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strikeMar 28, 2026

The Iran war has given Trump his best hand against China — now he shouldn’t fold

Summary

The Iran war has given Trump his best hand against China — now he shouldn’t fold President Donald Trump should say the quiet part out loud: China’s years of economic, technological and diplomatic support for Iran did not merely underwrite the regime’s malign activity. It accelerated it, financed it and made striking the Islamic Republic necessary to defend the interests of the United States and its partners around the world. President Trump should rally America’s allies in Europe and the Gulf Arab states behind this message leading up to trade talks with Xi Jinping next month in Beijing. He should make clear that, without China, the Iranian regime would have never been able to pay for waves of military strikes on Israel, target US bases in the region or shut down Gulf energy infrastructure. And he should go one step further. Trump should establish that every country negatively impacted by China’s role as the world’s largest sponsor of sanctions evasion is equally impacted by the Chinese Communist Party’s market-distorting trade practices. In this sense, the strikes on Iran have given Trump an opening to extract concessions from Beijing on a range of issues fundamental to the structure of the global economy. He should therefore leverage America’s economic advantages in energy, trade and finance to not only hold Beijing accountable for its support of the regime in Iran, but to cut at the heart of China’s economic model as well. Here’s how. First, Trump should further target Beijing’s appetite for sanctioned oil. For years, China has sustained its state-subsidized export machine partly on the back of deeply discounted sanctioned crude from Russia, Iran and Venezuela. These sanctioned barrels accounted for roughly a third of China’s crude imports in 2025, saving the country billions. Trump has already removed Venezuela as a source of illicit oil flows, but he can do more to target Russia and Iran. Even amid the strikes, Iranian ships are making their way to China. As for Russia, it supplies over 10% of China’s imported crude. Cutting off these flows would compete with other administration priorities, such as relieving supply shock pressures on oil consumers generated by the war in Iran, but they would effectively raise the cost base for China’s industrial sector and combat its destabilizing, nonmarket practices in a targeted fashion. All of this is compounded by China’s vulnerability to energy supply shocks. About half of China’s oil imports and nearly 30% of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) transit the Strait of Hormuz. Disruptions there hit China far harder than the United States, even with the buffer Beijing enjoys from years of building a strategic oil stockpile. That is why China’s foreign minister initially asked Iran to respect the “reasonable concerns” of its energy exporting neighbors in the Gulf while providing only muted criticism of the US and Israeli attacks. Beijing is now caught between two bad options: Intervene on Iran’s behalf and damage its relationships with the Gulf monarchies it depends on far more than it does on Tehran, or stand aside and watch Washington dismantle a partner in Tehran that Beijing spent years cultivating. The second area of vulnerability relates to trade. The Commerce Department has already imposed statutorily sound tariffs as high as 93% on Chinese goods sold below cost — like anode-grade graphite used in electric vehicle batteries — and could launch further investigations while pressing the World Trade Organization to hold Beijing accountable. Commerce has also concluded that Beijing’s state-directed tactics in the semiconductor and shipbuilding sectors constitute threats to US national security. Chip tariffs took effect in December 2025 and will escalate further in 2027. Meanwhile, suspended shipbuilding remedies are set to snap back this November. These deadlines — coupled with new trade investigations announced just weeks before the summit and dozens of trade agreements being negotiated to bolster partner country export controls and transshipment enforcement — should be seen for what they are: targeted, yet widespread and growing economic leverage aimed squarely at Beijing. Where China has tried to preempt US pressure, its strategy has backfired. Beijing implemented its strictest rare earth and permanent magnet export controls last year, including restrictions directly targeting foreign defense supply chains. It later suspended those controls, but the damage was done. China triggered the exact response it was trying to prevent — a wave of multilateral supply chain diversification, with billions flowing from partners in Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, the Gulf and elsewhere into strategic sectors of the US economy. The third vulnerability relates to U.S. dominance in financial flows. The Chinese Communist Party has long sought to distinguish between official government policy and the actions of private companies — but the line between the Chinese state and its commercial empire is far from an impenetrable legal shield. Trump should direct Treasury and State to prepare sanctions designation packages targeting the many Chinese financial institutions that process payments for sanctioned Iranian and Russian crude, the hundreds of Chinese firms operating in sanctioned sectors of those economies and the joint ventures engineered to create distance between sanctioned entities and Chinese state-owned enterprises. These targets should explicitly include China’s state-owned entities that purchase output from so-called “teapot refineries” processing sanctioned crude, as well as any Chinese financial conduits being used to pay the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for access through Iran’s territorial waters in the strait. Washington should signal to Beijing which firms could be targeted, what China stands to lose from being cut off financially and how the US has more targets ready if a deal cannot be reached. But Trump shouldn’t pull the sanctions trigger yet. Beijing is contending with one of the worst housing crises in modern history, collapsing household wealth and persistent deflationary pressure. Efforts to address any of these challenges — let alone all three — will be slow and necessarily weaken CCP control over key state resources. And all of that was true before the war on Iran compounded Beijing’s vulnerabilities. China simply cannot afford financial isolation from the West. It must negotiate. When Trump arrives in Beijing next month, he should push Xi for concrete concessions that this moment has made uniquely possible: a verifiable commitment to halt purchases of sanctioned Iranian and Russian crude; market access reforms that rein in Beijing’s overproduction and state subsidies; strict export controls on dual-use technology and precursor chemical flows to Iran and other US adversaries; and enforceable mechanisms to shut down Beijing’s broader role as a sanctions evasion hub. Washington has real leverage, but that leverage has a shelf life. A protracted conflict risks negatively impacting the petrochemical sector that provides feedstock for plastics, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and advanced manufacturing globally. The window to extract concessions from Beijing requires an urgent response from Washington — and it should not stand alone in making these demands of Beijing. The war should clarify something for European and Gulf partners that years of US pressure never achieved: China’s support for Iran is not an abstraction. It underwrote the regime that just destabilized their energy security, shipping lanes and regional order. That shared recognition should form the basis for a unified front — not just against Iran, but against the nonmarket practices Beijing has used for decades to hollow out allied industries and subsidize its export machine. It is time to hold Beijing accountable for keeping the Iranian regime afloat. The United States has a full arsenal of American economic statecraft to do just that. Elaine K. Dezenski is senior director and head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Max Meizlish is a research fellow. Follow them on X @ElaineDezenski and @maxmeizlish.

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  • Elaine K Dezenski; Max MeizlishBy Elaine K Dezenski; Max Meizlish

    The Iran war has given Trump his best hand against China — now he shouldn’t fold President Donald Trump should say the quiet part out loud: China’s years of economic, technological and diplomatic support for Iran did not merely underwrite the regime’s malign activity. It accelera

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The White House is now apparently using Russian tactics to convince the American public that the war in Iran is not, in fact, a war. When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday whether the most intense sustained air campaign by American forces since the invasion of Iraq would be over by the midterms, Vice President JD Vance replied: “I wouldn’t call it a war.

” Vladimir Putin said much the same thing when he invaded Ukraine. Russia was not fighting a war either, the Kremlin insisted; it was merely conducting a “special military operation.” If that comparison strikes you as shocking, consider the contours of the two conflicts.

A vastly more powerful military launched a punishing offensive against a smaller, less well-equipped adversary, inflicted enormous damage without achieving a decisive resolution, and then found itself drawn into a longer, grinding conflict with no clear way out.

The motivations behind the wars may be different, and they’re playing out in different theaters, but the pattern is eerily similar. Now, so too is the attempt by those in power to control how the public understands, and even what it is allowed to call, the obvious war unfolding in front of them.

If This Isn’t a War, What Is? Let us take a moment to assess what exactly has happened since February 28, when the U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury. The opening U.S.-Israeli attack killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the defense minister and various other senior officials.

According to the U.S. military’s own accounting, the first 38 days of major combat operations involved more than 10,200 sorties and 13,500 strikes. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) says those attacks damaged or destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone and naval defense industrial base, while knocking out 82 percent of its air-defense missile systems.

The U.S. sent carrier strike groups and warships into the region, later imposing a military blockade on Iranian ports. Meanwhile, American and allied air defenses intercepted more than 6,000 Iranian attack drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles fired at U.

S. forces, Israel and American partners across the Middle East. More than 50,000 U.S. service members remain deployed across the region. The fighting has killed 18 U.S. service members and at least 8,000 people across Iran, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states.

More than 750 U.S. service members have been wounded. Last month, during a lull in the fighting, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a sanctions package likened to an “economic D-day” that is designed to make Iran an “economic outcast” and cut the adversary off from all available forms of economic support.

In the announcement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent openly declared that Iran had been “at war against America” for 47 years. This week, the shooting resumed; the U.S. hit targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran blasted missiles at targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq.

All this from an administration that almost exactly a year ago launched a rapid rebrand of the Defense Department into the “Department of War”. No boots on the ground, though, so it’s not a war, right? Tell It Kind of Like It Is Even the very best snake-oil salesman would have a hard time convincing people that the war in Iran isn’t a war.

So why is JD Vance even trying? Well, if there’s one thing politicians understand better than anyone, it’s the importance of language and rhetoric. Words have immense power; a well-written speech can unite millions of people, and a catchy slogan like Make America Great Again can come to represent an entire political philosophy.

But war is a pesky word. For one, it implies there will eventually be a winner and a loser. It also brings with it certain expectations—and some very difficult questions. What is the objective? How many people will die? When will it end? And, perhaps most dangerously of all: was it worth it?

Those are not questions the White House wants Americans to be asking. Trump built a substantial part of his political identity around ending, rather than beginning, America’s “endless wars.” When Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in June, the White House presented it as proof that Trump’s America First approach could deliver peace without another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Then the hostilities started again. Earlier this week, Trump shared a Truth Social graphic declaring that “Hormuz Oil Volumes are BACK!”, saying 18 million barrels a day were once again leaving the Strait, compared with 20 million before the war. No independent commodity tracking company or energy analyst appeared to verify Trump’s claims.

But most Americans won’t be checking tanker-tracking dashboards. What they’ll care about is the cold, hard fact that diesel hit a new record price this morning, soaring to an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever. Gasoline is $4.15 a gallon on average, compared with $3.

20 at this time last year, according to AAA. The numbers on the sign at the gas station and the price on the grocery receipt aren’t affected by Trump’s tall tales, but they’ll surely affect how Americans vote at the midterms. When viewed in this light, Vance’s attempt to discourage reporters from “call[ing] it a war” begins to make sense.

A war is something that we want to end. It tends to result in a winner and a loser. And its worth is up for debate at all times. A different kind of engagement that doesn’t quite meet the threshold of war—say, a special military operation—is not exposed to the same kind of scrutiny.

Vance effectively made that case himself. “When you ask, ‘When will this end?’ You’re asking me a question like, ‘When will the Iranians stop shooting at ships?’” he said. By that logic, there is no American war—only recurring Iranian provocations that require American military responses.

That’s exactly the logic applied by Putin to Ukraine and supposed expansion of NATO. Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly invoked the War Powers Resolution to challenge Trump’s authority to keep fighting Iran without specific congressional authorization.

The law generally gives a president 60 days after U.S. forces enter “hostilities” to secure congressional approval or bring those hostilities to an end. That makes the pauses in fighting hugely important. When the original 60-day deadline arrived in May, Trump told Congress that the temporary ceasefire reached in April meant the hostilities that began on February 28 had ended.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the War Powers clock could “pause, or stop” when the shooting did. That position is disputed by legal experts, but its political utility is obvious. If every new outbreak of fighting can be treated as a separate skirmish, rather than part of one continuous war, the administration can argue that a fresh 60-day clock starts each time.

Vance’s insistence that there is no continuing “war” fits neatly for an administration that has already tried to divide six months of conflict into separate periods of hostilities, interrupted by ceasefires and pauses. This brings us back to Moscow.

The Kremlin’s own linguistic trick was also about making one sprawling war sound smaller, more limited and more manageable than it really was. From the very beginning of the invasion, Putin described the war as a special military operation. Only after two years of grinding warfare did Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly declare Russia to be in a “state of war”—and even then, he said the transformation had occurred because the “collective West” had joined the fight against Russia.

Vance is playing a similar game, but in reverse. Only now—with soaring fuel prices, mounting casualties, concerns over the military’s munitions stockpiles, and midterm elections on the horizon—is the conflict no longer a war. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, though, and the American people aren’t stupid.

Vance and the White House may discover in November that voters are perfectly capable of recognizing a war, even when the vice president doesn’t want to call it one.

Location: Iran