Summary

Last month, I discussed how the use of drones and artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping the wars in Ukraine and Iran. While no two conflicts unfold in exactly the same manner, South Korea’s ability to integrate drone technologies into its military capabilities is becoming an essential component of maintaining deterrence against North Korea. In the current conflicts, Russia and Iran have turned to drones as both a replacement for and complement to ballistic missiles, using them to strike not only military targets but also civilian infrastructure. In Ukraine, both Russia and Ukraine have entered a period of rapid innovation in drone capabilities as the technology has become central to the conflict. The use of drones as an offensive tool has increased in both Ukraine and Iran for reasons of efficiency. Drones are significantly cheaper than traditional ballistic missiles. Russia’s Iskander‑M short‑range ballistic missile — similar to the KN‑23 that North Korea has provided to Moscow — costs between $2 million and $3 million to produce. Older legacy systems such as the Soviet‑era Tochka‑U are less expensive but still cost roughly $300,000 per missile. By contrast, drones can be produced with inexpensive, off‑the‑shelf commercial components. Estimates suggest that Iran’s Shahed‑136 “kamikaze” drone costs between $30,000 and $50,000 to manufacture. Russia initially imported Shahed‑136 drones from Iran early in the Ukraine war but has since begun domestic production and adapted the technology as Ukrainian defenses evolved. Russia’s version remains in a similar cost range, making it a highly cost‑effective battlefield tool. The potential role of drones in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula is not theoretical. North Korean troops who participated in the conflict in Ukraine now have real‑world combat experience using drones. Russia is believed to have shared guidance, control, navigation and airframe technology with North Korea for Shahed‑style drones, strengthening Pyongyang’s ability to produce effective systems domestically. Reports also suggest that North Korean workers may be in Russia gaining firsthand experience constructing drones. Even before the Ukraine war, North Korea maintained its own domestic drone development program. In addition to Shahed‑style systems, Pyongyang is experimenting with AI‑enabled kamikaze drones designed to resist electronic jamming. Adapting to drone warfare is essential for South Korea, yet it currently lacks both interceptor and attack drones. While traditional missile defenses can intercept attack drones, the cost exchange is unfavorable. A U.S. Patriot interceptor costs around $3 million, while South Korea’s equivalent Cheongung‑II interceptors are estimated at $1.5 million. Drones, by comparison, are far cheaper and faster to produce. To address this capability gap, the South Korean military has fast‑tracked an 18 billion won ($11.9 million) program to develop interceptor drones. It is unclear, however, whether this is the most effective approach. Ukraine has developed the most advanced and innovative drone interception systems under real battlefield conditions. Ukrainian interceptor drones generally cost between $1,000 and $2,500 to produce, with some higher‑end models reaching $15,000. It seems unlikely that South Korea will be able to develop a comparable system at a lower cost. Rather than developing an indigenous interceptor drone from scratch, South Korea should consider a different approach: partnering with the most innovative Ukrainian drone producers and licensing their technology to launch its own interceptor drone program. South Korea needs an initial stockpile of interceptor drones to respond to the early stages of a conflict, but it will also need the ability to adapt quickly as North Korean drone capabilities evolve. One lesson from the Russia-Ukraine conflict is that in any prolonged confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul should expect offensive drone capabilities to evolve rapidly. This requires a more flexible approach to drone production than traditional defense procurement allows. It also necessitates building a domestic production culture that supports rapid technological iteration. Such a partnership would create a hybrid model for developing and acquiring interceptor drones. Collaboration with Ukrainian firms would allow South Korean companies to skip the initial development phase and adopt battlefield‑tested technologies immediately. If the partnership is structured to provide access to continuous battlefield data to improve existing drones, South Korean defense firms could not only update existing drones but then share innovations that benefit Ukraine and contribute additional production capacity. In the event of a conflict, South Korea will need a robust stockpile of interceptor drones to protect critical civilian infrastructure and military assets from North Korean attacks. But given the low cost and proven effectiveness of existing Ukrainian systems, Seoul should not spend years developing its own from scratch. A partnership with Ukraine would give South Korea immediate access to battlefield‑tested technology and a pipeline of real‑time operational data. In an era when drone warfare is advancing faster than traditional procurement cycles, speed and flexibility — not reinvention — will determine who maintains the advantage. Troy Stangarone is the director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy and the deputy director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center.