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strikeMar 27, 2026

Nixon to Trump: Pakistan’s long record as backchannel between rival powers

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Nixon to Trump: Pakistan’s long record as backchannel between rival powers Nixon’s historic 1972 China visit was facilitated by three years of Pakistani diplomacy. Can Islamabad deliver the goods again? Islamabad, Pakistan – In the middle of 1971, at the height of the Cold War, a Pakistani government plane carrying US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger flew overnight from Islamabad to Beijing. The trip was secret, the facilitator was Pakistan, and the geopolitical consequences were generational. More than 50 years later, Pakistan is once again carrying messages. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed on March 25 that Islamabad is relaying a US 15-point ceasefire proposal to Tehran, with Turkiye and Egypt providing additional diplomatic support, as the US-Israeli war against Iran stretches into its second month. On Thursday, chief US negotiator Steve Witkoff also confirmed that Pakistan was transferring messages between Washington and Tehran. Hours later, President Donald Trump announced on his social media platform, Truth Social, a 10-day pause on threatened strikes against Iranian power plants, citing, in his words, a request from the Iranian government. Iran has so far denied that direct negotiations are taking place, but Trump’s latest pause means that his initial threat to attack Iran’s power plants, delivered last weekend, has now been deferred twice, as Pakistan plays the part of a key diplomatic facilitator. The role is not new. Pakistan brokered the secret US-China backchannel in 1971 and was a key interlocutor in the Geneva Accords that helped end the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. It also facilitated talks that led to the 2020 Doha Agreement and has, across successive governments, attempted to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Since the launch of Operation Epic Fury, the US-Israeli air campaign that began in late February 2026 and killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei within days, Islamabad has quietly but deeply inserted itself into the crisis, working the phones and holding meetings with key regional actors. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has spoken repeatedly to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir has held at least one direct call with President Donald Trump. Both Sharif and Munir have also travelled to Saudi Arabia, with whom Pakistan signed a mutual defence agreement in September last year, and which hosts a US base and has faced Iranian attacks in recent weeks. “Pakistan’s story is told most often through the prism of conflict,” says Naghmana Hashmi, a former Pakistani ambassador to China. “Yet beneath the headlines of coups, crises, and border skirmishes runs a quieter, more consistent thread: a state that has repeatedly tried to turn its geography and Muslim-world ties into diplomatic leverage for peace,” she told Al Jazeera. Whether this latest round of diplomacy produces anything durable remains uncertain. But it has once again raised a familiar question: How and why does Pakistan keep emerging as a diplomatic broker, and how effective has it been? Opening the China channel In August 1969, US President Richard Nixon visited Pakistan and quietly tasked the country’s military ruler, President Yahya Khan, with passing a message to Beijing: Washington wanted to open communication with the People’s Republic of China. At the time, the US treated Taiwan as China and did not recognise Beijing. Pakistan was chosen for the diplomatic role because it maintained working relations with both Washington and Beijing. Winston Lord, who served as Kissinger’s aide and was on the flight to Beijing, described the decision in a 1998 oral history interview conducted by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. “We finally settled on Pakistan. Pakistan had the advantage of being a friend to both sides,” he said. Two years of indirect exchanges followed, with Pakistani officials carrying messages between the two capitals. Then, in July 1971, Kissinger arrived in Islamabad on a public tour of Asia. According to historical records and accounts from key participants, he appeared to fall ill at a welcome dinner. In the early hours of July 9, Yahya Khan’s driver took Kissinger and three aides to a military airfield, where a Pakistani government plane was waiting with four Chinese representatives on board. The aircraft flew to Beijing overnight, while a decoy car headed to the hill resort of Nathia Gali, about three hours from Islamabad. Kissinger spent 48 hours in meetings with Chinese leader Zhou Enlai before returning to Pakistan. The trip paved the way for Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972, and the famous handshake with Chinese leader Mao Zedong that led to a detente between the two countries, and the US recognition of communist China. Kissinger later acknowledged in an interview with news magazine The Atlantic that the Nixon administration had declined to publicly condemn Pakistani army actions in East Pakistan, which contributed to the creation of Bangladesh in December 1971. According to him, doing so “would have destroyed the Pakistani channel, which would be needed for months to complete the opening to China, which indeed was launched from Pakistan”. Masood Khan, who served as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States and later to the United Nations, says the episode reflected something structural. “In 1971, Pakistan was the only country that could be trusted simultaneously in Washington and Beijing with a very sensitive mission, which was kept secret even from the State Department,” he told Al Jazeera. “But beyond trust, Pakistan had also acquired the requisite strategic manoeuvrability and operational flexibility that suit interlocutors caught in an apparently irredeemable situation,” Khan added. Muhammad Faisal, a Sydney-based foreign policy analyst, called it Pakistan’s defining diplomatic moment. “Pakistan’s facilitation of the US-China backchannel is unambiguously the most consequential. It restructured Cold War geopolitics in ways that still define the international order. No other Pakistani facilitation comes close in scale or permanence,” he said. But he also points to its limits. “Pakistan couldn’t turn that support from both powers to its advantage in the 1971 civil conflict and the subsequent war with India. Despite being on good terms with both China and the US, Pakistan couldn’t deter India from taking advantage of the civil conflict,” he added. Mediator and stakeholder Pakistan’s role in Afghan diplomacy spans four decades and does not always fit neatly into the category of neutral brokering. An early instance came in the 1980s, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Pakistan became the primary conduit for US, Saudi and Chinese military and financial assistance to the Afghan mujahideen, with its intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), organising and directing the resistance. From June 1982, a United Nations-mediated process began in Geneva. Since Pakistan refused to recognise the Soviet-backed Kabul government, negotiations were conducted indirectly. The Geneva Accords were eventually signed on April 14, 1988, by the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the United States and the Soviet Union as guarantors. They set a timetable for Soviet withdrawal, completed by February 1989. As Khan observed, Pakistan occupied a dual role. “It was both a stakeholder and a mediator,” he said, a distinction that would shape its Afghan policy for decades. Nearly three decades later, in July 2015, Pakistan hosted the first officially acknowledged direct talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government of then-President Ashraf Ghani in Murree, near Islamabad, with US and Chinese officials attending as observers. The Taliban, who had ruled Afghanistan from 1996 until being overthrown after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, were then waging a rebellion against US and NATO forces. Pakistan, widely seen as having influence over the group, played a key facilitating role. During the subsequent US-Taliban negotiations that led to the Doha Agreement in 2020, Pakistan’s involvement was less visible but remained central. US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad repeatedly acknowledged that Pakistani pressure on Taliban leadership helped sustain the talks. Faisal said it is unclear what the agreement delivered for Pakistan. “Pakistan did bring the Taliban interlocutors to the table. However, the outcome, the rushed US exit and the Taliban takeover, did not secure Pakistan’s own medium-to-long term interests,” he said. Today, Pakistan and the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan are locked in a war, both firing at each other. And the Taliban has grown close to Pakistan’s South Asian rival, India. Saudi-Iran: efforts without outcomes Few diplomatic efforts have absorbed more Pakistani energy with less to show than attempts to ease tensions between Riyadh and Tehran, say analysts. In January 2016, after protesters ransacked Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran, then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, elder brother of current premier Shehbaz, flew to both capitals in a single trip alongside then-Army chief General Raheel Sharif. Within days, however, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir publicly denied that any formal mediation had been agreed. In October 2019, after drone and missile attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais temporarily halved the kingdom’s oil output, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan undertook shuttle diplomacy between Tehran and Riyadh. Khan said that Trump, then in his first term, had personally asked him to “facilitate some sort of dialogue”. Iranian officials said at the time they were unaware of any formal mediation process. When China brokered the restoration of Saudi-Iran diplomatic ties in Beijing in March 2023, Pakistan’s Foreign Office noted that the first direct contact between the two sides since 2016 had taken place on the sidelines of a summit of Islamic countries hosted by Islamabad a year earlier. Khan, the diplomat, rejects the view that China’s role in the 2023 breakthrough represented a Pakistani failure. “China should get all the credit for the culmination of the Iran-Saudi rapprochement, but Beijing would recognise that Pakistan paved the way for it,” he said. “Pakistan’s forte is opening channels, building confidence, and hosting indirect, proximity talks. This kind of facilitation is foundational in any kind of mediation and subsequent conciliation, arbitration, and agreements,” he added. Attempt at peace in Middle East In September 2005, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri met his Israeli counterpart Silvan Shalom in Istanbul, marking the first publicly acknowledged official contact between the two countries. In his memoir, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, Kasuri described the meeting as an attempt to turn Pakistan’s nonrecognition of Israel into diplomatic leverage, using its credibility in Arab and Muslim capitals as a conduit, contingent on progress towards Palestinian statehood. Shalom called the talks “a huge breakthrough”. But the initiative did not survive domestic opposition. Protests erupted in Pakistan, which does not recognise Israel. No follow-up meeting took place, and no structured process emerged. Recurring diplomacy Faisal attributes Pakistan’s recurring diplomatic role to enduring structural factors. “Pakistan’s access is linked to its geography and its regional relationships amid many fault lines that it straddles,” he said. “Iran cannot ignore Pakistan because it is home to the largest Shia population outside Iran. For the US, ignoring Pakistan, a nuclear-armed Muslim-majority nation straddling the broader Middle East and South Asia with close ties to China, comes at its own risk.” Khan rejects the suggestion — made by some analysts — that Pakistan’s mediation is driven primarily by Washington. “To suggest that Pakistan has always opted for mediation at the behest of the US is a reductive construct. Mediation is in the DNA of Pakistan’s diplomacy,” he said. “Pakistan does not pursue bloc politics and prefers to maintain equidistant relations with Washington, Beijing, Tehran, Riyadh, and other Gulf states. It is aligned, but not a camp follower.” Yet the current Iran mediation carries higher stakes than most recent efforts. “Pakistan now enjoys trust in Washington, Tehran and the Gulf capitals,” Khan said. “No other country in the region has that kind of leverage.”

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” Vladimir Putin said much the same thing when he invaded Ukraine. Russia was not fighting a war either, the Kremlin insisted; it was merely conducting a “special military operation.” If that comparison strikes you as shocking, consider the contours of the two conflicts.

A vastly more powerful military launched a punishing offensive against a smaller, less well-equipped adversary, inflicted enormous damage without achieving a decisive resolution, and then found itself drawn into a longer, grinding conflict with no clear way out.

The motivations behind the wars may be different, and they’re playing out in different theaters, but the pattern is eerily similar. Now, so too is the attempt by those in power to control how the public understands, and even what it is allowed to call, the obvious war unfolding in front of them.

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According to the U.S. military’s own accounting, the first 38 days of major combat operations involved more than 10,200 sorties and 13,500 strikes. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) says those attacks damaged or destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone and naval defense industrial base, while knocking out 82 percent of its air-defense missile systems.

The U.S. sent carrier strike groups and warships into the region, later imposing a military blockade on Iranian ports. Meanwhile, American and allied air defenses intercepted more than 6,000 Iranian attack drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles fired at U.

S. forces, Israel and American partners across the Middle East. More than 50,000 U.S. service members remain deployed across the region. The fighting has killed 18 U.S. service members and at least 8,000 people across Iran, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states.

More than 750 U.S. service members have been wounded. Last month, during a lull in the fighting, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a sanctions package likened to an “economic D-day” that is designed to make Iran an “economic outcast” and cut the adversary off from all available forms of economic support.

In the announcement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent openly declared that Iran had been “at war against America” for 47 years. This week, the shooting resumed; the U.S. hit targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran blasted missiles at targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq.

All this from an administration that almost exactly a year ago launched a rapid rebrand of the Defense Department into the “Department of War”. No boots on the ground, though, so it’s not a war, right? Tell It Kind of Like It Is Even the very best snake-oil salesman would have a hard time convincing people that the war in Iran isn’t a war.

So why is JD Vance even trying? Well, if there’s one thing politicians understand better than anyone, it’s the importance of language and rhetoric. Words have immense power; a well-written speech can unite millions of people, and a catchy slogan like Make America Great Again can come to represent an entire political philosophy.

But war is a pesky word. For one, it implies there will eventually be a winner and a loser. It also brings with it certain expectations—and some very difficult questions. What is the objective? How many people will die? When will it end? And, perhaps most dangerously of all: was it worth it?

Those are not questions the White House wants Americans to be asking. Trump built a substantial part of his political identity around ending, rather than beginning, America’s “endless wars.” When Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in June, the White House presented it as proof that Trump’s America First approach could deliver peace without another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Then the hostilities started again. Earlier this week, Trump shared a Truth Social graphic declaring that “Hormuz Oil Volumes are BACK!”, saying 18 million barrels a day were once again leaving the Strait, compared with 20 million before the war. No independent commodity tracking company or energy analyst appeared to verify Trump’s claims.

But most Americans won’t be checking tanker-tracking dashboards. What they’ll care about is the cold, hard fact that diesel hit a new record price this morning, soaring to an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever. Gasoline is $4.15 a gallon on average, compared with $3.

20 at this time last year, according to AAA. The numbers on the sign at the gas station and the price on the grocery receipt aren’t affected by Trump’s tall tales, but they’ll surely affect how Americans vote at the midterms. When viewed in this light, Vance’s attempt to discourage reporters from “call[ing] it a war” begins to make sense.

A war is something that we want to end. It tends to result in a winner and a loser. And its worth is up for debate at all times. A different kind of engagement that doesn’t quite meet the threshold of war—say, a special military operation—is not exposed to the same kind of scrutiny.

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That’s exactly the logic applied by Putin to Ukraine and supposed expansion of NATO. Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly invoked the War Powers Resolution to challenge Trump’s authority to keep fighting Iran without specific congressional authorization.

The law generally gives a president 60 days after U.S. forces enter “hostilities” to secure congressional approval or bring those hostilities to an end. That makes the pauses in fighting hugely important. When the original 60-day deadline arrived in May, Trump told Congress that the temporary ceasefire reached in April meant the hostilities that began on February 28 had ended.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the War Powers clock could “pause, or stop” when the shooting did. That position is disputed by legal experts, but its political utility is obvious. If every new outbreak of fighting can be treated as a separate skirmish, rather than part of one continuous war, the administration can argue that a fresh 60-day clock starts each time.

Vance’s insistence that there is no continuing “war” fits neatly for an administration that has already tried to divide six months of conflict into separate periods of hostilities, interrupted by ceasefires and pauses. This brings us back to Moscow.

The Kremlin’s own linguistic trick was also about making one sprawling war sound smaller, more limited and more manageable than it really was. From the very beginning of the invasion, Putin described the war as a special military operation. Only after two years of grinding warfare did Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly declare Russia to be in a “state of war”—and even then, he said the transformation had occurred because the “collective West” had joined the fight against Russia.

Vance is playing a similar game, but in reverse. Only now—with soaring fuel prices, mounting casualties, concerns over the military’s munitions stockpiles, and midterm elections on the horizon—is the conflict no longer a war. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, though, and the American people aren’t stupid.

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