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strikeApr 10, 2026

Could the Islamabad talks end 48 years of hostility between the US and Iran?

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Could the Islamabad talks end 48 years of hostility between the US and Iran? After 40 days of intense military confrontation between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other, the sudden announcement of a two-week ceasefire has raised a central question: what compelled the parties to pause the war at this stage? The ceasefire did not emerge from a single development, but from a combination of military, strategic, political, and economic realities that reshaped the calculations of the actors involved. At the same time, the truce remains fragile, and its future will depend on several critical factors. According to emerging reports, high-level negotiations could take place in Islamabad on Saturday, reportedly involving the speaker of Iranian parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and US Vice President JD Vance. If confirmed, such a meeting would represent the highest-level direct political engagements between the two sides after 48 years, and could help test whether the ceasefire will open the path to serious negotiations or merely serve as a temporary pause in hostilities. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters Several major developments help explain why the ceasefire became possible. First, Iran’s 40 days of resistance and the powerful response of its military forces in what Tehran described as a "war of survival" challenged a long-standing assumption among some advocates of military action in Washington and Tel Aviv: that the Iranian government would collapse quickly under sustained military attack. For decades, this assumption served as a central argument for those advocating military confrontation with Iran. The events of the war appear to have weakened that premise. Over more than 15 years of academic work at Princeton University, I repeatedly argued in hundreds of articles, interviews, and analyses that such expectations were unrealistic. New calculations Second, Iran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz significantly altered the economic and strategic calculations surrounding the war. The strait is one of the most critical chokepoints in the global energy system, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply passes. During the conflict, fears of disruption in the waterway triggered instability in financial markets and sharp increases in global energy prices. These developments had immediate repercussions far beyond the region, affecting economies in Europe, Asia, and North America. Policymakers were therefore forced to confront the possibility that a prolonged war with Iran could produce severe global economic consequences. Third, a large-scale operation reportedly conducted by the United States involving more than 150 aircraft failed to achieve one of its key objectives: seizing approximately 450 kilograms of Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium. According to reports, the mission was carried out under the cover of rescuing a pilot but ultimately failed to secure the targeted nuclear material. The failure of such a complex operation underscored the operational challenges of attempting to eliminate or capture sensitive elements of Iran’s nuclear programme by military means. Political dynamics Also, domestic developments inside Iran have influenced the trajectory of the conflict. Contrary to expectations among some planners that military pressure might trigger widespread unrest or political destabilisation, large numbers of Iranians took to the streets in support of national unity and resistance against foreign attack. Direct negotiations and comprehensive dialogue addressing nuclear, regional, and bilateral issues could create a real opportunity for a durable agreement At the same time, many Iranians living abroad joined campaigns opposing the war against Iran. This reaction complicated scenarios that had anticipated internal unrest as a result of military strikes. Iran’s security forces maintained firm control over the country’s borders during the conflict. One of the concerns during wartime instability is the possibility that terrorist or militant groups might attempt to exploit the situation by infiltrating the country and creating chaos. Iranian forces appear to have prevented such scenarios from materialising, thereby avoiding the emergence of a broader internal security crisis. The political dynamics in the United States and internationally also contributed to the decision to pause the war. As the conflict continued, opposition among segments of the American public increased and criticism from political figures grew. International public opinion in many countries also shifted toward greater opposition to the continuation of hostilities. The potential domestic political consequences in the United States, including the possibility of electoral setbacks in the November elections, likely factored into Washington’s calculations. Fragile and uncertain The expanding regional dimensions of the conflict played a decisive role. The war inflicted significant damage on multiple sides. Iran targeted Israel, US military facilities, and positions associated with allied countries in the region, while the United States and Israel carried out extensive strikes inside Iran. "The war is turning Iran into a major world power," wrote the New York Times. The cumulative damage suffered by all sides and the risk of further escalation into a broader regional war appear to have encouraged a temporary halt to hostilities. These developments explain why a ceasefire became acceptable after 40 days of fighting. Yet, the ceasefire itself is fragile and uncertain, and its sustainability will depend on several critical factors. First, the framework of the ceasefire and possible negotiations remains unclear. It is not known whether the talks will be based on the United States's reported 15-point proposal, Iran’s ten-point plan, or a combination of both. Moreover, positions expressed by Washington and Tel Aviv appear to differ from what Pakistan, acting as mediator, has described, raising doubts about whether the parties share a common negotiating framework. Second, the key unknown is Washington’s political will. It remains uncertain whether the two-week pause reflects a genuine effort to pursue diplomacy or simply time to replenish weapons stockpiles before renewed military action. This skepticism is rooted in several precedents: the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) despite Iran’s compliance and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification; the 2025 military attack; and the 2026 war launched even as negotiations were reportedly progressing. Third, Iran–US engagement in the coming weeks will be decisive. Direct negotiations and comprehensive dialogue addressing nuclear, regional, and bilateral issues could create a real opportunity for a durable agreement. Additionally, Israel’s role will be critical. Israel has often opposed efforts to improve Iran–US relations, and it remains unclear whether it will again disrupt diplomacy. Its attacks on Lebanon indicate it wishes to prevent an agreement. Face-saving deal Regional alignments have also shifted, with the United Arab Emirates developing a close strategic partnership with Israel. Notably, on the first day after the ceasefire, the UAE publicly opposed the pause. Also, the position of the Persian Gulf countries will be crucial. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that five Gulf states cooperated with the US–Israel war against Iran, and none has publicly denied this claim. The key question is whether these countries are ready to engage in comprehensive negotiations with Iran toward a new framework for regional security and cooperation in the Persian Gulf, including arrangements for safe navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Finally, domestic political dynamics in Iran will shape the prospects for diplomacy. In Iran, a segment of people oppose the ceasefire and favour continuing the war. Leaders, therefore, need an agreement that is politically defensible at home. For diplomacy to succeed, direct Iran–US talks will be essential. Negotiations should address a comprehensive agenda - including nuclear, regional, and bilateral issues - through a phased approach that allows confidence to build gradually. The current channel also offers a rare opportunity. On the US side, Vice President JD Vance represents a credible, senior, and authorised political figure speaking directly for Trump. On the Iranian side, figures such as Ghalibaf and Mohammad Bagher Zolghar, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council - both senior commanders of Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) - represent Iran’s most influential security institutions. Their presence creates a unique opportunity for Washington to negotiate with officials who possess power and authority within Iran’s strategic decision-making structure. This level of representation could give both sides the authority needed to make difficult decisions. Ultimately, any agreement must also provide a face-saving outcome for all parties, enabling each side to present the result as consistent with its national interests. Only under such conditions can the current ceasefire evolve into a durable settlement rather than another temporary pause in a long conflict. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye. Middle East Eye delivers independent and unrivalled coverage and analysis of the Middle East, North Africa and beyond. To learn more about republishing this content and the associated fees, please fill out this form. More about MEE can be found here.

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  • Seyed Hossein MousavianBy Seyed Hossein Mousavian

    Could the Islamabad talks end 48 years of hostility between the US and Iran? After 40 days of intense military confrontation between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other, the sudden announcement of a two-week ceasefire has raised a central question: what

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The White House is now apparently using Russian tactics to convince the American public that the war in Iran is not, in fact, a war. When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday whether the most intense sustained air campaign by American forces since the invasion of Iraq would be over by the midterms, Vice President JD Vance replied: “I wouldn’t call it a war.

” Vladimir Putin said much the same thing when he invaded Ukraine. Russia was not fighting a war either, the Kremlin insisted; it was merely conducting a “special military operation.” If that comparison strikes you as shocking, consider the contours of the two conflicts.

A vastly more powerful military launched a punishing offensive against a smaller, less well-equipped adversary, inflicted enormous damage without achieving a decisive resolution, and then found itself drawn into a longer, grinding conflict with no clear way out.

The motivations behind the wars may be different, and they’re playing out in different theaters, but the pattern is eerily similar. Now, so too is the attempt by those in power to control how the public understands, and even what it is allowed to call, the obvious war unfolding in front of them.

If This Isn’t a War, What Is? Let us take a moment to assess what exactly has happened since February 28, when the U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury. The opening U.S.-Israeli attack killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the defense minister and various other senior officials.

According to the U.S. military’s own accounting, the first 38 days of major combat operations involved more than 10,200 sorties and 13,500 strikes. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) says those attacks damaged or destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone and naval defense industrial base, while knocking out 82 percent of its air-defense missile systems.

The U.S. sent carrier strike groups and warships into the region, later imposing a military blockade on Iranian ports. Meanwhile, American and allied air defenses intercepted more than 6,000 Iranian attack drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles fired at U.

S. forces, Israel and American partners across the Middle East. More than 50,000 U.S. service members remain deployed across the region. The fighting has killed 18 U.S. service members and at least 8,000 people across Iran, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states.

More than 750 U.S. service members have been wounded. Last month, during a lull in the fighting, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a sanctions package likened to an “economic D-day” that is designed to make Iran an “economic outcast” and cut the adversary off from all available forms of economic support.

In the announcement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent openly declared that Iran had been “at war against America” for 47 years. This week, the shooting resumed; the U.S. hit targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran blasted missiles at targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq.

All this from an administration that almost exactly a year ago launched a rapid rebrand of the Defense Department into the “Department of War”. No boots on the ground, though, so it’s not a war, right? Tell It Kind of Like It Is Even the very best snake-oil salesman would have a hard time convincing people that the war in Iran isn’t a war.

So why is JD Vance even trying? Well, if there’s one thing politicians understand better than anyone, it’s the importance of language and rhetoric. Words have immense power; a well-written speech can unite millions of people, and a catchy slogan like Make America Great Again can come to represent an entire political philosophy.

But war is a pesky word. For one, it implies there will eventually be a winner and a loser. It also brings with it certain expectations—and some very difficult questions. What is the objective? How many people will die? When will it end? And, perhaps most dangerously of all: was it worth it?

Those are not questions the White House wants Americans to be asking. Trump built a substantial part of his political identity around ending, rather than beginning, America’s “endless wars.” When Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding in June, the White House presented it as proof that Trump’s America First approach could deliver peace without another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Then the hostilities started again. Earlier this week, Trump shared a Truth Social graphic declaring that “Hormuz Oil Volumes are BACK!”, saying 18 million barrels a day were once again leaving the Strait, compared with 20 million before the war. No independent commodity tracking company or energy analyst appeared to verify Trump’s claims.

But most Americans won’t be checking tanker-tracking dashboards. What they’ll care about is the cold, hard fact that diesel hit a new record price this morning, soaring to an average of $5.85 a gallon for the first time ever. Gasoline is $4.15 a gallon on average, compared with $3.

20 at this time last year, according to AAA. The numbers on the sign at the gas station and the price on the grocery receipt aren’t affected by Trump’s tall tales, but they’ll surely affect how Americans vote at the midterms. When viewed in this light, Vance’s attempt to discourage reporters from “call[ing] it a war” begins to make sense.

A war is something that we want to end. It tends to result in a winner and a loser. And its worth is up for debate at all times. A different kind of engagement that doesn’t quite meet the threshold of war—say, a special military operation—is not exposed to the same kind of scrutiny.

Vance effectively made that case himself. “When you ask, ‘When will this end?’ You’re asking me a question like, ‘When will the Iranians stop shooting at ships?’” he said. By that logic, there is no American war—only recurring Iranian provocations that require American military responses.

That’s exactly the logic applied by Putin to Ukraine and supposed expansion of NATO. Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly invoked the War Powers Resolution to challenge Trump’s authority to keep fighting Iran without specific congressional authorization.

The law generally gives a president 60 days after U.S. forces enter “hostilities” to secure congressional approval or bring those hostilities to an end. That makes the pauses in fighting hugely important. When the original 60-day deadline arrived in May, Trump told Congress that the temporary ceasefire reached in April meant the hostilities that began on February 28 had ended.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the War Powers clock could “pause, or stop” when the shooting did. That position is disputed by legal experts, but its political utility is obvious. If every new outbreak of fighting can be treated as a separate skirmish, rather than part of one continuous war, the administration can argue that a fresh 60-day clock starts each time.

Vance’s insistence that there is no continuing “war” fits neatly for an administration that has already tried to divide six months of conflict into separate periods of hostilities, interrupted by ceasefires and pauses. This brings us back to Moscow.

The Kremlin’s own linguistic trick was also about making one sprawling war sound smaller, more limited and more manageable than it really was. From the very beginning of the invasion, Putin described the war as a special military operation. Only after two years of grinding warfare did Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly declare Russia to be in a “state of war”—and even then, he said the transformation had occurred because the “collective West” had joined the fight against Russia.

Vance is playing a similar game, but in reverse. Only now—with soaring fuel prices, mounting casualties, concerns over the military’s munitions stockpiles, and midterm elections on the horizon—is the conflict no longer a war. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, though, and the American people aren’t stupid.

Vance and the White House may discover in November that voters are perfectly capable of recognizing a war, even when the vice president doesn’t want to call it one.

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