Islamist extremist violence in Africa’s Sahel region is set to reach historic highs after a series of sweeping offensives by groups linked to al-Qaida and Islamic State, according to new figures compiled by the conflict monitor Acled. As the US marks the 25th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks launched by al-Qaida against targets in Washington and New York, the statistics underline the continued expansion of the veteran organisation in parts of Africa – in stark contrast with its relative weakness elsewhere. Compiled by Acled, which stands for Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, the statistics focus on the centre of Islamic militancy in three countries – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – which together comprise a huge and hotly contested zone at the heart of the strategic Sahel region. According to the respected non-profit organisation, incidents of violence with jihadist groups present in the three countries have soared from 63 in 2016 to 2,845 in 2025. So far this year, 2,145 events have already been logged. If current trends continue in coming months, an annual total of well over 3,000 events appears likely. Though total deaths from terrorism globally have fallen to their lowest level since 2008, those in the Sahel have risen sharply. “Terrorism has become more geographically concentrated: the Sahel continued to record some of the world’s highest terrorism death tolls, with the UN recording more than 9,000 deaths from security incidents across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in 2025,” the 2026 report of the Global Peace Index noted earlier this year. In April, a joint offensive in Mali launched by the al-Qaida-linked group Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Tuareg-dominated rebel group Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) targeted strategic towns, government forces and their Russian auxiliaries with ambushes, car bombs, drones and raids, inflicting significant casualties. Mali’s defence minister died in a suicide attack on his residence in the garrison town of Kati, 9 miles north-west of the capital, Bamako, and the head of military intelligence was killed. Other attacks hit Mali’s international airport, while rebels seized control of the strategic city of Kidal, a former stronghold of the FLA, after soldiers fled and a force of Russian mercenaries surrendered. The defeat reversed a key symbolic victory won by the junta in Mali three years ago. Since then, JNIM has continued to expand areas under its control in Mali, killing more soldiers and Russian mercenaries in recent weeks, and broadening its operations in some neighbouring countries. Much of the violence involves fighting with rival groups. The conflict has also included multiple killings by government armed forces and Russian mercenaries. In Burkina Faso, JNIM has claimed more than 130 attacks in 2026, striking closer to Ouagadougou, the capital. In Niger, the group claimed at least 17 attacks but remained significantly less active than its rival Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, according to a recent United Nations report based on intelligence supplied by member states. Experts said JNIM had distanced itself from al-Qaida’s historic objectives of striking the US and its allies. “In the Sahel, Islamic State and al-Qaida now command big areas but these are very localised groups. Not a single attack in Europe or the US has been planned in the Sahel,” said Ulf Laessing, a senior analyst at the Konrad Adenauer foundation in Berlin. The other main group in sub-Saharan Africa with links to al-Qaida is al-Shabaab, which has dominated much of Somalia’s rural areas for many years. “In east Africa, al-Shabaab remains one of the continent’s deadliest groups, with Acled recording more than 10,000 reported deaths in al-Shabaab-related violence over the past 18 months,” said Peter Bofin, Acled’s senior analyst for south-east Africa. “Despite some degradation of its extortion in Mogadishu, its revenue streams stretch across the country, and the region.” Militant groups linked loosely to IS are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Chad and Nigeria, where they were targeted by US airstrikes last year. The continuing expansion in sub-Saharan Africa has been welcomed in al-Qaida’s propaganda, but experts point out the continent barely featured in the group’s strategic planning until recent years. “Twenty-five years ago it was all about Afghanistan and then Iraq … Africa wasn’t really of interest then. Now its the main area of operations,” said Laessing. Though sectarian and ethnic conflict, bitter competition over resources, poor governance, endemic instability and other factors make Africa a fertile ground for Islamic militant recruiters, territory in places like Mali and Somalia has major limitations as a base for campaigns elsewhere in the world or for long-range terrorist attacks. At its peak in the years after the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaida affiliates posed a significant threat to authorities across much of the Middle East, with thousands convinced by the group’s call for a global uprising against the US, Israel and local regimes. Al-Qaida was also able to inspire and direct a series of lethal attacks in Europe that killed hundreds. However, the recent UN report described al-Qaida senior leadership as “marginalised” and noted that the group’s capability and intent to conduct external operations remained “unclear”. Analysts point out there has been no formal declaration of a successor to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the veteran Egyptian militant killed in Kabul by the US in 2022. Instead, the de facto leader is believed to be 66-year-old Saif al-Adel, who is thought to have been in Iran since 2002 and has yet to make any public statement. Other leaders are likely to be based in Afghanistan, where the group has been able to rebuild a limited infrastructure, western intelligence services believe. The most potent al-Qaida affiliate outside Africa is the Yemen-based Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which the UN report described as “the vanguard of the global al-Qaida movement” and one of the few affiliates committed to continuing al-Qaida’s decades-old campaign against the US. In May, AQAP’s media channels released a new video calling on Muslims in Europe and the US to carry out local attacks and to fight on “behalf of the [Islamic community] in any way possible”. But though AQAP continues to maintain an estimated 2,000 fighters, largely entrenched in the mountains between Abyan and Shabwa, the group’s activity fell by approximately 70%, from 63 events in the first seven months of 2025 to 19 during the same period in 2026, according to Acled. Some analysts have contrasted the high numbers of militants currently mobilised by groups such as JNIM and al-Shabaab, which number in the tens of thousands, with the much more limited manpower available to al-Qaida before the 9/11 attacks. Others stress the very different intentions and capabilities of the group now and 25 years ago.
Islamist extremist violence in Africa’s Sahel region is set to reach historic highs after a series of sweeping offensives by groups linked to al-Qaida and Islamic State, according to new figures compiled by the conflict monitor Acled. As the US marks the 25th anniversary of the 9…
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Yemen's Houthis claimed on Wednesday to have shot down a Saudi F-15 fighter jet with a locally manufactured missile, while Saudi Arabia announced new deterrent measures following alerts of potential drone attacks near Mecca. The Houthi military spokesman stated that the incident occurred during "hostile operations" and rejected Saudi allegations that the group had targeted Mecca, attributing the claims to fabrication.
US weapon support to Israel! $2.8 billion bomb sales plan (machine-translated headline from a Turkish-language source)
Cairo: At various times over the last decade, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Britain and Israel have carried out punishing air raids on Yemen's Houthi rebels -- only to see them grow even stronger. Now, as the Iran-backed Houthis advance on a key maritime chokepoint and strike Saudi oil facilities, rattling world markets, there is little that can be done to stop them that hasn't been tried before.
That's because the Houthis operate in a large and mountainous territory where they can disperse fighters and military infrastructure while threatening major oil infrastructure and key trade routes. Iran and its allies in Lebanon and Iraq provide expertise, training and sophisticated weapons, according to UN and other experts, and the Houthis' hard-line ideology does the rest.
"They are the most committed, the most ideologically pure and the most aggressive" of Iran's regional allies, says Michael Knights, who has written extensively about the Houthis and is now head of research at Horizon Engage, a New York-based strategic advisory.
"They've been developed by the Iranians in a fast-track way. Things that took the Lebanese Hezbollah 20 years to develop, the Houthis have developed in five." Iran denies arming the Houthis, which would violate a UN embargo. But smuggled Iranian weapons and parts have been seized from numerous shipments bound for Yemen, and a report by UN experts in 2024 documented extensive military ties between the Houthis, Iran and its other allies.
That report estimated that the Houthis had recruited up to 350,000 fighters by 2024, up from just 30,000 in 2015, when Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen's civil war against the Houthis and imposed a naval blockade. The Houthis can use relatively inexpensive drones and missiles to target oil and other infrastructure just across the border in Saudi Arabia, as well as tankers off the coast.
And while Iran is believed to supply cutting-edge components like guidance systems, the Houthis can manufacture much of their weaponry domestically. Saudi Arabia boasts an array of US-supplied weapons, including sophisticated aircraft as well as advanced missile defences used against Iran at the height of the war last spring.
But with supplies of high-end interceptors under pressure, it's unclear how long it can ward off attacks -- not only from the Houthis, but from Iran-backed militias in Iraq blamed for an attack that shut down an east-west pipeline crucial for oil exports.
Over the next seven years, Saudi Arabia carried out waves of airstrikes against the Houthis, often killing civilians. An array of Yemeni government forces and southern separatists struggled to push the Houthis back, and the battle lines moved little before a 2022 ceasefire.
The following year, after the outbreak of the war in Gaza, the Houthis began attacking Red Sea shipping in what they said was a blockade of Israel. The US and the UK launched waves of strikes against the Houthis beginning in January 2024. The following year, US President Donald Trump ordered an intensified air campaign, with some 2,000 munitions dropped on over 1,000 targets, a US military official told The Associated Press at the time.
The cost of the US munitions alone totalled more than USD 750 million, while the Houthis destroyed seven US MQ-9 Reaper drones, at a cost of more than USD 30 million apiece. An over USD 60 million F/A-18 fighter jet slid off an aircraft carrier. After weeks of US strikes, the Houthis agreed to stop attacking American ships.
But they continued to target Israel, which responded with its own strikes later in 2025, killing the Houthi prime minister along with other senior officials and repeatedly hitting a key port. The Houthis largely kept to the sidelines in the first several months of the Iran war, but in July, they resumed attacks on Saudi Arabia and declared a blockade on Saudi shipping.
In the case of Yemen, the ground fighters opposed to the Houthis are deeply divided and fought each other as recently as January. They include fighters loyal to the Saudi-backed government and southern separatists supported by the United Arab Emirates -- a sometimes rival to the Saudis that withdrew from Yemen in 2019.
"Half of the story is Iranian support, and this is extremely important ... but there's another half of the story, which is the weakness of their adversaries," said Thomas Juneau, a professor of international affairs at the University of Ottawa specialising in Iran and Yemen.
"(Yemen's) internationally recognised government is fragmented, it's weak, it's disunited, it's corrupt, and the Houthis have systematically been able to exploit that," he said. In recent weeks, anti-Houthi forces have fallen back from one position after another as the rebels have advanced toward the Bab el-Mandeb, a narrow strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
The Saudis appear reluctant to enter another full-scale war with the Houthis. A ground campaign would involve prolonged fighting and high casualties. The US, still preoccupied with Iran, also appears keen to stay out. A Saudi mutual defence pact with Turkey and Pakistan signed last month has yet to be activated.
The diplomatic options are also limited. The Houthis are demanding that Saudi Arabia lift its blockade, which would be an admission of defeat in the long-running war and pave the way for even more extensive Iranian aid to the rebels. "As long as US-Iran tensions are not resolved, there will not be significant progress between Saudi Arabia and Iran," Juneau said.
"The Houthis are in a very intransigent mood right now, and they are absolutely not ready to make any kind of concessions." (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel) Now, as the Iran-backed Houthis advance on a key maritime chokepoint and strike Saudi oil facilities, rattling world markets, there is little that can be done to stop them that hasn't been tried before.
That's because the Houthis operate in a large and mountainous territory where they can disperse fighters and military infrastructure while threatening major oil infrastructure and key trade routes. Iran and its allies in Lebanon and Iraq provide expertise, training and sophisticated weapons, according to UN and other experts, and the Houthis' hard-line ideology does the rest.
"They are the most committed, the most ideologically pure and the most aggressive" of Iran's regional allies, says Michael Knights, who has written extensively about the Houthis and is now head of research at Horizon Engage, a New York-based strategic advisory.
"They've been developed by the Iranians in a fast-track way. Things that took the Lebanese Hezbollah 20 years to develop, the Houthis have developed in five." The well-armed Iranian ally has room to runThe Houthis have a wide array of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones -- many resembling Iranian models -- that can reach all the Gulf states as well as Israel.
They have also used sophisticated anti-ship missiles and naval drones to strike vessels in the Red Sea, threatening a critical trade route. Iran denies arming the Houthis, which would violate a UN embargo. But smuggled Iranian weapons and parts have been seized from numerous shipments bound for Yemen, and a report by UN experts in 2024 documented extensive military ties between the Houthis, Iran and its other allies.
That report estimated that the Houthis had recruited up to 350,000 fighters by 2024, up from just 30,000 in 2015, when Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen's civil war against the Houthis and imposed a naval blockade. The Houthis can use relatively inexpensive drones and missiles to target oil and other infrastructure just across the border in Saudi Arabia, as well as tankers off the coast.
And while Iran is believed to supply cutting-edge components like guidance systems, the Houthis can manufacture much of their weaponry domestically. Saudi Arabia boasts an array of US-supplied weapons, including sophisticated aircraft as well as advanced missile defences used against Iran at the height of the war last spring.
But with supplies of high-end interceptors under pressure, it's unclear how long it can ward off attacks -- not only from the Houthis, but from Iran-backed militias in Iraq blamed for an attack that shut down an east-west pipeline crucial for oil exports.
Airstrikes have had limited effectSaudi Arabia went to war against the Houthis in early 2015, after the rebels seized much of northern and central Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, from Yemen's internationally recognised government. Even then, the Saudis feared the growth of a well-armed Iranian proxy on their border.
Over the next seven years, Saudi Arabia carried out waves of airstrikes against the Houthis, often killing civilians. An array of Yemeni government forces and southern separatists struggled to push the Houthis back, and the battle lines moved little before a 2022 ceasefire.
The following year, after the outbreak of the war in Gaza, the Houthis began attacking Red Sea shipping in what they said was a blockade of Israel. The US and the UK launched waves of strikes against the Houthis beginning in January 2024. The following year, US President Donald Trump ordered an intensified air campaign, with some 2,000 munitions dropped on over 1,000 targets, a US military official told The Associated Press at the time.
The cost of the US munitions alone totalled more than USD 750 million, while the Houthis destroyed seven US MQ-9 Reaper drones, at a cost of more than USD 30 million apiece. An over USD 60 million F/A-18 fighter jet slid off an aircraft carrier. After weeks of US strikes, the Houthis agreed to stop attacking American ships.
But they continued to target Israel, which responded with its own strikes later in 2025, killing the Houthi prime minister along with other senior officials and repeatedly hitting a key port. The Houthis largely kept to the sidelines in the first several months of the Iran war, but in July, they resumed attacks on Saudi Arabia and declared a blockade on Saudi shipping.
Any lasting defeat would require ground troopsAs recent conflicts have shown, air power is rarely effective without ground troops who can move in and seize territory after strikes. In the case of Yemen, the ground fighters opposed to the Houthis are deeply divided and fought each other as recently as January.
They include fighters loyal to the Saudi-backed government and southern separatists supported by the United Arab Emirates -- a sometimes rival to the Saudis that withdrew from Yemen in 2019. "Half of the story is Iranian support, and this is extremely important ...
but there's another half of the story, which is the weakness of their adversaries," said Thomas Juneau, a professor of international affairs at the University of Ottawa specialising in Iran and Yemen. "(Yemen's) internationally recognised government is fragmented, it's weak, it's disunited, it's corrupt, and the Houthis have systematically been able to exploit that," he said.
In recent weeks, anti-Houthi forces have fallen back from one position after another as the rebels have advanced toward the Bab el-Mandeb, a narrow strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The Saudis appear reluctant to enter another full-scale war with the Houthis.
A ground campaign would involve prolonged fighting and high casualties. The US, still preoccupied with Iran, also appears keen to stay out. A Saudi mutual defence pact with Turkey and Pakistan signed last month has yet to be activated. The diplomatic options are also limited.
The Houthis are demanding that Saudi Arabia lift its blockade, which would be an admission of defeat in the long-running war and pave the way for even more extensive Iranian aid to the rebels. "As long as US-Iran tensions are not resolved, there will not be significant progress between Saudi Arabia and Iran," Juneau said.
"The Houthis are in a very intransigent mood right now, and they are absolutely not ready to make any kind of concessions.
The Saudi-led coalition announced it would take "deterrent measures" after stating that a Houthi drone targeted Mecca, a claim the Iran-backed group swiftly rejected as a "lie." This alleged incident has intensified tensions within a broader regional conflict where the Houthis have recently declared a maritime blockade and seized control of Yemen's Red Sea coast, threatening key shipping lanes used for Saudi oil exports.