across Iran, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states.

More than 750 U.S. service members have been wounded. Last month, during a lull in the fighting, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a sanctions package likened to an “economic D-day” that is designed to make Iran an “economic outcast” and cut the adversary off from all available forms of economic support.

In the announcement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent openly declared that Iran had been “at war against America” for 47 years. This week, the shooting resumed; the U.S. hit targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran blasted missiles at targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq.

All this from an administration that almost exactly a year ago launched a rapid rebrand of the Defense Department into the “Department of War”. No boots on the ground, though, so it’s not a war, right? Tell It Kind of Like It Is Even the very best snake-oil salesman would have a hard time convincing people that the war in Iran isn’t a war.

So why is JD Vance even trying? Well, if there’s one thing politicians understand better than anyone, it’s the importance of language and rhetoric. Words have immense power; a well-written speech can unite millions of people, and a catchy slogan like Make America Great Again can come to represent an entire political philosophy.

But war is a pesky word. For one, it implies there will eventually be a winner and a loser. It also brings with it certain expectations—and some very difficult questions. What is the objective? How many people will die? When will it end? And, perhaps most dangerously of all: was it worth it?

Those are not questions the White House wants Americans to be asking. Trump built a substantial part of his political identity around ending, rather than beginning, America’s “endless wars.” When Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in June, the White House presented it as proof that Trump’s America First approach could deliver peace without another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Then the hostilities started again. Earlier this week, Trump shared a Truth Social graphic declaring that “Hormuz Oil Volumes are BACK!”, saying 18 million barrels a day were once again leaving the Strait, compared with 20 million before the war. No independent commodity tracking company or energy analyst appeared to verify Trump’s claims.

But most Americans won’t be checking tanker-tracking dashboards. What they’ll care about is the cold, hard fact that diesel hit a new record price this morning, soaring to an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever. Gasoline is $4.15 a gallon on average, compared with $3.

20 at this time last year, according to AAA. The numbers on the sign at the gas station and the price on the grocery receipt aren’t affected by Trump’s tall tales, but they’ll surely affect how Americans vote at the midterms. When viewed in this light, Vance’s attempt to discourage reporters from “call[ing] it a war” begins to make sense.

A war is something that we want to end. It tends to result in a winner and a loser. And its worth is up for debate at all times. A different kind of engagement that doesn’t quite meet the threshold of war—say, a special military operation—is not exposed to the same kind of scrutiny.

Vance effectively made that case himself. “When you ask, ‘When will this end?’ You’re asking me a question like, ‘When will the Iranians stop shooting at ships?’” he said. By that logic, there is no American war—only recurring Iranian provocations that require American military responses.

That’s exactly the logic applied by Putin to Ukraine and supposed expansion of NATO. Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly invoked the War Powers Resolution to challenge Trump’s authority to keep fighting Iran without specific congressional authorization.

The law generally gives a president 60 days after U.S. forces enter “hostilities” to secure congressional approval or bring those hostilities to an end. That makes the pauses in fighting hugely important. When the original 60-day deadline arrived in May, Trump told Congress that the temporary ceasefire reached in April meant the hostilities that began on February 28 had ended.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the War Powers clock could “pause, or stop” when the shooting did. That position is disputed by legal experts, but its political utility is obvious. If every new outbreak of fighting can be treated as a separate skirmish, rather than part of one continuous war, the administration can argue that a fresh 60-day clock starts each time.

Vance’s insistence that there is no continuing “war” fits neatly for an administration that has already tried to divide six months of conflict into separate periods of hostilities, interrupted by ceasefires and pauses. This brings us back to Moscow.

The Kremlin’s own linguistic trick was also about making one sprawling war sound smaller, more limited and more manageable than it really was. From the very beginning of the invasion, Putin described the war as a special military operation. Only after two years of grinding warfare did Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly declare Russia to be in a “state of war”—and even then, he said the transformation had occurred because the “collective West” had joined the fight against Russia.

Vance is playing a similar game, but in reverse. Only now—with soaring fuel prices, mounting casualties, concerns over the military’s munitions stockpiles, and midterm elections on the horizon—is the conflict no longer a war. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, though, and the American people aren’t stupid.

Vance and the White House may discover in November that voters are perfectly capable of recognizing a war, even when the vice president doesn’t want to call it one.

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