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ردیاب بحران ایران-خلیج فارس ۲۰۲۶
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strikeApr 2, 2026

How Tehran’s proxy network could outlast the Iranian regime

Summary

- - Click here to listen to this article - - Share via A month into the Iran war, the United States has offered a 15-point plan to end the hostilities, which includes a broad range of demands on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and guarantees on freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. is also insisting on Iranian commitments to stop funding and supporting its network of proxies, including Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthi militants in Yemen, recognizing that these terrorist groups have been one of the major driving forces behind the chaos that currently exists in the region. While the U.S. is right to press Tehran hard on the proxy front, they should minimize expectations that this decades-long problem will be solved in the near term. First, don’t count on Iran agreeing to the U.S. conditions. During his 37-year reign, the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made it one of his highest priorities to build and strengthen Iran-backed militias and terrorist groups that could extend the regime’s influence and project its power across the Middle East. That legacy is likely to outlive Khamenei. Furthermore, while these proxies still rely on Iranian support, particularly Hezbollah, they have also all developed their own global, independent terrorist, procurement, financial and logistical networks. The threat these groups pose to both the region and beyond is unlikely to disappear regardless of how the Iran war ends — and the U.S. and its partners should be prepared. Consider Hezbollah, Iran’s most loyal and longest operating partner. Over the decades, Hezbollah developed terrorist networks and infrastructure around the world that operates independently of Iran. Hezbollah terrorist activity has been uncovered and disrupted in Cyprus, Peru, Colombia, Thailand, London and the U.S., among many other locales — demonstrating its threat well beyond the Middle East. And while Hamas has never carried out a successful terrorist attack outside of Israel, the West Bank or Gaza, recent criminal cases in Germany and Denmark reveal that Hamas had contingency plans prior to the Oct. 7 attacks for strikes in Europe, stashing small arms for its operatives in multiple European countries. This is a dangerous trend well worth watching. Hezbollah and the Houthis have also established their own robust international procurement networks to obtain cutting edge communications, electronics and other dual-use and weapons technology. All this has been critical for building Hezbollah’s and the Houthis’ own drone forces — which are now central to their battle plans. To disguise their hands, both Hezbollah and the Houthis have created numerous front companies, run by individuals without known ties to the groups. These fronts have been particularly active in China and the United Arab Emirates, though they have also sourced supplies from Europe, elsewhere in Asia and even the U.S. In some cases, the sellers are well aware of who they are dealing with and are willing to help evade detection. For example, two Chinese companies sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2025 — Hubei Chica Industrial Co. and Shenzhen Shengnan Trading Co. — allegedly helped the Houthis falsify shipping documents to facilitate the transactions. According to the Treasury Department, Hubei supplied the Houthis with “bulk quantities of chemical precursors” for “ballistic missiles, explosives, and other advanced weapon systems,” while Shenzhen Shengnan provided electronic equipment used in drones. This past summer, European authorities disrupted a large-scale Hezbollah procurement network operating in Spain, Germany, France and the U.K. According to media reports, front companies linked to Hezbollah were obtaining drone components (including engines, chemical compounds and electronic systems) for use in targeting Israel. Criminal charges were brought against suspects in all four countries. Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis all can raise funds independently of Iran. For the last several years, the Houthis have found a surprising new profit center: selling weapons to Al Shabab, the Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group in Somalia. This partnership not only demonstrates the Houthis’ fundraising creativity but their apparent surplus of weapons in Yemen. The Houthis also tax and extort money from the local population and engage in smuggling and other means of raising funds. Hamas has an even more extensive overseas financial infrastructure. Hamas has established so-called charities and other nongovernmental organizations to raise its funds. Europe has been a particular hotbed for this type of Hamas activity, according to the Israeli government. The U.S. estimated that Hamas was raising $10 million a month from these sham charities in the lead-up to the Oct. 7 attacks, rivaling what it received from Iran. Given Hamas’ successful Gaza fundraising campaigns post-Oct. 7, these figures may well have even increased since the attacks. While Hezbollah relies far more on Iran for its funding than Hamas and the Houthis do, the Lebanese militia also has its own fundraising mechanisms. Hezbollah has long-established networks in South America and West Africa that generate funding for the organization. This includes funding from licit and illicit businesses owned and operated by Hezbollah financiers and donations from supporters in the large expatriate communities throughout these regions. This funding alone would not sustain Hezbollah or let it rebuild from the Israeli attacks. But Hezbollah could likely call on these networks to generate more funding if Iran were unable or unwilling to sustain its past levels of resources. Cutting the ties between Iran and its proxies would certainly be a major step forward, though the selection of the ayatollah’s hard-line son Mojtaba as the new supreme leader is a strong indication that Iran is not moving in a better direction. But don’t assume that even if Iran cuts off its support, it would eliminate the threat. Even as it works to secure promises from Tehran, the U.S. should also press its partners around the world to maintain pressure on the proxies’ independent networks, particularly in the locales where Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis have been most active. If the international community fails to aggressively crack down on these networks, the late ayatollah might have the last laugh. Michael Jacobson is a former director of strategy, plans and initiatives in the State Department’s Counterterrorism Bureau. Matthew Levitt is a former deputy assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis at the Treasury. They are senior fellows at the Washington Institute. More to Read Insights L.A. Times Insights delivers AI-generated analysis on Voices content to offer all points of view. Insights does not appear on any news articles. Viewpoint Perspectives The following AI-generated content is powered by Perplexity. The Los Angeles Times editorial staff does not create or edit the content. Ideas expressed in the piece Iran’s proxy network will likely endure beyond any regime transition because groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis have developed independent global financial, procurement, and logistical networks that operate independently of Tehran[1][2]. These proxies have established sophisticated terrorist infrastructure and operational capacity across multiple continents, with Hezbollah cells documented in Cyprus, Peru, Colombia, Thailand, London, and the United States, demonstrating their capacity to threaten regional and international interests without direct Iranian command[1]. The proxy groups have created autonomous funding mechanisms that rival or exceed Iranian support in some cases, including Hezbollah’s South American and West African networks, Hamas’s European charity operations that reportedly generated $10 million monthly before October 7, and Houthi weapons sales to Al Shabab in Somalia[1]. Proxies have constructed independent procurement networks using front companies and Chinese and Emirati intermediaries to obtain advanced weapons technology and drone components, deliberately disguising their Iranian connections to evade international sanctions and detection[1]. Even if Iran were to cease supporting these groups, the threat would persist because the proxies’ institutional capacity, financial independence, and global networks have matured beyond dependence on Tehran’s direct involvement[1][2]. The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme leader suggests Iran will maintain rather than abandon its proxy strategy, indicating the ideological and strategic commitment to proxy networks transcends individual leaders[1]. Different views on the topic Proxy relationships face inherent limitations in control and effectiveness; sponsors cannot easily direct proxy behavior despite providing extensive support, as proxies operate according to their own leadership incentives, internal politics, and strategic calculations[4]. Proxy forces function most effectively in irregular warfare roles such as intelligence gathering and sabotage but cannot realistically function as surrogate conventional militaries capable of seizing and holding significant territory[4]. The structural resilience of Iran’s regime—comprising security services, intelligence agencies, the IRGC’s economic networks, and local enforcement bodies—means that decapitation of senior leadership does not eliminate the institutional capacity to project influence through proxies[3]. Proxy warfare should be understood as a tactical tool integrated into broader strategy rather than as an independent strategic solution, and expectations about proxy effectiveness must remain realistic to avoid overestimating their capacity to achieve strategic objectives[4].

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  • Michael Jacobson; Matthew LevittBy Michael Jacobson; Matthew Levitt

    - - Click here to listen to this article - - Share via A month into the Iran war, the United States has offered a 15-point plan to end the hostilities, which includes a broad range of demands on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and guarantees on freedom of navigation in the S

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The White House is now apparently using Russian tactics to convince the American public that the war in Iran is not, in fact, a war. When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday whether the most intense sustained air campaign by American forces since the invasion of Iraq would be over by the midterms, Vice President JD Vance replied: “I wouldn’t call it a war.

” Vladimir Putin said much the same thing when he invaded Ukraine. Russia was not fighting a war either, the Kremlin insisted; it was merely conducting a “special military operation.” If that comparison strikes you as shocking, consider the contours of the two conflicts.

A vastly more powerful military launched a punishing offensive against a smaller, less well-equipped adversary, inflicted enormous damage without achieving a decisive resolution, and then found itself drawn into a longer, grinding conflict with no clear way out.

The motivations behind the wars may be different, and they’re playing out in different theaters, but the pattern is eerily similar. Now, so too is the attempt by those in power to control how the public understands, and even what it is allowed to call, the obvious war unfolding in front of them.

If This Isn’t a War, What Is? Let us take a moment to assess what exactly has happened since February 28, when the U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury. The opening U.S.-Israeli attack killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the defense minister and various other senior officials.

According to the U.S. military’s own accounting, the first 38 days of major combat operations involved more than 10,200 sorties and 13,500 strikes. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) says those attacks damaged or destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone and naval defense industrial base, while knocking out 82 percent of its air-defense missile systems.

The U.S. sent carrier strike groups and warships into the region, later imposing a military blockade on Iranian ports. Meanwhile, American and allied air defenses intercepted more than 6,000 Iranian attack drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles fired at U.

S. forces, Israel and American partners across the Middle East. More than 50,000 U.S. service members remain deployed across the region. The fighting has killed 18 U.S. service members and at least 8,000 people across Iran, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states.

More than 750 U.S. service members have been wounded. Last month, during a lull in the fighting, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a sanctions package likened to an “economic D-day” that is designed to make Iran an “economic outcast” and cut the adversary off from all available forms of economic support.

In the announcement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent openly declared that Iran had been “at war against America” for 47 years. This week, the shooting resumed; the U.S. hit targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran blasted missiles at targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq.

All this from an administration that almost exactly a year ago launched a rapid rebrand of the Defense Department into the “Department of War”. No boots on the ground, though, so it’s not a war, right? Tell It Kind of Like It Is Even the very best snake-oil salesman would have a hard time convincing people that the war in Iran isn’t a war.

So why is JD Vance even trying? Well, if there’s one thing politicians understand better than anyone, it’s the importance of language and rhetoric. Words have immense power; a well-written speech can unite millions of people, and a catchy slogan like Make America Great Again can come to represent an entire political philosophy.

But war is a pesky word. For one, it implies there will eventually be a winner and a loser. It also brings with it certain expectations—and some very difficult questions. What is the objective? How many people will die? When will it end? And, perhaps most dangerously of all: was it worth it?

Those are not questions the White House wants Americans to be asking. Trump built a substantial part of his political identity around ending, rather than beginning, America’s “endless wars.” When Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in June, the White House presented it as proof that Trump’s America First approach could deliver peace without another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Then the hostilities started again. Earlier this week, Trump shared a Truth Social graphic declaring that “Hormuz Oil Volumes are BACK!”, saying 18 million barrels a day were once again leaving the Strait, compared with 20 million before the war. No independent commodity tracking company or energy analyst appeared to verify Trump’s claims.

But most Americans won’t be checking tanker-tracking dashboards. What they’ll care about is the cold, hard fact that diesel hit a new record price this morning, soaring to an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever. Gasoline is $4.15 a gallon on average, compared with $3.

20 at this time last year, according to AAA. The numbers on the sign at the gas station and the price on the grocery receipt aren’t affected by Trump’s tall tales, but they’ll surely affect how Americans vote at the midterms. When viewed in this light, Vance’s attempt to discourage reporters from “call[ing] it a war” begins to make sense.

A war is something that we want to end. It tends to result in a winner and a loser. And its worth is up for debate at all times. A different kind of engagement that doesn’t quite meet the threshold of war—say, a special military operation—is not exposed to the same kind of scrutiny.

Vance effectively made that case himself. “When you ask, ‘When will this end?’ You’re asking me a question like, ‘When will the Iranians stop shooting at ships?’” he said. By that logic, there is no American war—only recurring Iranian provocations that require American military responses.

That’s exactly the logic applied by Putin to Ukraine and supposed expansion of NATO. Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly invoked the War Powers Resolution to challenge Trump’s authority to keep fighting Iran without specific congressional authorization.

The law generally gives a president 60 days after U.S. forces enter “hostilities” to secure congressional approval or bring those hostilities to an end. That makes the pauses in fighting hugely important. When the original 60-day deadline arrived in May, Trump told Congress that the temporary ceasefire reached in April meant the hostilities that began on February 28 had ended.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the War Powers clock could “pause, or stop” when the shooting did. That position is disputed by legal experts, but its political utility is obvious. If every new outbreak of fighting can be treated as a separate skirmish, rather than part of one continuous war, the administration can argue that a fresh 60-day clock starts each time.

Vance’s insistence that there is no continuing “war” fits neatly for an administration that has already tried to divide six months of conflict into separate periods of hostilities, interrupted by ceasefires and pauses. This brings us back to Moscow.

The Kremlin’s own linguistic trick was also about making one sprawling war sound smaller, more limited and more manageable than it really was. From the very beginning of the invasion, Putin described the war as a special military operation. Only after two years of grinding warfare did Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly declare Russia to be in a “state of war”—and even then, he said the transformation had occurred because the “collective West” had joined the fight against Russia.

Vance is playing a similar game, but in reverse. Only now—with soaring fuel prices, mounting casualties, concerns over the military’s munitions stockpiles, and midterm elections on the horizon—is the conflict no longer a war. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, though, and the American people aren’t stupid.

Vance and the White House may discover in November that voters are perfectly capable of recognizing a war, even when the vice president doesn’t want to call it one.

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