strikeJun 10, 2026

The geoeconomic battlefield

Summary

The geoeconomic battlefield Sanctions and blockades are used as nonconventional tools to apply force Share The Epaminondas ship during its seizure by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Strait of Hormuz in Iran on April 24, 2026 (Photo: Reuters) “You have almost like a perfect storm — a massive energy shock in prices and quantities, and a potential agricultural shock. That’s why you cannot rule out a serious outcome for India, both for prices and for real activity and standards of living.” Arvind Subramanian, former chief economic advisor to the Government of India, told the Blueprint. “Oil marketing companies are already bleeding, so price increases are almost inevitable,” he added. The two incidents are not directly related, yet there’s a clear cause-and-effect: The war in Iran may have begun with missiles and drones raining down on infrastructure. At the time of writing, it has transformed surreptitiously into an economic battlefield that has made the world sit up and take note. As one of the world’s biggest energy consumers, almost wholly imported, near the top of that list of worried nations is India. Also Read The May 8 action by Iranian commandos was not an isolated incident — it was just the most recent move to break the crippling regime from the Western sanctions that the Islamic republic has come under. Iran has for years relied on a shadow fleet, a covert network of ageing oil tankers, shell companies, and logistical operations used to secretly export crude oil in defiance of international sanctions imposed by the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN). The seizure of Ocean Koi made little sense on paper. Iran had just confiscated a ship that was, by all accounts, its own, moving Iranian oil through a network built by Iran to skirt US sanctions. Iranian state media claimed the vessel was “attempting to disrupt oil exports and the interests of the Iranian nation”. But no independent source has verified this claim. A satellite image showing smoke billowing at Aramco oil facility in Saudi Arabia after a reported attack, following the announcement of a two-week ceasefire in the Iran war on April 8, 2026 (Photo: Reuters) This incident revealed a central paradox of Iran’s shadow fleet. These vessels are the foot soldiers of a shadow economy — the only reason Iran is still in this war. And yet, this economy is so shadowy, so fragmented and decentralised that even Iran cannot fully control it. For decades, Iran has evaded US-led sanctions through its shadow economy. The scale of this parallel economy is staggering, with analysts estimating that China alone receives 1.38 million barrels of Iranian crude oil every day, despite sanctions. This oil is disguised through ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman and the Malacca Strait, where Iranian crude is mixed with other oils or simply relabelled as Malaysian or Omani blends. According to the Atlantic council, the payment for the Iranian crude is often paid in China’s renminbi (RMB) system, which is the official currency and financial architecture of China and is tied to its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System. This benefits Iran as it is not dependent on dollar-controlled systems like the Society for World wide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network, headquartered in Brussels. The SWIFT system facilitates international transactions and Iran is out of this framework as it is under heavy US sanctions. In May, China invoked an anti-sanctions law against the US blacklisting of several of its oil refineries over purchases of Iranian crude. “China is benefiting reputationally. The US is being seen as erratic and as having started this war and inflicted damage on the global economy. China, by contrast, is being seen as a more stable and reliable major power,” Subramanian said. According to reports, Iran is already charging a toll in Chinese yuan from ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. At this point in time, BRICS (an intergovernmental organisation and geopolitical bloc comprising major economies like Brazil, Russia, India, China), is also exploring alternatives to the US dollar and Western financial networks, like BRICS Pay and states are increasingly trading in local currencies. US President Donald Trump had in December 2024 threatened up to 100 to 150 per cent tariffs on the trade and products of any nation attempting to replace the dollar. Russia, which was sanctioned by the US and the EU in 2022, has shifted much of its trade to the RMB. According to Financial Times, most of the Russia and China trade, which is worth over $240 billion annually, is settled in yuan and rubles. “They (Iran) have developed all kinds of shadowy ways to do business, including shadow banking, shadow finance, shell companies, exploiting virtual currencies, and crypto,” said Rachel Ehrenfeld, director of the American Centre for Democracy and its Economic Warfare Institute. “There are so many who are willing to circumvent the sanctions. And so this is how Iran operates: in untraditional ways of payment. They are very good at coming up with new ways to circumvent the system,” she added. In late April, the US Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned 35 entities and individuals overseeing Iran’s shadow banking architecture, which facilitates the movement of tens of billions of dollars tied to sanctions-busting. At the centre of this network is oil magnet Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, alias Hector, the primary architect of Iran’s shadow oil trade. His Shamkhani network controls dozens of vessels and front companies, moving Iranian and Russian crude globally, often to China. The profits total up to tens of billions of dollars annually and do not move through traditional banks. Instead, the network uses Dubai-based hawala trust transfers, Hong Kong yuan swaps, and trade misinvoicing to launder the money back to the IRGC. The Shamkhani network serves as a critical logistical link for funnelling drones, missiles, and dual-use components to Russia for the Ukraine war and to the Houthis in Yemen. What makes them so dangerous and difficult to track is their deliberate evasion of maritime law. Normal ships broadcast their location using an automatic identification system (AIS) transponder. Shadow fleet ships disable their AIS to “go dark” or they use a technique called “spoofing” that transmits false coordinates to mislead authorities. According to the advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), the shadow fleet now exceeds 500 vessels. This parallel system did not materialise overnight — it has been built through decades of experience evading US sanctions through what some call a “resistance economy”. The country produces 80 per cent of its food domestically and has the region’s most diversified economy. According to reports, Iranian oil exports have nearly doubled since the war began; the country is exporting 2.4 million to 2.8 million barrels of oil per day, sold at much higher prices. Most of these proceeds go to the IRGC to sustain the war machinery. Iran has effectively blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman through which 20 per cent of the global oil passes. The US responded with its own naval blockade of Iranian ports and vessels — it calls its campaign Operation Economic Fury. “Disrupting the Shadow Fleet is obviously key for the US blockade to work. The US naval blockade has two purposes. First, to weaponise the Strait of Hormuz against Iran, but also to open the Strait of Hormuz,” said Rob Geist Pinfold, lecturer in defence studies at King’s College London. A blaze rising from an industrial building after being struck by debris from an intercepted Iranian missile in Haifa, Israel on March 30, 2026 (Photo: Reuters) Game of chicken The Iranian subterfuge, by all accounts, has surprised the US, which thought its economic pressure would cause the Iranian economy to collapse, making it impossible for Iran to sustain the war. Kenneth Abramowitz, an investor, a threat analyst and author of The Multifront War, said, “President Trump publicly said, ‘If we have to use military means, we’ll stop Iran’.If we just keep the blockade up, they’re going to starve eventually.’ Personally, he would prefer the second plan. (There’s) 50 per cent chance that Trump continues with the blockade and 50 per cent chance he goes back to the military.” “It’s a game of chicken: two cars running into each other at 100 miles an hour. We’ll soon find out if someone turns away,” he added. The game narrative has worked like this: when the US presented its initial 15-point proposal in late March through Pakistani mediators, it required Iran to unconditionally reopen the strategic waterway. Iran rejected those terms and issued a counter-proposal: international recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. It even established a new agency, the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, to regulate vessel traffic and collect transit fees. As expected, these conditions were unacceptable to the US. Iran’s economic game plan was clear: through the blockade, it was waiting for the global economy to suffer to the point that the US would be forced into a ceasefire. “We did not expect Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz. That’s very clear. The US did not have the assets in place to prevent that from happening. The US was clearly surprised,” Pinfold said. “Iran wants to cause so much chaos and so many second — and third-order effects to the global economy, negatively affecting US allies, that the US will be deterred from escalating confrontation.” This raises a central question: has the conflict between the US and Iran transformed into a geoeconomic war, where economic pressure replaces military confrontation as the primary weapon? From the US perspective, Ehrenfeld said, “The goal is to weaken Iran to the extent that they won’t be able to create a nuclear power, but they will be busy in really surviving. If they don’t have money to pay the soldiers, the fighters, or the Basij (Iran’ss regular army), people will go out to the streets.” The concept of economic warfare is nothing new. In 1990, American political scientist Edward Luttwak argued that the waning of the Cold War would see states preferring economic and commercial instruments to using armed forces in their strategic competitions. ‘Geoeconomics’ was the term Luttwak coined to describe “the logic of war transposed into the grammar of commerce”. The US, with its grip on the world economy, has waged economic wars for decades, deploying instruments like sanctions and blockades. Former US president Jimmy Carter imposed a trade embargo and froze approximately $12 billion in Iranian assets after Iranian students took diplomats hostage in 1979. “If I can solve a problem without military means and use economic means, namely a boycott or a blockade, if that serves the purpose, I’d rather do that,” Abramowitz said. “I think the feeling of the West in the Middle East (West Asia) is we’re going to win the war with Iran, whether it’s through kinetic war or through economic war.” These sanctions have remained in place because the leaders and supporters of the Islamic revolution in Iran, led by former supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini, were ideologically hostile to the West. Economics underpinned their first clash: In 1953, a US-backed coup deposed Iran’s democratically-elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, who had decided to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (which today is British Petroleum). American and British intelligence services conspired to stage the coup that placed the pro-West Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in charge. When the king was ousted by the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran severed all ties with the US. The West’s sanctions grip on Iran has only increased with time. In 1984, the US State Department designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism, which triggered a ban on US foreign assistance and arms sales. Under US former president Bill Clinton, there were executive orders for a total ban on US trade, investment and involvement in the Iranian oil and gas sector. By 2006, the focus had turned to Iran’s nuclear programme: The US and the UN Security Council imposed multilateral financial and proliferation-focused sanctions on Iranian individuals, institutions and the Central Bank of Iran. The following year, the sanctions were extended to the IRGC. The US was particularly concerned about Iran’s nuclear enrichment and its alleged pursuit of a nuclear bomb, something denied by Iran. As concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme grew, the US increasingly targeted Iranian banks and entities involved in weapons of mass destruction proliferation. This culminated in the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act in 2010. In July 2015, an agreement was reached between Iran and the P5+1 countries — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the US (under Barack Obama) and Germany — on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In exchange for heavy curtailment of Iran’s nuclear programme and stringent International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, the US and its partners ended nuclear-related secondary sanctions against Iran, giving the country access to frozen funds and enabling it to export oil in the international market. In 2018, the Trump administration pulled out of the JCPOA and reimposed the suspended sanctions. This was a reversion to a hardline ‘maximum pressure’ policy aimed at compelling Iran to negotiate on issues, including ballistic missiles and its regional proxy network of armed allies. The reimposition of these sanctions had a crippling effect on the Iranian economy — its famed hand woven persian carpets, a $2 billion industry that was a major export product, plunged to $40 million annually. The US has been strongly opposed to Iranian support for non-state militant allies such as Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. These groups are not only hostile to the US presence in the region but are also in constant conflict with its principal ally in the region, Israel. “This war was a strategic disaster for Iran because it didn’t do enough damage to deter Israel or to de-escalate tension, and it normalised the paradigm of state-on-state warfare,” Pinfold said. Iran’s involvement in civil wars, such as backing Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the Shia militias in Iraq, has meant the US and Iran have often been on opposing sides in proxy conflicts. Iran calls this network of militias in the region the Axis of Resistance. This network was more or less put in place and coordinated through Iranian major general Qassem Soleimani, who was killed by a US drone in 2020 in Baghdad. The militias, along with the IRGC, have attacked Israel, its Gulf allies like Saudi Arabia and US bases in the region, most notably the October 7 attacks in 2023 by Hamas in southern Israel, which triggered a regional war beginning with Gaza and has culminated in the ongoing US-Iran conflict. Although significantly weakened and battered in the conflict, they remain present on the fringes of the current war.“The Gaza war is the key precipitant factor for all of this. Hamas, as far as we know, did not get Iranian approval to launch the October 7 attacks. That caught the Iranians by surprise,” Pinfold said. During the 12-day war with Iran in 2024, the US, through its B-2 Spirit bombers and GBU-57 bunker-busting bombs, attacked Iranian nuclear sites in Isfahan, Fordow and Natanz. These caused massive damage to the sites but reportedly did not effectively destroy Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities. Coming into the current phase of the US-Iran war, Trump again cited the Iranian nuclear threat as a reason to go to war. The Pentagon renamed it Operation Epic Fury 2.0. “The desired political goal has never been fully clear to us. We get a lot of discussion about why we don’t want Iran to get a nuclear weapon. Well, if that's the case, we can drop bombs on Iranian nuclear facilities all day long,” Dan Grazier, a former US Marine Corps ground combat officer and senior fellow and Director at the Stimson Centre, told Blueprint. “But if that destruction isn’t immediately followed up and exploited on the ground, as soon as the Iranians’ ears stop ringing, they’re going to clean up and start over again.” For most Americans, the Iran war was characterised by severe economic stress and rising inflation. As many as 61 per cent of US adults disapprove of the conflict. Polling by the Pew Research Centre indicates that only about 36 per cent of Americans support the strikes, while 49 per cent explicitly oppose further US airstrikes. “I drive a Toyota 4Runner. I just filled up that gas tank on Monday. And yeah, I definitely noticed the cost of that racking up very quickly as they were pumping gas,” Grazier said. “I think the longer this goes on, the more Americans are going to feel it on the ground, too, because rising fuel and energy costs have a downstream effect.” The cost of Brent crude went up to $126 per barrel during the conflict. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned that if the price stays well above $100 a barrel, the world economy would be headed for a recession. “The inflation numbers in the US are high today. Because this is one global market, rising prices are also creating pressure,” Subramanian said. “Had the US been importing directly through Hormuz, the pressure would have been even greater.” he added. Meanwhile, the US spent an estimated $890 million to $2 billion daily during the peak of its military campaign against Iran. The Pentagon is seeking an additional $200 billion from the US Congress. And Iranian strikes on US bases in West Asia have caused at least $800 million in direct infrastructure damage, according to the Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). According to a congressional report, 42 US aircraft were either destroyed or extensively damaged. This damage is thought to include about 24 to 30 MQ-9 Reaper drones (each drone costs $30 million), stealth planes, and a radar surveillance jet worth $700 million. According to CSIS, the value of American equipment lost is estimated to be between $2.3 billion and $2.8 billion. A key point of the war came when Iran used low-cost barrages of Shahed 134/136 drones to overwhelm US air defences, which were made up of expensive Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) interceptors. These barrages were able to overwhelm and exhaust US air defences and cause massive damage not just to US bases and assets but also to infrastructure; oil refineries of Gulf countries like Ras Tanura (Saudi Aramco’s largest crude processing plant) were hit. Attacks like these changed the economics of warfare in Iran’s favour and caused damage to its Gulf neighbours that not only affected their manufacturing capacities and oil trade but also damaged their reputation as an oasis of stability in West Asia. The UAE, famous for its futuristic skyline, luxury lifestyle, and flamboyant architecture, has seen the most drone and missile attacks. These losses cannot be quantified and are set to haunt the region for years to come. “Iran is looking for softer targets, those with far less skin in the game, those who are far more linked up to the global economy,” Pinfold said. Source: Based on a House Armed Services Committee hearing, other corroborating data from the Congressional Research Service, CBS News Distant war hits home India, though without a direct stake in the conflict, has not been insulated from the ill effects of this war; it enjoys good strategic ties with both Iran and the US. With the US, it has deepened defence cooperation through the Quad grouping, intelligence-sharing agreements, and a mutual interest in countering Chinese expansionism. With Iran, India maintains diplomatic and economic relations rooted in historical ties and access to the Chabahar port. However, the current war has exposed the limits of this neutrality. India’s oil tankers have been unable to pass the Strait of Hormuz and have even faced a few attacks. When the US imposes sanctions, Indian banks fear secondary penalties. In 1965, the then Indian prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, while on a fundraising tour in Hyderabad, made an appeal to Indian citizens to part with their gold for the national defence fund during the war with Pakistan. As Pakistani forces crossed the border into Kashmir, Shastri also asked the country to skip a meal every week so that the nation could save foodgrains for the war effort. Nearly 61 years later, Prime Minister Narendra Modi also made an appeal from the same city. The only difference was that in 1965, India was at war. Now, the economic effects of a war elsewhere were hitting India at home. Since the start of the war between the US and Iran, the price of global crude oil has surged, putting a huge strain on India as it imports nearly 48 to 50 per cent (2.5 million barrels per day) of its crude oil requirements from the Gulf. Tanker risks in the Strait of Hormuz have raised shipping insurance premiums by 20–25 per cent ever since the waterway was declared closed by the Iranian navy. Meanwhile, gold imports from the international market have remained high. Both these issues posed a danger to the rupee’s stability: the currency has weakened past 95.69 per $1 that has widened the country’s trade deficit. Economically, the war has hit almost every single Indian household. The closure of ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz triggered a severe supply crisis of liquefied natural gas, forcing the poor to switch to firewood and those who could afford it to electric stoves for cooking. Restaurants across the country have had to increase food prices, lay off staff or permanently shut down. The crisis is also disrupting India’s agricultural production, as roughly three-fourths of its imported urea and ammonia come from the Gulf region. These inputs are critical for producing nitrogen-based fertilisers, which in turn are essential for wheat, rice, and sugarcane. Equally, Indian exports to Gulf countries are at an all-time low — nearly 400,000 tonnes of basmati rice are stuck at ports or in mid-transit. Total exports to the region have fallen to $2.15 billion in March, down 57.6 per cent from $5.07 billion a year ago. “Remittances might also be affected. If Gulf countries cannot export oil and construction activity slows down, that becomes both a remittance shock and an export shock. That adds to why this is becoming such a major economic shock,” Subramanian said. “Geopolitically, we have very few levers to change any meaningful outcomes significantly. We have no real say in the outcome. I think we just have to wait it out.” In this climate, Modi has reframed patriotism as economic discipline. “There was a time when, during a crisis or war, people would donate gold to the country. Today, there is no need for donations. But for the nation, we must decide that for one year, we will not buy gold jewellery at any function or event,” he said. The irony, of course, is that India is not a party to this conflict. It is a bystander. But in a globalised economy, bystanders can bleed first. Both sides are indirectly involved in ceasefire negotiations and have agreed on a broad framework, but after the Islamabad talks failed to deliver a long-lasting solution, peace remains elusive. The war may yet end with negotiations. As of late May, both nations are evaluating a 60-day memorandum of understanding. The US claims the deal will mandate a completely open strait with no tolls, but the shadow economy built to survive sanctions will likely remain. And far from the Gulf, countries like India will continue paying the price of conflicts they neither started nor control. “The only certainty is that there will be another war in the future. It’s just a matter of when that is and who the key players are,” Grazier said. In this war of economic attrition, it is a game of which side blinks first. Written By Mohammad Asif Khan Mohammad Asif Khan is a Senior Correspondent at Business Standard, where he covers defence, security, and strategic affairs. First Published: Jun 10 2026 | 6:50 AM IST In this article :

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Business Standard; Mohammad Asif KhanBy Business Standard; Mohammad Asif Khan
The geoeconomic battlefield Sanctions and blockades are used as nonconventional tools to apply force Share The Epaminondas ship during its seizure by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Strait of Hormuz in Iran on April 24, 2026 (Photo: Reuters) “You have almost like a p…

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Iran War: Brief US Pause Followed by Renewed Strikes as Iran Intensifies Attacks on Bases and Kuwait Desalination; Continued Speculation About US Operation | naked capitalism

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Over the weekend, after exchanges where the US hit bridges and a desalination plant in Iran (reportedly repaired very quickly) and Iran’s response included hitting a much more important desalination and power plant in Kuwait and pounding important US operations in Jordan, the US attacks fell way back one night and CENTCOM and even Trump were quiet.

Some speculated that more Gulf states were denying the US the use of their airspace and the US was having to make a major regrouping. However, the US resumed strikes last night, with the pretext that the US had suffered two more military deaths on top of two just reported.

1 Trump had promised intensified strikes beginning more or less today if Iran did not return to negotiations, as in capitulate. And as many noted, the US had escalated last week, albeit not to the level of attacks during the initial phase of the war, not just with the number of strikes but also the targeting: the aforementioned desalination plant, bridges, too close for comfort to the Bushehr nuclear plant2 and to a nuclear site under development at Darkhovin.

Many have argued that the latest round of strikes look like shaping attacks in preparation for a ground operation, which pretty much everyone with even a modicum of military knowledge sees as insane.3 Daniel Davis has also mentioned in passing that despite all the noise about using ground forces and other signs of a buildup, such as more refueling tankers flying to Jordan, that Trump was shaken by the near-disaster at Isfahan, where a supposed rescue of a downed pilot resulted in the loss of more air assets than in any single engagement since Vietnam.

Many experts have contended that that was an actual operation, a botched attempt to remove some of Iran’s “nuclear dust.” However, Scott Ritter may have squared that circle. See his brief clip starting at 11:55: From a lightly-edited machine transcript: Jawaid: Scott Ritter thinks that Israeli lap dog Trump will soon launch a ground invasion of Iran, but he will fail miserably.

Also, this is something Iran has been wanting Trump to commit to for a long time. Ritter: There’s a a mission called a raid. Um, and I, you know, we already had US troops fighting on the ground. We did a raid to rescue a pilot. We were in limited ground combat operations there.

I think there’s a high potential that the US will conduct a raid here and there because that’s a that’s a a very specific task. A raid is is the only military mission where we plan to retreat. You know, every other military mission there’s no plan. You commit and you go, but a raid is in and out.

So maybe we can do a raid, but the idea that we’re going to land in seize territory, there’s zero chance that will happen because there’s zero chance of success. Now admittedly, if pilot rescue came about as the result of the botched operation in Isfahan, that would be debatable as a raid.

Even though the intent again was to retreat, the US would have had to stage equipment for the removal and transport of nuclear material, so there would be a short-lived occupation of terrain and not just a fast snatch and grab, as with Maduro. Nevertheless, the US military may not be totally suicidal, so the plan may be for a fast landing to inflict some sort of concrete form of damage that cannot be well inflicted from the air and then to decamp.

This segment also includes a very informative explanation of how important the operations in Jordan are to the US, and how the Iran intend is destroy bases so that the US has to retreat to Israel and then Iran will proceed forcefully against the remaining assets there.

We’ll soon turn to updates, but to start with some bigger picture considerations: it is disconcerting to see how many commentators resort to the trope that neither side can prevail on the battlefield, that they will in the end negotiate an outcome. As we pointed out, a study of modern wars found that more than half did not.

The distrust between the two sides, which has now reached the level of mutual loathing as a result of the fast breakdown of the already likely to fail Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), means any “deal” is vanishingly unlikely. Iran knew even before it entered into talks that the US and Israel intended to execute a “mowing the lawn” strategy, of keeping crippling sanctions in place and beating up on Iran every so often to weaken it and hopefully create severe internal divisions that would trigger an overthrow or balkanization.

Even if Iran’s 47 year record of taking severe punishment and surviving says this plot would probably fail, Iran had been preparing since the Iraq War for the US and Israel to launch a major campaign. After the illegal launch, the assassination of a major part of Iran’s leadership, as well as war crimes exemplified by the massacre of school children in Minab, the nation is highly unified around inflicting a decisive defeat on the US, so that it won’t even think about military action against Iran for at least a decade.

We were far from alone in making that case early in the war and Iran’s resolve has only stiffened as it can see how it has weakened the US while Iran has learned from combat and claims to have even bigger inventories of key weapons than it had at the start of the war.

Critically, Iranian leaders have said, bluntly, that negotiating with the US is not just pointless but also demeaning. Consider the germane parts of a recent statement by the Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei,4 as summarized at PressTV: - Leader said the United States had once again violated the memorandum of understanding signed between the presidents of Iran and the US, proving that the signature of the American president is worthless and unreliable.

- He said bullying, hegemonic ambition, and savagery are inseparable characteristics of the United States and that Washington had once again revealed its true, unmasked face to the world. - He described the latest developments – US attacks against southern Iran, mainly targeting the civilian infrastructure – as further evidence of America’s deceitfulness, irrationality, unreliability, and wickedness.

- Leader said the United States is seeking to ignite further war despite facing heavier costs and greater disgrace. - He warned that the Iranian nation and the Resistance Front have unforgettable lessons for the United States, adding that the bravery of Islamic resistance fighters and the courageous people of southern Iran have already demonstrated examples of those lessons.

However, Araghchi subsequently gave an interview which can be read as pushing back against the Supreme Leader:5 Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says that negotiations with the U.S. should be pursued even if the chances of success are only 10 percent, further highlighting disagreements between Iran’s political and military echelons.

“I am the Foreign Minister for the interests of… pic.twitter.com/uW1DzcfRhG — Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران (@ariel_oseran) July 19, 2026 Keep in mind also that China is still bleating about the need to settle the conflict and Pakistan and Qatar (among others) are also pressing for a resumption of the talks, so Araghchi as Foreign Minister has to keep the idea in play, irrespective of whether he privately places much stock in the idea.

6 And there is another way to read Araghchi’s talk: So they wanted to manufacture a clean record of “we exhausted every diplomatic option." Once that record existed, the hardliners with Mojtaba could shut the process down without looking like the ones who refused talks.

Moderates who pushed the channel now own the failure, and… https://t.co/Y63yYJVaEZ — Vonbury Research (@VonburyResearch) July 19, 2026 Kinetic action seems likely to continue to dominate: ADVISOR TO IRANIAN SUPREME LEADER, MOHSEN REZAEI, SAYING: “I declare it is over.

Both negotiation and war are over. If in the next two or three days the Americans continue the war, we will enter a phase of complete offense and destruction.”#Iran #IranWar pic.twitter.com/1M3A1pboH9 — Iran Now – WANA (@WANA_Iran) July 18, 2026 Robert Pape also seems confident that US escalation will continue7.

I found this discussion noteworthy because Andrew Neil strongly resisted the idea that there would be no negotiated ending and also found it inconceivable that Iran could become, as Pape has argued, the fourth world power. In other words, Neil seems to epitomize a set of normally pretty smart people who find it hard to see where the direction of travel is going because those outcomes so conflict with their priors: From a lightly cleaned up machine transcript: Pape: This is not what’s coming in the next few weeks likely.

What’s much more likely is he’s [Trump’s] going to do the close blockade and if he can then use the southern corridor with that close blockade to reopen the Strait, he’ll he’ll be probably satisfied with that. Very unlikely that’s going to work and that’s why you’ve got the 82nd Airborne and the Marines there to push back further.

Now, I’m not saying this is going to work, Andrew…. Neil: So, I’ve got to ask you some questions in this because I’m unclear. Do you think that the of the limited options President Trump now has, that escalation as you describe it is the most likely?

Pape: Yes. Neil: And that escalation will begin with a much more aggressive, more comprehensive a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz with the possibility of ground incursion on the northern side of the straight in Iranian territory? Pape: Yes. Yes, and it’s our and and the first part has already started this week.

So, so you’re already seeing in fact last week was the beginning of the air suppression campaign for this week. And as President Trump laid out the bombing schedule last night, the reason he will, if he if this keeps going forward, okay, just keep saying that if, he’s going to want to take out things like electric power and bridges is because he’s going to want to try to suppress as much of Iran’s military defenses as he can as he goes forward here.

And the military is giving him the plans for doing that. One place where I differ with Pape is that he posits that Congress might get out of bed in six months and Do Something to check Trump then. To again invoke Stein’s Law, if something cannot continue, it will stop.

The US and Israel can of course carry on with terrorism within Iran, such as assassinations and cyber attacks. But the level of weapons depletion and on current trajectories, shortly-arriving fuel shortages, seems very likely to put a choke chain on US aggression soon.

From Larry Johnson in The US Faces a Strategic Crisis with Iran…The Rapid Depletion of US Battlefield Missiles:8 The tables below are based on the most recent publicly available analyses from CSIS, the Payne Institute, and major media outlets (as of mid-2026), and provide a current (overly optimistic in my opinon) estimate for US inventory levels of these key weapons systems.

Please note that actual inventories are classified; these are informed estimates derived from DOD budget documents, procurement records, and reported expenditures during Operation Epic Fury (the US-Israeli war with Iran). Air Defense Missiles Anti-Radiation / SEAD Long-Range Strike (Ground & Sea-Launched) Missiles These are not just the numbers currently in the hands of US CENTCOM (i.

e., the US military command in charge of the war against Iran), these are the total numbers available to all of the US military commands. If these missiles are allocated evenly to the other two critical commands — i.e., EUCOM (European Command) and PACOM (Pacific Command) — then you begin to understand the gravity of this deficit.

Let’s take the case of the Tomahawk missile. Let’s assume there are 3,000 left (I believe that is a generous over estimate) and the remaining number are divided evenly among CENTCOM, EUCOM and PACOM… That means each command gets 1,000. Does anyone want to argue that in the event of a hot war with Russia or China that EUCOM and PACOM respectively would be able to sustain combat operations for more than four weeks?

Hell, CENTCOM fired 850 of them during the first four weeks of EPIC FURY. Here’s another major problem: All eight missile systems rely on rare earth elements — there are no exceptions among modern US precision-guided weapons. The dependence is nearly universal because rare earth permanent magnets are irreplaceable for the high-performance actuators, guidance motors, and seeker gimbals that make these weapons accurate.

And who controls the supply chain of these rare earth minerals? China!… The supply chain isn’t just about mining — it’s about processing, separation, and magnet manufacturing, which China controls: - Mining: China ~60% of global rare earth oxide production - Refining/Separation: China ~91% - Sintered NdFeB Magnet Manufacturing: China **~94%** Now to updates.

From Aljazeera’s live feed: - A vessel is on fire in the Strait of Hormuz after being hit by a projectile, forcing the crew to abandon ship. They were later rescued by a tugboat. - One person has been killed and several others wounded after the US military attacked the Iranian city of Tabriz in northwestern Iran.

The entries in the feed include ones describing how Mr. Market is taking cheer from the Iran Foreign Ministry admitting they are getting communiques from intermediaries and reviewing them as if they originated from the US. Recall that the negotiators have often developed ideas and tried to sell both sides on them.

Bloomberg’s Javier Blas, who has been a consistent seller of lower oil prices, is refreshingly precise about Iran not saying either way as to whether the missives were from the US or just the negotiators operating on their own: Iran has received “some proposals” from unspecified mediators regarding the war with the US, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmail Baghaei says in press conference, without elaborating.

— Javier Blas (@JavierBlas) July 20, 2026 Contrast that with the Aljazeera account: Oil prices ease after Iran says US contacts continuing through mediators Oil prices have scaled back their gains after hitting their highest in a month after Iran said diplomatic exchanges with the US are ongoing via mediators despite renewed conflict in the Middle East.

Grr. Another Aljazeera live feed entry: Iran ‘counting down the minutes’ for US ground invasion [Today’s Iran war post launched more or less complete. I will be off duty for a while. If there are any updates, they will come in the comment section later] Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei says the United States will face “consequences of any adventure” to seize Kharg Island in southern Iran.

He added there are people in Iran’s leadership “counting down the minutes to welcome” US forces in any ground invasion. Kharg is the heart of Iran’s oil industry. It sits 55km (34 miles) off Iran’s coast in Bushehr province. President Trump has repeatedly threatened to seize the territory during the war.

A raid on Kharg could fit Ritter’s raid scenario, with the US busting things up and then leaving.9 But experts have pointed out that Iran has at least four other export routes. Kharg is the most efficient but losing it while being repaired would be inconvenient as opposed to a fatal blow.

From Bloomberg’s landing page: From US Bombs Iran for Ninth Day as Standoff Over Hormuz Deepens: The US conducted a ninth straight day of airstrikes on Iran, trying to force the Islamic Republic to stop shipping attacks and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

The American military bombed military targets and communications networks in a three-hour operation ending around 5:30 a.m. Iranian time on Monday. Iran continued to attack US bases in the likes of Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain and Iraq. The standoff shows no sign of easing, with Iran refusing to relent over Hormuz and insisting it has a right to manage traffic through the waterway.

Energy prices have jumped on the worsening hostilities. Brent crude oil rose to above $90 a barrel for the first time in more than five weeks in early trading on Monday. US gasoline prices climbed back over the $4-a-gallon mark, potentially hurting President Donald Trump and his Republican party ahead of midterm elections in November… Hormuz Shipping Traffic Slumps as US-Iran Hostilities Worsen The tit-for-tat attacks are getting deadlier….

Shipping volumes have slumped and the number of tankers and other vessels going through Hormuz is roughly down to the same level from the height of the conflict in March and early April… US President Donald Trump warned Iran last week he’d escalate airstrikes and widen the scope of targets until it backed down… Kuwait continues to experience some of the worst attacks from Iran.

Over the weekend, Kuwait’s main state energy company said an unspecified site sustained “significant material losses,” causing its evacuation and a number of injuries, while two power and desalination plants have been hit in recent days. And from Hormuz Traffic Near Standstill as US-Iran Hostilities Escalate: - Visible traffic through the Strait of Hormuz appeared at a near standstill Monday after Iran targeted vessels in the narrow waterway.

- A Marshall Islands-flagged bulk carrier and a liquefied petroleum gas carrier appeared to approach the strait, with the bulk carrier turning off its transponder while approaching. - The targeting of vessels will likely raise fresh concerns over the safety of ships transiting Hormuz, which could deepen disruptions to energy flows from the Persian Gulf to global customers.

Indirectly importance of US operations in Jordan, the lead story in the Wall Street Journal is Jordan Becomes New Flashpoint in U.S.-Iran War as Troop Deaths Rise. But it fails to set forth any of the juicy details that Janta Ka presents. This is the thin strategic gruel offered: For years, Jordan sought to play down its close military and intelligence cooperation with the U.

S. The U.S. aircraft that carried out strikes on Islamic State from a base in Jordan during the American war with the militants didn’t advertise the country they were operating from. But Jordan’s role is now becoming too prominent to obscure. Jordan has become an attractive location for U.

S. armed forces since it is among the most permissive in the Arab world when it comes to allowing the U.S. to operate from its bases. A bit more on Jordan: The view from Tehran. “The increased focus on Jordan may serve as part of Iran’s preparation and testing of operational concepts for more intense and precise strikes against Israel in later stages of the conflict.

Qatar and Saudi Arabia—have at times sought to impose limits… — Policy Tensor (@policytensor) July 20, 2026 By contrast, the House of Saud published a remarkably revealing document (hat tip Eugene Linden), Iran Struck Prince Sultan and No One Was Required to Say So: Iranian ballistic missiles struck Prince Sultan Air Base in Al-Kharj on July 18, wounding twelve US service members — two critically — and hitting KC-135 Stratotankers on the flight line while a second rotation was still climbing out.

Saudi Arabia’s Civil Defense Authority cleared the sirens six minutes later without naming the weapon, the origin, or the damage, and neither Riyadh nor Washington has issued an official statement since. The strike was the first direct Iranian attack on Saudi territory in approximately four months, a gap during which the IRGC struck Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE while conspicuously sparing the Kingdom.

Its return to PSAB — confirmed by a US official to Axios, corroborated by satellite imagery, and detailed by Air & Space Forces Magazine — ended whatever territorial immunity Saudi Arabia believed it still possessed. But the more consequential development is not the strike itself.

It is the silence that followed, and the institutional architecture that sustains it: a three-party managed ambiguity in which Iran, Saudi Arabia, and CENTCOM each benefit from leaving the damage question unanswered, because answering it would force a public reckoning with a PAC-3 reserve that is approaching a ceiling none of them can afford to name.

The strike was confirmed by a US official cited by Axios as “the first time the Islamic Republic has directly attacked the kingdom in four months” — a description that the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Saudi Ministry of Defence have each declined to repeat on the record.

Air & Space Forces Magazine, drawing on multiple US military sources, reported at least twelve wounded and multiple Stratotankers damaged on the tarmac. Open-source satellite imagery corroborated the impact site within the base perimeter. Iran’s state broadcaster supplied what no government would.

The missiles were launched “moments after American refueling planes took off,” a detail that only makes sense if the IRGC had real-time ISR coverage of PSAB’s tanker rotation schedule. The aircraft hit were those that remained on the flight line after the airborne pair departed — the timing was deliberate, and the targeting message was not about maximising destruction but about demonstrating that PSAB’s daily operational patterns are watched, clocked, and within reach….

Riyadh cannot confirm the strike without confronting two questions it has spent the war avoiding. The first is defensive: if Iranian missiles hit PSAB and wounded US personnel, the Sakhir Declaration — the mutual defence framework Saudi Arabia negotiated with Washington — becomes the operative instrument, and invoking it requires publicly admitting what the Arab Center DC described as the core strategic dilemma: “the PAC-3 architecture is functionally exhausted.

” The second is economic. Aramco’s August Arab Light OSP already dropped $11 month-on-month to $1.50 per barrel below Oman/Dubai, the largest such cut in over two decades and the lowest since June 2020. Confirming that Iranian ballistic missiles are landing on military installations 77 kilometres south of the capital forces a sovereign-risk reassessment that Riyadh’s fiscal position — a Q1 deficit of SAR 125.

7 billion, with Aramco’s free cash flow at 0.85 times its quarterly dividend — is not structured to absorb…. Washington faces a different but parallel constraint. Confirming the strike means confirming that 2,300 US service members at PSAB are taking casualties at a base where 43 US warplanes have been grounded since Saudi Arabia’s Operation Project Freedom in May 2026.

CENTCOM cannot describe a defensive engagement at PSAB without also describing the legal anomaly: the 1977 USMTM memorandum governing US presence is not a Status of Forces Agreement, and Project Freedom severed the operational relationship between American air power and Saudi host-nation authority.

An official statement would invite the Congressional question that the Pentagon’s communications strategy is built to defer: why are American troops still at a base where their aircraft have been grounded by the host nation, absorbing Iranian fire under a legal framework that was designed for peacetime advisory missions?

Please read this article in full. It contains remarkable operational detail. It is over my pay grade as to why it was published, but it seems to suggest considerable unhappiness at Riyadh. Due to the length of this post, we have skipped over the fact that Ansar Allah seems just about to threaten or actually close the Bab el-Mandeb strait: 🚨 BREAKING 🇾🇪 YEMEN’S HOUTHI FORCES WILL MAKE A “HUGE” ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY AT 8:30 AM ET.

REPORTS EXPECT THEM TO ANNOUNCE A BLOCKADE OF THE BAB EL-MANDEB STRAIT. TOGETHER WITH THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, THESE TWO CHOKEPOINTS HANDLE OVER 25% OF GLOBAL SEABORNE OIL TRADE. IF TRUE,… pic.twitter.com/yjavHpPKOi — Wimar.X (@DefiWimar) July 20, 2026 This does not look terribly negotiation-receptive.

And some additional sightings from Twitter: Israelis have never felt less secure. 64% are unhappy with how the endless wars have been run. 73% are upset at how there has been no real investigation of October 7. 73% of the public also feel the government has not dealt well with the rise in crime.

No one wins from these… https://t.co/4OjhLUD14O — Shaiel Ben-Ephraim (@academic_la) July 19, 2026 These remarks would seem to negate happy thinking about negotiations: ⚡️⭕️ Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei says Tehran is determined to exercise sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz through measures already taken, and states the US failed to fulfill its commitments under a memorandum of understanding, so Iran will not fulfill… — Middle East Observer (@ME_Observer_) July 20, 2026 The average price for a gallon of gas hit $4, the second time it has reached that benchmark since the war in Iran disrupted global oil supplies https://t.

co/Cg8rE3XnJ7 pic.twitter.com/3UqHfwU4sc — CNN (@CNN) July 20, 2026 Done for today! See you tomorrow! ____ 1 What kind of admission of weakness is this? Part of the job description of a service member is that they may wind up dying for their country.

Admittedly, the US is widely suspected of suffering a much higher body count and covering that up. But this show of extreme sensitivity to losses again shows the US has a glass jaw. 2 Nima also discusses at some length at the top of a new talk with Larry Johnson why they look misguided.

He knows Bandar Abbas well, which is where the US has been hitting bridges so as to isolate it. Nima explains and even shows pictures that the bridges exist only to cope with seasonal floods for a few months a year. Those sluices are dry now, so Bandar Abbas is easily accessible by all sorts of routes.

3 🚨 BREAKING: Russia has evacuated 198 of its personnel from the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran. It is believed that the plant could be targeted again. pic.twitter.com/lPoQB05qgo — GBC (@GBC_Press) July 17, 2026 4 A new trope in the US-backing commentary community is to depict the new Supreme Leader as a figurehead, which is easy to make stick given his lack of public appearances (I suspect that among other things, he is having facial reconstruction; that can take an extremely long time since procedures are done serially with healing time in between).

I believe it was on a recent Dialogue Works talk where Professor Marandi debunked one popular claim, that he IRGC was operating on its own authority. Professor Marandi described the governing structure and said the military (both the regular forces and the Guards) needed approval of the Supreme Leader for its operations.

Having said that, I have commented that Iran seems to have a Japanese-style decision-making structure, as in more bottoms-up than the West. That results in more time to make decisions but much more internal cohesion when they are reached, since those at lower levels would be able to voice concerns and make suggestions.

Upon reflection, this would make sense given that Iran adopted its “mosaic” structure of extreme decentralization so as to allow it to function well even when the leadership was killed or incommunicado, as we saw at the onset of the current conflict.

In the Japanese model, decisions are effectively made at the senior-middle level ranks, which does tend result in the board and CEO being ceremonial. But the top level can and does say no, or effectively does so by asking probing questions and sending the matter back down the chain for further study and perhaps some revision.

I have been involved in decisions in Japan where the board and CEO were highly engaged, and these were ones that were of critical strategic importance. 5 DropSite has a longer recap of Araghchi’s remarks: ⭕️ Iran FM Araghchi: Wars End Either Through Total Victory or Negotiations… Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi: 🔹 A war must be ended precisely at the point when you hold the upper hand on the battlefield.

Ending a war is possible either through total military victory or… pic.twitter.com/kHeYhShsXC — Drop Site (@DropSiteNews) July 20, 2026 IMHO his analysis is wrong-headed. As indicated above, a bit over half the modern wars do not end with a negotiated settlement.

And it is a false dichotomy to say that to win, Iran must conquer the US and Israel. FFS, please explain Vietnam. Bad logistics and depleting weapons mean that ex nukes, the US cannot win against Iran. The question is how long it takes and how much damage is done not just to Iran but also the world economy.

Keep in mind the intermediaries are still busy but motion is not progress: #Iran's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson has confirmed that Tehran has received "ideas and proposals" from mediators. He declined to provide any further details regarding the specifics of the mediation efforts.

pic.twitter.com/8Pzs25eauc — Iran Nuances (@IranNuances) July 20, 2026 6 A memorable scene in the Daniel Ellsberg memoir Secrets is when Ellsberg, widely seen as the top US expert on Vietnam, briefed McNamara in a helicopter about how badly things were going.

McNamara said, “Just as I suspected,” and then upon landing updated the press on the great progress the US was making. 7 It has taken me too long to see why Pape often acts as if he is speaking to children or the stoopid. Making this his normal manner of presentation means that when he actually is having to speak to someone who is being stoopid, they won’t take offense.

8 However, to quibble with Johnson on another matter: he has been saying, as he does in the talk linked in Footnote 2 above, that the Iran attacks on a former US base in Syria, Al Tanf, were pointless because the base had been vacated for years. Vanessa Beeley, who has spent a lot of time on the ground in Syria and still has contacts there, begs to differ.

She says the base was recently restored to service. From Why did Iran target the US Occupation base at Al Tanf, Syria? On Friday 17th July, Iran carried out an extensive attack on the US occupation base at Al Tanf in Syria. A drone and missile strike targeted a US Special Operations Command base in south-eastern Syria..

the first strike on Syrian territory since the toppling of the former government in December 2024. In a statement, the IRGC said its aerospace forces conducted what it described as the 11th phase of “Operation Nasr-2,” targeting the strategically located base near Syria’s borders with Iraq and Jordan.

The IRGC further claimed the attack destroyed a radar installation and several U.S. military helicopters, while alleging that many American personnel were killed. This strike occurred as the build up of both Turkish and HTS military forces increases inside Syria, along the border with Lebanon and in the coastal region to the north of Lebanon.

I have been reporting on this here and here. Syrian sources provided more detail on the attack: Despite previous reports of an almost total evacuation of the Al Tanf base, located on the borders of Syria, Iraq and Jordan, almost 5 months ago – the intensity of the strikes suggested a shift in the site’s operational status.

This was not an empty base, in fact, according to sources, the IRGC’s tracking systems and human intelligence in the region detected U.S. forces airdropping “Special Forces” units into the base approximately two weeks before the attack. Analysis would suggest that the purpose of these drops might be to prepare for a ground incursion across Iraqi territory (Sulaymaniyah Axis) in coordination with the local Kurdish separatist factions in Iraq.

One military analyst told me: The attack reflects the operator’s ability to breach the secrecy surrounding U.S. movements and to convert radio and visual data into precise target coordinates. According to reports from inside Syria, the strikes inflicted direct damage on the base’s newly constructed infrastructure, neutralised the US elite combat force and derailed the Iraq-Axis operation against Iran.

Of course, US media will not report on the planned operations or on the number of casualties – such a critical security breach and the significant scale of damage, as reported, will not be revealed. 9 Maybe mines?

Yves Smith

Jul 21, 2026strikeUnverifiedIran

Ships shun Strait of Hormuz as renewed fighting strains key oil corridor

○ 1 source

- Vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has slumped since U.S. President Donald Trump's blockade took effect last week. - Crossings through the Strait have fallen sharply across multiple shipping datasets with renewed U.S. strikes on Iran. Vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has slumped since U.

S. President Donald Trump's blockade took effect last week, with shipowners increasingly avoiding one of the world's most important energy corridors as fighting between the U.S. and Iran intensifies. Crossings through the Strait have fallen sharply across multiple shipping datasets with renewed U.

S. strikes on Iran, Tehran's declaration of a blanket ban on maritime traffic and fresh attacks on commercial vessels has prompted operators to reassess the risks of entering the Gulf. Lloyd's List Intelligence recorded just 53 vessel transits in the week through July 20, down 66% from 157 the previous week.

Tanker and gas carrier movements, which are the ships responsible for transporting most Gulf crude oil and liquefied natural gas, dropped to 30 crossings from 90. Kpler data similarly show activity deteriorating almost immediately after the blockade began.

Daily crossings, which had averaged more than 20 vessels before July 15, fell to 16 that day before dropping to single digits on July 16. Traffic remained subdued through the rest of the week, with only sporadic recoveries. The latest slowdown reverses weeks of gradual normalization after the mid-June ceasefire had encouraged some shipowners to resume Gulf voyages.

Instead, the renewed fighting has once again nearly emptied the strategic waterway that carries roughly a fifth of global oil consumption. "Things have slowed down significantly since tensions reignited," said Bridget Diakun, senior risk and compliance analyst at Lloyd's List Intelligence.

"That's not surprising - people pull back and reassess, as you'd expect." Traffic has not disappeared altogether, however. "Every single person has a different risk appetite," Diakun said. "We're still seeing tankers crossing in and out, it hasn't ground to a complete halt.

" Rather than recovering steadily, vessel movements are likely to continue coming "in ebbs and flows" as shipowners seize brief windows of perceived safety before pulling back again whenever tensions escalate, she said. S&P Global data painted a similar picture.

Just 40 vessels transited the strait between July 17 and July 19, averaging roughly 13 crossings a day, while weekly traffic through July 19 fell almost 50% from the previous week. Commercial ships still accounted for more than 70% of traffic over the period, although only about one-third were assessed as compliant with maritime restrictions.

Iran-linked and sanctioned vessels continued to dominate many movements, suggesting mainstream international shipowners remain reluctant to return. "The latest escalation shows how expectations of a rapid opening of the Strait were premature," said Saul Kavonic, head of energy research at MST Marquee.

"The hostilities and reimposed blockade set the conflict back on an escalatory trajectory," he said, adding that flows through Hormuz had dropped to around 15% of pre-war levels. Oil could retest $100 a barrel if the current intensity of fighting persists for several weeks or if regional energy infrastructure comes under attack, he told CNBC via email.

Lee Ying Shan; Anniek Bao

Jul 21, 2026strikeUnverifiedUSIsraelIranProxy

Another tanker attacked in Strait of Hormuz as US attacks Iran for 10th consecutive night

○ 1 source

The UK Maritime Trade Operations center reported that a tanker was struck by an unknown projectile in the Strait of Hormuz early Tuesday. Two additional vessels were reported attacked in the area within the past day, with Iran's Revolutionary Guard claiming responsibility for those incidents.

The United States military stated it conducted strikes targeting Iranian capabilities used against commercial shipping in the strait.

Location: Strait of Hormuz

SECTIONS Another tanker attacked

Jul 21, 2026strikeUnverifiedUSIsraelIran

Latest FCDO Dubai travel advice for UK holidaymakers after Iran strikes

○ 1 source

The US and Israel conducted strikes on Iranian targets beginning in February, after which Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and carried out strikes on sites across the region, including Dubai. Following the collapse of a short-term ceasefire, US strikes on Iranian sites continued for at least nine days.

The UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has not altered its guidance for the UAE since removing the "all but essential travel" advisory on 18 June and states that the situation remains unpredictable.

Location: Dubai

Tannur Anders