Iranian leaders threaten to bomb British base on Cyprus if the U.S. steps up the war - See more Daily Mail on Google - save us as a Preferred Source Iranian leaders are preparing to resume attacks on a British base in Cyprus should Donald Trump escalate the conflict.

RAF Akrotiri, a centre for UK air operations in the region, was struck by an Iranian drone in March – damaging a hangar and causing a political row. Then-prime minister Keir Starmer faced questions from the Cypriot government over its failure to protect the base situated near the tourist hub of Limassol.

It emerged on Wednesday Iran is considering attacking the base and US military sites in Europe. Cypriot officials responded by appealing to Iran not to strike the Mediterranean island. A Cypriot government source said: 'We are in contact with Iran, and Cyprus is not a target.

' The Ministry of Defence insisted the security of the base, its personnel and their dependants were 'our highest priority'. A spokesman insisted RAF Akrotiri was protected by 'robust, multi-layered security measures'. Soldiers prepared to board an aircraft in April 2023 at RAF Akrotiri which was bound for Sudan An Iranian drone hit the RAF Akrotiri base in Cyprus, pictured, in March At the beginning of the conflict families of personnel at Akrotiri were forced to abandon their homes due to the Iranian aerial threat.

Labour was lambasted at the time for leaving UK service personnel and partners and children so vulnerable, and for failing to deploy a Royal Navy warship to defend Cyprus. According to a report in the Financial Times, Iranian forces are also considering US military targets in eastern and southern Europe.

It follows the US President threatening to resume attacks on Iran's civilian infrastructure. Iranian insiders told the Financial Times the country would place 'no limits' on its response should the US attack its natural resources, energy plans and transport networks.

They said Iran would defend itself 'at any price' including 'going beyond the region and hitting Europe, too'. Experts say Iran's tactic is to attack countries, such as Cyprus, that host bases but are opposed to the conflict in the hope it will call for an end to war, as Jordan did when its US bases came under fire.

Iran could also target under-sea cables in the region as hardliners in its government push for a tougher stance against the US and its allies. Diplomatic efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and resume negotiations over a broader agreement to end the war have so far failed to produce a breakthrough.

The US is exerting financial pressure on Iran by blockading its ports. Last night, the United Arab Emirates said it was suspending trade with Iran.

U.S. government agencies warned that unidentified hackers, utilizing AI to develop exploits, are attempting to breach Siemens S7 Series programmable logic controllers used in critical infrastructure. This advisory, issued by multiple federal departments, notes that these attempts coincide with recent cyber incidents targeting water systems in several states, which experts suspect may be linked to Iran.

Siemens has not yet responded to requests for comment regarding the matter.

U.S. equity futures were largely flat with mixed performance across sectors, while Brent crude rose 0.8% to near $92 following reports that indicated limited progress toward a resolution to the U.S.-Iran conflict. Investors focused on upcoming Fed minutes and a 20-year bond auction for signals regarding monetary policy and government borrowing costs.

The 60-day window created by the Islamabad Memorandum expired on Monday with no permanent agreement between the United States and Iran. The 14-point framework, brokered principally by Pakistan with Qatar’s involvement, was signed on 17 June in an attempt to convert a fragile ceasefire into something durable.

It covered the war’s end, Iran’s nuclear programme, sanctions, frozen assets, the US naval blockade and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Both sides had 60 days to reach final terms. Those 60 days are gone. Iran now says it is shifting to a “fully offensive” posture.

Washington has ruled out an extension. Tehran says Hormuz stays shut until the US lifts its blockade, ends oil sanctions, releases frozen assets and halts military pressure. Brent crude is back above $90 a barrel, and another commercial vessel was struck near the strait this week.

It would be easy to file this as one more US-Iran negotiation collapsing under the usual weight. But the timeline raises a sharper question: did something change inside Tehran’s power structure while these talks were underway — and did that change do more to kill the deal than anything Washington did?

A leader who inherited power through assassination Mojtaba Khamenei did not become Supreme Leader through succession planning. His father, Ali Khamenei, was killed on 28 February in a joint US-Israeli strike that also killed other family members. Mojtaba was injured in the same attack and named successor on 8 March, while Iran was still under bombardment.

That origin matters more than most Western coverage of this story acknowledges. Iran’s current negotiating posture cannot be separated from the fact that its head of state took office because a foreign strike killed his father. Reuters reported in April, citing people close to his circle, that Mojtaba suffered severe facial and leg injuries, including significant disfigurement.

For weeks he essentially vanished from public view — no recordings of his voice, only written statements, while President Masoud Pezeshkian gave shifting accounts of how much contact he actually had with him. Power, in that vacuum, moved to Iran’s security establishment.

The Revolutionary Guards and the Supreme National Security Council gained outsized wartime authority. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf — a former senior IRGC commander, not a moderate by any reasonable definition — became the visible faces of diplomacy.

Their importance was significant enough that Pakistan reportedly asked Israel to remove both men from a target list while Islamabad was trying to build a negotiating channel. Pakistan’s stake in this isn’t neutral, either Pakistan’s mediating role deserves scrutiny, not just credit.

Islamabad’s diplomacy produced the June framework through sustained shuttle efforts, and Pakistan retains genuine access on both sides — relations with Washington, a channel into Tehran, and a demonstrated willingness to intervene directly, as the Israeli target-list episode shows.

But Pakistan is not a disinterested broker. A prolonged US-Iran war on its western periphery threatens energy prices, regional stability and Pakistan’s own security along a border it already struggles to manage. Successful mediation also buys Islamabad exactly the kind of diplomatic capital it has been cultivating all year, from the Mecca defence pact to its expanding Gulf relationships.

None of that makes Pakistan’s mediation illegitimate. It does mean Islamabad has its own reasons for wanting this conflict contained, separate from any commitment to a fair outcome for either side. Then Mojtaba came back By July, Pezeshkian was describing more regular contact with Khamenei.

On 10 August he said he’d spent roughly seven hours with the Supreme Leader, calling him in “full health.” State media released undated footage of Mojtaba meeting officials — not conclusive proof of full recovery, but combined with Pezeshkian’s account, real evidence he is functioning again.

At almost the same moment, Iran’s power structure shifted visibly. On 9 August, Khamenei appointed veteran IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei as his representative to the Supreme National Security Council; the next day, Pezeshkian formalised him as the council’s secretary.

Rezaei commanded the Revolutionary Guards through much of the Iran-Iraq war and has spent decades near the centre of the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus. He replaced Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr, who was moved to a political advisory role. Other appointments strengthened veteran hardliners across the military and security establishment.

Days later, Tehran started using the language of “offensive war.” None of this proves Mojtaba personally torpedoed the Islamabad deal — his own positions were hardline from the start; he rejected de-escalation proposals in his first foreign-policy session back in March, months before this recovery.

What it suggests instead is that Iran’s diplomats had more practical room to manoeuvre while their Supreme Leader was incapacitated, and that room is now narrowing as he reasserts himself. Washington isn’t blameless None of this lets the US off the hook.

Trump was calling the Islamabad framework “over” within a month of signing it. Washington is refusing an extension while demanding what amounts to Iranian surrender, and threatening even Oman — a longstanding US partner mediating Hormuz arrangements — if it gets in the way.

Every threat from Washington hands ammunition to Tehran’s hardliners, who argue the US treats compromise as weakness. Every Iranian strike on shipping does the same for Washington’s hawks. Both governments are currently feeding the factions on the other side least interested in a deal.

What comes next Qalibaf hasn’t disappeared from the picture — he’s still the one stating Iran’s terms publicly. But he, Araghchi and Pezeshkian all now operate beneath an authority that looks considerably more assertive, and more militarised, than it did when the Islamabad framework was built.

Any renewed mediation effort — from Pakistan, Qatar, Oman or Turkey, all of whom have signalled continued involvement — will have to negotiate with that reality, not the Iran of March. The 60-day window has closed. Whether the political conditions that produced it still exist is a separate, and harder, question.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.