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strikeApr 11, 2026

The Islamabad opening: Translating the ceasefire into a process

Summary

Islamabad is ready to host something that, until recently, seemed almost unthinkable: direct, high-level talks between the United States and Iran. The city is under tight security, senior delegations from both sides have arrived, and regional representatives are also in town as Pakistan hosts what is being described as the highest-level US-Iran engagement since 1979. Regional partners have already signalled support for Pakistan’s diplomatic role, and that matters. This is not a meeting that emerged out of nowhere. It is the visible culmination of a broader process in which Islamabad steadily positioned itself as a venue, a facilitator, and, above all, a state willing to create diplomatic space when the region was sliding toward wider war. That wider process deserves more attention than the talks alone. Pakistan did not suddenly discover diplomacy after the ceasefire. It had already been working on multiple tracks: bilateral outreach, quiet message-passing, a regional consultation process, and coordination with major partners such as China. Islamabad hosted a quadrilateral foreign ministers’ meeting with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Egypt in late March, where the emphasis was squarely on dialogue, restraint, and structured negotiations. Shortly afterwards, Pakistan and China jointly put forward a five-point initiative calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities, urgent diplomatic engagement, protection of sovereignty, and the restoration of normal maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Read together, these moves show that Pakistan’s role has not been episodic. It has been cumulative. This is why today’s talks should be seen not as a diplomatic surprise, but as the product of sustained groundwork. Reporting from Islamabad suggests Pakistan had been trying for months to keep channels open between Tehran and Washington. Even before the February 28 aggression against Iran, Islamabad was exploring openings, carrying proposals, and attempting to slow the rush toward war. After the strikes, those efforts became even more urgent. Pakistan maintained its own parallel track while other mediation channels were active, seeking to prevent events from outrunning diplomacy altogether. In my view, substantial groundwork has already been laid through backchannel diplomacy. If there were no real prospects of progress, it is hard to believe Washington and Tehran would have come all the way to Islamabad at this level. READ: US Vice President Vance heads to Pakistan for Iran peace talks To understand why Pakistan has invested so heavily in this process, one must begin with geography and strategic reality. Iran is not a distant theatre for Pakistan; it is a close neighbour. The Gulf states, meanwhile, are not peripheral actors but close economic, political, and security partners. Pakistan therefore experiences this crisis from both sides of the regional equation. It cannot afford a rupture with Iran, nor can it ignore the security and economic centrality of the Gulf. That dual reality explains why Islamabad has approached the conflict with such caution and such urgency. It is not mediating from the comfort of distance. It is acting from within the fallout zone. That balancing act also explains why Pakistan was a logical host. First, Pakistan is uniquely positioned to understand and translate each stakeholder’s red lines. It has credible access to Tehran, longstanding ties with Gulf capitals, and working channels with Washington. Second, Pakistan is not merely a recipient of Gulf support; it is also a provider of strategic value. Its geography, security profile, and convening ability give it relevance beyond economics. Third, Pakistan’s own experience with India lends credibility to its warnings about escalation. Islamabad understands crisis signalling, deterrence, limited-war logic, and the danger of assuming escalation can always be controlled. That allows Pakistan to speak with authority on the need for off-ramps before rhetoric hardens into strategic entrapment. The February 28 attacks changed the strategic environment dramatically. Since then, the region has lived under the shadow of a broader confrontation involving Iran, Israel, Gulf states, and the maritime chokepoints that affect the global economy. Shipping disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz, missile and drone exchanges across multiple fronts, and fears of further regional spillover all pushed the costs of continued escalation sharply upward. Pakistan’s diplomacy has reflected a clear judgment: force alone could not stabilise this crisis; only a political process could. That is the larger context in which Islamabad’s current role should be read. At the same time, none of this means the diplomatic opening is secure. In fact, the fragility of the process has already been exposed. Barely a day into the ceasefire announcement, Israeli attacks on Lebanon threatened to derail everything. The problem was not simply renewed violence. It was also the ambiguity around whether Lebanon was included in the ceasefire understanding. Pakistan and Iran treated Lebanon as part of the de-escalatory framework; Israel said it was not included. That kind of ambiguity is dangerous, because ceasefires often collapse not only from deliberate violation but from incompatible understandings of what was agreed in the first place. This is precisely why I would not read too much into the public rhetoric. The tone remains hardline. The statements remain maximalist. But that is often the nature of diplomacy at moments like this. Public language is crafted for domestic audiences, alliance management, and negotiating leverage. The more important signal is the one conveyed by action: both sides are here, at this level, in Islamabad. That suggests seriousness beneath the posturing. The very fact that these talks are taking place under such intense diplomatic and security management points to the existence of real stakes and at least some shared recognition that the alternative is far worse. READ: Pakistan defence minister calls Israel ‘a curse for humanity’ There is another factor that should not be overlooked. Netanyahu’s corruption trial is set to resume on 12th April following the end of Israel’s emergency suspension of normal court activity. It would be simplistic to reduce regional escalation to one man’s legal troubles, but it would also be naive to ignore the political incentives that operate in moments like these. In the past, critics have repeatedly argued that external confrontation has helped divert attention from Netanyahu’s domestic pressures. At the very least, the timing adds another layer of uncertainty to an already brittle regional environment. Still, diplomacy rarely begins in conditions of trust. It begins when the cost of refusing diplomacy becomes too high. That appears to be the point the region has reached. The economic consequences have already been felt. The military risks remain obvious. The diplomatic channels, fragile as they are, now offer the only serious route away from a deeper and more uncontrollable crisis. Pakistan’s contribution has been to keep that route open when many assumed it had already closed. That is why this moment matters. Islamabad is not merely hosting talks. It is hosting the diplomatic outcome of weeks and months of layered engagement: regional consultations, China-backed initiatives, quiet mediation, and a sustained effort to translate a ceasefire into a process. Pakistan’s role has not been to grandstand. It has been to create conditions in which diplomacy, however uncertain, remains possible. If there were no real prospects of movement, the United States and Iran would not have come to Islamabad in this way, at this level, and under these conditions. That alone tells us that something significant is being tested here. Whether it results in a durable understanding or only a temporary pause remains to be seen. But one point is already clear: Pakistan has shown that it can do more than comment from the sidelines. It can shape the diplomatic stage itself. All eyes are on Islamabad. READ: Trump announces 2-week ceasefire with Iran The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

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The White House is now apparently using Russian tactics to convince the American public that the war in Iran is not, in fact, a war. When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday whether the most intense sustained air campaign by American forces since the invasion of Iraq would be over by the midterms, Vice President JD Vance replied: “I wouldn’t call it a war.

” Vladimir Putin said much the same thing when he invaded Ukraine. Russia was not fighting a war either, the Kremlin insisted; it was merely conducting a “special military operation.” If that comparison strikes you as shocking, consider the contours of the two conflicts.

A vastly more powerful military launched a punishing offensive against a smaller, less well-equipped adversary, inflicted enormous damage without achieving a decisive resolution, and then found itself drawn into a longer, grinding conflict with no clear way out.

The motivations behind the wars may be different, and they’re playing out in different theaters, but the pattern is eerily similar. Now, so too is the attempt by those in power to control how the public understands, and even what it is allowed to call, the obvious war unfolding in front of them.

If This Isn’t a War, What Is? Let us take a moment to assess what exactly has happened since February 28, when the U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury. The opening U.S.-Israeli attack killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the defense minister and various other senior officials.

According to the U.S. military’s own accounting, the first 38 days of major combat operations involved more than 10,200 sorties and 13,500 strikes. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) says those attacks damaged or destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone and naval defense industrial base, while knocking out 82 percent of its air-defense missile systems.

The U.S. sent carrier strike groups and warships into the region, later imposing a military blockade on Iranian ports. Meanwhile, American and allied air defenses intercepted more than 6,000 Iranian attack drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles fired at U.

S. forces, Israel and American partners across the Middle East. More than 50,000 U.S. service members remain deployed across the region. The fighting has killed 18 U.S. service members and at least 8,000 people across Iran, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states.

More than 750 U.S. service members have been wounded. Last month, during a lull in the fighting, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a sanctions package likened to an “economic D-day” that is designed to make Iran an “economic outcast” and cut the adversary off from all available forms of economic support.

In the announcement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent openly declared that Iran had been “at war against America” for 47 years. This week, the shooting resumed; the U.S. hit targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran blasted missiles at targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq.

All this from an administration that almost exactly a year ago launched a rapid rebrand of the Defense Department into the “Department of War”. No boots on the ground, though, so it’s not a war, right? Tell It Kind of Like It Is Even the very best snake-oil salesman would have a hard time convincing people that the war in Iran isn’t a war.

So why is JD Vance even trying? Well, if there’s one thing politicians understand better than anyone, it’s the importance of language and rhetoric. Words have immense power; a well-written speech can unite millions of people, and a catchy slogan like Make America Great Again can come to represent an entire political philosophy.

But war is a pesky word. For one, it implies there will eventually be a winner and a loser. It also brings with it certain expectations—and some very difficult questions. What is the objective? How many people will die? When will it end? And, perhaps most dangerously of all: was it worth it?

Those are not questions the White House wants Americans to be asking. Trump built a substantial part of his political identity around ending, rather than beginning, America’s “endless wars.” When Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in June, the White House presented it as proof that Trump’s America First approach could deliver peace without another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Then the hostilities started again. Earlier this week, Trump shared a Truth Social graphic declaring that “Hormuz Oil Volumes are BACK!”, saying 18 million barrels a day were once again leaving the Strait, compared with 20 million before the war. No independent commodity tracking company or energy analyst appeared to verify Trump’s claims.

But most Americans won’t be checking tanker-tracking dashboards. What they’ll care about is the cold, hard fact that diesel hit a new record price this morning, soaring to an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever. Gasoline is $4.15 a gallon on average, compared with $3.

20 at this time last year, according to AAA. The numbers on the sign at the gas station and the price on the grocery receipt aren’t affected by Trump’s tall tales, but they’ll surely affect how Americans vote at the midterms. When viewed in this light, Vance’s attempt to discourage reporters from “call[ing] it a war” begins to make sense.

A war is something that we want to end. It tends to result in a winner and a loser. And its worth is up for debate at all times. A different kind of engagement that doesn’t quite meet the threshold of war—say, a special military operation—is not exposed to the same kind of scrutiny.

Vance effectively made that case himself. “When you ask, ‘When will this end?’ You’re asking me a question like, ‘When will the Iranians stop shooting at ships?’” he said. By that logic, there is no American war—only recurring Iranian provocations that require American military responses.

That’s exactly the logic applied by Putin to Ukraine and supposed expansion of NATO. Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly invoked the War Powers Resolution to challenge Trump’s authority to keep fighting Iran without specific congressional authorization.

The law generally gives a president 60 days after U.S. forces enter “hostilities” to secure congressional approval or bring those hostilities to an end. That makes the pauses in fighting hugely important. When the original 60-day deadline arrived in May, Trump told Congress that the temporary ceasefire reached in April meant the hostilities that began on February 28 had ended.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the War Powers clock could “pause, or stop” when the shooting did. That position is disputed by legal experts, but its political utility is obvious. If every new outbreak of fighting can be treated as a separate skirmish, rather than part of one continuous war, the administration can argue that a fresh 60-day clock starts each time.

Vance’s insistence that there is no continuing “war” fits neatly for an administration that has already tried to divide six months of conflict into separate periods of hostilities, interrupted by ceasefires and pauses. This brings us back to Moscow.

The Kremlin’s own linguistic trick was also about making one sprawling war sound smaller, more limited and more manageable than it really was. From the very beginning of the invasion, Putin described the war as a special military operation. Only after two years of grinding warfare did Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly declare Russia to be in a “state of war”—and even then, he said the transformation had occurred because the “collective West” had joined the fight against Russia.

Vance is playing a similar game, but in reverse. Only now—with soaring fuel prices, mounting casualties, concerns over the military’s munitions stockpiles, and midterm elections on the horizon—is the conflict no longer a war. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, though, and the American people aren’t stupid.

Vance and the White House may discover in November that voters are perfectly capable of recognizing a war, even when the vice president doesn’t want to call it one.

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