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strikeApr 15, 2026

Iran-Israel ceasefire: Why America’s amateur diplomats are set up to fail

Summary

The first reason is that the US in the second term of Donald Trump relies not on professional diplomats and experts but on amateurs who may have the trust of the president but are otherwise out of their depth. The second is that Trump, as strategist-in-chief, keeps giving his negotiators objectives so implausible, confused or contradictory that even the wiliest diplomats in history — a Klemens von Metternich in the 19th century, say, or a Henry Kissinger in the 20th — would come up empty. In some cases, he even seems intent on setting up specific underlings to fail. That would explain why he suddenly put his vice president, JD Vance, in charge of the talks with Iran. Also Read| Trump says Iran talks may resume 'over the next two days' in Pakistan The amateurism is a problem all by itself, and is part of Trump’s full-bore assault against professionalism across government. From the start of his second term, those officials who would in a normal administration play leading roles in diplomacy have been relegated to bit parts, while the president’s friends and family members have taken the leads. Marco Rubio, who was not in Islamabad, is a notable example. He’s the secretary of state as well as the national security adviser (only Kissinger has ever combined both functions simultaneously). But while Rubio has displayed impressive talents of political survival and has the president’s ear on matters such as Venezuela and Cuba, he has been on the sidelines in dealing with the three big conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza and Iran. On those, the unofficial title of top diplomat instead belongs to “special envoy” Steve Witkoff. He’s a real-estate tycoon from New York who has been friends with Trump for decades (he was golfing with the president during the second assassination attempt) but had no experience or credentials in diplomacy before the second Trump administration. It shows. For example, Witkoff spent much of last year shuttling to Moscow to speak to his Russian contacts and President Vladimir Putin, while somehow neglecting ever to visit Kyiv. When in Russia, he generally sidestepped the US embassy and its experts, at times not even using American translators, and relied on the Kremlin’s interpretation instead. He became notorious for an interview with Tucker Carlson in which he regurgitated Putin’s talking points and propaganda almost word for word and didn’t seem to understand that Russia was the aggressor and Ukraine the victim. The president has paired Witkoff with Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner. He had helped broker the Abraham Accords in Trump’s first term but had been planning during the second to focus on his vast investment funds (with much of the money coming from the Middle East). Trump had different ideas, and Kushner and Witkoff have been hopscotching between negotiations on Ukraine, Gaza and Iran. Also Read| After unsuccessful US-Iran talks, what next for Trump? They were still engaged in talks with Tehran’s envoys last June, when Trump abruptly started bombing, and again in February, when he launched the war. At various points, Witkoff and Kushner didn’t seem to understand what the Iranian side was offering to them, because they lacked expertise on the arcana of nuclear physics and the like. They’ve been more successful in Gaza, where they secured a tenuous ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. But then they overhyped that baby step as the beginning of a renaissance for Gaza and the region, as though they were selling a glitzy real-estate project. Somehow, the Board of Peace that was supposed to manage the rebuilding of Gaza and point toward a long-term solution — albeit without including any Palestinians — has become distracted with other matters, not least the aggrandizement of Trump. Veterans of traditional diplomacy such as Aaron David Miller and Daniel Kurtzer give Witkoff and Kushner an F and consider the administration’s diplomatic process a “hot mess.” Only so much blame can be assigned to those tasked to execute strategy, however. The bigger question has to be whether that strategy is realistic and coherent. It is not, and that is the president’s fault. How could anybody, even a modern-day Metternich, negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine, when the American commander-in-chief keeps applying more pressure on the invaded country and less, if any, on the invader? And what could even a Kissinger, say, do in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict when Trump keeps deferring to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, instead of reining in Israeli settler violence in the West Bank and the like? In launching his “military operation” against Iran (ominously echoing Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine), Trump appears to have been unduly swayed by Netanyahu, while ignoring whatever timid objections his own advisers expressed. The most explicit objector was Vance, who has been consistently opposed to foreign adventurism, and to this Iran war in particular. If it turns into disaster (and it’s well on the way), Vance could look prescient. That doesn’t sit well with the boss. And so Witkoff and Kushner were dispatched to Islamabad as part of a delegation that was now led by the vice president. Holed up for 21 exhausting hours with their Iranian counterparts, the American amateur trio had to hold multiple opposed ideas in their minds at the same time while retaining the ability to function. They had to hew to Trump’s line that the US was already victorious, even as the Iranians clearly believe that they are now stronger than they had been before Feb. 28. They had to haggle about suspensions on Iran’s nuclear program — 20 years, or perhaps only five? — while avoiding any impression that they were negotiating anything resembling the Obama-era agreement that Trump derided and unilaterally quit in his first term. At a luncheon before the talks, Trump had made a joke to an audience that included Vance. He wants a deal, the president said, but “if it doesn’t happen, I’m blaming JD Vance. If it does happen, I’m taking full credit.” Trump may be a masterful tactician in the game of me-first-politics. But he’s a woeful strategist in the immeasurably greater game of America First geopolitics. (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel) (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel) Explore More Stories

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  • SECTIONS Iran-Israel ceasefire Why America’s amateur diplomats are set up; BloombergBy SECTIONS Iran-Israel ceasefire Why America’s amateur diplomats are set up; Bloomberg

    The first reason is that the US in the second term of Donald Trump relies not on professional diplomats and experts but on amateurs who may have the trust of the president but are otherwise out of their depth. The second is that Trump, as strategist-in-chief, keeps giving his neg

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The White House is now apparently using Russian tactics to convince the American public that the war in Iran is not, in fact, a war. When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday whether the most intense sustained air campaign by American forces since the invasion of Iraq would be over by the midterms, Vice President JD Vance replied: “I wouldn’t call it a war.

” Vladimir Putin said much the same thing when he invaded Ukraine. Russia was not fighting a war either, the Kremlin insisted; it was merely conducting a “special military operation.” If that comparison strikes you as shocking, consider the contours of the two conflicts.

A vastly more powerful military launched a punishing offensive against a smaller, less well-equipped adversary, inflicted enormous damage without achieving a decisive resolution, and then found itself drawn into a longer, grinding conflict with no clear way out.

The motivations behind the wars may be different, and they’re playing out in different theaters, but the pattern is eerily similar. Now, so too is the attempt by those in power to control how the public understands, and even what it is allowed to call, the obvious war unfolding in front of them.

If This Isn’t a War, What Is? Let us take a moment to assess what exactly has happened since February 28, when the U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury. The opening U.S.-Israeli attack killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the defense minister and various other senior officials.

According to the U.S. military’s own accounting, the first 38 days of major combat operations involved more than 10,200 sorties and 13,500 strikes. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) says those attacks damaged or destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone and naval defense industrial base, while knocking out 82 percent of its air-defense missile systems.

The U.S. sent carrier strike groups and warships into the region, later imposing a military blockade on Iranian ports. Meanwhile, American and allied air defenses intercepted more than 6,000 Iranian attack drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles fired at U.

S. forces, Israel and American partners across the Middle East. More than 50,000 U.S. service members remain deployed across the region. The fighting has killed 18 U.S. service members and at least 8,000 people across Iran, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states.

More than 750 U.S. service members have been wounded. Last month, during a lull in the fighting, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a sanctions package likened to an “economic D-day” that is designed to make Iran an “economic outcast” and cut the adversary off from all available forms of economic support.

In the announcement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent openly declared that Iran had been “at war against America” for 47 years. This week, the shooting resumed; the U.S. hit targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran blasted missiles at targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq.

All this from an administration that almost exactly a year ago launched a rapid rebrand of the Defense Department into the “Department of War”. No boots on the ground, though, so it’s not a war, right? Tell It Kind of Like It Is Even the very best snake-oil salesman would have a hard time convincing people that the war in Iran isn’t a war.

So why is JD Vance even trying? Well, if there’s one thing politicians understand better than anyone, it’s the importance of language and rhetoric. Words have immense power; a well-written speech can unite millions of people, and a catchy slogan like Make America Great Again can come to represent an entire political philosophy.

But war is a pesky word. For one, it implies there will eventually be a winner and a loser. It also brings with it certain expectations—and some very difficult questions. What is the objective? How many people will die? When will it end? And, perhaps most dangerously of all: was it worth it?

Those are not questions the White House wants Americans to be asking. Trump built a substantial part of his political identity around ending, rather than beginning, America’s “endless wars.” When Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in June, the White House presented it as proof that Trump’s America First approach could deliver peace without another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Then the hostilities started again. Earlier this week, Trump shared a Truth Social graphic declaring that “Hormuz Oil Volumes are BACK!”, saying 18 million barrels a day were once again leaving the Strait, compared with 20 million before the war. No independent commodity tracking company or energy analyst appeared to verify Trump’s claims.

But most Americans won’t be checking tanker-tracking dashboards. What they’ll care about is the cold, hard fact that diesel hit a new record price this morning, soaring to an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever. Gasoline is $4.15 a gallon on average, compared with $3.

20 at this time last year, according to AAA. The numbers on the sign at the gas station and the price on the grocery receipt aren’t affected by Trump’s tall tales, but they’ll surely affect how Americans vote at the midterms. When viewed in this light, Vance’s attempt to discourage reporters from “call[ing] it a war” begins to make sense.

A war is something that we want to end. It tends to result in a winner and a loser. And its worth is up for debate at all times. A different kind of engagement that doesn’t quite meet the threshold of war—say, a special military operation—is not exposed to the same kind of scrutiny.

Vance effectively made that case himself. “When you ask, ‘When will this end?’ You’re asking me a question like, ‘When will the Iranians stop shooting at ships?’” he said. By that logic, there is no American war—only recurring Iranian provocations that require American military responses.

That’s exactly the logic applied by Putin to Ukraine and supposed expansion of NATO. Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly invoked the War Powers Resolution to challenge Trump’s authority to keep fighting Iran without specific congressional authorization.

The law generally gives a president 60 days after U.S. forces enter “hostilities” to secure congressional approval or bring those hostilities to an end. That makes the pauses in fighting hugely important. When the original 60-day deadline arrived in May, Trump told Congress that the temporary ceasefire reached in April meant the hostilities that began on February 28 had ended.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the War Powers clock could “pause, or stop” when the shooting did. That position is disputed by legal experts, but its political utility is obvious. If every new outbreak of fighting can be treated as a separate skirmish, rather than part of one continuous war, the administration can argue that a fresh 60-day clock starts each time.

Vance’s insistence that there is no continuing “war” fits neatly for an administration that has already tried to divide six months of conflict into separate periods of hostilities, interrupted by ceasefires and pauses. This brings us back to Moscow.

The Kremlin’s own linguistic trick was also about making one sprawling war sound smaller, more limited and more manageable than it really was. From the very beginning of the invasion, Putin described the war as a special military operation. Only after two years of grinding warfare did Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly declare Russia to be in a “state of war”—and even then, he said the transformation had occurred because the “collective West” had joined the fight against Russia.

Vance is playing a similar game, but in reverse. Only now—with soaring fuel prices, mounting casualties, concerns over the military’s munitions stockpiles, and midterm elections on the horizon—is the conflict no longer a war. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, though, and the American people aren’t stupid.

Vance and the White House may discover in November that voters are perfectly capable of recognizing a war, even when the vice president doesn’t want to call it one.

Location: Iran