Summary

Are The 2026 Primaries Building A New Antiwar Movement? – OpEd Key Takeaways: - Abdul El-Sayed’s narrow win in Michigan’s Democratic Senate primary showed that combining opposition to the Iran war, U.S. military aid to Israel, and AIPAC influence can succeed electorally—even against $30 million in opposing spending—by framing foreign policy as a choice between war spending and domestic needs. - Similar primary victories in New York and campaigning in Florida indicate a growing Democratic trend where criticism of Israel and antiwar positions are no longer automatically disqualifying, backed by polls showing majorities view the Iran intervention as a costly mistake. - While these wins signal antiwar politics moving from protests to the ballot, building lasting congressional power will require broader coalitions and using budget tools to constrain war funding, testing whether such candidates can make endless conflict politically expensive. For years, “Free Palestine” and “No War on Iran” belonged mainly to marches, campus rallies, and the margins of congressional debate. In 2026, those slogans are beginning to acquire something Washington respects more readily: electoral consequences. The clearest evidence comes from Michigan. Abdul El-Sayed, a physician and former county health director, narrowly defeated Rep. Haley Stevens for the Democratic Senate nomination. He did so after making three arguments part of a single case: the United States should not continue its war with Iran, should stop supplying military aid that enables Israel’s conduct in Gaza, and should reject the power of the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and other big-money groups to police the boundaries of Democratic foreign policy. That combination matters. Antiwar politics often fails when it sounds abstract, as if it were a lecture about restraint detached from people’s daily lives. El-Sayed spoke instead about where public money goes. At Michigan State University, he attacked the Iran war, opposed U.S. military and financial aid to Israel, and argued that special interests should not be able to buy political obedience. His point was not simply about the immorality of a specific foreign policy. It was that money spent on war is money not spent on health care, schools, roads, and communities at home. AIPAC and allied interests reportedly spent more than $30 million to defeat him. Yet El-Sayed won. The contest was described as a referendum on Israel among Democratic voters. That description is fair, but the result may be broader still: Michigan voters proved that criticism of Israel, opposition to war with Iran, and resistance to donor power could survive together in a statewide battleground. The public mood made that opening possible. Pew found that roughly six in 10 Americans believe that the United States made the wrong decision in using force against Iran. A June Quinnipiac poll likewise found that 60 percent of registered voters thought the military action was not worth it, while 48 percent said Washington was too supportive of Israel, the highest share Quinnipiac had recorded on that question. Among Democrats, the figure was 66 percent. “No War on Iran” is no longer merely protest language when majorities see intervention as a costly mistake. Nor is Michigan an isolated case. In New York, Mayor Zohran Mamdani backed Claire Valdez, Brad Lander, and Darializa Avila Chevalier, and all three won their Democratic congressional primaries. Their campaigns differed, but each occupied political terrain once treated as disqualifying: Palestinian rights, opposition to blank-check support for Israel, and a domestic agenda summarized by the demand to invest in people rather than bombs. The victories dealt a visible blow to the idea that pro-Israel orthodoxy is the only electorally safe position in Democratic politics. Now that argument is moving south. Ahead of Florida’s August 18 primary, Rep. Rashida Tlaib planned to campaign for Senate candidate Angie Nixon and House candidates Elijah Manley and Oliver Larkin. Although the Democratic Party responded to political complaints by canceling the original Fort Lauderdale venue for the rally, organizers relocated it. The episode revealed both sides of the new politics: an emerging network willing to nationalize antiwar candidacies, and an establishment still eager to stigmatize criticism of Israeli policy rather than debate it. An electoral current, however, is not yet a governing coalition. If El-Sayed wins in November, his most important test will not be whether he can deliver another sharp speech. It will be whether he can assemble votes in Congress. A serious antiwar bloc would need to link progressives who oppose the Gaza war with constitutionalists worried about presidential overreach, budget hawks alarmed by open-ended commitments, and lawmakers whose constituents are tired of paying the human and economic costs of escalation. The available tools are real. In Congress, lawmakers can demand an endgame, condition or refuse supplemental funding, restrict the use of appropriations, and insist that any continued hostilities receive explicit authorization. The War Powers Resolution has often proved too weak by itself; the budget is where Congress can make refusal consequential. The strategic case for using that leverage is equally strong, especially since the Iran War has resulted so far in a costly deadlock. Washington could inflict damage without compelling capitulation, while Tehran could preserve the state without securing peace or prosperity. That is the familiar trap of American intervention in which tactical destruction is mistaken for political success followed by new spending to manage the dangers that the intervention helped create. The line from “Free Palestine” to “No War on Iran” is therefore not rhetorical decoration. It identifies a common structure: unconditional support for Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, executive freedom to widen war, and a campaign-finance system that punishes dissent are mutually reinforcing. Challenging only one part leaves the others intact. El-Sayed’s victory does not prove that a durable antiwar majority exists. His November race against Republican Mike Rogers will be close, and foreign policy rarely displaces the cost of living at the top of voters’ concerns. But Michigan has already changed the burden of proof. The question is no longer whether an antiwar candidate can survive a massive spending assault. It is whether enough such candidates can enter Congress to make war politically expensive. If they can, 2026 may be remembered as the year antiwar politics moved from the street to the ballot—and from moral witness to congressional power. - This article was published at FPIF Like what you read? Please consider supporting Eurasia Review. Thank you for your consideration!