Summary

OPINION: Last week, the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, currently in session at the United Nations, elected Iran as one of its 34 vice presidents. It did so despite Iran’s noncompliance with International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The unfortunate decision undermines trust in a conference that should focus on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the emerging nuclear arms race. Nuclear weapons proliferation In April, IAEA Chief Rafael Grossi warned during a visit to South Korea that North Korea was significantly boosting its nuclear weapons capacity with the completion of a new uranium enrichment facility at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. He called it a “very serious increase” in the production of nuclear weapons. North Korea is believed to have 50 to 60 nuclear weapons. In a few years, it will likely have up to 100 nuclear warheads that can be miniaturized and mated to short-range and long-range ballistic missiles (KN-2, KN-24 and Hwasong-18, -19, and -20) capable of targeting South Korea, Japan and the U.S. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and is expected to have more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, with estimates of more than 1,500 by 2035. Based on satellite imagery, China recently completed the construction of new nuclear missile silo fields in Gansu and Xinjiang provinces. It is an apparent “strategic nuclear breakout.” Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian ruler Vladimir Putin has consistently threatened to use nuclear weapons to deter European and U.S. intervention in the war. Mr. Putin updated Russia’s nuclear doctrine: a conventional attack on Russia or Belarus by a non-nuclear state, if supported by a nuclear power, will be viewed as a joint attack, allowing Russia’s use of nuclear weapons. Mr. Putin’s objective is to deter Western involvement in the war, especially its provision of Ukraine with long-range, precision-guided missiles that can be used to attack Russian territory. Nuclear arms race Recent polls in South Korea consistently show more than 70% public support for the country having its own, independent nuclear arsenal rather than relying on U.S. extended deterrence commitments (nuclear umbrella). North Korea’s exponential increase in the production of nuclear weapons using plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and the number and sophistication of the short-range ballistic missiles that can target South Korea (and Japan), have convinced the public that it needs its own nuclear arsenal. In the 1970s, the Park Chung-hee government had an active clandestine plutonium nuclear weapons program, which the U.S. forced South Korea to cancel in 1976. Japan has a sophisticated civilian nuclear industry and a stockpile of plutonium, so it is viewed as a leading “latent” nuclear power capable of producing nuclear weapons if desired. Indeed, Japan depends on the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” for protection from the threats of North Korea and China. Yet given North Korea’s growing nuclear weapons capability, there is now more of a dialogue in Japan about the value of the nation having its own nuclear deterrent. Iran’s status as a threshold nuclear weapons state has been an issue that countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey follow closely. Indeed, if Iran acquired its own nuclear weapons, then each of these countries, and others in the Middle East, would pursue their own nuclear weapons capability. They all have the infrastructure necessary to go nuclear, if desired. Things are on pause now, given the ongoing war with Iran, but once the war is over and if Iran continues to enrich uranium, it is possible that Saudi Arabia and other countries would eventually consider acquiring their own nuclear capabilities. The United Nations U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons have been eroding and there is a need to “breathe life into the NPT once more.” He went on to mention the new dangers to nuclear proliferation from artificial intelligence and concerns about the growing use of AI in military conflicts. The president of the NPT Review, Vietnam’s Do Hung Viet, said two previous review conferences (in 2022 and 2015) failed to reach consensus, hoping to find agreement this time. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the NPT review conference, which ends May 22, will reach consensus on the critical issues related to nuclear nonproliferation. • The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views. Copyright © 2026 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission. Please read our comment policy before commenting.