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מעקב משבר איראן-המפרץ 2026
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strikeApr 2, 2026

How Iranian hackers pose a threat to US critical infrastructure

Summary

Michigan may be more than 6,000 miles away from the war in Iran, but, virtually speaking, it’s well within striking distance. An Iran-linked group calling itself Handala claimed responsibility for a cyberattack on Portage, Michigan-based medical device maker Stryker Corp., carried out on March 11, 2026. Handala said the attack was in retaliation for events related to the conflict in Iran. The cyberattack affected Stryker’s internal Microsoft software system, disrupting the company’s order processing, manufacturing and shipping. As a scholar who researches cyber conflict, I’ve found that in periods of geopolitical tension such as the current U.S./Israel-Iran war, cyber operations often sit right next to missiles and airstrikes as a tool that states and state-linked groups use to inflict damage, probe weaknesses and signal resolve to their enemies. The Stryker case is notable because it shows how quickly a regional conflict can translate into disruption for organizations far from the battlefield. It also illustrates the vulnerabilities of U.S. organizations, including those involved in critical infrastructure. Modern critical infrastructure does not only involve the obvious big targets like power plants or water utilities. It also relies on suppliers and service providers that sit one or two links upstream – such as managed information technology providers, cloud and data center operators and specialized parts suppliers – that keep everything from hospitals to transit systems running. This is one reason U.S. officials emphasize critical infrastructure as a whole-of-society problem, not a niche government issue. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s “Shields Up” guidance is written for exactly this reality: a world where geopolitical shocks can threaten organizations that did not think they were part of the battlefield. Cyber operations are often about options When people imagine cyber warfare, many often picture dramatic outcomes. The lights go out. The water turns toxic. The trains stop. Those scenarios are real risks. But they are not the only objective, and often not the main one. The real strategic value is access. Cyber access is like a set of keys. If you can get into a network quietly, stay there and learn how it works, you create options for later. You can steal information, map dependencies and position yourself to cause disruption. You can keep the option to strike in your pocket, so that in a crisis, you can cause or credibly threaten to cause harm. That is why U.S. agencies took the China-linked Volt Typhoon group’s hacking activity so seriously. In joint advisories, U.S. officials described a campaign that compromised the information technology systems of organizations across multiple critical infrastructure sectors and used so-called living-off-the-land techniques that can blend into normal administrative activity. This is an important point. A lot of state-linked cyber activity is not designed to create immediate, visible chaos. It is designed to build leverage. How state-sponsored cyberattacks typically work Most state-backed cyber operations, including those carried out by the United States, follow a common sequence. First, the attackers gain initial access through techniques such as phishing, exploiting known vulnerabilities or abusing weak remote access. Once inside, attackers try to learn where the valuable data and sensitive systems are. They seek higher privileges and move laterally, often using legitimate administrative tools to blend in. That stealthy maneuvering is one reason campaigns like Volt Typhoon raised alarms. Defenders can have a hard time distinguishing an intruder from a normal administrator in a busy environment, especially when the intruder is deliberately trying to make their actions look like ordinary activity. The attackers then establish persistence, meaning they can sustain their access. If the goal is leverage, the attackers want to survive defenders’ cleanup efforts after they discover they’ve been hacked. That can mean gaining multiple footholds, altering authentication settings or gaining access via third parties. Finally, they choose the effects they want to have. Consider the “Shamoon” attack in 2012 in Saudi Arabia. After gaining access, the attackers used malware to wipe data on thousands of computers at oil giant Saudi Aramco, disrupting business operations. But not every intrusion ends in destruction. Sometimes it ends with data theft, where the prize is information rather than causing downtime. An example is the 2015 breach of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, in which attackers stole sensitive personnel data. Other times, the point is disruption designed to send a message such as the cyberattack on Sony Pictures in 2014, when hackers sought to keep the company from releasing the comedy film “The Interview.” What defenses does the US have? The U.S. has a growing defense ecosystem, but it is not a single shield you can switch on. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency encourages organizations to heighten their cybersecurity vigilance during periods of elevated geopolitical risk. The agency, along with the FBI, the National Security Agency and international partners, also publishes advisories with indicators and recommended mitigations when they see active campaigns. Because critical infrastructure is mostly privately owned, federal defense also depends on partnership. For instance, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative is designed to support coordinated public-private planning and information sharing around major cyber risks. Congress has also pushed the private sector toward reporting incidents more quickly. The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 sets reporting timelines that include reporting cyber incidents within 72 hours and ransomware payments within 24 hours after payment. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has been implementing these requirements through ongoing rulemaking. These are meaningful steps, but they do not erase the basic constraints: uneven resources, uneven incentives and the reality that many targets sit outside direct federal control. Lessons from the Stryker hack The Stryker episode is a reminder that cyber operations are now a routine tool that state-linked actors can use to project power during international crises. They can aim at theft, disruption or signaling. Sometimes they hit government networks, and other times they hit private companies that sit inside essential supply chains. Either way, the consequences can be felt far from the conflict itself. In cyber conflict, the quiet part – gaining access, establishing persistence and preparing for deployment – typically comes first. The visible disruption often gets headlines, but it is the hidden positioning that sets the stage for offensive cyber operations in a crisis. Wars today are not only fought with missiles and airstrikes you can see in the sky. They are also fought with what you cannot see moving through computer networks.

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Sources

  • William AkotoBy William Akoto

    Michigan may be more than 6,000 miles away from the war in Iran, but, virtually speaking, it’s well within striking distance. An Iran-linked group calling itself Handala claimed responsibility for a cyberattack on Portage, Michigan-based medical device maker Stryker Corp., carrie

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The White House is now apparently using Russian tactics to convince the American public that the war in Iran is not, in fact, a war. When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday whether the most intense sustained air campaign by American forces since the invasion of Iraq would be over by the midterms, Vice President JD Vance replied: “I wouldn’t call it a war.

” Vladimir Putin said much the same thing when he invaded Ukraine. Russia was not fighting a war either, the Kremlin insisted; it was merely conducting a “special military operation.” If that comparison strikes you as shocking, consider the contours of the two conflicts.

A vastly more powerful military launched a punishing offensive against a smaller, less well-equipped adversary, inflicted enormous damage without achieving a decisive resolution, and then found itself drawn into a longer, grinding conflict with no clear way out.

The motivations behind the wars may be different, and they’re playing out in different theaters, but the pattern is eerily similar. Now, so too is the attempt by those in power to control how the public understands, and even what it is allowed to call, the obvious war unfolding in front of them.

If This Isn’t a War, What Is? Let us take a moment to assess what exactly has happened since February 28, when the U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury. The opening U.S.-Israeli attack killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the defense minister and various other senior officials.

According to the U.S. military’s own accounting, the first 38 days of major combat operations involved more than 10,200 sorties and 13,500 strikes. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) says those attacks damaged or destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone and naval defense industrial base, while knocking out 82 percent of its air-defense missile systems.

The U.S. sent carrier strike groups and warships into the region, later imposing a military blockade on Iranian ports. Meanwhile, American and allied air defenses intercepted more than 6,000 Iranian attack drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles fired at U.

S. forces, Israel and American partners across the Middle East. More than 50,000 U.S. service members remain deployed across the region. The fighting has killed 18 U.S. service members and at least 8,000 people across Iran, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states.

More than 750 U.S. service members have been wounded. Last month, during a lull in the fighting, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a sanctions package likened to an “economic D-day” that is designed to make Iran an “economic outcast” and cut the adversary off from all available forms of economic support.

In the announcement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent openly declared that Iran had been “at war against America” for 47 years. This week, the shooting resumed; the U.S. hit targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran blasted missiles at targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq.

All this from an administration that almost exactly a year ago launched a rapid rebrand of the Defense Department into the “Department of War”. No boots on the ground, though, so it’s not a war, right? Tell It Kind of Like It Is Even the very best snake-oil salesman would have a hard time convincing people that the war in Iran isn’t a war.

So why is JD Vance even trying? Well, if there’s one thing politicians understand better than anyone, it’s the importance of language and rhetoric. Words have immense power; a well-written speech can unite millions of people, and a catchy slogan like Make America Great Again can come to represent an entire political philosophy.

But war is a pesky word. For one, it implies there will eventually be a winner and a loser. It also brings with it certain expectations—and some very difficult questions. What is the objective? How many people will die? When will it end? And, perhaps most dangerously of all: was it worth it?

Those are not questions the White House wants Americans to be asking. Trump built a substantial part of his political identity around ending, rather than beginning, America’s “endless wars.” When Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in June, the White House presented it as proof that Trump’s America First approach could deliver peace without another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Then the hostilities started again. Earlier this week, Trump shared a Truth Social graphic declaring that “Hormuz Oil Volumes are BACK!”, saying 18 million barrels a day were once again leaving the Strait, compared with 20 million before the war. No independent commodity tracking company or energy analyst appeared to verify Trump’s claims.

But most Americans won’t be checking tanker-tracking dashboards. What they’ll care about is the cold, hard fact that diesel hit a new record price this morning, soaring to an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever. Gasoline is $4.15 a gallon on average, compared with $3.

20 at this time last year, according to AAA. The numbers on the sign at the gas station and the price on the grocery receipt aren’t affected by Trump’s tall tales, but they’ll surely affect how Americans vote at the midterms. When viewed in this light, Vance’s attempt to discourage reporters from “call[ing] it a war” begins to make sense.

A war is something that we want to end. It tends to result in a winner and a loser. And its worth is up for debate at all times. A different kind of engagement that doesn’t quite meet the threshold of war—say, a special military operation—is not exposed to the same kind of scrutiny.

Vance effectively made that case himself. “When you ask, ‘When will this end?’ You’re asking me a question like, ‘When will the Iranians stop shooting at ships?’” he said. By that logic, there is no American war—only recurring Iranian provocations that require American military responses.

That’s exactly the logic applied by Putin to Ukraine and supposed expansion of NATO. Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly invoked the War Powers Resolution to challenge Trump’s authority to keep fighting Iran without specific congressional authorization.

The law generally gives a president 60 days after U.S. forces enter “hostilities” to secure congressional approval or bring those hostilities to an end. That makes the pauses in fighting hugely important. When the original 60-day deadline arrived in May, Trump told Congress that the temporary ceasefire reached in April meant the hostilities that began on February 28 had ended.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the War Powers clock could “pause, or stop” when the shooting did. That position is disputed by legal experts, but its political utility is obvious. If every new outbreak of fighting can be treated as a separate skirmish, rather than part of one continuous war, the administration can argue that a fresh 60-day clock starts each time.

Vance’s insistence that there is no continuing “war” fits neatly for an administration that has already tried to divide six months of conflict into separate periods of hostilities, interrupted by ceasefires and pauses. This brings us back to Moscow.

The Kremlin’s own linguistic trick was also about making one sprawling war sound smaller, more limited and more manageable than it really was. From the very beginning of the invasion, Putin described the war as a special military operation. Only after two years of grinding warfare did Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly declare Russia to be in a “state of war”—and even then, he said the transformation had occurred because the “collective West” had joined the fight against Russia.

Vance is playing a similar game, but in reverse. Only now—with soaring fuel prices, mounting casualties, concerns over the military’s munitions stockpiles, and midterm elections on the horizon—is the conflict no longer a war. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, though, and the American people aren’t stupid.

Vance and the White House may discover in November that voters are perfectly capable of recognizing a war, even when the vice president doesn’t want to call it one.

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