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strikeMay 15, 2026

Reordering the Nuclear Regime in the Wake of the Iran War

Summary

Reordering the Nuclear Regime in the Wake of the Iran War The Iran war is accelerating a reordering of the global nuclear regime, with far-reaching implications for nonproliferation, civil nuclear trade, and nuclear security. The Iran war has delivered another hammer blow to an already crumbling global nuclear regime. The rapid and destabilizing technological and geopolitical changes of recent years have severely undermined the international order and sent shock waves that are reshaping nuclear energy, security, and weapons policy. Iran’s Nuclear Challenge The Iran war underscores the evolution of the nuclear regime. It has set a precedent for the forcible dismantlement of a sovereign nation’s active nuclear program. Military strikes on nuclear infrastructure are unusual in the history of containing nuclear proliferation, although Israel has preemptively struck non-operating research reactors in Iraq and Syria. The United States and Israel launched air strikes that incapacitated much of Iran’s hard and soft nuclear infrastructure with a focus on destroying its uranium enrichment and scientific capability. President Donald Trump has claimed the uranium enrichment capability has been “obliterated,” and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director, John Ratcliffe, has stated that the nuclear sites have been “severely damaged.” This has led to the loss of control of Iran’s fissile material. Iran has produced 400 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium that likely is buried under tons of rubble at the Isfahan nuclear complex. While mystery still shrouds its status, it is probable that Iran does not control this material. There is a historical precedent for uncertain control of weapons-grade material in the wake of the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). But that original “loose nukes” problem was remedied through cooperation among the United States, Russia, and the former Soviet states. Such cooperation seems unlikely in Iran, but joint activity with a common goal is perhaps not out of the question. Trump has claimed that Iran believes that only the United States or China could excavate and remove the buried uranium. And at various times, he has stated that Iran is willing to allow the removal of the material from the country. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, apparently with the agreement of the United States, has declared that the war will not be over until the enriched uranium has been “taken out of Iran” and “enrichment sites…dismantled.” It is dangerous, expensive, and complex for the United States or Israel to attempt to remove the uranium under hostile conditions. And the option of sending it to Russia (as was done under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) when President Vladimir Putin has pledged to Iran’s foreign minister that he will “do everything that serves your interests,” is unlikely to be appealing to the United States or Israel. However, there may be an acceptable third country that could hold the uranium if it is removed from Iran. For the foreseeable future, the United States and Israel may be satisfied to allow the uranium to remain buried under the rubble. Both seem to believe they can prevent the restitution of Iran’s uranium enrichment program through active monitoring and additional military strikes. In reference to the buried uranium, Trump stated, “We’ll get to that at some point. We have it surveilled…If anybody got near the place, we will know about it, and we’ll blow them up.” This approach has raised questions about how the international system of the future will respond to nations that skirt the fringes of their peaceful nuclear commitments as members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). There is already significant pressure on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard existing nuclear facilities, but as nuclear power expands, the number of new nuclear sites requiring oversight will grow. The agency’s mandate, structure, and budget may not be adequate for this task. If it cannot offer the necessary control and confidence that nuclear programs won’t morph into threats, coalitions of willing and powerful nations may act in concert to limit atomic transgressions and prevent new nuclear states outside of the traditional international diplomatic framework. Iran’s history here is instructive. Diplomacy restrained but did not end the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program. It offered cover for non-nuclear dangers, including a ballistic missile and a terrorist network build-up. Military strikes substantially rolled back the nuclear program. With its baseline now reset, it seems unlikely that the United States or Israel, after spending $25 billion plus to militarily eliminate Iran’s nuclear threat, will accept a solution that allows continued uranium enrichment in Iran. The Middle East’s Nuclear Energy Expansion The Iran war’s impacts are also rippling through a Middle East that is increasingly interested in nuclear power. The United Arab Emirates already operates three Korean reactors, Egypt and Turkey are building Russian reactors, and the United States and Saudi Arabia are on the path to nuclear energy cooperation that would result in the construction of one or more reactors. Other nations in the region are also interested in nuclear energy. The US-Saudi agreement is an important bellwether for how the parameters of civil nuclear energy cooperation will evolve. Because of its controversial content, this agreement could become a casualty, or it could set new precedents for how the United States engages in international commerce. A key concern about the Saudi agreement revolves around the nonproliferation conditions. Saudi Arabia has insisted on two red lines—preserving its right to enrich uranium and its unwillingness to accept the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. A nonproliferation report that the Trump administration sent to Congress last November, supporting the Saudi agreement, stated that the United States would address the Additional Protocol by creating a “Bilateral Safeguards Agreement” to supplement the IAEA safeguards system. The details of that arrangement were not specified, but the report identified it as focusing on “sensitive areas of potential nuclear cooperation,” including uranium enrichment, conversion, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing. The agreement may also allow Saudi Arabia to preserve the right to enrich uranium, although the framework surrounding that activity has not been revealed. These provisions have triggered a congressional backlash, with some members insisting on a “Gold Standard” for this and future nuclear cooperation agreements. That standard requires a nation to forego enrichment and reprocessing if it wants US nuclear technology. But it is not a requirement under the US Atomic Energy Act, which governs bilateral US nuclear agreements, and it is enshrined in only a few nuclear cooperation agreements, including the US-UAE nuclear pact. Beyond Saudi Arabia, allowing uranium enrichment is also under negotiation between the United States and South Korea, as is the consideration of spent-fuel reprocessing. Potentially loosening the constraints on these components of US nuclear cooperation would reverse years of policy practice that sought to limit the expansion of sensitive nuclear activities. But new global energy security and geopolitical realities are intruding on the old nuclear frameworks. There are numerous advanced reactors that require higher enrichment levels (though not to weapon-grade levels) and that are designed to use plutonium as a fuel. These reactors have lower power levels and flexible deployment options that are appealing to developing economies with growing energy needs, as well as to established nuclear nations. While it is unlikely that the United States will undermine its commitment to preventing nuclear proliferation, the new global realities may result in creative partnerships and policies that supplement traditional IAEA safeguards practices. This could allow the agency to remain relevant but also offer expanded options that can accommodate the scale of the new reactor technology opportunity. Emerging Nuclear Challenges These tradeoffs will attract sharp criticism, but they may be necessary to claw back international nuclear market share and keep authoritarian nuclear export competitors, such as Russia and China, at bay. The United States lost its lead in nuclear export decades ago, and it is unlikely that it can regain that role using its old playbook. Russia offers an export package that is very appealing, but it is a political debt trap. It includes state financing, a relaxed repayment schedule, the ability to operate the reactor in-country, and the willingness to accept the spent fuel back. Once China completes its substantial domestic nuclear buildout by mid-century, it may enter the export market with force to keep its industrial supply chains active and to support its geopolitical goals. Its Belt and Road Initiative is formidable, with infrastructure projects in over 150 countries, including many developing economies that may seek small- and mid-sized reactors. It matters which nation dominates the export of nuclear technology in this century. It is important for geopolitical influence because it establishes a 100-year energy relationship that has many political and economic spillover effects. And it helps to cement allies, sustain strong nuclear governance, and rebuild domestic and trusted national supply chains. In addition to market competition and nuclear proliferation, the new nuclear regime will need to manage the vulnerability of civil and military nuclear reactors in conflict zones. The taboo against attacks on civil nuclear infrastructure has been repeatedly broken by Russia. Despite the IAEA having passed resolutions condemning these actions, Russia has extensively targeted Ukraine’s civilian nuclear power infrastructure. The United States and Israel, in keeping with IAEA guidance prohibiting attacks on operating nuclear plants, exempted the Bushehr nuclear reactor from strikes in June 2025 and in March 2026. But in the new geopolitical and technological environment, this example of restraint may not be enough. This emerging challenge now extends beyond traditional reactors to include the security of small reactors that can be transported to military forward deployment zones, disaster relief areas, or used to power a variety of civil and military installations. The US military has several programs supporting advanced reactor concepts that are slated for demonstration in the coming years. Other nations may follow the United States’ lead. Because many of these designs do not rely on water as a coolant, the reactors can be located in remote areas away from traditional security systems. Networked drone swarms are a particular concern for all nuclear reactors, but remote reactors are very vulnerable. These weapons have been used against military and economic targets in the Ukraine and Iran wars, and their capabilities are growing more powerful as a result. This creates a new dimension in the nuclear security threat environment for which there is not yet a good policy or technology response. About the Author: Kenneth Luongo Kenneth N. Luongo is a recognized innovator, entrepreneur, and leader in global nuclear energy and transnational security policy. He is the president and founder of the Partnership for Global Security (PGS). He has been a TEDx presenter, written over 100 articles, including in The New York Times and Foreign Affairs, and engaged extensively with global media, governments, and audiences around the world on nuclear energy and transnational security challenges and responses. He was formerly a senior advisor to the secretary of energy and a professional staff member on Capitol Hill.

Perspectives

Iranian Official

The US and Israeli aggression against Iran has flagrantly violated the Islamic Republic's sovereignty through unlawful strikes on its nuclear infrastructure, setting a dangerous precedent for the forcible dismantlement of a nation's legitimate nuclear rights under international law. This foreign assault, which has severely damaged enrichment facilities and led to the loss of control over Iran's fissile materials, exposes the crumbling hypocrisy of the global nuclear regime dominated by aggressor powers. Iran remains steadfast in its resistance, defending its sovereign capabilities against such imperialist encroachments.

Israeli

The Iran war underscores Israel's defensive imperative to neutralize Iran's existential nuclear threat, advanced through its vast proxy network of terror groups encircling the Jewish state. US-Israeli strikes on enrichment facilities and scientific infrastructure have severely damaged Tehran's breakout capacity, setting a necessary precedent against forcible dismantlement of a rogue program's fissile material—now including 400 kg of weapon-grade uranium at risk of loss of control. This reorders the nuclear regime around survival realities rather than failed nonproliferation norms.

Neutral

US and Israeli airstrikes targeted Iranian nuclear facilities, focusing on uranium enrichment infrastructure. President Trump stated that enrichment capabilities had been obliterated, while CIA Director John Ratcliffe reported severe damage to the sites. These developments have prompted discussion of shifts in global nuclear nonproliferation norms, with the status of Iran’s reported stock of weapon-grade uranium remaining unconfirmed.

Western

The United States and Israel conducted precision strikes on Iran’s uranium enrichment sites and nuclear infrastructure, neutralizing a direct proliferation threat and degrading its capacity to produce weapons-grade material. These targeted operations have severely damaged key facilities and disrupted fissile material control, advancing strategic objectives to prevent nuclear breakout by a destabilizing actor. The action strengthens the nonproliferation regime by enforcing accountability through decisive, limited military means.

Pro-Peace

The US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities have inflicted severe humanitarian costs, including risks of radioactive contamination to civilian populations and widespread disruption of essential infrastructure amid the fog of war. These military actions, which have scattered hundreds of kilograms of fissile material, prioritize force over diplomacy and set a precedent that undermines negotiated nonproliferation frameworks capable of averting such devastation. Civilian lives and long-term regional stability bear the brunt, highlighting the urgent need for renewed international talks to address nuclear concerns without further bloodshed.

Global South

The US and Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites mark a direct assault on national sovereignty, exposing how Western powers impose regime change under the guise of nonproliferation while shielding their own nuclear arsenals and allies. This bypass of IAEA oversight and multilateral norms reveals the institutional decay of a regime long skewed against Global South states pursuing independent technological development. With 400 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium now unaccounted for amid the rubble, non-aligned nations face heightened risks of selective enforcement and eroded rights to civil nuclear autonomy.

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Sources

  • Kenneth LuongoBy Kenneth Luongo

    Reordering the Nuclear Regime in the Wake of the Iran War The Iran war is accelerating a reordering of the global nuclear regime, with far-reaching implications for nonproliferation, civil nuclear trade, and nuclear security. The Iran war has delivered another hammer blow to an a

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Goldman Sachs expects Brent crude to average $80 per barrel in the fourth quarter and $75 next year, assuming tensions in the Middle East ease. However, the risks to its forecasts remain "tilted to the upside" due to potential disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and possibly the Red Sea, analysts said.

Global energy markets have faced renewed volatility this month, with Brent climbing back above $91 per barrel amid fresh fighting between the U.S. and Iran and a threat by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen to blockade shipments from Saudi Arabia. Red Sea routes have played a key role in enabling Persian Gulf crude cargoes affected by disruptions to reach buyers.

Also read: Relieved that crude has finally fallen? The real warning signs just began flashing elsewhere Goldman Sachs said lower global inventories in the second quarter have increased the oil market's vulnerability to supply shocks. However, weaker Chinese imports and greater demand elasticity could limit the potential for further price gains.

Oil prices edged lower on Tuesday as markets weighed reports of renewed diplomatic efforts between the U.S. and Iran, including a proposed 10-day ceasefire, against continued military exchanges and a threat by Yemen's Houthis to impose a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia.

Crude oil price today A senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran had received a 10-day ceasefire proposal from mediators. The initiative aims to preserve the interim agreement signed on June 17 and create a path toward a lasting deal to end the conflict that began on February 28 following U.

S.-Israeli attacks on Iran. The diplomatic push followed another night of U.S. strikes on Iranian cities and retaliatory attacks by Iran's Revolutionary Guards on U.S. military assets across the region. U.S. Central Command later said on Monday that it had launched another round of strikes on Iran.

The U.S. carried out its 10th consecutive day of strikes after President Donald Trump vowed that Iran "will pay" for the killing of American soldiers. Iran responded with attacks on Kuwait. The conflict began on February 28, when the U.S. and Israel launched attacks on Iran.

Tehran retaliated with strikes on Israel and Gulf states that host U.S. military bases. U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran, along with Israeli strikes on Lebanon during the conflict, have killed thousands of people and displaced millions. Also read:Oil is crude once again!

Is $95 the new normal and what it means for Indian investors? Over the past week, Trump has also threatened to widen the scope of U.S. strikes in Iran to include energy facilities and bridges. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, which set rules for humanitarian conduct during war, prohibit attacks on sites considered essential to civilian life.

Following Trump's earlier threats to target such infrastructure, international law experts in the U.S. said earlier this year that such attacks could potentially constitute war crimes. (Disclaimer: Recommendations, suggestions, views and opinions given by the experts are their own.

These do not represent the views of The Economic Times) (You can now subscribe to our ETMarkets WhatsApp channel) (What's moving Sensex and Nifty Track latest market news, stock tips, Budget 2025, Share Market on Budget 2025 and expert advice, on ETMarkets.

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Opening summary: Iran claims attacks on strait of Hormuz ships amid fresh US strikes Welcome to our live coverage of the latest developments in the Middle East crisis. Iran attacked a tanker in the strait of Hormuz early on Tuesday, forcing its crew to abandon the ship, as Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis announced they were imposing an immediate maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea after the two sides traded fire last week for the first time in years.

A Houthi official said the Bab al-Mandeb strait – at the southern end of the Red Sea, through which about 12% of the world’s trade usually passes – would be closed to the Saudis in response to the kingdom’s “unjust blockade on Yemenis for over 10 years”.

Saudi Arabia said it would take “all necessary measures to protect its vessels in accordance with international law”. A 10 consecutive night of US airstrikes has not compelled Tehran to loosen its grip on the strait of Hormuz, a vital route for global energy supplies.

But even as Iran’s president said the country had returned “full-scale war”, the Iranian interior minister travelled to Pakistan – a key mediator in the conflict – for talks. In key developments: The latest US strikes came hours after Donald Trump said Iran would pay “many times over” for killing US soldiers after multiple service members were killed in action over the weekend.

A tanker came under attack early Tuesday in the Hormuz strait off Oman, forcing the crew to abandon the vessel, the British military’s United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre said. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards claimed the attack as well as two other attacks on ships in the waterway on Monday.

The US military’s Central Command said its latest airstrikes were to “degrade” Iran’s ability to attack commercial shipping in the strait and included hitting military command centres and missile and drone launch sites. Iranian media reported strikes in parts of the country including Bandar Abbas, Tabriz and Bushehr, home to the country’s only operational civilian nuclear power.

Iran’s launched attacks in response against Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan, which all host US forces. Oil prices softened after hitting their highest levels in more than a month in the previous session. Brent crude futures eased 0.4% to $88.87 a barrel by 0052 GMT on Tuesday while US West Texas Intermediate crude for September delivery was steady at $82.

47 a barrel. Democrats have seized on the deaths of three US troops killed in Iranian strikes to urge Trump to urgently reverse his resumption of the war with Iran amid widespread anxiety over climbing casualties. The Lebanese army began taking charge of security in three southern villages, the US said, as a deal to secure an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah faced its first test on the ground.

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US forces struck the tanker Settebello in the Gulf of Oman on June 10, killing three Indian crew members when munitions hit the engine room and adjacent areas. Maritime tracking data indicate the vessel had transported Iranian oil under US sanctions for several years and conducted offshore transfers prior to the strike.

The US military described the action as a precision operation, while reports note the ship was stationary at the time.

Location: Strait of Hormuz
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Over the weekend, after exchanges where the US hit bridges and a desalination plant in Iran (reportedly repaired very quickly) and Iran’s response included hitting a much more important desalination and power plant in Kuwait and pounding important US operations in Jordan, the US attacks fell way back one night and CENTCOM and even Trump were quiet.

Some speculated that more Gulf states were denying the US the use of their airspace and the US was having to make a major regrouping. However, the US resumed strikes last night, with the pretext that the US had suffered two more military deaths on top of two just reported.

1 Trump had promised intensified strikes beginning more or less today if Iran did not return to negotiations, as in capitulate. And as many noted, the US had escalated last week, albeit not to the level of attacks during the initial phase of the war, not just with the number of strikes but also the targeting: the aforementioned desalination plant, bridges, too close for comfort to the Bushehr nuclear plant2 and to a nuclear site under development at Darkhovin.

Many have argued that the latest round of strikes look like shaping attacks in preparation for a ground operation, which pretty much everyone with even a modicum of military knowledge sees as insane.3 Daniel Davis has also mentioned in passing that despite all the noise about using ground forces and other signs of a buildup, such as more refueling tankers flying to Jordan, that Trump was shaken by the near-disaster at Isfahan, where a supposed rescue of a downed pilot resulted in the loss of more air assets than in any single engagement since Vietnam.

Many experts have contended that that was an actual operation, a botched attempt to remove some of Iran’s “nuclear dust.” However, Scott Ritter may have squared that circle. See his brief clip starting at 11:55: From a lightly-edited machine transcript: Jawaid: Scott Ritter thinks that Israeli lap dog Trump will soon launch a ground invasion of Iran, but he will fail miserably.

Also, this is something Iran has been wanting Trump to commit to for a long time. Ritter: There’s a a mission called a raid. Um, and I, you know, we already had US troops fighting on the ground. We did a raid to rescue a pilot. We were in limited ground combat operations there.

I think there’s a high potential that the US will conduct a raid here and there because that’s a that’s a a very specific task. A raid is is the only military mission where we plan to retreat. You know, every other military mission there’s no plan. You commit and you go, but a raid is in and out.

So maybe we can do a raid, but the idea that we’re going to land in seize territory, there’s zero chance that will happen because there’s zero chance of success. Now admittedly, if pilot rescue came about as the result of the botched operation in Isfahan, that would be debatable as a raid.

Even though the intent again was to retreat, the US would have had to stage equipment for the removal and transport of nuclear material, so there would be a short-lived occupation of terrain and not just a fast snatch and grab, as with Maduro. Nevertheless, the US military may not be totally suicidal, so the plan may be for a fast landing to inflict some sort of concrete form of damage that cannot be well inflicted from the air and then to decamp.

This segment also includes a very informative explanation of how important the operations in Jordan are to the US, and how the Iran intend is destroy bases so that the US has to retreat to Israel and then Iran will proceed forcefully against the remaining assets there.

We’ll soon turn to updates, but to start with some bigger picture considerations: it is disconcerting to see how many commentators resort to the trope that neither side can prevail on the battlefield, that they will in the end negotiate an outcome. As we pointed out, a study of modern wars found that more than half did not.

The distrust between the two sides, which has now reached the level of mutual loathing as a result of the fast breakdown of the already likely to fail Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), means any “deal” is vanishingly unlikely. Iran knew even before it entered into talks that the US and Israel intended to execute a “mowing the lawn” strategy, of keeping crippling sanctions in place and beating up on Iran every so often to weaken it and hopefully create severe internal divisions that would trigger an overthrow or balkanization.

Even if Iran’s 47 year record of taking severe punishment and surviving says this plot would probably fail, Iran had been preparing since the Iraq War for the US and Israel to launch a major campaign. After the illegal launch, the assassination of a major part of Iran’s leadership, as well as war crimes exemplified by the massacre of school children in Minab, the nation is highly unified around inflicting a decisive defeat on the US, so that it won’t even think about military action against Iran for at least a decade.

We were far from alone in making that case early in the war and Iran’s resolve has only stiffened as it can see how it has weakened the US while Iran has learned from combat and claims to have even bigger inventories of key weapons than it had at the start of the war.

Critically, Iranian leaders have said, bluntly, that negotiating with the US is not just pointless but also demeaning. Consider the germane parts of a recent statement by the Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei,4 as summarized at PressTV: - Leader said the United States had once again violated the memorandum of understanding signed between the presidents of Iran and the US, proving that the signature of the American president is worthless and unreliable.

- He said bullying, hegemonic ambition, and savagery are inseparable characteristics of the United States and that Washington had once again revealed its true, unmasked face to the world. - He described the latest developments – US attacks against southern Iran, mainly targeting the civilian infrastructure – as further evidence of America’s deceitfulness, irrationality, unreliability, and wickedness.

- Leader said the United States is seeking to ignite further war despite facing heavier costs and greater disgrace. - He warned that the Iranian nation and the Resistance Front have unforgettable lessons for the United States, adding that the bravery of Islamic resistance fighters and the courageous people of southern Iran have already demonstrated examples of those lessons.

However, Araghchi subsequently gave an interview which can be read as pushing back against the Supreme Leader:5 Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says that negotiations with the U.S. should be pursued even if the chances of success are only 10 percent, further highlighting disagreements between Iran’s political and military echelons.

“I am the Foreign Minister for the interests of… pic.twitter.com/uW1DzcfRhG — Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران (@ariel_oseran) July 19, 2026 Keep in mind also that China is still bleating about the need to settle the conflict and Pakistan and Qatar (among others) are also pressing for a resumption of the talks, so Araghchi as Foreign Minister has to keep the idea in play, irrespective of whether he privately places much stock in the idea.

6 And there is another way to read Araghchi’s talk: So they wanted to manufacture a clean record of “we exhausted every diplomatic option." Once that record existed, the hardliners with Mojtaba could shut the process down without looking like the ones who refused talks.

Moderates who pushed the channel now own the failure, and… https://t.co/Y63yYJVaEZ — Vonbury Research (@VonburyResearch) July 19, 2026 Kinetic action seems likely to continue to dominate: ADVISOR TO IRANIAN SUPREME LEADER, MOHSEN REZAEI, SAYING: “I declare it is over.

Both negotiation and war are over. If in the next two or three days the Americans continue the war, we will enter a phase of complete offense and destruction.”#Iran #IranWar pic.twitter.com/1M3A1pboH9 — Iran Now – WANA (@WANA_Iran) July 18, 2026 Robert Pape also seems confident that US escalation will continue7.

I found this discussion noteworthy because Andrew Neil strongly resisted the idea that there would be no negotiated ending and also found it inconceivable that Iran could become, as Pape has argued, the fourth world power. In other words, Neil seems to epitomize a set of normally pretty smart people who find it hard to see where the direction of travel is going because those outcomes so conflict with their priors: From a lightly cleaned up machine transcript: Pape: This is not what’s coming in the next few weeks likely.

What’s much more likely is he’s [Trump’s] going to do the close blockade and if he can then use the southern corridor with that close blockade to reopen the Strait, he’ll he’ll be probably satisfied with that. Very unlikely that’s going to work and that’s why you’ve got the 82nd Airborne and the Marines there to push back further.

Now, I’m not saying this is going to work, Andrew…. Neil: So, I’ve got to ask you some questions in this because I’m unclear. Do you think that the of the limited options President Trump now has, that escalation as you describe it is the most likely?

Pape: Yes. Neil: And that escalation will begin with a much more aggressive, more comprehensive a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz with the possibility of ground incursion on the northern side of the straight in Iranian territory? Pape: Yes. Yes, and it’s our and and the first part has already started this week.

So, so you’re already seeing in fact last week was the beginning of the air suppression campaign for this week. And as President Trump laid out the bombing schedule last night, the reason he will, if he if this keeps going forward, okay, just keep saying that if, he’s going to want to take out things like electric power and bridges is because he’s going to want to try to suppress as much of Iran’s military defenses as he can as he goes forward here.

And the military is giving him the plans for doing that. One place where I differ with Pape is that he posits that Congress might get out of bed in six months and Do Something to check Trump then. To again invoke Stein’s Law, if something cannot continue, it will stop.

The US and Israel can of course carry on with terrorism within Iran, such as assassinations and cyber attacks. But the level of weapons depletion and on current trajectories, shortly-arriving fuel shortages, seems very likely to put a choke chain on US aggression soon.

From Larry Johnson in The US Faces a Strategic Crisis with Iran…The Rapid Depletion of US Battlefield Missiles:8 The tables below are based on the most recent publicly available analyses from CSIS, the Payne Institute, and major media outlets (as of mid-2026), and provide a current (overly optimistic in my opinon) estimate for US inventory levels of these key weapons systems.

Please note that actual inventories are classified; these are informed estimates derived from DOD budget documents, procurement records, and reported expenditures during Operation Epic Fury (the US-Israeli war with Iran). Air Defense Missiles Anti-Radiation / SEAD Long-Range Strike (Ground & Sea-Launched) Missiles These are not just the numbers currently in the hands of US CENTCOM (i.

e., the US military command in charge of the war against Iran), these are the total numbers available to all of the US military commands. If these missiles are allocated evenly to the other two critical commands — i.e., EUCOM (European Command) and PACOM (Pacific Command) — then you begin to understand the gravity of this deficit.

Let’s take the case of the Tomahawk missile. Let’s assume there are 3,000 left (I believe that is a generous over estimate) and the remaining number are divided evenly among CENTCOM, EUCOM and PACOM… That means each command gets 1,000. Does anyone want to argue that in the event of a hot war with Russia or China that EUCOM and PACOM respectively would be able to sustain combat operations for more than four weeks?

Hell, CENTCOM fired 850 of them during the first four weeks of EPIC FURY. Here’s another major problem: All eight missile systems rely on rare earth elements — there are no exceptions among modern US precision-guided weapons. The dependence is nearly universal because rare earth permanent magnets are irreplaceable for the high-performance actuators, guidance motors, and seeker gimbals that make these weapons accurate.

And who controls the supply chain of these rare earth minerals? China!… The supply chain isn’t just about mining — it’s about processing, separation, and magnet manufacturing, which China controls: - Mining: China ~60% of global rare earth oxide production - Refining/Separation: China ~91% - Sintered NdFeB Magnet Manufacturing: China **~94%** Now to updates.

From Aljazeera’s live feed: - A vessel is on fire in the Strait of Hormuz after being hit by a projectile, forcing the crew to abandon ship. They were later rescued by a tugboat. - One person has been killed and several others wounded after the US military attacked the Iranian city of Tabriz in northwestern Iran.

The entries in the feed include ones describing how Mr. Market is taking cheer from the Iran Foreign Ministry admitting they are getting communiques from intermediaries and reviewing them as if they originated from the US. Recall that the negotiators have often developed ideas and tried to sell both sides on them.

Bloomberg’s Javier Blas, who has been a consistent seller of lower oil prices, is refreshingly precise about Iran not saying either way as to whether the missives were from the US or just the negotiators operating on their own: Iran has received “some proposals” from unspecified mediators regarding the war with the US, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmail Baghaei says in press conference, without elaborating.

— Javier Blas (@JavierBlas) July 20, 2026 Contrast that with the Aljazeera account: Oil prices ease after Iran says US contacts continuing through mediators Oil prices have scaled back their gains after hitting their highest in a month after Iran said diplomatic exchanges with the US are ongoing via mediators despite renewed conflict in the Middle East.

Grr. Another Aljazeera live feed entry: Iran ‘counting down the minutes’ for US ground invasion [Today’s Iran war post launched more or less complete. I will be off duty for a while. If there are any updates, they will come in the comment section later] Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei says the United States will face “consequences of any adventure” to seize Kharg Island in southern Iran.

He added there are people in Iran’s leadership “counting down the minutes to welcome” US forces in any ground invasion. Kharg is the heart of Iran’s oil industry. It sits 55km (34 miles) off Iran’s coast in Bushehr province. President Trump has repeatedly threatened to seize the territory during the war.

A raid on Kharg could fit Ritter’s raid scenario, with the US busting things up and then leaving.9 But experts have pointed out that Iran has at least four other export routes. Kharg is the most efficient but losing it while being repaired would be inconvenient as opposed to a fatal blow.

From Bloomberg’s landing page: From US Bombs Iran for Ninth Day as Standoff Over Hormuz Deepens: The US conducted a ninth straight day of airstrikes on Iran, trying to force the Islamic Republic to stop shipping attacks and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

The American military bombed military targets and communications networks in a three-hour operation ending around 5:30 a.m. Iranian time on Monday. Iran continued to attack US bases in the likes of Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain and Iraq. The standoff shows no sign of easing, with Iran refusing to relent over Hormuz and insisting it has a right to manage traffic through the waterway.

Energy prices have jumped on the worsening hostilities. Brent crude oil rose to above $90 a barrel for the first time in more than five weeks in early trading on Monday. US gasoline prices climbed back over the $4-a-gallon mark, potentially hurting President Donald Trump and his Republican party ahead of midterm elections in November… Hormuz Shipping Traffic Slumps as US-Iran Hostilities Worsen The tit-for-tat attacks are getting deadlier….

Shipping volumes have slumped and the number of tankers and other vessels going through Hormuz is roughly down to the same level from the height of the conflict in March and early April… US President Donald Trump warned Iran last week he’d escalate airstrikes and widen the scope of targets until it backed down… Kuwait continues to experience some of the worst attacks from Iran.

Over the weekend, Kuwait’s main state energy company said an unspecified site sustained “significant material losses,” causing its evacuation and a number of injuries, while two power and desalination plants have been hit in recent days. And from Hormuz Traffic Near Standstill as US-Iran Hostilities Escalate: - Visible traffic through the Strait of Hormuz appeared at a near standstill Monday after Iran targeted vessels in the narrow waterway.

- A Marshall Islands-flagged bulk carrier and a liquefied petroleum gas carrier appeared to approach the strait, with the bulk carrier turning off its transponder while approaching. - The targeting of vessels will likely raise fresh concerns over the safety of ships transiting Hormuz, which could deepen disruptions to energy flows from the Persian Gulf to global customers.

Indirectly importance of US operations in Jordan, the lead story in the Wall Street Journal is Jordan Becomes New Flashpoint in U.S.-Iran War as Troop Deaths Rise. But it fails to set forth any of the juicy details that Janta Ka presents. This is the thin strategic gruel offered: For years, Jordan sought to play down its close military and intelligence cooperation with the U.

S. The U.S. aircraft that carried out strikes on Islamic State from a base in Jordan during the American war with the militants didn’t advertise the country they were operating from. But Jordan’s role is now becoming too prominent to obscure. Jordan has become an attractive location for U.

S. armed forces since it is among the most permissive in the Arab world when it comes to allowing the U.S. to operate from its bases. A bit more on Jordan: The view from Tehran. “The increased focus on Jordan may serve as part of Iran’s preparation and testing of operational concepts for more intense and precise strikes against Israel in later stages of the conflict.

Qatar and Saudi Arabia—have at times sought to impose limits… — Policy Tensor (@policytensor) July 20, 2026 By contrast, the House of Saud published a remarkably revealing document (hat tip Eugene Linden), Iran Struck Prince Sultan and No One Was Required to Say So: Iranian ballistic missiles struck Prince Sultan Air Base in Al-Kharj on July 18, wounding twelve US service members — two critically — and hitting KC-135 Stratotankers on the flight line while a second rotation was still climbing out.

Saudi Arabia’s Civil Defense Authority cleared the sirens six minutes later without naming the weapon, the origin, or the damage, and neither Riyadh nor Washington has issued an official statement since. The strike was the first direct Iranian attack on Saudi territory in approximately four months, a gap during which the IRGC struck Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE while conspicuously sparing the Kingdom.

Its return to PSAB — confirmed by a US official to Axios, corroborated by satellite imagery, and detailed by Air & Space Forces Magazine — ended whatever territorial immunity Saudi Arabia believed it still possessed. But the more consequential development is not the strike itself.

It is the silence that followed, and the institutional architecture that sustains it: a three-party managed ambiguity in which Iran, Saudi Arabia, and CENTCOM each benefit from leaving the damage question unanswered, because answering it would force a public reckoning with a PAC-3 reserve that is approaching a ceiling none of them can afford to name.

The strike was confirmed by a US official cited by Axios as “the first time the Islamic Republic has directly attacked the kingdom in four months” — a description that the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Saudi Ministry of Defence have each declined to repeat on the record.

Air & Space Forces Magazine, drawing on multiple US military sources, reported at least twelve wounded and multiple Stratotankers damaged on the tarmac. Open-source satellite imagery corroborated the impact site within the base perimeter. Iran’s state broadcaster supplied what no government would.

The missiles were launched “moments after American refueling planes took off,” a detail that only makes sense if the IRGC had real-time ISR coverage of PSAB’s tanker rotation schedule. The aircraft hit were those that remained on the flight line after the airborne pair departed — the timing was deliberate, and the targeting message was not about maximising destruction but about demonstrating that PSAB’s daily operational patterns are watched, clocked, and within reach….

Riyadh cannot confirm the strike without confronting two questions it has spent the war avoiding. The first is defensive: if Iranian missiles hit PSAB and wounded US personnel, the Sakhir Declaration — the mutual defence framework Saudi Arabia negotiated with Washington — becomes the operative instrument, and invoking it requires publicly admitting what the Arab Center DC described as the core strategic dilemma: “the PAC-3 architecture is functionally exhausted.

” The second is economic. Aramco’s August Arab Light OSP already dropped $11 month-on-month to $1.50 per barrel below Oman/Dubai, the largest such cut in over two decades and the lowest since June 2020. Confirming that Iranian ballistic missiles are landing on military installations 77 kilometres south of the capital forces a sovereign-risk reassessment that Riyadh’s fiscal position — a Q1 deficit of SAR 125.

7 billion, with Aramco’s free cash flow at 0.85 times its quarterly dividend — is not structured to absorb…. Washington faces a different but parallel constraint. Confirming the strike means confirming that 2,300 US service members at PSAB are taking casualties at a base where 43 US warplanes have been grounded since Saudi Arabia’s Operation Project Freedom in May 2026.

CENTCOM cannot describe a defensive engagement at PSAB without also describing the legal anomaly: the 1977 USMTM memorandum governing US presence is not a Status of Forces Agreement, and Project Freedom severed the operational relationship between American air power and Saudi host-nation authority.

An official statement would invite the Congressional question that the Pentagon’s communications strategy is built to defer: why are American troops still at a base where their aircraft have been grounded by the host nation, absorbing Iranian fire under a legal framework that was designed for peacetime advisory missions?

Please read this article in full. It contains remarkable operational detail. It is over my pay grade as to why it was published, but it seems to suggest considerable unhappiness at Riyadh. Due to the length of this post, we have skipped over the fact that Ansar Allah seems just about to threaten or actually close the Bab el-Mandeb strait: 🚨 BREAKING 🇾🇪 YEMEN’S HOUTHI FORCES WILL MAKE A “HUGE” ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY AT 8:30 AM ET.

REPORTS EXPECT THEM TO ANNOUNCE A BLOCKADE OF THE BAB EL-MANDEB STRAIT. TOGETHER WITH THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, THESE TWO CHOKEPOINTS HANDLE OVER 25% OF GLOBAL SEABORNE OIL TRADE. IF TRUE,… pic.twitter.com/yjavHpPKOi — Wimar.X (@DefiWimar) July 20, 2026 This does not look terribly negotiation-receptive.

And some additional sightings from Twitter: Israelis have never felt less secure. 64% are unhappy with how the endless wars have been run. 73% are upset at how there has been no real investigation of October 7. 73% of the public also feel the government has not dealt well with the rise in crime.

No one wins from these… https://t.co/4OjhLUD14O — Shaiel Ben-Ephraim (@academic_la) July 19, 2026 These remarks would seem to negate happy thinking about negotiations: ⚡️⭕️ Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei says Tehran is determined to exercise sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz through measures already taken, and states the US failed to fulfill its commitments under a memorandum of understanding, so Iran will not fulfill… — Middle East Observer (@ME_Observer_) July 20, 2026 The average price for a gallon of gas hit $4, the second time it has reached that benchmark since the war in Iran disrupted global oil supplies https://t.

co/Cg8rE3XnJ7 pic.twitter.com/3UqHfwU4sc — CNN (@CNN) July 20, 2026 Done for today! See you tomorrow! ____ 1 What kind of admission of weakness is this? Part of the job description of a service member is that they may wind up dying for their country.

Admittedly, the US is widely suspected of suffering a much higher body count and covering that up. But this show of extreme sensitivity to losses again shows the US has a glass jaw. 2 Nima also discusses at some length at the top of a new talk with Larry Johnson why they look misguided.

He knows Bandar Abbas well, which is where the US has been hitting bridges so as to isolate it. Nima explains and even shows pictures that the bridges exist only to cope with seasonal floods for a few months a year. Those sluices are dry now, so Bandar Abbas is easily accessible by all sorts of routes.

3 🚨 BREAKING: Russia has evacuated 198 of its personnel from the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran. It is believed that the plant could be targeted again. pic.twitter.com/lPoQB05qgo — GBC (@GBC_Press) July 17, 2026 4 A new trope in the US-backing commentary community is to depict the new Supreme Leader as a figurehead, which is easy to make stick given his lack of public appearances (I suspect that among other things, he is having facial reconstruction; that can take an extremely long time since procedures are done serially with healing time in between).

I believe it was on a recent Dialogue Works talk where Professor Marandi debunked one popular claim, that he IRGC was operating on its own authority. Professor Marandi described the governing structure and said the military (both the regular forces and the Guards) needed approval of the Supreme Leader for its operations.

Having said that, I have commented that Iran seems to have a Japanese-style decision-making structure, as in more bottoms-up than the West. That results in more time to make decisions but much more internal cohesion when they are reached, since those at lower levels would be able to voice concerns and make suggestions.

Upon reflection, this would make sense given that Iran adopted its “mosaic” structure of extreme decentralization so as to allow it to function well even when the leadership was killed or incommunicado, as we saw at the onset of the current conflict.

In the Japanese model, decisions are effectively made at the senior-middle level ranks, which does tend result in the board and CEO being ceremonial. But the top level can and does say no, or effectively does so by asking probing questions and sending the matter back down the chain for further study and perhaps some revision.

I have been involved in decisions in Japan where the board and CEO were highly engaged, and these were ones that were of critical strategic importance. 5 DropSite has a longer recap of Araghchi’s remarks: ⭕️ Iran FM Araghchi: Wars End Either Through Total Victory or Negotiations… Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi: 🔹 A war must be ended precisely at the point when you hold the upper hand on the battlefield.

Ending a war is possible either through total military victory or… pic.twitter.com/kHeYhShsXC — Drop Site (@DropSiteNews) July 20, 2026 IMHO his analysis is wrong-headed. As indicated above, a bit over half the modern wars do not end with a negotiated settlement.

And it is a false dichotomy to say that to win, Iran must conquer the US and Israel. FFS, please explain Vietnam. Bad logistics and depleting weapons mean that ex nukes, the US cannot win against Iran. The question is how long it takes and how much damage is done not just to Iran but also the world economy.

Keep in mind the intermediaries are still busy but motion is not progress: #Iran's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson has confirmed that Tehran has received "ideas and proposals" from mediators. He declined to provide any further details regarding the specifics of the mediation efforts.

pic.twitter.com/8Pzs25eauc — Iran Nuances (@IranNuances) July 20, 2026 6 A memorable scene in the Daniel Ellsberg memoir Secrets is when Ellsberg, widely seen as the top US expert on Vietnam, briefed McNamara in a helicopter about how badly things were going.

McNamara said, “Just as I suspected,” and then upon landing updated the press on the great progress the US was making. 7 It has taken me too long to see why Pape often acts as if he is speaking to children or the stoopid. Making this his normal manner of presentation means that when he actually is having to speak to someone who is being stoopid, they won’t take offense.

8 However, to quibble with Johnson on another matter: he has been saying, as he does in the talk linked in Footnote 2 above, that the Iran attacks on a former US base in Syria, Al Tanf, were pointless because the base had been vacated for years. Vanessa Beeley, who has spent a lot of time on the ground in Syria and still has contacts there, begs to differ.

She says the base was recently restored to service. From Why did Iran target the US Occupation base at Al Tanf, Syria? On Friday 17th July, Iran carried out an extensive attack on the US occupation base at Al Tanf in Syria. A drone and missile strike targeted a US Special Operations Command base in south-eastern Syria..

the first strike on Syrian territory since the toppling of the former government in December 2024. In a statement, the IRGC said its aerospace forces conducted what it described as the 11th phase of “Operation Nasr-2,” targeting the strategically located base near Syria’s borders with Iraq and Jordan.

The IRGC further claimed the attack destroyed a radar installation and several U.S. military helicopters, while alleging that many American personnel were killed. This strike occurred as the build up of both Turkish and HTS military forces increases inside Syria, along the border with Lebanon and in the coastal region to the north of Lebanon.

I have been reporting on this here and here. Syrian sources provided more detail on the attack: Despite previous reports of an almost total evacuation of the Al Tanf base, located on the borders of Syria, Iraq and Jordan, almost 5 months ago – the intensity of the strikes suggested a shift in the site’s operational status.

This was not an empty base, in fact, according to sources, the IRGC’s tracking systems and human intelligence in the region detected U.S. forces airdropping “Special Forces” units into the base approximately two weeks before the attack. Analysis would suggest that the purpose of these drops might be to prepare for a ground incursion across Iraqi territory (Sulaymaniyah Axis) in coordination with the local Kurdish separatist factions in Iraq.

One military analyst told me: The attack reflects the operator’s ability to breach the secrecy surrounding U.S. movements and to convert radio and visual data into precise target coordinates. According to reports from inside Syria, the strikes inflicted direct damage on the base’s newly constructed infrastructure, neutralised the US elite combat force and derailed the Iraq-Axis operation against Iran.

Of course, US media will not report on the planned operations or on the number of casualties – such a critical security breach and the significant scale of damage, as reported, will not be revealed. 9 Maybe mines?